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The State in Ancient India: A Study in the Structure and Practical Working of Political Institutions in North India in Ancient Times c14: Chapter X. The Early Dharma S'âstras, the Arthas'âstras and other Literature

The State in Ancient India: A Study in the Structure and Practical Working of Political Institutions in North India in Ancient Times c14

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English

Chapter X. The Early Dharma S'âstras, the Arthas'âstras and other Literature

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The period between the fall of the Mauryas and the supremacy of the Guptas was remarkable for the rise of Smritis or books of traditional law, etc., Arthaśāstra, or science of welfare and classical Sanskrit literature. From these literary sources it is possible to glean many administrative details which usefully supplement the meagre information yielded by the coins and inscriptions of the period. Theoretical works have, of course, to be used with the utmost caution and never taken as an exact description of the conditions of any period but, as expositions of ideals and even utopias, they inevitably furnish a peep into the institutions they would improve.

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The Smritis or Dharma Śāstras occupy a most important place in the Hindu literature on regulation of life,—on religion, ritual, domestic and social life, law, custom and polity. Unfor-tunately, it is impossible to ascertain their exact dates. Their origin perplexed even ancient writers. For instance, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa remarks in his Tantra Vārtika that owing to the scattering of Śākhās, human error or carelessness and the variety of topics, the beginnings of Smritis could not be traced. The opinions of modern scholars ranged over an extraordinarily long period. Sir William Jones, for instance, referred Manu to 1200 B.C. Later, some scholars brought him down to the twelfth or thirteenth century A.D. It is now generally agreed that the Smritis assumed their present shape at various epochs in the first millenium of the Christain Era. R. G Bhandarkar placed them in the Kuṣân-Gupta period, that is, between the middle of the second and the end of the fifth century A.D.¹ Hopkins refers Manu to the commencement of or even before the Christian era, while he assigns Viṣṇu to the third, Yâjñavalkya to the fourth and Nârada to the fifth century A.D.² Jolly thinks that Manu cannot be later than the second or third century A.D. while Viṣṇu cannot be earlier than the third. He would place Yâjñavalkya in the fourth and Nârada about the commencement of the sixth century while referring Brihaspati and Kâtyâyana to the sixth or seventh century A.D. Bühler, after a searching examination, came to the conclusion that Manusmriti existed, pretty much as we know it, in the second century A.D.³ Manu's references to the Kambojas, Yavanas and Śâkas bar an earlier date for the work as a whole.

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¹ R. G. Bhandarkar, J. B. B. R. A. S., Vol. XX, No. LVI, p. 356.

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² Hopkins, Cambridge History of India, Vol. I, p. 279.

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³ Bühler, Introduction to the Laws of Manu, translated with extracts from seven Commentaries. See also the Introduction to A. C. Burnell's translation, entitled 'The Ordinances of Manu.'

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The Smritis, though distinct from Śruti or Revelation, claim to be grounded in Vedic Dharma. In his Jaiminiya Nyâyamâlâvistara, Mâdhavâcârya declares that Smritis are digests collecting and epitomising ordinances which lie scattered in the Vedas. As a matter of fact, they have moved far from the Vedic tradition and only reflect the ideal or positive morality of the various regions in which they arose during the ages following the Dharma Sûtras. Thus Manu belongs to the Gangetic plains, Nârada probably to Nepal, and Yâjñavalkya to Mithilâ in modern Bihâr. The Smritis are attached to different Vedic Schools but the classification of them into Sâtvika, Râjasika and Tâmasika in the Padma Purâṇa is merely fanciful.¹ The discrepancies due to differences of sect, tradition, age and locality perplexed the later writers who were at pains to avoid confusion. The Mimâmsâ rules, though relating primarily to ritual, were extended to law, and formed a recognised canon of interpretation. That subject was reduced to what is called a Darśana or system of philosophy. The Pûrva Mimâmsâ declares that of two contradictory Smṛiti texts, the one supported by Śruti shall prevail. But it was argued by some that the other text might accord with a Śruti text which had disappeared. The Purva Mimâmsâ replies that a known Śruti text takes precedence of one unknown. It goes further and lays down that a Smṛiti text, though uncontradicted by Śruti, is liable to be rejected if it can be traced to an unworthy motive.² On the other hand, in his Mimâmsâ Sûtras, Jaimini denies to local usage any authority as a source of law independently of Śruti and Smṛiti. A similar opinion is expressed by Mâdhavâcârya in his Jaiminīya Nyâyamâlâvistara, though in his Vyavahâra Khaṇḍa he comes round to the different view of Nârada, Kâtyayana and others. The Skanda Purâṇa expressly admits that where the Vedas and Smṛitis are silent, the Dharmas should be ascertained by observation of the customs of families and countries. Commenting on Manu, Medhâtithi remarks that Âcâra, as understood in Smṛitis, referred to Śiṣṭa practices uncontradicted by Śruti or Smṛiti. Vijnâneśvara, commenting on Yâjñavalkya, goes further and interdicts action, which, though supported by Smṛitis, is disapproved by usage. Yâjñavalkya himself said that in a conflict between two Smṛiti texts, reason prevailed according to usage. Nârada expresses himself in a similar strain. But later writers insist that the function of reason is limited to the reconciliation of conflicting texts.¹ From this whole scholastic discussion it follows that the provisions of Smritis take account both of recognised ideals and current usage, that custom, social or political, was often recognised as authoritative in ancient India and that the state, in spite of its absorbing activity, had to leave a good deal to groups and associations, and to the operation of general conditions.

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¹ Padma Purâṇa, Uttarakhaṇḍa, Ch. XLIII.

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² Pûrva Mimâmsâ, I, Part III, 3-4.

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¹ Nârada, I, 40; Yâjñavalkya, XXI; Vijnâneśvara on Yâjñavalkya, I, V, 136.

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Of all the Smritis that of Manu is admittedly the most important and authoritative. Brihaspati remarks that the first rank belongs to Manu, because he has embodied the essence of the Veda in his work, and that the Smriti text which is opposed to Manu is not approved. The Dharma Śāstra of Manu is perhaps based on the Mânava Dharma Sûtra which has disappeared. The Mânavas represent one of the six subdivisions of the Maitrâyaṇi School of the Kṛiṣṇa Yajurveda. According to a tradition, Manusmriti is addressed to Râjas and other such personages and not to scholars. There are many verses common to the Smriti and the Mahâbhârata. Manu treats of the whole of life, and, differing from others, declares that the chief good consists in the combination of Artha, Dharma and Kâma. Needless to say, he is wedded to the recognised Dharma of castes and stages and declares, in a most pronounced and dogmatic fashion, for the supremacy of Brâhmaṇas. Whether ignorant or learned, whether following mean or noble occupations, a Brâhmaṇa is a great divinity. Kṣatriyas derive their origin from Brâhmaṇas and are to be restrained if they become overbearing towards the latter. Learning is the predominant occupation of a Brâhmaṇa, but Manu, obviously compromising with facts, allows him, in ‘distress,’ that is, in emergencies, to follow agriculture, gleaning of corn, etc.¹ From Manu's list of Brāhmaṇas who may not be invited to Śrāddha, it appears that some members of the highest caste worked as players, usurers, actors, singers, makers of bows and arrows, keepers of elephants, camels, horses, cattle, tamers of birds, architects, tradesmen, agriculturists, carriers of corpses, butchers, etc., etc.² The Śūdras are barred from all sacred learning. By themselves Śūdras can never form a stable society. A kingdom which is destitute of twice-born people, which contains very many Śūdras and atheists, is soon afflicted with disease and famine and utterly perishes. Brāhmaṇas should not reside in such a state. Manu makes no secret of his contempt for manual labour.³ He wants the king, that is, the state, to enforce his scheme of caste-superiority and social duties. In particular, Vaiśyas and Śūdras should be compelled to perform their prescribed jobs, for if they swerved from their duties, the whole world would be thrown into confusion.⁴ It is not impossible that Manu's advice was partially followed in practice. It was about this period that Gautamiputra Sātakarṇi prided himself on his restoration of caste rules.

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¹ On the whole subject, Manu, I, 21, 89, 91, 96, 98, 100-101; II, 224; IV, 4; VI, 34-37; IX, 313-323; XII, 88-90.

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² Ibid., III, 151 et seq.

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³ Ibid., IV, 81, 61; VIII, 22; also, III, 154-167; II, 155, 168; IV, 4-6; V, 83-84; VIII, 413-414. But also II, 238, in a slightly different strain.

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⁴ Ibid., III, 13; VIII, 418. For the ban on Śūdras against propounding the law, VIII, 20.

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Besides Śruti and Smṛti, Manu admits the customs of virtuous men and ātmatuṣṭi or one's own conscience as sources of law. Here is a round-about admission of custom and state-decrees as binding on the people. When he accords equal authority to two conflicting sacred texts, he can only be held to imply that reason or usage was to be the deciding factor. In his chapter on Civil and Criminal Law he is more explicit:

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“What may have been practised by the virtuous, by such twice-born men as are devoted to the law, that he (the king) shall establish as law, if it be not opposed to the (customs of) countries, families and castes.” Clearly, local and communal custom must always be respected and for the rest, sound tradition should have its way. Elsewhere, too, Manu lays down that legal disputes of all sorts should be decided “according to principles drawn from local usages and from the institutes of the sacred law.” Almost in the same breath he advises the judges to depend on “the eternal law” but, in his view, this involves no inconsistency with the observance of local usage.¹ It seems that even when political autonomy was disturbed by imperialistic ambitions, legal autonomy continued in every region. Manu expatiates at length on the ideal,² the majesty³ of the kingship and the need of a firm policy—Daṇḍa or chastisement, but he holds that the king should “behave like a father towards all men” and please all. He is probably reflecting actual practice when he wants the king to regulate the economic life of the community. The king should watch and control traders—‘open cheats.’ He must fix the prices of all marketable goods, mark the weights and measures and re-examine them every six months. The followers of various occupations, mechanics, manual workers come in for state supervision. Physicians or veterinary surgeons, who wrong their patients, must be fined.⁴ Manu again seems to steer close to facts when he insists on the appointment of a learned Brāhmaṇa as the royal priest and of seven or eight ministers. Every day they should be consulted on peace, war, finance, endowments and general administration. The king should consult them first individually and then collectively and ultimately decide for himself. Another official of first-rate importance was the Ambassador, a sort of foreign secretary and plenipotentiary, who negotiated alliances and transacted that business by which kings "are disunited or not." Then there are a number of other officials concerned with mines, manufactures, storehouses, revenue, etc.¹

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¹ Ibid., II, 14; VIII, 3, 8, 46.

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² Ibid., VII, 37-53, 145-146, 216-226.

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³ Ibid., V; VII, 3-12.

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⁴ Ibid., VII, 14-21, 22-24, 80, 82-88, 144; III, 134-136, 143; VIII, 309, 386, 401-403; IX, 256-260, 304, 309; XI, 18, 22-23.

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¹ Ibid., VII, 54-68, 80-81, 147-51.

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In local government the ultimate unit was the village. Every village must have a headman. The successively higher areas of local government were formed by groups of ten, twenty, a hundred and a thousand villages. Every town must have "a superintendent of all affairs" with an army of spies to assist him in "exploring" the behaviour of the people. Local government, as a whole, should be placed in charge of a minister at the headquarters. A company of soldiers must be stationed "in the midst of two, three, five or hundreds of villages for the protection of the kingdom." Manu seems to prescribe salaries in land or in kind. The village headman is entitled to certain commodities such as food, drink and fuel which the villagers ought to furnish daily to the king. The head of ten villages is entitled to one kula of land, that is, as much as would suffice for the maintenance of one family; the ruler of twenty villages to five kulas; the lord of a hundred villages is to get a village in Jāgir as the medieval Indian rulers would have called it. The ruler of a thousand villages is entitled to the revenues of a town.² All this seems to have a basis in facts. There was no need to idealise here; in fact, the idealistic vein is altogether absent. There is a touch of realism in what Manu says of the need of supervising and controlling royal officials. Those, though appointed for the protection of the people, "generally become knaves" and seize the property of others. Evil-minded officials who were guilty of bribery must suffer the confiscation of their whole property and must be banished. Ministers or judges who were at fault in the discharge of their duties should be fined a thousand paṇas.¹

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² Ibid., VII, 113-122

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¹ Ibid., 123-44; IX, 234.

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Manu's maxims on taxation throw some light on contemporary practice. In Manu, as in the Mahābhārata and elsewhere, the theoretical justification for the large amount and variety of state dues is that they represent the price of the protection which the state extends to all. The land revenue should be one-fourth, one-sixth or one-eighth of the crops, that is, of the gross produce. It is possible that in Manu's age the land-revenue varied from one-fourth to one-eighth in different localities. Besides, a fiftieth of cattle and gold may be taken by the king. He awards the king a sixth part of "trees, meat, honey, clarified butter, perfumes, (medicinal) herbs, substances used for flavouring food, flowers, roots and fruits; of leaves, potherbs, grass, (objects) made of cane, skins; of earthen vessels, all (articles) made of stone." The duties on traders should be fixed on a consideration of the rates of sale and purchase, the means of communication, the charges of securing goods and the necessary expenses of the dealers. Elsewhere Manu gives the state one-twentieth of the value of each saleable commodity as calculated by experts. All who live by traffic should annually pay something, be it a trifle. Any attempt to defraud the customs-house was to be punished with a fine, eight times the amount due. Mechanics, artisans and Śūdras who lived by manual labour should contribute to the state a day's labour in the month.

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Treasure-trove belonged to the king. Of property inadvertently lost and afterwards found, one-sixth, one-tenth, or at least one-twentieth should go to the king. Lost property, unclaimed for three years, should lapse to the king. Of treasure discovered underground, one-half should go to the king and the other half distributed among Brāhmaṇas. Besides all this, numerous petty dues were levied at ferries: ". . . an (empty) cart shall be made to pay one paṇa, a man's (load) half a paṇa, an unloaded man one-half of a quarter." Carts laden with merchandise should pay according to the value of the goods. In addition to these contributions Manu hints at some state monopolies, as also at some restrictions on exports and perhaps also imports. Those who violated these rules were to suffer the confiscation of their whole property.¹ No theorist could merely invent this extensive list. Whatever the embellishments, Manu is pointing to the extraordinarily large number of sources which the state had begun to tap by the second century A.D. to fill its coffers. He may again be building on facts when he exempts learned Brāhmaṇas, old persons past seventy, the blind, cripples and idiots from taxation.²

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¹ Ibid., VIII, 30-45, 307-8, 398-99; VII, 127-138; IX, 44.

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² Ibid., 133-36; VIII, 394.

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Manu's civil and criminal code is primarily idealistic but a few of its provisions might well have corresponded with reality. In the first place, its eighteen categories are interesting: (1) non-payment of debts, (2) deposit and pledge, (3) sale without ownership, (4) concerns among partners, (5) resumption of gifts, (6) non-payment of wages, (7) non-performance of agreements, (8) rescission of sale and purchase, (9) disputes between the owner and his owners, (10) boundaries, (11) assault, (12) defamation, (13) theft, (14) robbery and violence, (15) adultery, (16) duties of man and wife, (17) partition, (18) gambling and betting. Treason

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against the king, murder of Brāhmaṇas, women and children should be punished capitally. A cut-purse should be punished by two of his fingers being cut off for his first offence. If he repeated the crime, he should lose a hand and a foot, while for the third offence, he should be punished capitally. Robbers who cut the walls and committed thefts should be deprived of their hands and fastened on sharp stakes. Those who sheltered or helped the thieves in any way should be punished as thieves.¹ The destruction of the wall or gate of a town or the filling up of the ditch should be punished with instantaneous banishment. Adultery should, as a general rule, be punished with a terrible physical mutilation and banishment, though its detailed provisions are governed by considerations of caste. Various fines and damages of various amounts are prescribed for destroying a bridge or a flag, a pole or images of a temple or a royal palace, stealing a rope or water-pot from a well, damaging a water-hut, breaking the dam of a tank or defiling the sanitation of the highways.² Defamation is recognised as a crime though, like adultery, it is governed by notions of caste superiority and inferiority. It may be admitted at once that social status had, at least under rulers of Brahmanical persuasion, something to do with the degree of punishment. But it is doubtful if some of the monstrous penalties prescribed by the Dharma Śāstras were ever carried into effect. If a Śūdra mentioned the names and castes of the twice-born with contumely, "an iron rail, ten fingers long, shall be thrust red-hot into his mouth." If he insulted a twice-born man with gross invective, his tongue should be cut out, "for he is of low origin." If he was so arrogant as to teach Brâhmaṇas their duties, “the king shall cause hot oil to be poured into his mouth and into his ears.” Even harsher and sometimes unspeakable are the punishments prescribed by Manu for graver insults which a Śûdra might chance to offer to superior beings. Here the Brâhmaṇas seem to be painting themselves worse than they really were.¹

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¹ Ibid., VIII, 4-7.

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² Fines fell into three grades—the first or lowest amercement 250 paṇas, middlemost amercement 500 paṇas, the highest amercement 1,000 paṇas (VIII, 188). Paṇa here is the copper paṇa or kārṣāpaṇa, not silver paṇa (VIII, 186).

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¹ Ibid., VIII, 15, 319, 267-73, 276-77, 281-84, 352-53, 359, 364-65, 367-68, 374-85; IX, 232, 271, 276-79, 281-83, 285, 289.

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Allowing for obvious ultra-Brahmanical leanings, the judicial procedure of Manu appears to be based on practice. A remarkable feature is the introduction of the popular element into one of the most notable classes of disputes. The question of boundaries between fields and villages has always been a plentiful source of litigation. According to Manu if the inspection of various marks such as tanks, wells, cisterns, fountains and temples, failed to furnish decisive evidence, the case should depend on the testimony of witnesses. These must be examined “in the presence of the crowd of the villagers and also of the two litigants. As they, being questioned, unanimously decide, even so he (the king) shall record the boundary.” If no witnesses were available, the case might be left to the decision of people from four neighbouring villages. In certain contingencies Manu allows that the law may be taken in one's hand for recovering one's property.²

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² Ibid., VIII, 48-50. Manu lays down that the king or his officers should not instigate suits (VIII, 53). Suits are to be taken up in the order of the castes of the plaintiffs (VIII, 24). On the use of logic and reasoning in judicial proceedings, VIII, 44. On the invalidity of contracts, VIII, 163-68. For provision of something like a Court of Wards, VIII, 27-29. For provision of payment in work in case of inability to pay in money, VIII, 177.

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Judicial Procedure.

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The Court should be presided over by the king who should maintain a dignified demeanour but should refrain from ostentation in his dress or ornaments. The Court. He must always be assisted by Brâhmaṇas and learned counsellors. Seated or standing, he should raise his right arm and "examine the business of suitors." In the absence of the king, a learned Brâhmaṇa should preside over the Court and should be assisted by three counsellors. The judge should try to find out the truth by inferences as a hunter traces the lair of a wounded deer by the drops of blood. "When engaged in judicial proceedings, he must pay full attention to the truth, to the object, to himself, next to the witnesses, to the place, to the time and to the aspect." Manu bars from the witness-box interested persons, friends, companions, enemies, those convicted of perjury, notorious bad characters, followers of forbidden occupations, men of low caste, those deficient in organs of sense, lunatics, thieves, wrathful people, those who are extremely grieved, intoxicated, tormented by hunger or thirst or desire, or oppressed by fatigue, etc. In grave cases, however, the moral competence of witnesses should not be examined too closely. In Manu witnesses seem to share a little of the character of assessors. "On a conflict of witnesses," we are told, "the king shall accept the majority; if (the parties are) equal in number, those distinguished by good qualities; on a difference between the distinguished, the best among the twice-born." When the parties were assembled, the judge was to exhort them by heaven and hell, with the utmost solemnity, to speak the truth. Besides the evidence of witnesses, the observation of the voice, colour, motions, aspect, eyes and gestures of the parties should aid the judge in discovering the internal dispositions of men. Manu recognises two ordeals, though he does not dilate on them at length. If one could dive under water or carry fire, one should be adjudged innocent.¹ Manu recognises four grades of punishment—admonition, reproof, fines and corporal chastisement. From the last he would exempt Brāhmaṇas. Corporal punishment could fall on any part of the body such as the eyes, ears, the tongue, hands and feet. Imprisonment seems to have been regarded as a variety of corporal punishment.²

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¹ Ibid., VIII, 1-2, 9-11, 20-21, 25-26, 71-123, 115-117.

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² Ibid., VIII, 127-130, 43. If the king fails to recover stolen property, he must make it good out of his own treasury (VIII, 40). The king should inflict a fine of 100 paṇas on ministers or judges who might be guilty of illegalities in the work of adjudication (VIII, 234).

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Over all officials, judicial or executive or fiscal, as over the people at large, the king should keep a watch through spies. They are the eyes of the king. They are to ‘explore’ the behaviour of all.³

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³ Ibid., VII, 122, 154; IX, 256, 298.

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The ideas of Manu are, for the most part, echoed by Viṣṇu, who, though technically a Sūtrakāra, really represents the Dharmaśāstra line and belongs to about the third century A.D. He stresses caste and wants the traditional social order to be enforced by the state. If the king could not recover stolen property, he must recompense its owners from his own treasury. For administrative purposes Viṣṇu prescribes the same scheme of local government as Manu, except that he omits the subdivision of twenty villages.⁴ Viṣṇu’s fiscal system is practically the same as that of Manu, though it is far from being definite. The state is entitled to one-sixth of the gross produce of the land, one-tenth of the price of the articles sold within its frontiers and to one-twentieth of those sold outside. The latter is tantamount to an export-duty which might have obtained in practice. The king could charge a sixth on meat, honey, clarified butter, herbs, perfumes, flowers, roots, fruits, liquids and condiments, wood, leaves, skins, earthen pots, stone vessels and anything made of split bamboo. He could take a fiftieth of cattle, gold and clothes. The government is entitled to the whole produce of the mines and to one-half of treasure-trove, the other half going to Brāhmaṇas. As in Manu, labourers are to contribute a day's labour in the month. Attempts at evading the customs mean forfeiture of all the goods. A novel provision is that one-tenth of a debt which might be the subject of a law-suit should go to the king.¹ In Viṣṇu, as in Manu, espionage is an integral part of the machinery of government.

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⁴ Viṣṇu, II, 2-3, 7-16, 65-67, 98; XXIV, 1-8; XXVI, 4-7. See also I, 47; II, 17-21.

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¹ Ibid., III, 23-32, 55-64; VI, 20. According to Parāśaramādhava, 152, Viṣṇu permits the king to receive a tenth of the claim from the debtor as fine and a twentieth from the creditor as part of the expenses of the court.

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Later than Viṣṇu but more systematic, comprehensive and, therefore, more influential is Yājñavalkya. A compilation rather than an original production, his Smṛti borrows freely from Dharma Sūtras, Manu, Viṣṇu and the Purāṇas among others. According to him there are fourteen seats or sources of the sciences and Dharma—the Purāṇas, Nyāya, Mimāṃsā, the Dharma Śāstras, the six Aṅgas and the four Vedas. But he seems to have perceived that these authorities did not always agree among themselves. For the correct interpretation and thorough elucidation of law, Yājñavalkya would constitute a Pariṣad or legal assembly of members versed in the Vedas, Dharmas and the three sciences. Its decrees should be considered law. Failing such an assembly, the verdict of the foremost of theologians should be law. Like Manu, he recognises ātmatuṣṭi or one's conscience as one of the sources of law. It will appear that the king did sometimes constitute Pariṣads for the solution of legal doubts and that his own conscience, expressed through decrees, was a source of law.¹ In Yājñavalkya the sphere of government coincides with the whole field of human life.² On principles of justice he does not say much that is new. He grants that the customs of families, castes and corporations should be respected but he would allow appeals from their decisions to royal judges. All cases which might have been wrongly decided should be re-tried. His scale of the three amercements differs from that of Manu, being twenty, forty and eighty paṇas respectively.³ For the safety of the king, the treasury and the people, numerous fortresses should be erected and placed in charge of experts.⁴

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¹ Yājñavalkya, I, 3—5, 7, 11.

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² For the attitude and functions of the king, Ibid, XIII, 309—13, 344, 354—61, 364 et seq., 327—41; XVI, 20; XVIII, 4-5, 12.

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³ Ibid., II, 30, 305; XIII, 366—68.

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⁴ Ibid., XIII, 353.

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Contemporaneously with the earliest Smritis arose another class of writings, called Arthaśāstras, treatises on welfare or profit, which treat of politics and economics more or less independently of religion. The Arthaśāstra, in fact, is something like the secular counterpart of the Dharmaśāstra, just as the Kāmaśāstra is the erotic counterpart of it. All the three seem to have arisen at pretty much the same epoch and might have been the result of the same intellectual movement of specialisation. The Mahābhārata professes to quote from several teachers who are mentioned in Kauṭalya and may be supposed to be his forerunners. But the oldest extant work of its kind is the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra, discovered in Southern India less than a generation ago. Its discoverer and first editor, Mr. Shamasastry, accepted and argued for the age-long tradition of its authorship by Cāṇakya, or

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Kauṭalya, supposed to be the mighty Chancellor of the first Mauryan emperor in the 4th century B.C. In his Introductory Note Fleet countenanced the conclusion which still finds support with some scholars. But in a few years the conclusions of Mr. Shamasastry were called in question and a battle of articles has ever since raged over the problem. Rāmakṛiṣṇa Gopāla Bhāṇḍārkar came to the conclusion that the first or second century A.D. was the earliest date which could be assigned to Kauṭalya. Jolly, a later editor of the work, argues like Winternitz, that the real author was "a theoretician, no statesman but perhaps an official in a state of medium size." The ascription of the work to Kauṭalya or Cāṇakya was "entirely due to the myths current regarding the fabulous minister who was looked upon as the master and creator of the art of polity and as the author of all the floating wisdom on the subject of Niti." Both the scholars think that "we might abide by the third century A.D. as the probable date of the work." Berriedale Keith strongly argues for the same view¹

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¹ In support of the fourth century B.C. as the date of the Arthaśāstra, see Shamasastry's Preface to his edition of the Arthaśāstra; Fleet's Introductory Note; T. Gaṇapati Śāstrī's Introduction to his edition of the Arthaśāstra; Jacobi, Ind Ant, June-July, 1918; K. P. Jayaswal, Hindu Polity I, Appendix C, pp. 203-215; N. N. Law, Calcutta Review, September-December, 1924; D R. Bhandarkar, Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, VII, 1925-26, pp. 65 et seq.; Radha Kumud Mookerji's Introductory Essay on the Age and Authenticity of the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭalya in N. N. Law's Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity. See also H. C Ray, Ind. Ant, 1925, pp. 170, 201. L. D. Barnett in his "Indian Antiquities" does not commit himself but works on the basis of the same hypothesis. V.A. Smith (Early History of India, 3rd and 4th editions) and F. W. Thomas (Cambridge History of India, I) use the Arthaśāstra in connection with the Mauryas.

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For R. G. Bhāṇḍārkar's views, Proceedings of the First Oriental Conference, Poona, 1920.

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For the third century A.D. as the most probable date of the Arthaśāstra see Introduction to Jolly and Schmidt's edition of the Arthaśāstra, pp. 1-47; Jolly's paper "Kauṭalya and Cāṇakya" submitted to the Fourth Oriental Conference, Allāhābād, 1926; Winternitz, Calcutta Review, April, 1924; A. B. Keith, J.R.A.S., 1916, pp. 130-38.

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To a student of institutions it is apparent in almost every chapter of the Arthaśāstra and particularly in the later ones that the author is writing of very small states. The idea of a big state never enters his horizon. It seems improbable that he flourished during the days of the Maurya, Kaliṅga, or Āndhra empire. For the same reason he cannot be placed during the Gupta period. A lower date being barred by literary evidence, he seems to belong rather to the 3rd century A.D. than to any other epoch. It is impossible to dogmatise on the subject but the 3rd century A.D. is the best working hypothesis.

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Hillebrandt ascribes the composition of the Arthaśāstra to a school of Kauṭalya’s disciples. Keith ascribes it to some follower of Kauṭalya. But Kauṭalya is really in line with Hindu tradition in introducing his name in his own work. It may be stated, in reply to Keith, that ācāryāḥ is only the customary honorific plural; that on p. 261 (Shamasastry’s edition) Kauṭalya distinguishes the views of Ācāryāḥ from those of Kauṭalya and Vātavyādhi; that on p. 320 the views of Ācāryāḥ are distinguished from those of Bhāradvāja. On p. 253, the criticism of Kauṭalya by Bhāradvāja and that of the latter again by Kauṭalya only brings together the opinion of two schools of thought. The fact seems to be that the Arthaśāstra, like the Dharmaśāstra, had several traditions and that Kauṭalya represented one, perhaps the most powerful, of them. In his text Kauṭalya quotes, it seems, from four schools and thirteen individual teachers (D. R. Bhandarkar, Carmichael Lectures, 1918, pp. 91–99). Of these Manu, Indra or Bāhudantīputra, Bṛhaspati, Śukra, Viśālākṣa, and Bhāradvāja are also mentioned in the Mahābhārata. Vātavyādhi is one of the names of Uddhava, the friend of Kṛṣṇa in the Purāṇas, specially in the Śrīmad Bhāgavata.

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For references to Kauṭalya in Hindu Literature, Kāmandaka, I, 4–7, Daṇḍin, Daśakumāracarita, II, 8 and other works cited by Shamasastry, Gaṇapati Śāstri and Jolly in their introductions to the editions of the Arthaśāstra the Jaina Nandisūtra placed the Kauṭilīya among the false sciences though about the 10th century A.D. the Jaina author Samadeva Sūri borrowed the material of his Nītivākyāmṛta from Kauṭalya.

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The author of the Arthaśāstra is also called Cāṇakya or Viṣṇugupta. Hemacandra in his Abhidhānacintāmaṇi (Bombay Edition, p. 34) and Yādavaprakāśa (Vaijayantī, ed. Oppert p. 96) also call him Drāmila. Hemacandra identifies him with Vātsyāyana, the author of the Kāmasūtra (Shamasastry, Journal of the Mythic Society, Vol. IV, pp. 210–16). The identification is not corroborated in the rest of Sanskrit literature but the resemblance in the style of the two works is striking.

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In Mss. of the Arthaśāstra, both Kauṭalya and Kauṭilya occur as spellings of the author’s name. Both may, therefore, be held to As a scheme of administrative organisation, the Arthaśāstra is unsurpassed in Hindu literature. It is complete in its perspective, detailed in its regulations, thorough in its treatment. It makes provision for all contingencies, for all imaginable possibilities. As a statement of Hindu administrative theory, it leaves hardly anything to be desired. But its supreme merit is its gravest defect as a source of information on administrative practice. Here are no incidental references as in the Brāhmaṇas, Epics and Jātakas, which, merely on account of their inadvertence, may be held to be true to facts. Nor is politics here subsidiary and, therefore, roughly reflecting current practice as in the Dharma Sūtras and Dharma Śāstras. In the Arthaśāstra everything is elaborately planned, carefully thought out. In its own sphere it is an ideal, an utopia. Kauṭalya’s dialectical method points in the same direction. He is fond of inventing problems and riddles. Where possible, he states, discusses and corrects the views of others—and aims at the perfect conclusion. It is thus only in fundamentals and in broad outline of administrative structure which no theoretician could have produced out of his own fancy, that Kauṭalya can be relied on for the practical working of institutions. On the other hand, Kauṭalya’s secular tone and freedom from any religious bias tend to show that priestly influence was not always so powerful as the Dharma Śāstras might lead us to suppose.

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Unfortunately, it is difficult to check Kauṭalya by reference to contemporary facts. The third century A.D.

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be correct. But of the two Kauṭalya is preferable. That is the form which occurs in the Alur Inscription of Vikramāditya V of the tenth century A.D. (Ep. Ind., XVI, No. 7), and also in another inscription of the thirteenth century A.D. (Indian Historical Review, 1925, pp. 569, 786). The name is not, as some scholars have supposed, a nickname signifying ‘false’ or ‘fraudulent.’ For the matter of that, as has been pointed out, Sunaśepa means ‘dog’s tale’ and Divodāsa, ‘time-server.’

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which is his most probable epoch, is, as V. A. Smith puts it, “ one of the dark spaces in the spectrum of Indian history, and almost every event of that time is concealed from view by an impenetrable veil of oblivion.”¹ It can only be premised that so far as he reflects any actual practice, it is that which prevailed about the 2nd or 3rd century A.D.

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¹ Early History of India, p. 212, also p. 276.

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The general political conditions in Kauṭalya are the same as in Manu, Viṣṇu and Yājñavalkya and are not out of harmony with what little we know of the country between the fall of the Mauryan empire and the rise of the Gupta Empire. Causes of war among the small states into which the country was divided were always present. The clearing of forests on the frontiers of two or more states seem to have led to complications. The schemes of colonisation which might follow were another fruitful source of misunderstandings. Irrigation from the long rivers which ran through more than one state presented its own difficulties. Frontiers themselves were a problem. Then there were all the petty insults, real or imaginary, to the honour and dignity of sovereigns. Mere aggression, the quest for empire, which public opinion, political philosophy and tradition had sanctified, made confusion worse confounded. It was noticed that a given state—call it A—tended to embroil itself with its neighbours, say, the states of the circle X. These, in their turn, would be at daggers drawn with their adjacent neighbours, say of the circle Y. It seems to follow that these last would be allies of the state A. But as some states of the circles X and Y themselves adjoined one another, and were therefore likely foes, the general rule of political alliance and hostility was disturbed. On a balance of considerations it appeared that some would be foes, some allies, others neutral, and yet others completely indifferent to A. If you imagine a third circle Z, a more delicate balance will have to be struck. On the whole, a single group of alliances and enmities and neutralities would consist of twelve kings which might be classified as follows:—

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I. (1) The Vijigiṣu or would-be-conqueror in the centre.

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II. Five kings in front of the Vijigiṣu, thus:
(2) Ari, the enemy.
(3) Mitraprakriti, the friend of the Vijigiṣu.
(4) Arimitra, friend of the friend of Vijigiṣu.
(5) Mitrāmitra, friend of the friend of Vijigiṣu.
(6) Arimitrāmitra—friend of the enemy's friend.

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III. Behind the Vijigiṣu:—
(7) Pārṣṇigrāha—a rearward enemy.
(8) Ākranda—a rearward friend.
(9) Pārṣṇigrāhāsāra—friend of the rearward enemy.
(10) Ākrandāsāra—friend of the rearward friend.

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IV. (11) Madhyama—intermediary.

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(12) Udāsīna—or neutral.

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The idea is further subjected to mechanical and mathematical treatment until it gives rise to jig-saw puzzles which stray from reality as they advance in ingenuity. But from all that one thing emerges very clearly. Every state stood in all sorts of relationships with others ranging from complete indifference to deadly hostility or close alliance. In Kauṭalya, interstated diplomacy knows no morality. Neither unprovoked aggression, nor the violation of the neutrality of other states seems to cause any surprise. Spies and other secret agents revel in falsehood or immorality and freely resort to treachery, poison and the dagger. A strong power is expressly enjoined to embark on a career of conquest, subdue state after state and stand forth as the one all-embracing sovereign. Kauṭalya makes one approach to principle in diplomacy. He unfolds the idea of a balance of power. A king might represent to the neighbouring circle of states that a particular sovereign was growing too powerful, that he might destroy them all and that all should, therefore, march against him. Even this idea of balance, however, is only part of the general calculation which dominates the whole theory of interstatal relationships.

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On the other hand, Kauṭalya advises the conclusion of treaties and even defensive and offensive alliances in furtherance of common interests, such as the plantation of colonies, the clearing of forests, reclamation of wild tribes, construction of long trade-routes, fortification of strategic centres and the working of mines.

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Wars and alliances of a certain character resulted in the establishment of the relation of protector and protectorate. Driven to extremities, a weak state might purchase peace by sacrifice of its honour, by consenting to furnish hostages, by paying indemnity, or by binding itself to military service. But under favourable circumstances it might violate its agreements. There were ways and ways of commencing a war of liberation. A hostage might be encouraged to escape in any one of innumerable ways. And so forth. The whole subject is treated with an inexhaustible wealth of detail, supposition and ingenuity. On the other hand, the suzerain should do all he can to keep a permanent hold on his fresh acquisitions. Here force would be of little avail. Conciliation was the right policy. The suzerain should not attempt to bring a new acquisition into uniformity with his original territory. To use a modern term, there should be no annexation. The subdued dynasty should be maintained on the throne. Let the suzerain rescue the dependent princes from misfortunes, redress their grievances, treat them with honour and kindness and even shower on them wealth and dignity. Their family and property rights should be respected. Nor should these principles be departed from on the death of the first vassal. The latter's son should be duly crowned. The people of the feudatory states should be disturbed as little as possible. Manners and customs corresponded to conveniences and should be respected by the suzerain. What was good for one place might not be good for another.

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All the same, the strictest watch should be kept on the vassals—the Sâmantas as they are called. All their secrets must be ascertained through spies, through prostitutes, through all other conceivable means, fair and foul. The most shameless falsehoods and immoralities might be employed to keep them disunited. Nor should the secret dagger or poison be spared in case of need. On all this Kauṭalya dilates at great length and in a manner which might have shocked Machiavelli himself. He cannot be taken as an exact mirror of existing conditions. Here, as everywhere else, his imagination, his turn for systematisation, his genius for classification are discernible. But he leaves no doubt that the ordinary state in his time comprised many feudatories whose relations with the suzerain were often clouded by suspicion and occasionally characterised by ferocity and treachery on one side or the other.¹

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¹ Kauṭalya, Arthaśāstra ed. Shamasastry, Book VII, pp. 261–319, 380, 407. Cf. Kāmandaka (who, according to Winternitz, lived in the 8th century A.D., and according to others in the 6th or 7th century and who based his Nītisāra almost entirely on Kauṭalya), VIII, 20, 16-17; IX, 45, 2–21, 75; X, 18–22; XVII, 2-3. Also the Agni Purāṇa, Canto CUXL. Some of the maxims of Kauṭalya are condemned by Bāṇa, in his Kādambarī, ed. Peterson, Vol. I, p. 109. For a comparison, not altogether accurate, of Kauṭalya with Machiavelli, see G. B. Botazzi, Precursori di Nicolo Machiavelli in Grecia ad in India, Kauṭalya ad Thucidide, tr. B. K. Sarkar, Indian Historical Quarterly, 1925.

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On the whole, Manu stands on a much higher moral pedestal than Kauṭalya. Once he interdicts all treacherous conduct on the part of a king. On the conclusion of a victorious campaign a king should display gentleness and generosity. After ascertaining the desires of the vanquished, he should instal a scion of the fallen dynasty on the throne, if need be, on his own terms. He should honour his new protégé and the latter’s principal officials with precious gifts. Promises of safety should be proclaimed and the customs of the people declared authoritative. Even Manu, however, permits the devastation of hostile territory in times of war. When a king has shut up his foe in a town, “let him sit encamped, harass his kingdom, and continually spoil his grass, food, fuel and water. Likewise let him destroy the tanks, ramparts and ditches.” Even in Manu, it is almost the duty of a king to sow dissensions in the ranks of his enemies.¹

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¹ Manu, VII, 104, 122, 154, 158—207; IX, 256, 298.

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On these matters as on so many others Viṣṇu reads like an echo of Manu. The old dynasty of a conquered country should be maintained, unless it is of ignoble descent. So far as possible, a conqueror should invest a prince of the same line with the ‘royal’ dignity.² In his scheme of foreign policy as in domestic administration spies play an important part.³

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² Viṣṇu, III, 47—9.

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³ Ibid., III, 35.

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Yājñavalkya, too, expounds the usual policies of conciliation, diplomacy, fraud and force. When a country has been conquered, its customs, laws, and family usages must be maintained. On the other hand, a king should attack the enemy when the latter is weak and his realm is filled with corn and provisions. Nothing can be more meritorious than to acquire wealth by war and bestow it on Brāhmaṇas.⁴

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⁴ Yājñavalkya, XIII, 321, 353.

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The cumulative evidence of Manu, Kauṭalya, Viṣṇu and Yājñavalkya, all of whom belong to the great interregnum between the Mauryas and the Guptas tends to show that the country was divided into a large number of states, that they were constantly vacillating between the status of suzerain and that of vassal, that many a state had a number of dependencies and that the internal autonomy of a dependency was generally, though not uniformly, respected, that the status of a protectorate was most difficult to define ranging as it did from almost complete independence to practical annexation, that the acknowledgment of suzerainty might have been merely nominal in some cases, while other states might have been reduced to mere estates. Kauṭalya’s reference to some people as Śastropa-jīvinaḥ is obscure but it probably means those who lived by their arms and refers to some warlike clans.¹ His characterisation of Dvairājya as productive of rivalry and mutual conflict leading to destruction indicates some peoples who had not evolved a regular form of monarchical government.² In the vocabulary of politics, feudalism is the only word that describes this state of things. The difference between the conditions of medieval Europe and the India of the early Christian era is apparent but the actual position of the state and its head show points of resemblance in either country. It is the institutions of such a small state, ridden by feudalism, that Kauṭalya seeks to portray in what appeared to him an ideal form.

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¹ Arthaśāstra (ed. Shamasastry), p. 376.

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² Ibid., p. 323.

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The scope of the activity of the state in Kauṭalya includes practically everything. It should promote true religion but Kauṭalya wants it to regulate the age and conditions under which one might renounce the world.

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The scope of state-activity.

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The state should see that husband and wife, father and son, brother and sister, uncle and nephew, teacher and pupil are faithful to one another and do not play each other false. The state itself should provide support to poor, pregnant women, to their new-born offspring, to orphans, to the aged, the infirm, the afflicted and the helpless.¹ He lays down when men may use witchcraft to gain the affections of their wives or sweethearts and when, for instance, in cases of perversion for incestuous purposes, it was to be punished with mutilation or death.² He prescribes the conditions of divorce, separation, second or subsequent marriages, ways of teaching manners to refractory women.³ Detailed and minute are his provisions for safeguarding the honour of women, the safety of immature girls, relations of lovers, etc.⁴ His law of adultery, proceeds on lines of caste.⁵ Coming to elopement, he would legislate on every step, on every possibility, in that complicated affair.⁶ He classifies prostitutes, places them under a state superintendent, prescribes their fees, checks their tendency to extravagance, limits their expenditure, lays down their conduct in detail towards their paramours, provides for their safety and does not fail to decree that one-fifteenth of their income should go to the state.⁷

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¹ Ibid., pp. 47-48; 199. Differing from Manu (VIII, 138) and others, Kauṭalya gives the following scale of fines: the first amercement ranging from 48 to 98 paṇas, the middlemost amercement ranging from 200 to 500 paṇas, and the highest ranging from 500 to 1,000 paṇas.

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² Ibid., 232-35.

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³ Ibid., 153-59.

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⁴ Ibid., 124, 183, 228-29.

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⁵ Ibid., 199, 232-35.

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⁶ Ibid., 232-35.

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⁷ Ibid., 124-25, 184.

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The state should facilitate, regulate and control public amusements and entertainments. It was to assist the foundation of academies where actors and actresses might learn reading and writing, music and song, dancing and painting and where they might master a complete code of deportment and blandishment. The movements of dancers, rope-dancers, buffoons, jugglers, mimic players and troubadours were to be regulated and a fifteenth of their incomes taken as the dues of the state.¹

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¹ Ibid., 48-49, 125, 202.

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Gambling was to be controlled by a Superintendent who should appoint definite places, supply water and other conveniences, of course, for a consideration, and hire out dice at the rate of a Kâkṇi per pair. He was to appropriate five per cent. of all winnings for the state. To play anywhere else should mean a fine of twelve paṇas. The same rules apply to all betting and challenging, except in learning and art. While the play was in progress, the superintendent should exert all his psychological skill in detecting thieves and spies.²

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² Ibid., 197-98.

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The same three fold motive of regulating life, detecting thieves and spies, and securing some revenue for the state underlies Kauṭalya's excise policy. In town and country, camp and forts, the state should itself establish liquor shops at suitable distances from one another or license private individuals to do so according to the laws of supply and demand. Kauṭalya would furnish public houses with beds and seats and enhance their attractions with scents, garlands of flowers, water and other comforts. Stringent regulations on the sale and use of liquor and other fermentations are given but the code of temperance was to be relaxed for four days on occasions of festivity, fairs and pilgrimages.¹ On the slaughter of animals and the sale of meat, Kauṭalya is equally minute.² According to the Arthaśāstra, all professions and occupations are to be controlled by the state. For instance, physicians should report all cases of grave illness to the government. If death occurred in an unreported case, the physician should be punished with the first amercement. If in any case death was due to his carelessness, he should receive the middlemost amercement, while positive neglect or indifference was to be treated as assault or violence.³ Similarly, rules with an amazing fulness of detail are given for the conduct of goldsmiths, weavers of various descriptions, washermen, and others,⁴ while a series of veritable draft statutes of labourers prescribes, *inter alia*, that artisans must fulfil their engagements as to time, place and form of work and obey the instructions duly given, on pain of forfeiting their ways or paying damages or both.⁵

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