The State in Ancient India: A Study in the Structure and Practical Working of Political Institutions in North India in Ancient Times c14.7

c14.7

The Smritis, though distinct from Śruti or Revelation, claim to be grounded in Vedic Dharma. In his Jaiminiya Nyâyamâlâvistara, Mâdhavâcârya declares that Smritis are digests collecting and epitomising ordinances which lie scattered in the Vedas. As a matter of fact, they have moved far from the Vedic tradition and only reflect the ideal or positive morality of the various regions in which they arose during the ages following the Dharma Sûtras. Thus Manu belongs to the Gangetic plains, Nârada probably to Nepal, and Yâjñavalkya to Mithilâ in modern Bihâr. The Smritis are attached to different Vedic Schools but the classification of them into Sâtvika, Râjasika and Tâmasika in the Padma Purâṇa is merely fanciful.¹ The discrepancies due to differences of sect, tradition, age and locality perplexed the later writers who were at pains to avoid confusion. The Mimâmsâ rules, though relating primarily to ritual, were extended to law, and formed a recognised canon of interpretation. That subject was reduced to what is called a Darśana or system of philosophy. The Pûrva Mimâmsâ declares that of two contradictory Smṛiti texts, the one supported by Śruti shall prevail. But it was argued by some that the other text might accord with a Śruti text which had disappeared. The Purva Mimâmsâ replies that a known Śruti text takes precedence of one unknown. It goes further and lays down that a Smṛiti text, though uncontradicted by Śruti, is liable to be rejected if it can be traced to an unworthy motive.² On the other hand, in his Mimâmsâ Sûtras, Jaimini denies to local usage any authority as a source of law independently of Śruti and Smṛiti. A similar opinion is expressed by Mâdhavâcârya in his Jaiminīya Nyâyamâlâvistara, though in his Vyavahâra Khaṇḍa he comes round to the different view of Nârada, Kâtyayana and others. The Skanda Purâṇa expressly admits that where the Vedas and Smṛitis are silent, the Dharmas should be ascertained by observation of the customs of families and countries. Commenting on Manu, Medhâtithi remarks that Âcâra, as understood in Smṛitis, referred to Śiṣṭa practices uncontradicted by Śruti or Smṛiti. Vijnâneśvara, commenting on Yâjñavalkya, goes further and interdicts action, which, though supported by Smṛitis, is disapproved by usage. Yâjñavalkya himself said that in a conflict between two Smṛiti texts, reason prevailed according to usage. Nârada expresses himself in a similar strain. But later writers insist that the function of reason is limited to the reconciliation of conflicting texts.¹ From this whole scholastic discussion it follows that the provisions of Smritis take account both of recognised ideals and current usage, that custom, social or political, was often recognised as authoritative in ancient India and that the state, in spite of its absorbing activity, had to leave a good deal to groups and associations, and to the operation of general conditions.