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Theory of Government in Ancient India (Post-Vedic) c14.s4: Guilds in Later Times

Theory of Government in Ancient India (Post-Vedic) c14.s4

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Guilds in Later Times

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decline of industry and commerce in the last centuries of the ancient age. But guilds have never altogether vanished from India. Śukranīti emphasises the principle of trial with the help of one's peers. Foresters are to be tried with the help of foresters, merchants by the help of merchants and so on.¹ Guilds have survived in some parts of the country up to the present day. They or rather their headmen still claim to be courts of justice. They still have their rules of apprenticeship, membership, business and expenditure. They still seek to guide the life of their members.²

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¹ Śukranīti, IV, 5, 24, cf. Bṛihaspati, I, 25–27.

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² Ibid., 176.

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Craft-guilds and merchant-guilds have been the most enduring of all corporations in the country. But Buddhist India witnessed the formation of a remarkable order of monks and nuns with definite, minute rules to meet every possible contingency. Renunciation was nothing new to the country in the days of Buddha. After the zest of life which is redolent in the Ṛigveda had given way to meditation, Brāhmaṇas expatiated on the nothingness of this world, the incalculable importance of the life after death, the necessity of release from bondage and, as a result, the desirability of renunciation and asceticism. The Upaniṣads reveal numbers of devout men who had retired into the forest to contemplate the divinity or practise austerities. The Buddha himself had forsaken home and hearth one solemn night and betaken himself to severities, which almost wore out his health, and to contemplation which at last brought the flash of the Truth. He forbade excesses of asceticism but founded an order of recluses for men as well as for women. The new element which he introduced was that of organisation. Brāhmaṇism has always fought

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The Buddhist Saṃgha.

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shy of organisation. It is, on its spiritual side, too individualistic for corporate life. The Buddha on the other hand, partly perhaps because he had to establish a new church on secure foundations, organised his monks and nuns into fraternities and told them how to manage their affairs. How far he borrowed his rules from any existing economic or social corporations or political assemblies is difficult to determine. But it is remarkable that in the Chullavagga and the Mahâvagga, he is represented as announcing his regulations to meet the exigencies of practical life as they arose. Whatever his debt to others, he or his successors must be credited with a good deal of originality. From the point of view of political theory, the most striking feature of the Buddhist monastic code is that it practically ignores the state and touches it at very few points. In the third century B.C., Aśoka appears from his own edicts and the general testimony of Buddhist literature, to have actually assumed something like the headship of the Buddhist Church. But his ascendancy was due to the personal factor and did not imply any theoretical recognition of the state as ecclesiastical sovereign. The Saṃgha has its own rules of membership, of administration and of life in general. It derived its constitution from the Buddha alone and recognised him alone as its lawgiver. The great teacher himself had not been anxious to fetter the discretion of his followers completely. “When I am gone, Ānanda,” he said to his chief disciple, “let the saṃgha, if it should wish, revoke all the lesser and minor precepts.” But when the regulations came up for discussion at a council, the brethren could not come to any decision on proposed alterations and innovations. The differences became so acute that the council resolved, as the only way out of the difficulty, that they should adhere to all the precepts laid down by the Buddha, “not ordaining what has not been ordained and not revoking what has been ordained.”¹ So, in theory, at any rate, the Buddha remained the sole lawgiver. In the domain of practical administration, the general assembly of monks was the sovereign. But it must act in conformity with the procedure laid down by the Buddha. Nor was it empowered to alter the law of the Buddha. The Chullavagga definitely lays down that the vote of the majority was invalid, if it conflicted with the law. The tenth chapter of the fourth Khandhaka of the Chullavagga enumerates ten cases in which the taking of votes is invalid, inter alia, “when the taker of votes knows that those whose opinions are not in accordance with the law will be in the majority, or probably may be in the majority.” The fourteenth chapter of the same section, when describing the secret method of taking votes, lays down that if the taker of votes ‘ascertains that those whose opinion is against the Dhamma are in the majority, he is to reject the vote as wrongly taken. If he ascertains that those whose opinion is in accordance with the Dhamma are in the majority, he is to report the vote as well taken.”² The fiction of the right or wrong taking of votes is transparent. It is the supremacy of the Dhamma which is to be assured somehow. But we are not told who was to decide on the conformity of an opinion to the law. The taker of votes though, as we learn from another passage, was to be a very responsible and reliable person, could hardly take that role entirely on himself. Difficulties must have arisen in practice but the theory is perfectly clear that not even the Assembly could override or alter the law.

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¹ Chullavagga, XI, 1, 9.

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² Chullavagga, IV, 10, 1, 14, 26, translated by Rhys Davids and Oldenberg in Vinaya Texts, Part III, pp. 26-27, 56.

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Nowhere in this account is the state called in. In the rest of the rules, too, it appears extremely rarely. The references to it are of a trivial nature. For instance, the Pātimokkha, describing various offences to be confessed by Bhikkhus in the assembly, could be recited only by a learned brother and only in a full assembly. If a Bhikkhu had been seized by the king, robbers or relations, a request should be made for his temporary release or for bringing him outside the boundary so that the congregation might be complete.¹ Otherwise the monastic rules hardly refer to the state. Buddhist theory, as worked out elsewhere, expects the state to protect the monks from all molestation, to afford them all facilities, and to endow their institutions with lavish generosity but it does not contemplate any interference in their internal affairs. Even Brahmanic political theory respects the autonomy of heretical associations. Yājñavalkya only wants the king to see that they continue to manage their affairs according to their own rules and traditions.² Nārada wants the king to maintain the usages settled among heretics as among others.³ This is one of the most remarkable points of difference between the theory of economic organisations and that of religious association. The former were interwoven with the communal economic life with which the state was intimately concerned at every point. They constituted a plentiful source of revenue. They handled vast sums which might be turned to the service of the state in emergencies. Religious corporations, on the other hand, had only to be encouraged and patronised.

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¹ Mahāvagga, II.

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² Yājñavalkya Saṃhitā, II, 192.

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³ Nārada, X, 2, 3.

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Left pretty much to itself, the Buddhist Saṃgha tried some experiments in administration which are unique in Indian history. In the first place, all its rules are practically common to monks and nuns. The Buddhist texts are at pains to repeat them for both. In the second place, the order believed in the communism of property for itself. All the property of the Saṃgha was open to the use of all brethren from wheresoever they might come.

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Communism in the Buddhist Saṃgha.

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In the third place, the order, spread out in communities big or small, over the whole country and had no central government. In organisation it had left the Brahmanical Hindus far behind, but it never approached the Roman Catholic Church or even the Franciscan and Dominic orders. It never had a real head, there was no hierarchy connecting the various communities together. The Buddha and his word were the only universally acknowledged guides throughout the centuries. An intense spirit of localism therefore pervaded the order. Here lay its strength and its weakness.

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Localism.

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Within each community, was naturally a distinction between novices and full-fledged monks or nuns. The latter controlled and supervised the former. Otherwise the form of government was eminently democratic. There developed a regular parliamentary procedure and jargon which, at several points, are startling in their coincidence with modern practice. It lies beyond the scope of this work to trace the practical working of these institutions but their theory may be briefly recapitulated from Buddhist records. Fortunately, the material in the Mahâvagga and the Chullavagga is abundant.¹

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¹ This evidence has been worked at from the point of view of political assemblies by K. P. Jayaswal in "The Introduction to Hindu Polity," Modern Review, Calcutta, 1913, and in his recent work "Hindu

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Democracy in the Saṃgha.

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It was the duty of the Gaṇapûraka or the whip to see that the necessary quorum was forthcoming.¹ As the members entered the Hall, they were to be directed to their seats, allotted in the order of seniority by the Āsanapaññāpaka or the Regulator of Seats.² If a number of members proceeded to business in anticipation of a quorum, an act of indemnity had to be passed subsequently. But high authority denied the legality of such indemnity altogether, and pronounced the rule of quorum essential and inviolable.³ Every motion must pass two or four readings. Jñapti, as the first reading was called, announced the proposal and briefly explained the reasons thereof, that is, furnished, a sort of preamble. The Praṭijnā or the second reading took the form of a definite

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¹ Mahâvagga, III, 6, 26; IX, 3, 2. Sacred Books of the East, XIII, 307. Gaṇapûraka literally means ‘the securer of the number. Thus गणपूरको वा भविष्यामीति ‘or I will be the securer of the number.’

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² Rhys Davids’ Dialogues of the Buddha, I, 113. “Now at that time a Bhikkhu named Ajita, of ten years’ standing, was the reciter of the Pâtimokkha to the Saṃgha. Him did the Saṃgha appoint as seat-regulator (Āsanapaññāpaka) to the Thera Bhikkhus. Chullavagga, XII, 2, 7. Sacred Books of the East, XX, 408. Jayaswal, Modern Review, 1913, June, p. 664.

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³ “Is the indemnity-licence, Lord, allowable?” “What, Sir, is this indemnity-licence?” “Is it allowable, Lord, for a Saṃgha which is not legally constituted, to perform an official act, on the ground that they will afterwards obtain the sanction of such Bhikkhus who may subsequently arrive?” “No, Sir, it is not allowable.” Chullavagga, XII, 1, 10.

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Polity.” He starts with the assumption that the monastic procedure was borrowed from political assemblies, but sufficient evidence is not forthcoming to connect the two.

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resolution and put the straight question whether the motion was approved. In the more important cases, the query should be repeated thrice. Silence implied consent. But it was the right of every member to discuss and freely criticise a proposal. Acute differences of opinion often manifested themselves.

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A way of amicable settlement was discovered in a system of committees—a system that, in ancient as in modern times, has formed a necessary concomitant of every living assembly. When irrelevant and pointless speeches were made, the matter should be referred to a committee. The proposal for a committee thus partly answers to the closure. But if the committee failed to arrive at a compromise, the matter returned to the full assembly. Here, if the quest for unanimity failed once more, the motion was finally put to the vote. A teller, fearless, impartial, and clever should be appointed by the Assembly itself. He should distribute Śalākās or wooden-pins to the members, and explain the significance of their various colours. Three methods of voting were known—the secret, the whispering, and the open. According to the first, the choice of a pin by a member was not disclosed to any one else. Provision was made for recording the votes of absent members. The votes collected and counted, the voice of the majority should ordinarily prevail. Yebhuyyasi-kassa was the high-sounding name for the rule of majority, one of the master inventions of the political art. It was familiar

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Second,

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Third and Fourth Readings.

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Free discussion.

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Committees.

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The Teller.

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Voting wooden-pins.

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The secret, whispering, and open methods of voting.

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The votes of absent members recorded.

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to all. Any infringement of the rules of procedure invalidated the proceedings. According to the Chullavagga, the voting was invalid in ten cases: When the matter in dispute is trivial—when the case has not run its course—when regarding the matter in dispute the Bhikkhus have not formally remembered, or been formally called upon to remember the offence, when the opinion of the majority is likely to be an infringement of the law—when the voting may result in a schism of the Samgha—when the votes are irregularly given—when all do not vote equally—and when they do not vote in accordance with the view which they really hold.”¹ When duly passed by a majority, the resolution became a Kamma which, literally translated, means an Act, an astounding coincidence with modern parliamentary jargon. A question that had once been decided could not be reopened, but the sovereign assembly, a law unto itself, sometimes disregarded the salutary rule.²

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¹ Chullavagga, IV, 10, 1, tr. pp. 26-27.

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² A few of the passages, from which the rules of procedure have been gathered, may be cited here.

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Moving the Jñapti once and the Pratijñā once, was called Nattidutiya—the two-Natti procedure. When the Pratijñā was moved thrice, it was called Natti-chatuttha, or the four-Natti procedure. Putting the resolution or Pratijñā to the Assembly was called Kammavāchā.

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“If one performs, O Bhikkhus, a Nattidutiyā act with one Natti, and does not proclaim a Kammavāchā, such an act is unlawful. If one performs, O Bhikkhus, a Nattidutiya act with two Nattis and does not proclaim a Kammavāchā......with one Kammavāchā, and does not proclaim a Kammavāchā, such an act is unlawful. If one performs, O Bhikkhus, a Nattichatuttha act with two, etc . . . . . ” Mahâvagga, tr. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg, IX, (3), 2, 3, 4, 7, 8.

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The Teller’s qualifications:—

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“A Bhikkhu, who shall be possessed of five qualifications, shall be appointed as taker of the voting tickets—one who does not walk in partiality, one who does not walk in malice, one who does not walk Of the Buddhist theory of monastic government it is possible to obtain a full and, on the whole, clear idea.

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The materials for its Jaina counterpart are not equally copious. In spite of metaphysical differences, Jainism and Buddhism developed side by side on parallel lines. Like in folly, one who does not walk in fear, one who knows what votes have been taken and what have not been taken.

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"And thus shall he be appointed..."

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The Bhikkhu's consent was obtained, and then some able and discreet member proposed:—

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"Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me. If the time seems meet to the Saṃgha, let the Saṃgha appoint a Bhikkhu of such and such a name as the taker of the voting tickets."

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*Voting*—

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"By that Bhikkhu, the taker of the voting tickets, are the votes to be collected. And according as the larger number of the Bhikkhus who are guided by the Dhamma shall speak, so shall the case be decided.

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"I enjoin upon you, Bhikkhus, three ways of taking votes in order to appease such Bhikkhus—the secret method, the whispering method, and the open method. And how, O Bhikkhus, is the secret method of taking votes? The Bhikkhu who is the teller of the votes is to make the voting tickets of different colours, and as each Bhikkhu comes up to him he is to say to him thus: 'This is the ticket for the man of such an opinion; this is the ticket for the man of such an opinion. Take whichever you like.' When he has chosen (he is to add), 'Do not show it to anybody.'"

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Chullavagga, IV, 9, 5; 14, 24; 14, 26, 25. Sacred Books of the East, XX, pp. 25, 54.

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"If, O Bhikkhus, while the case is being enquired into by those Bhikkhus, pointless speeches are brought forth, and the sense of any single utterance is not clear, I enjoin upon you, O Bhikkhus, to settle the case by referring it (to a jury or commission).

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"And thus, O Bhikkhus, is he to be appointed. First, the Bhikkhu asked (whether he be willing to undertake the office). Then some discreet and able Bhikkhu should address the Saṃgha thus:

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"May the venerable Saṃgha hear me. Whilst this case was being enquired into, pointless speeches were brought forth, and Buddhism, Jainism branched off into several sects a few centuries after the nirvâṇa of its founder. Towards the close of the first century A.D., the Jainas were divided into Digâmbaras and Śvetâmbaras. Before two centuries had elapsed the former split into Nandisaṃgha, Devasaṃgha,

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the sense of no single utterance was clear. If the time seems meet to the venerable Saṃgha, let it appoint Bhikkhus of such and such a name on a Committee. This is the motion * *

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"If those Bhikkhus, O Bhikkhus, are not able by the Committee to settle that case, those Bhikkhus ought to hand over the case to the Saṃgha, saying, 'We, sirs, are not able, by a committee, to settle this case; let the Saṃgha settle it.'

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"I enjoin upon you, O Bhikkhus, to settle such a case by the vote of the majority.

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"But if you, Sirs, should not be able to do so, then will we ourselves retain the custody of the case."

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Again: Then the Saṃgha met together with the intention of enquiring into this legal question. But while they were enquiring into it, both were such pointless speaking brought forth and also the sense in no single speech was clear. Then the venerable Revata laid a resolution before the Saṃgha:

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" * * * If it seems meet to the Saṃgha, let the Saṃgha settle this question by referring it (to a jury)."

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And he chose four Bhikkhus of the East, and four Bhikkhus of the West. "Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me. During the enquiry into this matter there has been much pointless talk among us. If it seems meet to the Saṃgha, let the Saṃgha delegate four Bhikkhus of the East and four Bhikkhus of the West to settle this question by reference. Whosoever of the venerable ones approves thereof, let him keep silence. Whosoever approves not thereof, let him speak. The delegation is made accordingly. The Saṃgha approves thereof. Therefore it is silent. Thus do I understand."

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Chullavagga, V, 14, 24; IV, 14,18; XII, 2, 7-8. Jayaswal, Modern Review, June, 1913, p. 666.

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An example of a motion:—

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"Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me. This Bhikkhu Uvâla, being examined in the midst of the Saṃgha with an offence, when he has Senasaṃgha and Siṃhasaṃgha, among whom the differences turn on trivial points.¹ Later came a totally different sect, that of the Sthânakavûsins or Ḍhuṇḍhiyâs, altogether more rational than the others and sternly opposed to idol worship. In their contempt of the petty splendours of this world and in their emphasis on the sovereign importance of release from Karma, the Jainas surpass the Brâhmaṇas and Buddhists. The number of monks and ascetics in their ranks has always been large. But Jainism is, on

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¹ Indranandisûri, Samayabhûṣaṇa, 6-8.

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denied it, then confesses it; when he has confessed it, then denies it, makes countercharges and speaks lies which he knows to be such. If the time seems meet to the Saṃgha, let the Saṃgha carry out the Tassapâpiyyasikâkamma against the Bhikkhu Uvâla. This is the motion:
"Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me. This Bhikkhu Uvâla, etc. The Saṃgha carries out the Tassapâpiyyasikâkamma against Uvâla the Bhikkhu. Whosoever of the venerable ones approves thereof, let him keep silence. Whosoever approves not thereof, let him speak. A second time I say the same thing. The Bhikkhu Uvâla let him speak.
"The Tassapâpiyyasikâkamma has been carried out by the Saṃgha against Uvâla the Bhikkhu. Therefore it is silent. Thus do understand."
Chullavagga, IV, 11, 12, tr. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg, pp. 27-31.
Another instance :-
"Then the venerable Mahâkassapa laid the resolution before the Saṃgha: 'Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me. If the time seems meet to the Saṃgha, let the Saṃgha appoint that these five hundred Bhikkhus take up their residence during the rainy season at Râjagaha to chant over together the Dhamma and the Vinaya, and that no other Bhikkhus go up to Râjagaha for the rainy sesaon. This is the resolution. Let the venerable Saṃgha hear. The Saṃgha appoints accordingly. Whosoever of the venerable ones approves thereof, let him keep silence. Whosoever approves not thereof, let him speak. The Saṃgha has appointed accordingly. Therefore it is silent. Thus do I understand.
"And the venerable Mahâkassapa laid the resolution before the Saṃgha: 'If the time seems meet to the Saṃgha, I will question Upâli concerning the Vinaya.' And the venerable Upâli laid a resolution before the Saṃgha: 'Let the venerable Saṃgha hear me If the time seems meet to the Saṃgha, I, when questioned by the venerable Mahâkassapa, will give reply.'"
Chullavagga, 11, 1, 4; 1, 7.

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On other aspects of procedure, see also Mahâvagga, IX, 3, 5-6 Sacred Books of the East, XVII, 266. Chullavagga, V, XII, 1, 10.

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its spiritual side, rigidly individualistic and counsels solitude. It holds that even good action has a tendency to bind the soul to matter. The less of it, the better. As a result, the corporate side of its monasticism did not receive the same development as in Buddhism. The orders which arose followed the lines of the numerous sects. They resembled the Buddhist Saṃgha in independence of state, in absence of central government, or a graded hierarchy. The supremacy of the Jaina Dharma is, of course, unquestioned and whatever is resolved or done by any individual or group must conform to it. Within the four corners of the sacred injunctions, the monks are to manage their affairs on democratic principles.

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