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The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehli c7: Chapter I

The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehlī c7

Language
English

Contents

Chapter I

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THE division of time into epochs is but a historical convention; for life never stands still. No change, however fundamental, overtakes a people in a moment; every revolution in human affairs is only the culmination of long simmering forces. Yet, humanity would lose its way in the expanse of time without landmarks. In the history of India, the foundation of the sultanate of Dehlī is one; the restoration of Humāyūn is another. It was in 1193 that Qutb-u'd-dīn Aibak captured Dehlī and made it his headquarters as the viceroy of his royal master, Sultān Mu'izz-u'd-dīn Muhammad bin Sām of Ghūr; but officially the sultanate came into existence in 1206, when the viceroy became the first independent sultan of Dehlī. There was a succession of Turkish, Sayyid and Afghān dynasties until the hereditary Mongol foe, now a brother Muslim and led by the cultured prince, Bābur, entered the domains of Ibrāhīm Lodī at the invitation of disaffected nobles and established the first Mughal empire in 1526. The sultanate was, however, revived by Sher Shāh Sūr in 1539-40; but Humāyūn watched his opportunity and for once in his life, he seized it and re-established himself at Dehlī in 1555.

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Every student of the history of the sultanate has to face the problem of stopping at 1526 or of including the Sūrs in his study. To treat them with the Mughuls has a certain advantage for the political historian, for the rise and fall of the Sūrs are so intermingled with the affairs of the Mughuls that separate treatment is difficult. Still, the rule of the Sūrs was, technically, a part of the sultanate. The Sūr

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The period under review.

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styled themselves sultans and did not assume the Mughul title of Pādishāh; they looked upon the Timurids as intruders whose rule was to be treated as an unpleasant episode. It is true that the restored Mughuls regarded the Sūrs as usurpers, whose memory was to be obliterated; yet from an impartial point of view, Sher Shāh’s achievement was too brilliant and too abiding to be treated as a mere interlude. In reality, there is hardly any choice left for a writer on the history of institutions. Sher Shāh did not borrow his administration from Bābur and Humāyūn; he had a hearty contempt for their ill-organized government.¹ His system was the natural development of a long tradition; his institutions had their roots in the experiments of the sultanate. The essentials of the Mughul administration, even after the highly-eulogized reforms of ‘the world-illuminating wisdom’ of Abū-l-Faḍl’s hero, were but an adaptation of the older system, sometimes not even thinly disguised. Yet, there are some remarkable changes under Akbar, and the end of the Sūr empire is a convenient date to stop and take stock of the ground won by the progress and evolution of institutions. It was Sher Shāh who started anew the administrative machinery of the sultanate; Akbar’s officials had only to add a wheel here and adjust a lever there. Chronologically the sultanate does not possess continuity; geographically it lacks territorial definition, for its boundaries constantly changed; it is only in the smooth evolution of institutions that the sultanate is revealed as a political entity. For this reason this treatise covers the period from 1206 to 1555.

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¹ Sher Shāh’s remarks regarding Mughul administrative methods have probably been put too early into his mouth by ‘Abbās Sarwānī (Sarwānī, f. 21a); but probably he did express these views later in life.

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A brief historical survey. India first came into political contact with the Muslims when Muḥammad bin Qāsim conquered Sind (711-713). Here was decided the vital question: What was to be the attitude of the Muslims towards the Hindus? Were the Hindus to be treated as dhimmīs and mu‘āhids, a protected and allied people, and taken into minor partnership, or, were hostilities to be carried to extremes? The Muslim lawyers were divided; but tolerance and political wisdom carried the day, and a precedent was established which was followed by subsequent conquerors and rulers. Muḥammad bin Qāsim employed the Hindus as revenue officials and treated their chiefs with consideration; he left them in possession of their territories on payment of tribute.¹ These principles were to be the fundamentals of Muslim policy in India.

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¹ Chach-nāmah, pp. 208, 209; Tuḥfat-u'l-kirām, f. 259b; Tāj, f. 164a.

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About three centuries later, the Ghaznavids established their rule in the Panjāb, the importance of which, from the administrative point of view, has not been properly assessed. The main reason is the lack of relevant material. If only Baihaqī's magnum opus, the Tārīkh-i-āl-i-Sabuktigīn had survived in its entirety, our knowledge about the Ghaznavid administration would have been much fuller. There can, however, be little doubt that the sultans of Dehlī inherited the experience gained by the dynasty of Sabuktigīn from two centuries of rule in India. This view is confirmed by the existence of parallel and sometimes identical institutions under the sultanates of Ghaznah and Dehlī. It will be a great mistake to isolate these sultanates from the rest of the Muslim world for the purpose of examining their institutions. When the Caliphate was strong, even distant provinces were under effective control, and the Abbasid tradition had become deeply rooted throughout the caliph's dominions. This tradition was handed down to the Ghaznavids through their original overlords, the Samanids. Besides, a particular kind of statecraft had sprung up in these succession states; this uniformity was due to the essential unity of Muslim culture, the universality of Muslim law and the mobility of Muslim men of genius.² In their treatment of the Hindus, the Ghaznavids followed in the footsteps of the Arab conquerors of Sind. Notable generals and reliable contingents provided by the conquered race fought in wars waged by Maḥmūd and his successors; Hindu chiefs and their tribute figure conspicuously in the chronicles; the revenue administration of the Panjāb must have employed considerable native talent.

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² Vide Chapters III & IX.

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Qutb-u'd-dīn Aibak consolidated his conquests by organizing their administration.¹ It is obvious that he could not spare much time in the midst of his campaigns to work out new schemes of government; nor could he afford to make experiments. There is a strong probability that he borrowed the institutions working at Lāhor, and that he employed a large number of experienced Ghaznavid officials. This tradition was considerably strengthened by the arrival of Fakhr-u'd-dīn ‘Iṣāmī at the court of Shams-u'd-dīn Īltutmish. ‘Iṣāmī had served as a wazīr at Baghdād. The sultan extended to him a warm welcome and appointed him his prime minister.² A large number of experienced officials and generals arrived in the next few years from foreign countries, being driven from their homes by the Mongols.³ The sultan thus came to possess expert administrators within the first two decades of its foundation. Considerable interest must have been taken in administrative affairs, for it was at this time that Fakhr-i-Mudabbir presented his Ādāb-u'l-mulūk to the sultan. The Abbasid tradition thus gained a firm footing in the administration of the sultanate of Dehlī.

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¹ Tāj, e.g., ff. 9b, 80b, 84b, 141b, 149a, 158, 164b, 181b, 182b, etc.

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² Firishtah, i, p. 117. Also, ‘Iṣāmī, Futūḥ-u's-salāṭīn, p. 122.

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³ Firishtah, i, pp. 131, 132. Muslims from foreign countries were always welcome at the court of Dehlī. Ibn Baṭṭūṭah gives details of how foreigners were received and treated at Dehlī (I. B., ii, pp. 80, 81). Also vide Masālik-u'l-abṣār, p. 63. There was a special officer called ḥājib-u'l-ghurabā to receive and look after foreigners. The sultans were, however, reluctant to let foreigners take any wealth out of the empire. (I. B., ii, p. 42.)

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The central authority weakened at the death of Īltutmish, and the real power passed into the hands of the ‘Forty.’ Their policy was to maintain a balance of power amongst themselves and to turn against anyone who threatened their domination. Balban, however, succeeded in breaking their power and in restoring the prestige of the central government. The independence and turbulence of the ‘Forty’ had considerably degraded the monarchy, and the natural reaction was that Balban introduced the Persian ceremonial which gave royalty a new dignity.¹ His court was the asylum of a large number of distinguished refugees—princes, administrators, scholars and artists. Dehlī became the most enlightened city of the East and the fame of the sultanate spread to the four corners of the Muslim world.² Balban concentrated on home defence and on strengthening the administration. The rebellious elements were suppressed, and the country was considerably opened up by cutting down forests and constructing roads.³

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¹ Baranī, pp 27-29, 30-32.

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² Ibid., pp. 111-112.

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³ Ibid., pp. 28, 50-52, 56-60.

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Mu'izz-u'd-dīn Kaiqubād frittered away his heritage. Jalāl-u'd-dīn Khaljī possessed too mild a temperament, and probably felt too insecure to insist on great reforms. His nephew, 'Alā-u'd-dīn, however, was a man of different calibre who stands in the front rank of bold and successful administrative experimenters. He established a tight control on economic life and worked it successfully. He had to maintain a large army to defend his dominions from recurring Mongol attacks, so he raised the revenue demand and took away the special perquisites of the Hindu chiefs.⁴ Even these measures and the wealth he had brought from the south could not suffice to pay his troops. 'Alā-u'd-dīn, therefore, reduced the prices of commodities so that he could get a soldier at less pay. With the help of an efficient staff, he succeeded in this scheme of price control.⁵ The conception and the success of the plan reveal expert knowledge and a remarkable insight into economic factors. This reign saw a great expansion of the influence of the state at the expense of the power of the Muslim and Hindu nobility.⁶

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⁴ Vide Chapter VI.

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⁵ Vide Chapter VIII.

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⁶ Vide Chapter X.

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Even Quṭb-u'd-dīn Mubārak Shāh's profligate reign and the anarchy both preceding and following it could not undo 'Alā-u'd-dīn's great work. The harsher measures were abolished, and the peasant's burden was lightened; but it was left to Ghiyāth-u'd-dīn Tughluq to consolidate the administration, to restore the more reasonable privileges of the Muslim nobles as well as of the Hindu chiefs, and to enforce useful reforms.¹ This sultan possessed a sound political instinct; it is under him that the administrative system of the sultanate is seen at its best. So long as Muḥammad bin Tughluq did not interfere with the organization, he achieved remarkable success, and the prosperity and grandeur of his empire excited the admiration of the Muslim world; but very soon he started his disastrous experiments. Muḥammad bin Tughluq was a man of remarkable attainments; his learning was profound; but his real place was a professorial chair, not the throne of Dehlī. His ideas were brilliantly conceived, but he ignored the difficulties in their practical application. Never did a man fail more completely. His measures were attended by famines and natural disasters; bankruptcy and disaffection followed in the wake. The embittered sultan retaliated against the rebels by ruthless punishment, and the vicious circle became complete.² He lost his life in fighting the hydra-headed monster which his own indiscretion had raised.³

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¹ *Vide* Chapters VI and X; also, Barani, pp. 429-432.

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² Barani, p. 522.

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³ Ibid., p. 525.

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Fīrūz Shāh had to be content with a much smaller empire; and it took him long to heal the wounds Muḥammad bin Tughluq's policy had inflicted on the body-politic. He strengthened the state by conciliating the harassed population and by an effective reorganization of the administration. The peace and prosperity of his reign lulled the sultanate into a false sense of security; Fīrūz Shāh's unwise leniency towards his soldiers and officials paved the way for the anarchy which set in during his lifetime.⁴ After his death internal feuds weakened the central authority; two puppets were seen reigning together within the precincts of the capital. It was during this anarchy that the provincial dynasties of Jaunpūr, Mālwah and Gujrāt came into existence.

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⁴ 'Afif, pp. 298-301.

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The final blow was dealt by Tīmūr. After the storm had passed away, the forces of reconstruction began to assert themselves. The Sayyids established some kind of authority in the western remnant of the sultanate, but disorder was too widespread for them to control it. Most of their time was spent in fighting rebellions. The situation called for rulers of great vigour, which the dynasty sadly lacked. Its authority was reduced gradually to a mere shadow; and out of all the turmoil emerged Buhlūl Lodī. He realized that single-handed he was not capable of restoring order to his newly acquired dominions; he, therefore, made himself the head of a tribal hegemony. His Afghān instincts as well as the political situation led him to this policy. The prestige and the authority of the monarchy had been completely undermined; almost every *parganah* was in a state of rebellion. The peasants and the chiefs—united by the common interest of withholding revenue and waylaying travellers—defied the central authority. Besides, there were the rival nobles who had not liked the rise of the Lodīs. Buhlūl had neither the machinery, nor the army, nor the resources to fight this widespread disaffection; he, therefore, sent a general invitation to his fellow Afghāns to come and share his triumph and his responsibilities. These men spread into every corner of the sultanate and reduced the *parganahs* once again to order, though, of course, with varying success. They were attached to the Lodīs by ties of gratitude and self-interest, and the sultanate was transformed into a loosely-knit Afghān empire.¹ Buhlūl was alive to the importance of putting his administration on a sound basis. The effects of his policy can be discerned in the gradual strengthening of his position: whereas at first he could scarcely cope with Jaunpūr, he later turned the tables completely and annexed the Sharqī kingdom. This could not be merely the result of Husain Shāh's military incapacity or the fickle favour of fortune. Buhlūl's efforts bore full fruit in the next reign. Sikandar devoted himself to the consolidation of his dominions and the better organization of the administration.² There was now peace in the land which brought with it not only prosperity, but also a cultural renaissance, the most remarkable feature being that the Hindus were infected with the new enthusiasm for Muslim learning.

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¹ Sarwānī, ff. 3-4.

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² Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī, i, p. 335.

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Sikandar Lodī succeeded in increasing the power and the prestige of the throne without unduly encroaching upon the interests of his nobles; his son, Ibrāhīm, however, was of a different temperament. Without understanding the nature of the Afghān hegemony, Ibrāhīm tried to emulate the older sultans in controlling the nobles. In putting his ideal of monarchy into practice, he imposed an irksome court ceremonial and took vigorous steps to crush the authority of the powerful Afghān lords whom he treated with severity and even injustice. The result was disaffection which Bābur utilized to his great advantage.

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Bābur and Humāyūn do not come within the scope of this work; chronologically their reigns break the continuity of the sultanate, but they did not have much influence on the growth of institutions. The reasons are obvious: they had neither the time nor the inclination to alter the administrative organization of their new empire. Endowed with great energy and powers of generalship, Bābur was no administrator; his son, Humāyūn, a man of great culture, had even less opportunity or talent to introduce reforms into the government of the empire. When, after bitter experience of adversity, he did think of reorganization on his return, his so-called reforms largely consisted of the introduction of astrological considerations into matters of state.¹

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¹ Humāyūn-nāmah by Khwāndamīr, ff. 130-135.

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Too lavish praise has been bestowed on Akbar; only recently has Sher Shāh been allowed a small share in the Great Mughul's glory. In actual fact Akbar's institutions were largely inherited from his predecessors. Even Sher Shāh, undoubtedly a capable monarch and a great administrator, has been credited with greater originality than he possessed. He enjoyed sovereignty only for six years, a considerable portion of which was spent in campaigns. It lay outside the range of human achievement to devise and put into practice, during this brief period, an original system of administration which was to form the structure of the government for succeeding ages. His reforms consisted mostly in reviving institutions which had fallen into disuse; for Sher Shāh, like Ghiyāth-u’d-dīn Tughluq, was a keen student of history and consciously borrowed successful measures of previous reigns.¹ Most of the institutions, however, Sher Shāh inherited in working order; but his personal interest in the administration increased their efficiency. Islām Shāh practically left the machinery as he had found it. He was the last capable ruler of his dynasty, which soon came to an end after his death.

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¹ Sarwānī, f. 67a; Firishtah, i, p. 232.

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It is the aim of this work to describe the administrative institutions during the sultanate period and to explain how they came to assume the form in which they are found under the Sūrs. The following is a preliminary outline.

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Legally the sultanate of Dehli was a part of the Eastern Caliphate; even when the line of Baghdād caliphs came to an end, the fiction of allegiance to a khalīfah was kept alive for a short while when Quṭb-u’d-dīn Mubārak Shāh assumed the caliphate. Muḥammad bin Tughluq acknowledged the supremacy of the Egyptian Abbasids; Khiḍr Khān, the first Sayyid ruler, was a vassal of Tīmūr and Shāh Rukh; subsequent sultans maintained the tradition of owning allegiance to a nameless caliph. In actual practice the sultanate was an independent empire exercising all the authority of a sovereign state. The form of the government was despotic; the sultan was the head of the state and its chief military commander. He was, legally, subordinate to the Muslim Law, which it was his duty to protect and enforce. He had no authority to alter the Law in its essentials, though he had a limited right to interpret it. With this reservation, his power was absolute, though it was checked by various political factors, which will be discussed later. The sultan was the pivot of the administration; his court was the very centre of the political and social life of the empire. Majesty surrounded itself with an elaborate ceremonial; etiquette was exacting; a numerous staff was necessary to maintain the splendour of the court; there was a large force of household troops. The sultan was the greatest patron of learning and art; he was the fountain-head of honour and patronage. These factors made the royal household an important department whose head was the wakīl-i-dar. Proximity to the sultan being a source of pride and power, the household embraced some of the greatest dignitaries of the state; it also maintained a large number of kārkhānahs which supplied the court as well as departments of the government with provisions, stores and equipment.

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It lay within the ambition of a noble to become nā’ib-u’l-mulk or Lord Lieutenant of the Empire; under strong sultans this was an empty title; the nā’ib-u’l-mulk of a weak monarch was virtually the regent.¹ He was the head of the army. The ‘āriḍ-i-mumālik was responsible for the recruitment, payment and inspection of troops as well as transport and commissariat.

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¹ The nā’ib-u’l-mulk was also called malik nā’ib.

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The head of the civil administration was the wazīr; his special domain was financial organization and administration. He was assisted by a nā’ib wazīr, the mushrif-i-mumālik and the mustaufī-i-mumālik. The first was a general assistant, the second the accountant-general and the third the auditor-general of the realm; later the mushrif was the accounts officer responsible for income and the mustaufī for expenditure. The nāẓir supervised the agency for collecting revenue; the waqūf, who was added later, controlled the expenditure. The barīd-i-mumālik was in charge of the royal post and news agency. The qāḍi-i-mumālik was the chief justice; he was responsible for the enforcement of the shar‘; in addition he was usually the ṣadr-u’ṣ-ṣudūr, and as such he controlled the department of religious affairs, pious foundations and education. The amīr-i-dād enforced the decisions of the judges and brought culprits before the qāḍis; he presided over the maẓālim court in the absence of the sultan. The kotwāl was the head of the police. The muḥtasib was the censor of public morals; he stopped flagrant breaches of decency or law, prevented actions tantamount to a public nuisance, and controlled prices and markets. The muḥtasib, the kotwāl and the amīr-i-dād worked in close co-operation.

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The provincial government was a replica of the central government. The governor represented the sultan and was the head of his administration. The various departments at the centre were duplicated in the provinces. Normally the provincial departments were controlled from the capital but distant or difficult provinces practically ran themselves. The unit of administration was the village with its headman and accountant; villages were grouped into pargaṇahs and the latter into shiqqs. The shiqqs and some small provinces came to be known as sarkārs towards the end of the period. A marked feature of the period were the Hindu tributary rulers; the smaller Hindu chiefs were employed in various capacities by the sultan.¹ Most of the local administration was left in the hands of the Hindus; the state adapted the existing machinery to the new requirements. Peace was maintained by garrisoning strategic centres, planting colonies of Muslim warriors, developing and enforcing local responsibility, and by improving communications. The local administration of the larger towns was based on the model of the capital; village communities functioned in accordance with their old traditions.

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¹ Vide Chapters VI and X for details.

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Lack of space forbids a full discussion of the bibliography on which the following pages are based; a fuller list appears in an appendix. The main authorities group themselves under the following heads:—

c7.44.1

For the Ghaznavids, a knowledge of whose institutions is essential, there are two main sources; the Tārīkh-i-Yamīnī by 'Utbī is not so rich in administrative details and anecdotes as Abū-'l-Faḍl Baihaqī's Tārīkh-i-Baihaqī which is only a fragment of his greater work, the *Tārīkh-i-āl-i-Sabuktigīn*, now unfortunately lost. Baihaqī was a member of the *dīwān-i-inshā* under Mas‘ūd and had opportunities of personal contact with the sultan; he was acquainted with most of the state secrets. He writes in a gossiping style and gives the reader a rare insight into court life as well as into the working of the central government. *Al-Kardīzī’s Zain-u’l-akhbār* is a brief and dry chronicle. For the earlier period of the sultanate (587-614 A.H. ; 1191-1217 A.C.). Ḥasan Niẓāmī’s *Tāj-u’l-ma’āthir* is the primary authority. The author has a most tedious and flowery style, but his facts are correct and sometimes he records matters of administrative interest. The *Tārīkh-i-Fakhr-u’d-dīn Mubārakshāh* is valuable as a contemporary record, though the author was not the famous poet Fakhr-u’d-dīn Mubārakshāh Marw-a’r-rūdī as Sir Denison Ross calls him, but Fakhr-u’d-dīn Mubārakshāh alias Fakhr-i-Mudabbir who usually resided at Lāhor and Dehlī and was attached to the court.¹ This book deals with Quṭb-u’d-dīn Aibak only. Minhāj-u’d-dīn bin Sirāj-u’d-dīn’s *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī* is a compendium of Muslim history;

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but he discusses the main facts of the reigns of various sultans of Dehli in greater detail. He brings his history down to 658 A.H. (1261 A.C.) when Nāṣir-u’d-dīn Maḥmūd was the reigning monarch. Minhāj was, for some time, the chief *qāḍī* of the realm, but unfortunately he was not interested in administration. His sketches of the leading nobles are, however, useful, for he indicates the various stages in their careers; many of them had started as ordinary household slaves, so it is possible to visualize the various offices and posts they held as they progressed. The story is then taken up by Ḍiyā-u’d-dīn Baranī, whose *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī* carries it to the first six years of Fīrūz Shāh’s reign. Baranī was a retired official and understood the administration; he has recorded the main developments which took place in his time. His chronology is unreliable; his likes and dislikes are too strong; his arrangement is faulty; but he was faithful in recording administrative reforms. The first part of his history is based on the result of his diligent enquiries from eye-witnesses; during the later period he was an eye-witness himself. Shams-i-Sirāj ‘Afīf, another official, wrote a history of Fīrūz Shāh’s reign and called his book by the same title, *Tārīkh-i-Fīrūz Shāhī*. He is fond of jingling, rhyming prose and many of his observations are platitudes. Yet his chronicle is extensive and, being confined to one reign, gives many administrative details.

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Fīrūz Shāh’s own composition, the *Futūḥāt-i-Fīrūz Shāhī*, originally inscribed on a tower of the sultan’s chief mosque, but later preserved in manuscript, records the administrative achievements of the monarch. Then there is the anonymous *Sīrat-i-Fīrūz Shāhī* of which a unique manuscript exists in Bankipore Public Library. This book contains a brief history of the sultan’s reign as far as the expedition into Gujrāt; it deals adequately with the character, reforms and building activities of Fīrūz Shāh. It also throws welcome light on the relations of the sultanate with the House of ‘Abbās. The *Sīrat* was written in 772 A.H. and claims to have been dictated by the sultan himself.¹ The details of Tīmūr’s invasion are found in the two *Ẓafar-nāmahs*, one by Niẓām-u’d-dīn Shāmī and the other by Sharf-u’d-dīn Yazdī who mainly follows Shāmī, as well as in Shihāb-u’d-dīn Aḥmad’s *‘Ajā’ib-u’l-maqdūr fī akhbārāt-i-Tīmūr*. The period of the anarchy and the rule of the earlier Sayyids are described in Yaḥyā bin Aḥmad a’s-Sahrindī’s *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* which, however, begins with the reign of Muḥammad bin Sām and finishes in 838 A.H. (1434 A.C.). There is no contemporary chronicle of the Afghān dynasties, and one has to rely on books written under Akbar or even Jahāngīr.

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¹ Islamic Culture, October 1938, pp. 397-405.

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¹ The colophon says :

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باملاء شاه جهان شد کتابت طریق سلاطین و آداب شاهی . . . . . ز تاریخ هفتاد و دو بود و مقصد که اتمام این شد بفضل الهی gives a good insight into the political and social conditions under Quṭb-u’d-dīn Mubārak Shāh. Amīr Khusraw’s exceedingly tedious exercise in rhetoric, the Ijāz-i-Khusrawī throws important sidelights on the administration, for the model epistles addressed to officials refer to their functions. The Maṭla‘-u’l-anwār and Afḍal-u’l-fawā’id are useful to students of social history, for they portray contemporary manners and customs. The prefaces to the collections of his lyrical odes are also valuable for the same reason. The other writings have little historical significance. Amīr Ḥasan ‘Alā Sajzī’s Fawā’id-u’l-fawā’id like Khusraw’s Afḍal-u’l-fawā’id contains the table-talk of the saint Niẓām-u’d-dīn. The odes of Ḥasan, who was Khusraw’s contemporary, and the qaṣā’id of Badr-i-Chāch who flourished under Muḥammad bin Tughluq refer to political events and their chronograms are particularly valuable. Of great interest is ‘Iṣāmī’s Futūḥ-u’s-salāṭīn which is a chronicle of medieval India in verse; it is important in so far as it voices the feelings of the malcontents against Muḥammad bin Tughluq and justifies the rise of the Bahmanī kingdom. It also implements our knowledge regarding certain other events. Great importance has been attached by some recent writers to the Muḥammad bin Tughluq fragment consisting of four pages attached to a manuscript of the Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī (Add. 25785 in the British Museum) since it has been claimed as a part of the sultan’s autobiography.¹ The work is too concise in style to be an autobiography; no contemporary or later authority mentions the existence of such a document. A careful perusal will convince the reader that it is in fact part of a Persian version of the sultan’s application to the Egyptian caliph for recognition. The Basātīn-u’l-uns was composed in the beginning of Muḥammad bin Tughluq’s reign and contains some historical matter. Of great importance is the Inshā-i-Māhrū, being a collection of letters by ‘Ain-u’l-mulk, one of Fīrūz Shāh’s ministers. As they mostly deal with administrative affairs, they give a good insight into the working of the machinery of the government. ‘Abd-u’l-Ḥaqq Dehlawī’s Risālah dar taṣānīf-i-khud contains a brief outline of literary history. Of great social and cultural value are the poems and books by Hindu reformers, also Malik Muḥammad Jāisī’s Padmāvat and Akhrāvat.

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¹ The Rise and Fall of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, p. 251; K. M. Ashraf. p. 350, no. 123.

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The best known of all the travellers who visited India during this period is Ibn Baṭṭūṭah who reached Sind in 734 A.H. (1333 A.C.) and lived in the sultanate for nine years. His Tuḥfat-u’n-nuẓẓār fī gharā’ib-i’l-amṣār gives a fascinating picture of the court, the social life and the government of the sultanate, though his history is based on hearsay and not very reliable. Besides, he kept no notes, and the work was composed years after in the traveller’s native land. As the narrative of an eye-witness, Ibn Baṭṭūṭah’s account bears the marks of authenticity. Then there are the accounts of various travellers and Indian Muslims living abroad which have been collected in Qalqa-shandī’s Ṣubḥ-u’l-a‘shā fī ṣinā‘at-i’l-inshā, as well as in Ibn Faḍl-u’llah al-‘Umarī’s Masālik-u’l-abṣār fī mumālik-i’l-amṣār. The accounts relate to Muḥammad bin Tughluq’s reign. The Turkish admiral Sīdī ‘Alī Ra’is came immediately after the close of the period; he was at Dehlī when Humāyūn died. Among travellers, who came to India but whose accounts do not deal directly with the sultanate, are Marco Polo (thirteenth century), Ma Huan, the Muslim secretary of a Chinese naval mission, Nicolo Conti, ‘Abd-u’r-Razzāq, the famous author of Maṭla‘-u’s-sa‘dain and Shāh Rukh’s envoy to Vijayanagar, Athanasius Nikitin, Santo Stefano (fifteenth century), Varthema and Barbosa (sixteenth century).

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Too much importance cannot be attached to the treatises on politics, statecraft and law. The hold of the shar‘, the Islamic law, on the Muslim mind was profound, and the rulers took care to follow its tenets in public affairs. Even the slightest disregard led to unpopularity. Suggestions that some rulers ignored the *sharʿ* should be treated with great caution; Baranī was exceedingly strict in his notions of legal propriety and the slightest lapse on the part of the monarch condemned the ruler in the historian's eyes. The structure of the government and the functions of the officials were essentially based on legal sanctions; besides, the *sharʿ* had come to embrace a great deal of Abbasid tradition which was deeply ingrained in the administrative notions of the sultanate. Aspiring politicians and administrators studied, as an essential part of their training, the treatises on politics and the art of government. Besides, the large number of foreigners who continued to be engaged for government service kept up the Muslim tradition of administration in the sultanate. The political and legal writings of the period, therefore, form a necessary background to the history of the administration. In this respect one can transgress the limits of time and space on account of the universality of Muslim legal and political theory, though much discretion is necessary in distinguishing between the universal and abiding on the one hand and the particular and incidental on the other.

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A good rule is to rely mainly on the authorities recognized either universally or in India during or before our period; though one should be permitted to use information regarding an institution which is known not to have undergone a change even if that material is contained in a work written after the end of the sultanate. To take the law books first, there are the famous *Hidāyah* and *Wiqāyah* with their various commentaries. Greater interest, however, attaches to the *Fiqh-i-Fīrūz Shāhī*, a legal compendium compiled by Yaʿqūb Kirāmī and enlarged and revised under Fīrūz Shāh’s patronage, which embodies the orthodox legal view on various problems, some of administrative importance. Another book on Muslim law compiled during the period is the *Majmūʿ-i-Khānī* dedicated to Bahrām Khān who has now been identified with Muḥammad bin Tughluq's tutor, Qutlugh Khān. This work is not important, for it is really a compilation made from previous well-known books. In the sphere of statecraft, the most important works are the *Ādāb-u'l-mulūk wa kifāyat-u'l-mamlūk* and *Fatāwā-i-jahāndārī*. The first book is by Fakhr-u'd-dīn Mubārakshāh alias Fakhr-i-Mudabbir, the author of one of the histories discussed above. This work, which is also called *Ādāb-u'l-ḥarb wa'sh-shujā'ah*, was presented to Sulṭān Shams-u'd-dīn Īltutmish; it describes in great detail a number of political, administrative and military institutions. As a contemporary picture of government, its value is considerable.

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Although other authors mention it, an extensive use of the book has been made for the first time in this treatise. The *Fatāwā-i-jahāndārī* is by the historian Baranī who, as internal evidence shows, wrote it under Muḥammad bin Tughluq. It reveals Baranī's ideals and notions of government with clarity besides throwing light on several institutions. The *Tadhkirat-u'l-khulafā fī tawṣiyat-i'l-mulūk wa'l-umarā* is anonymous and without date but it was written in India and mentions 'Alā-u'd-dīn Khaljī and Baranī among others. The of the writers outside India, the most important is Abū-'l-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Baghdādī al-Māwardī, generally known as Imām Māwardī, who in his main work *Al-aḥkām-u's-sulṭāniyah* gives a detailed picture of the administration as he found it during the last days of the Abbasids. As he was writing from the jurist's point of view, his book had a profound influence on the subsequent development of Muslim polity. Ghazzālī wrote as a political philosopher and mystic; it was through him that Greek political ideas gained popularity in Muslim countries. Though a wazīr under the Saljūqs, Abū 'Alī Ḥasan ibn 'Alī Ṭūsī Niẓām-u'l-mulk was long regarded in Muslim lands as a master statesman and his *Siyāsat-nāmah* was the bible of Muslim administrators. So great was his influence that even the spurious *Naṣā'iḥ* enjoyed popularity; it should, however, be admitted that it is useful in throwing light on the spirit of the government in those days.

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'Unṣur-u'l-Ma'ālī's Qābūs-nāmah was also studied with respect by nobles and princes. Ibn Khaldūn's famous Prolegomena, Jurjī Zaydān's A't-tamaddun-u'l-Islāmī and Von Kremer's Culturgeschichte des Orients give an excellent insight into the origins of Muslim institutions and their working. For the Hindu antecedents, there are the famous nīti-shāstras besides the invaluable Arthashāstra by Kautilya.

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Numismatics and Epigraphy. Coins and inscriptions are as useful to the writer on administration as they are to the political historian. Edward Thomas's Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi will remain a classic; H. Nelson Wright's The Coinage and Metrology of the Sulṭāns of Dehli brings the numismatic information up to date. Some useful information is also available in The Coins of the Kings of Ghazna by Thomas. Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's Āthār-u'ṣ-ṣanādīd, the reports of the Archæological Survey of India, the Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica and the catalogue of the Archæological Museum of Dehlī have also been used.

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Modern works. A large number of modern works on the various aspects of the subject of this treatise have been consulted; but most of these deal with subsidiary topics only. Of the works dealing directly with the period, the most useful from the author's point of view was W. H. Moreland's The Agrarian System of Moslem India, which leaves little to be desired in erudition and criticism; where this book differs from the views expressed by Moreland, it is in the spirit of further examination of the question in the light of extended information. Unfortunately, Moreland deals with only one of the many topics under examination; for the rest there was little in modern works to guide the writer. The Cambridge History of India, Volume III, is mainly a chronicle; Dr. Ishwari Prasad's History of Medieval India is too much of a text-book and his views hardly bear the test of impartial criticism; Lane-Poole's *Medieval India* is charming to read, but now out of date. Of recent works there is Dr. R. P. Tripathi's *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, a history of the monarchy and *wizārat*; its chapters on the agrarian system were written before Moreland's book was published. Dr. Ishwari Prasad has also written *A History of the Qaraunah Turks in India* of which the first volume only has been published. A much better work is Āghā Mahdī Ḥusain's *The Rise and Fall of Muḥammad bin Tughluq* which deals with the same subject; for he has used a larger number of sources and his views are more balanced. The author discusses the administration, but he relies only on the contemporary authorities and specially on Ibn Baṭṭūṭah, whereas it is necessary to take a more extended view even to understand the working of institutions in a single reign. His thesis on *Le Gouvernement du Sultanat de Dehli* is sketchy and mainly reproduces Ibn Baṭṭūṭah. Kanwar Muḥammad Ashraf has published his thesis on *Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan (1200-1550 A.D.)*; he has excluded, as he himself states, "all references to the civil administration, the system of land revenue, the army, the system of transport, the ideas on education, and the development of literature, or even to the religious life of the people."¹ Even in the realms he has explored, it would be difficult to agree with all his opinions and conclusions. The various English and French translations of Persian and Arabic authorities have been used with great caution; it is necessary to rely on the original texts in unravelling the technicalities of administration. Most of the translations, in any case, need editing. However, of a different nature is Professor Hodivala's learned commentary on Elliot and Dowson, which has unravelled many a knotty problem of *Indo-Muslim History*.²

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¹ Pp. 108-109.

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² This book was not officially published when I wrote this treatise. However, I was able to consult an advance copy through the courtesy of my supervisor, Dr. R. B. Whitehead, when I was finally revising the manuscript of this book for the first edition.

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MUḤAMMAD welded into a polity the disorganized and warring Arabs by inculcating among them the necessity of unity. They were enjoined "to hold fast by the covenant of Allah" and to form a compact brotherhood.¹ This teaching was to play a great part in the history of Islam, for its logical consequence was the theory of an indivisible Muslim world. The death of the Prophet was a crucial test of the solidarity of Islam. The community had to choose a new head. The Qur'ān was silent beyond saying that Muslims should settle their affairs by mutual consultation.² The Prophet had abstained from nominating a successor or laying down any rules. Sectarian traditions to the contrary may be dismissed as later fabrications in face of the historical evidence that they were not advanced at the time of election. Nothing, however, could be more natural than what actually happened. The leaders met in their usual assembly house and chose one who, by his piety and eminence, seemed to be the natural leader. The most significant fact in the election is that the separatist tendency of the Anṣār who proposed that there should be two imāms, one for the Quraish and the other for themselves, was ruled out, because that would have divided Islam. The decision of the leaders, whose choice fell on Abū Bakr, was communicated to the people who confirmed it by giving allegiance. The importance of this election in Islamic history cannot be over-emphasized. It provided the later jurists with a precedent on which they could base their theories of succession not only to the caliphate, but also to kingship. The immediate significance, however, did not lie in the method of the election; the person elected was to exercise a deeper influence on the subsequent history of the Muslim world. Certain Bedouin tribes refused to pay zakāt. They did not forsake their belief in Islam; in refusing to pay the legal taxes they were only trying to revert to tribal anarchy; they wanted to break away from the central authority. This endeavour was considered an act of apostasy by the caliph who, in spite of the critical nature of the situation, decided to wage a jihād against the rebels to bring them back to their allegiance. He thus re-emphasized the principle of the indivisibility of Islam.

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¹ Holy Qur'ān, III, 102.

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² Ibid., XLII, 38.

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The head of the Muslims was the caliph. His functions as laid down by the jurists indicate his place in the Islamic polity. He is the defender and maintainer of the Faith, the protector of the territory of Islam, the supreme judge of the state, and the chief organizer and administrator of the commonwealth.¹ He is the successor to the Prophet as head of the community, commander of the Faithful, leader and ruler of all Muslims. His authority is limited by the existence of a divine law which he cannot supersede, but he is its final interpreter and it is his duty to enforce it.² The caliph was not a priest, but the Abbasids assiduously exploited the idea of being the vicegerents of the Prophet until they achieved a sacerdotal character and became the centre of unwarranted superstition.³ The existence of a rival caliphate in the West with parallel claims deprived them of much of the Muslim world. The hidden propaganda which they had employed against the Umayyads had now turned against them with a much better developed technique. The claims of the rival house of the Fatimids considerably weakened the Abbasid authority.

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¹ Al-aḥkām-u's-sulṭāniyah, pp. 3, 16; Arnold: The Caliphate, p. 72.

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² Arnold: The Caliphate, pp. 31-34, 72; Sulūk-u'l-mulūk, ff. 15b, 16a.

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³ Hulāgū hesitated to kill Musta'ṣim, for he was told that the world would come to an end if the caliph were executed.

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and the rise of powerful chiefs and rulers proved disastrous to their political power. All these factors made it more necessary for the House of Baghdād to make themselves as sacrosanct as Muslim opinion would tolerate.

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In the eastern lands of Islam the legal position of the Abbasids was unquestioned. It almost became an article of orthodox belief to recognize their supremacy, for the Fatimids identified themselves with the Shī‘ahs. No orthodox Muslim could think of owning allegiance to the Fatimids without abjuring his sect. The Sunnī jurists could not help exaggerating the claims of the Abbasid caliphs in fighting the vigorous propaganda of the Bāṭinīs. Writers like Ibn Khaldūn emphasized the religious aspect of the caliphate by rejecting the idea of its rational necessity and basing it entirely on the shar‘.¹ So great was the prestige of the Abbasid caliphs that a powerful ruler like the Buwayhid ‘Aḍud-u’d-dawlah, made a pretence of complete submission and reverence before the puppet caliph Ṭā‘ī‘ whose name he used to maintain his own authority. That ‘Aḍud-u’d-dawlah being a Shī‘ah could not believe in Ṭā‘ī‘s legal sovereignty is obvious.² Maḥmūd of Ghaznah could threaten the caliph, but he also sought recognition from him.³ Even the mighty Saljūqs, who ruled the largest empire of their day, could not ignore the caliph’s legal position. In short no monarchy considered itself legally established without recognition by the Commander of the Faithful. Niẓāmī-i-‘Arūḍī has put the legal position well when he explains that a monarch is a lieutenant of the caliph to administer the outlying parts of the commonwealth which cannot be easily governed by one authority from the centre. Just as the Prophet is the vicegerent of God and the caliph the vicegerent of the Prophet, the monarch is the vicegerent of the caliph.⁴ Thus it would appear that no area where the caliph was recognized could be legally independent. Even the rulers of states on whom he was politically dependent were legally subordinate to him. *De jure* he was the sovereign, no one could rule without his consent. Writing as late as the middle of the fifteenth century Khalīl bin Shāhīn aẓ-Ẓāhirī says about the caliph that no king of the east or the west can hold the title of sultan unless there be a covenant between him and the khalīfah.¹

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¹ Proleg., pp. 165-166.

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² Jurjī Zaydān : Umayyads and Abbasids, Eng. tr., p. 258.

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³ ‘Utbī, pp. 214-216.

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⁴ Arnold: The Caliphate, pp. 73, 74 quoting Chahār Maqālah.

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¹ Quoted by Arnold in *The Caliphate*, pp. 101, 102.

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The Muslim jurists had a remarkably practical outlook; whenever they saw an anomaly, they tried to remove it. In order to bring law into accordance with practice, they juggled with the interpretation of the word 'governor'. Māwardī, living in an age when the caliph's power was in decay, recognizes three kinds of governors. The first are the governors with limited powers, the second those with unlimited powers and the third *de facto* independent rulers and monarchs—men who carve out their own dominions—whom he styles 'governors by usurpation'.² It would be difficult, even impossible, to depose these last. Obviously it was practical politics to recognize them, and thus to regularize what was clearly rebellion. This method had the advantage of maintaining appearances, of respecting the feelings of the legalists and utilizing capable men in the interests of Islam by not driving them to extremes. It was, on the other hand, too compromising a method to make the unity of Dār-u'l-Islām a political reality. It was a cloak which only imperfectly covered the nakedness of the caliph's weakness. It, however, kept alive the idea of the unity of Islam.

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² *Al-aḥkām-u's-sulṭāniyah*, p. 32.

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The first part of India to come under the sway of Islam was Sind which was conquered in the days of a strong caliphate by the caliph's army acting under the orders of his governor, Ḥajjāj. Of greater importance, from the point of view of Indian history, was the occupation of the major portion of the Panjāb by Maḥmūd of Ghaznah who was legally a lieutenant of the caliph.¹ Thus the Panjāb became a part of the Eastern Caliphate. Maḥmūd’s son, Mas‘ūd, was also recognized by the Abbasids.² Baihaqī has preserved the form of the written oath of allegiance which the sultan had to sign.³ It would be difficult to imagine a more solemn oath; it fully brings out the legal subordination of the sultan as a vassal of the caliph. The rest of the Ghaznavids frankly recognized their vassalage.⁴ Thus the tradition of allegiance to the Abbasids was firmly rooted in the Panjāb when Mu‘izz-u’d-dīn Muḥammad bin Sām conquered it. The caliph is mentioned on the coins struck in his name as joint king of Ghūr with his brother Ghiyāth-u’d-dīn as well as on the pieces struck by him as a full-fledged monarch after the death of his brother in 599 A.H. (1202 A.C.)⁵ Ghiyāth-u’d-dīn had been the recipient of robes of honour on several occasions from al-Mustaḍi-bi-amr-i’llah and a’n-Nāṣir-li-dīn-i’llah; the sultan is styled ‘Helper of the Commander of the Faithful’ by Minhāj-i-Sirāj.⁶

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¹ C.H.I., iii, p. 26.

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² Vide Appendix A.

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³ Thomas, pp. 12-14, 29.

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⁴ Baihaqī, p. 50.

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⁵ On Coins of Ghazna, pp. 78-108.

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⁶ Minhāj, pp. 76, 125.

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Religious belief and tradition, therefore, made allegiance to the caliphate a foregone conclusion when the sultanate of Dehlī was founded by Quṭb-u’d-dīn Aibak who assumed the royal dignity on 18th Dhu’l-Qa’dah 602 A.H.⁷ He received his insignia from Ghiyāth-u’d-dīn Maḥmūd, the nephew of his late lord and master, Mu‘izz-u’d-dīn Muḥammad bin Sām, it is true, and not from the caliph but there seems to have grown up a theory that what the caliph did not forbid, he permitted, for instances of rulers owning allegiance to the caliph and not receiving explicit recognition from him are too numerous to justify any other legal theory. It was certainly better to receive a diploma of investiture, but the jurists do not seem to have considered it essential. It should not be considered, however, that the suzerainty of the Abbasids remained unquestioned.

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⁷ Ibid., p. 140.

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Multān had long been a centre of Karmathian dissenters from whose possession Muḥammad bin Sām took the city in 571 A.H. (1175 A.C.).¹ But the sect did not die, and one of their secret agents martyred the sultan at Damīk in 602 A.H. (1205 A.C.).² On 6th Rajab, 734 A.H. (1337 A.C.), a thousand fully armed members of the sect entered the Jāmi‘ Masjid at Dehlī and began to slaughter the worshippers. It was only when some soldiers were rushed to the spot that the insurrection was quelled.³ We read of Fīrūz Shāh taking action against these dissenters.⁴ The vast majority of the Muslims in India and all the sultans of Dehlī were, however, orthodox and mainly supporters of the Abbasids.⁵ Most of the Muslim conquerors came to India from lands of orthodoxy.

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¹ Minhāj, p. 116.

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² Ibid., p. 124.

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³ Ibid., pp 189-190; Zubdat-u’t-tawārīkh, f. 13a.

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⁴ Futūḥāt-i-Fīrūz Shāh, p. 7.

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⁵ Dawalrānī Khiḍr Khān, p. 47; Masālik-u’l-abṣār, p. 27.

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The first sultan of Dehlī to receive explicit recognition was Shams-u’d-dīn Īltutmish. The name of a’n-Nāṣir-li-dīn-i’llāh had appeared on his coins as early as 622 A H. (1225 A.C.), or even earlier.⁶ On Monday, the 22nd Rabī‘-u’l-awwal, 626 A.H. (1229 A.C.), the emissaries of the caliph Abū Ja‘far Manṣūr al-Mustanṣir-bi’llāh reached Dehlī. It was a day of rejoicing, for the newly established empire was receiving formal recognition from the Commander of the Faithful. The city was decorated and the emissaries were given a befitting reception. In sending robes for the sultan the caliph had not forgotten his sons and nobles, and even the slaves were remembered.⁷ Al-Mustanṣir’s name now replaced a’z-Ẓāhir’s on the coinage and was, for the first time, mentioned in Hindī on the humble billon currency so that the poorest might come to know who was their legal overlord.⁸ They were to learn that their land was a part of Dār-u’l-Islām and their mighty ruler was only one of the many who owned allegiance to the caliph. Mustanṣir’s name was removed from the new dies of the mint by ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Mas‘ūd Shāh in 641 A H. (1243 A.C.) when the news of the caliph’s death reached Dehlī, and the name of his unfortunate successor, Musta‘ṣim, was inscribed instead.¹ It is curious, however, that Mustanṣir’s name appears on a few coins of Nāṣir-u’d-dīn Maḥmūd’s reign; these were probably old dies in distant mints.²

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