History of Dharmashastra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law in India) v7.c95.244

v7.c95.244

All the above discussion in the Upaniṣads about transmigration of the individual self are valid and concerned with the empirical or phenomenal world (saṃsārāvasthā or vyavahārāvasthā) but considered from the highest metaphysical standpoint of thorough-going *advaita* (the *parā vidyā* of Muṇḍaka I. 1. 5-6 or *amūrta brahma* of Bṛ. Up. II. 3. 5-6) it falls to the ground, since the individual self is non-different from the Absolute *Brahman*. Śaṅkarācārya on V. S. II. 3. 30 emphasizes this point. He states: As long as the individual self is in *saṃsāra* state and has not attained perfect knowledge and brought the empirical or phenomenal state to an end, so long the connection of the self with *buddhi* does not cease. As long as this connection with *buddhi* (a limiting adjunct) lasts, so long lasts the state of being an individual self merged in *saṃsāra*. But the real truth is that there is no entity called *jīva* by itself except in so far as it is fictitiously hypostatized by *buddhi*, the limiting adjunct. For, when we determine the real meaning of Vedānta texts, we find no intelligent substance other than the one omniscient Lord whose nature is eternal freedom. Then Śaṅkarācārya cites certain texts (viz. Bṛ. Up. I. 4. 7, III. 7-13, Chān. Up. VI. 1. 6, VI. 8. 7 ²⁵⁴⁰ and remarks that there are hundreds of such texts. Śaṅkarācārya states that even Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Vedāntasūtras, composed some sūtras from the highest *advaita* standpoint and some from the empirical standpoint. In the following sūtras of V. S. Bādarāyaṇa is obliged to differentiate Jīva and Paramātman I. 1. 16-17; I. 1 21, I. 2. 20, I. 3. 5, II. 1. 21-23, II. 3. 21. II. 3. 41, II. 3. 43 &c. But the sūtras I. 1. 33, II. 1. 14, IV. 13 indicate that there is non-difference between the two.²⁵⁴¹