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The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics c16.s2: Section 3. The Theory of International Relations

The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics c16.s2

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English

Contents

Section 3. The Theory of International Relations

a) The Doctrine of Mandala (Sphere of Influence)

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The conception of "external" *aiśvarya* (sovereignty) was well established in the Hindu philosophy of the state. The Hindu thinkers not only analyzed sovereignty with regard to the constituent elements in a single state. They realized also that sovereignty is not complete unless it is external as well as internal, that is, unless the state can exercise its internal authority unobstructed by, and independently of, other states.

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"Great misery", says Śukra, "comes of dependence on others, there is no greater happiness than that from self-rule". This is one of the maxims of the *Śukra-nîti*³ bearing on the freedom of the *râṣtra*, or the land and the people in a state. Kautilya also in his remarks on "foreign rule" expresses the same idea in a negative manner. Under it, we are told in his *Artha-śâstra*,¹ the country is not treated as one's own land, it is impoverished, its wealth carried off, or it is treated "as a commercial article". The description is suggestive of John Stuart Mill's metaphor of the "cattle farm" applied to the "government of one people by another."

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³ Ch. III, line 646. It is not the object of this section to describe the Hindu laws of peace, war and neutrality, for which see Visvanath's "International Law in Ancient India" on the *Mod. Rev.*, April-November 1918, and Pramatha Nath Banerji's "International Law and Custom in Ancient India" in the *Journal of the Department of Letters*, Vol. I (Calcutta University), 1921.

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¹ Book VIII, ch. II, *Ind. Ant.*, 1910, p. 83. For older uses of the concept of *sva-râj* (self-rule) *vide* the *Atharva-Veda*, XVII, i, 22, 23, also Macdonell and Keith's *Vedic Index*, Vol. II, p. 494; the *Mod. Rev.* March 1919.

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The doctrine of independence (*svârâjya*, *aparâdhînatva*) implied in this conception of external sovereignty was obviously the foundation of the theory of the state in relation with other states. And it gave rise to certain categories of *droit des gens* or *jus gentium* which normally influenced Hindu political thinking from at least the fourth century B. C. These concepts can more or less be grouped under the doctrine of *mandala*, that is, sphere or circle (of influence, interests, ambitions, enterprise, and what not).

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This doctrine of *mandala*, underlying as it does the Hindu idea of the "balance of power," pervades the entire speculation on the subject of international relations. It is hinted at by Śukra² and referred to by Manu.³ Kâmandaka⁴ has devoted a whole chapter to the topic. It has been exhaustively treated by Kautilya.⁵ We are not concerned here with the doctrine as such; we shall only study it in its bearing on the theory of sovereignty.

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² IV, i, lines 39—43.

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³ VII, 154, 156, 207.

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⁴ Ch. VIII.

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⁵ Book VI, ch. II.

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In the first place, the doctrine of *mandala* is essentially the doctrine of *vijigîsu* (aspirant to conquest) or *Siegfried*. It is the cult of expansion. Now, the *Mahâbhârata*⁶ inculcates the ethics of "manliness as the highest thing" and characterizes it as consisting in a ceaseless "upward striving". The same aspiration to "press only up" and "bend not" or "elect glory even at the cost of life" can influence each and all of the states on earth. The doctrine becomes necessarily a spur to the struggle for existence, self-assertion and world domination among the *Siegfrieds*. The conception is thus altogether a dynamic factor calculated to disturb the equilibrium and *status quo* of international politics.

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⁶ Book XII, ch. 56, verse 15; V, 127, 19—20; V, 134, 39; *J. A. O. S.*, 1889, pp. 156, 187—189.

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First, then, in regard to the doctrine of *vijigîsu*. According to Kautilya,¹ it is the ambition of each state to acquire "strength and happiness" for the people. The *élan vital* of a ruler in Kâmandaka's conception² also lies in the "aspiration to conquer". The king, says he, should establish in himself the *nâbhi* (or centre of gravity) of a system. He should become the lord of a *mandala*. It is part of his duty to try to have "a full sphere around him" just as the "moon is encircled by a complete orb". The "full sphere" is, of course, the circle of states related to the Siegfried as allies, enemies and neutrals. Perpetual "preparedness" must therefore be the first postulate of *Realpolitik* in Hindu theory. "One should be ever ready with *danda*" (the "mailed fist"), declares Manu³ naively, "should always have one's might in evidence and policies well-guarded, as well as be ever on the look out for the enemy's holes". Further, one should "bring to subjection all those elements that are obstacles to the career of triumph".⁴

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¹ *Ind. Ant.*, 1909, p. 284.

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² VIII, 1, 3, 6.

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³ VII, 102.

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⁴ Manu, VII, 107.

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The rationale of this preparedness is very simple indeed. It is as elemental as human blood itself. It goes without question in *Śukranîti*⁵ that "all rulers are unfriendly", nay, they are "secret enemies to those who are rising, vigorous, virtuous and powerful". "What wonder in this?" asks Śukra, and his solution is given in another query which carries its own answer: viz., "Are not the rulers all covetous of territory?" Such being the data of international psychology, Kâmandaka⁶ frankly suggests that "in order to do away with one's enemies their kith and kin should be employed" whenever possible. For, is not poison out-done by poison, diamond cut by diamond, and the elephant subdued by the elephant? "Fishes, again, swallow fishes, similarly relatives relatives." The *Râmâyana* is cited in the *Kâmandakî-nîti* for a corresponding precedent in diplomatic tactics. The fact is well known that in order to overthrow Râvana his brother Vibhîsana was exploited by Râma.

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⁵ IV, i, lines 15—17.

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⁶ VIII, 58. f..

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The *vijigîsu*, then, cannot by any means afford to indulge in pious wishes or have faith in the Utopian statecraft of idealistic dreamers. What under these conditions are likely to be the relations between the hypothetical Siegfrieds of the *nîti-śâstras*? These firebrands are normally endowed with a war-mentality and a bellicose attitude. The world in their eyes is a theater of warfare and equipment for warfare, as it has really been since the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu's *Art of War*; and they proceed on the assumption that nothing can be unfair in war. The student of political science must therefore have to make almost the same remarks about the "aspirants" of Hindu political speculation as those of Grotius in the prolegomena to his epoch-making *Laws of War and Peace* (1625). "I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world", writes the father of international law, in regard to the European international politics of the early seventeenth century, "a license in making war of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed. Recourse was had to arms for slight reason or no reason, and when arms were taken up, all reverence for divine and human law thrown away, just as if men were henceforth authorized to commit all crimes without restraint".

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The *vijigîṣu* would think like Maude of the British War-office that the "surest means of keeping the peace is war", or like Stockton, the American militarist, that "the army and the navy is not a burden during peace, but if properly maintained is but a paying business proposition". He can also have the idealism of a Hegel in order to support his *sâdhanâ* or *Streben* to win the place in the sun, and if necessary may as well induct the ancient Greek sophists in his service to prove that might is right.

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The theorists who propounded the cult of *vijigîṣu* would have been in good company with the philosophers of ancient Greece. In Aristotle's postulate of "natural" slaves, "natural" masters, "natural" wars, and so forth, the writers of the *nîti-śâstras* could easily find a place for the "natural" aspirations, "natural" allies and "natural" enemies of their doctrine of *mandala*. The *Politica* assumes that the "barbarians", or non-Greeks, were intended by nature to be slaves¹ and ruled by the Greeks. And since slaves are "property" like "other things", warfare with the object of making slaves and thus acquiring wealth is a legitimate and "naturally just" occupation.² This Aristotelian justification of warfare can be easily recognized as forming the theoretical basis and psychological background of all wars from the conquests of Alexander and the Roman Caesars down to the Thirty Years' War.³ Furthermore, the methods and tactics of the Christian *vijigîṣus* who are responsible for the expansion of Europe in Asia, Africa and America, can all be traced to the dicta of the father of political science, though as a rule moralists are apt to associate them with the teachings of Machiavelli's *Prince* (1513).

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¹ Book I, chs. ii, vi.

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² Book I, ch. viii.

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³ Lawrence's *Essays on Modern International Law*, IV. Vide Machiavelli's *Discourses*, Bk. II, xxi, Willoughby, pp. 77—78, Lilly's *First Principles in Politics*, p. 56, Hobhouse's *Metaphysical Theory of the State*, pp. 100—103, Stockton, p. 203.

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The opinions adumbrated in the *nîti-śâstras* are in any case neither exclusively oriental nor exclusively medieval or primitive. Nor need they be dubbed exclusively Machiavellian. For, has not the *Prince* furnished the fundamental logic of statesmen from the Athenian Pericles and Macedonian Philip down to the Metternichs, Bismarcks and Cavours of our own times? "Also it must be recognized", as Figgis, justifying the methodology of Machiavelli, says in his volume on political theory, *From Gerson to Grotius*,¹ "that in a state of things like international politics, where there is no recognized superior, and even International Law is but the voice of public opinion, the condition of affairs is very much more nearly akin to the state of nature as imagined by Hobbes than it is in the relation of individuals". It is on such considerations that, like Machiavellism, the doctrine of *vijigîṣu* maintains its legitimate place in a theory of international relations. It provides an unvarnished statement of the only hypothesis which can satisfactorily explain the innate militarism that the human world inherits from "beasts and birds".

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¹ Page 101.

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Let us now examine the other aspect of the doctrine of *maṇḍala*, that of the struggle for existence and "place in the sun" among the states. To a *vijigîṣu*, as Bhîṣma² declares, "right is that which a strong man understands to be right"; and the international *mores* of the *Mahâbhârata*³ is summed up in the dictum that "victory is the root of right", just as its creed of life for the individual appraises "death as better than lack of fame". How, then, is this quest of fame, victory or world-domination to be regulated by each state in competition with the others? Are there any rules or methods by which the competing states may guide themselves in this conflict of aspirations? These constitute in substance a natural corollary to the doctrine of *vijigîṣu*.

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² *Mahâ.*, Book II, ch. 69, verse 15.

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³ J. A. O. S., 1889, pp. 187–189.

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The "proper study" of the *vijigîṣu*, a Kaiser Wilhelm *in posse*, is, according to the *Manu Samhitâ*,⁴ his own and his enemy's spheres. And how are these spheres located in his imagination? Śukra gives a brief summary of the Siegfried's investigations as to the "balance of forces" or "conjuncture of circumstances" with a view to the "Next War." We are told that the enemies diminish in importance according as they are remote from the "centre of the sphere." First to be dreaded by the *vijigîṣu* are those who are situated around or very near his own state, then those who live farther away,⁵ and so on. With the remoteness of location, enmity, hatred or rivalry naturally declines. Whether a state is to be treated as inimical, indifferent or friendly depends *per se* on its propinquity or distance. The geographical distribution of states influences their psychology in regard to their neighbors as a matter of course in such an order that the positive antipathy of the nearest dwindles into tolerable apathy of the next and gives way to active sympathy and even friendliness of the farthest distant. This, however, is not the only possible grouping of powers in a *vijigîṣu's* estimation. The *Śukra-nîti*¹ gives another order in which the states may be distributed. According to this computation, first are situated the enemies, then come the friends, next the neutrals, and the most remote on all sides are the enemies again.

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⁴ VII, 154.

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⁵ *Śukra-nîti*, IV, i, lines 39–41.

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¹ *Ibid*, IV, i, lines 42—43.

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These are the elementary principles of international dealings of which elaborate accounts are given in the writings of Kautilya and Kâmandaka. The theory holds that there is a hypothetical tug-of-war always being fought between the *vijigîṣu* and his *ari* (the enemy). These two are the combatants or belligerents. Along with these are to be counted another two states in order to furnish a logical completeness to the hypothesis. The *quadrivium*² consists of the following members:

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² *Kâmandakî*, VIII, 20; *Manu*, VII, 156.

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1. The *vijigîṣu*: the aspirant, e. g., an Alexander "mewing his might," bent on "conquering and to conquer;"

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2. The *ari* (the enemy): the one that is situated anywhere immediately on the circumference of the aspirant's territory;³

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³ *Artha*, Book VI, ch. ii, in the *Ind. Ant.* for 1909, p. 283. For a fuller account of the Kautilyan *Maṇḍala* see Law's *Inter-state Relations in Ancient India*. He suggests new terminology for states 3. and 4. in the *quadrivium* (vide, pp. vi, 13). But so far as the problem before the *vijigîṣu* is concerned the new terms do not seem to introduce any new point of view (p. 31).

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3. The *madhyama* (the mediatory): the one (located close to the aspirant and his enemy) capable of helping both the belligerents, whether united or disunited, or of resisting either of them individually;⁴

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⁴ *Ibid.* According to Law, *madhyama* = "medium power" state, cf. *Inter-state etc.*, p. 10.

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4. The *udâsîna* (the indifferent or the neutral): the one (situated beyond 1, 2, and 3) very powerful and capable of helping the aspirant, the enemy and the mediatory, together or individually, or resisting any of them individually.⁵

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⁵ *Ibid.* Law describes *udâsîna* as the "super-power" (*Ibid*, pp. 9—13).

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These four states, then, constitute the smallest unit of international grouping. From the standpoint of the *vijigîṣu* all other states are either his own allies or the allies of his enemy. Such states are held to be eight in number according to the hypothesis. How, now, is the "aspirant" to pick up his own allies from the crowd? He need only study the geographical position of these states with reference to the belligerents, i. e., to himself and to his enemy.

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The *madhyama* (the mediatory) and the *udâsîna* (the neutral) may be neglected by the Siegfried, for the time being, in his calculation of the possible array of forces directly allied or inimical to his career of conquest. The two belligerents, with the eight others (divided in equal proportion as their allies *in potentia*), are then located in the following order of *entente cordiale* by Kâmandaka¹ and Kautilya.²

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¹ VIII, 16, 17.

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² Book VI, ch. ii, *Ind. Ant.*, 1909, p. 284.

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The "aspirant" occupies, of course, the hypothetical centre. Next to his front is the "enemy." Now we have to calculate frontwards and rearwards. Frontwards: next to the "enemy" is situated (1) the aspirant's ally, next to that is (2) the enemy's ally, next (3) the ally of the aspirant's ally, and last (4) the ally of the enemy's ally. Rearwards from the aspirant: First is situated (1) the rearward enemy, next is (2) the rearward ally, then comes (3) the ally of the rearward enemy, and last (4) the ally of the rearward ally.

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There is nothing queer, archaic or unworkable in this conception of international relations. A simple illustration would show how humanly the political theorists of India approached the foreign policy of nations. Thus, for instance, according to the Kautiliyan doctrine of *mandala*, the "natural enemies" of France engaged in studying the *modus operandi* for "the next war" would be Spain, England and Germany, and her "natural allies" Portugal, Scotland, Ireland and Russia. A French *vijigîṣu*, e. g., a Napoleon, embarking on a war with Germany, should begin by taking steps to keep his "rear safe." With this object he should have Spain attacked by Portugal, and manage to play off the anti-English forces in Ireland and Scotland in such a manner that England may be preoccupied at home and unable to attack France in support of Germany. As Germany, on the other hand, is likely to have China as her natural ally (supposing there is no other state between Russia and the Far East), the French *vijigîṣu* should set Russia against China, and so on. It is obvious that the diplomatic feats conceived by the Hindu political philosophers could be verified almost to the letter by numerous instances in European and Asian history, especially in ancient and medieval times when Eur-Asia was divided into numberless nationalities.

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Nay, the principle of Kautilyan *mandala* is in operation even now in the numerous states carved out of the old Germanistic empires (1918). For instance, the manner in which Poland is being bolstered up by France against Germany on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other is in keeping with the adumbrations of the Old Asian Richelieu. Italy's pro-Hungarian sentiments as against Jugo-Slavia (1921) are also explicable quite easily by the *nîti* theory of political geography.

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Be this as it may, we have to observe that the group of ten states or a *decennium* constitutes one complete *mandala*. The *vijigîṣu* is the centre of gravity of this sphere. Now each state can have the same legitimate aspiration, that is, each can be fired by the same ambition to form and figure out a sphere of its own. The inevitable result is a conflict of interests, a pandemonium of Siegfrieds united in discord. The problem of statesmen in each state is to find out the methods of neutralizing the policies of others by exploiting the enemies of its rivals in its own interests. The doctrine of *mandala* thus makes of *nîti-śâstra* or political science essentially a science of enmity, hatred, espionage and intrigue, and an art of thousand and one methods of preparedness for "the next war."

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We need not go into the details of the *Machtpolitik* conceived in Kautilya's *Artha-śâstra* or in the sections on warfare in the *Śukra-nîti*. But it is already clear that the doctrine of *mandala* has launched us at last into *mâtsya-nyâya*,¹ the logic of the fish, the Hobbesian law of beasts, anarchy. The doctrine assumes and is prepared for a world of eternally warring states. While "internal" sovereignty dawns as the "logic of the fish" sets, "external" sovereignty postulates the existence of the same logic as a fact in international relations. In one instance *danda*² or punishment, that is, "sanction" of the state, is exercised to crush anarchy, but it is apparently in order to maintain a world-wide anarchy that *danda* or *Faust-recht* is employed by one state against another. The theory of the state is thus reared on two diametrically opposite conceptions:

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¹ Kautilya, I, iv; Kâmandaka, II, 40.

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² Manu, VII, 20; Śukra, I, line 45.

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1. The doctrine of *danda*, which puts an end to *mâtsya-nyâya* among the *prajâ* or members of a single state;

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2. The doctrine of *mandala*, which maintains an international *mâtsya-nyâya* or the civil war of races in the human family.

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From one anarchy, then, the state emerges only to plunge headlong into another. This is the dilemma that pervades the political philosophy of the Hindus.

b) The Doctrine of Sârva-bhauma (World-Sovereign)

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The Hindu theory of sovereignty did not stop, however, at the doctrine of a universal *mâtsya-nyâya*, that is of a world in which each state is at war with all. It generated also the concept of universal peace through the establishment of a *Weltherrschaft* as in Dante’s *De Monarchia*.¹ The doctrine of *mandala* as a centrifugal force was counteracted by the centripetal tendencies of the doctrine of *sârva-bhauma* (the ruler over the whole earth). With this theory of the world-state and *Pax Sârvabhaumica* we shall conclude our present study.

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¹ I, 4, I, 8, I, 10, etc.

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In Europe the idea or ideal of a universal empire took most definite shape towards the beginning of the fourteenth century “exactly when the actual development of the modern nationalities was rendering it practically impossible.”² This crisis and this transition in Western political thought are best represented in Bartolus (1314—1357), the “prince of jurists,” for he began³ by seeing a single universal empire, but he ended by recognizing a miniature empire in every *de facto* independent power. The same conception of a world sovereignty or a *federation de l’empire* is however as old in India as the political philosophers of the earliest Vedic period.

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² Carlyle, Vol. III, 179. But the concept of Dantesque universal monarchy is as old as Cicero. *Vide* Atger’s *Histoire des doctrines du Contrat Social*, p. 26.

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³ Woolf, 45, 109, 196.

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“Monarchy at its highest,” we read in the *Aitareya Brâhmana*,⁴ “should have an empire extending right up to natural boundaries, it should be territorially all-embracing, up to very ends uninterrupted, and should constitute and establish one state and administration up to the seas.” The ancient theorists were evidently thinking of the Indian continent as identical with the entire world. The achievement of a pan-Indian nationality was in their eyes the equivalent of a world federation just as in medieval European theory the unification of western Christendom was tantamount to the constitution of one state for all mankind, or as in the Eur-American world-peace movements of today “the world” is postulated to be the territories inhabited by albinoes or white races.

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⁴ VIII, 4, 1, in Mookerji’s *Fundamental*, p. 89.

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This theory of a world-nationalism (or, what is the same thing, a United Indianism) exercised a powerful influence on the political speculations of the Hindus. It gave rise to set formulae and slogans that fired the imaginations of the Alexanders, Charlemagnes and Fredericks of India through the ages. The *Aitareya Brâhmana*⁵ records some of the ambitions and ideals of the Young India of the sixth century B.C. and beyond. "I want to attain to lordship over all rulers," proclaims one aspirant, "I want to achieve the conquest of both space and time . . . I want to be *sârva-bhauma* . . . and be the *eka-rât* (sole monarch) of the earth up to the skies."

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⁵ VIII, i, 39.

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Hindu political thought produced several other categories to express the same idea of the world-state or universal sovereignty. We have, first, the doctrine of *chakravarti*. It indicates that the *chakra* or wheel of the state-chariot rolls everywhere without obstruction. The wheel is the symbol of sovereignty. Or, if *chakra*¹ be taken as denoting a country from sea to sea, the *chakravarti* would be the ruler of a state from sea to sea (i. e., extending to the farthest limits). It is this conception of a political "dominion," of a secular overlordship, that is employed metaphorically with a spiritual significance in the conception of the Lord Buddha as *Chakkavatti*. "A king am I, Sela," says Buddha² using the language of his contemporary imperialists, "the king supreme of righteousness. The royal chariot-wheel in righteousness do I set rolling on—that wheel that no one can turn back again."

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¹ Monier Williams' *Dictionary*.

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² *Sela-sutta* in *Sutta-nipâta*, III, 7, 7; Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 126.

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Secondly, we have the doctrine of *sârva-bhauma* expressed in the more popular and conventional conception of *samrât*. The *Mahâbhârata*, for instance, uses this category in order to convey the idea of a world dominion. "There are *râjâs* (kings) in every home (state) doing what they like," we read in the Book on *Sabhâ*,³ "but they have not attained to the rank of *samrât*; for that title is hard to win." And this rank is at last won by Yudhisthira in the epic. Yudhisthira would thus be the *Veltro* of the *Divine Comedy*.

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³ *Mahâ*, *Sabhâ* XV, 2.

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Another category in which the doctrine of *sârva-bhauma* is manifest is that of *châturanta*, of which Kautilya⁴ availed himself in order to establish his ideal of imperial nationalism. The *châturanta* state is that whose authority extends up to the remotest *antas* (limits) of the *chatur* (four) quarters. The ruler of such a state *ananyâm prithivîm bhumkte*, i. e., enjoys the whole earth with none to challenge his might. In the *Arthaśâstra*, he is known also as *chakravarti*, for the territory of such a *châturanta* is called *chakravarti kṣetra* (dominion of a *chakravarti*).

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⁴ *Artha*, I, v, vii.

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The *sârva-bhauma*, *chakravarti*, *samrât*, or *châturanta* of Hindu political theory is identical with the *dominus omnium*, or lord of univer- *sitas quaedum* in Bartolus’s terminology,¹ the *hwangti* of the Chinese.² He is “the monarch of all I survey.” He rules a state whose limits extend from sea to sea (*âsamudra-kṣitîśa*), and his chariots have free passage up to the skies (*ânâka-ratha-vartma*), as Kâlidâs, the Virgil of India, puts it in his *Raghu-vaṁśa* (“The House of Raghu”). The pretensions of the doctrine of *sârva-bhauma* thus bear close analogy with the universal authority claimed by Hildebrand (c1075) for the Papacy, or with that rival conception of his opponents, the Ghibelline imperialism of the Hohenstaufens. Herein is to be perceived the Hindu counterpart of the doctrine, albeit from the monarchical angle, of a single state for entire humanity, the futurist version of which has embodied itself from time to time in diverse forms, — in the visions of “permanent peace,” or in the pious wishes for a “parliament of man” or for the now almost discredited “league of nations,” or for its antithesis, the communist “Third International” of the proletarian world.

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¹ Woolf, pp. 22, 196.

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² Hardy, p. 126.

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The doctrine of *sârva-bhauma* does not stand alone in Hindu political philosophy. It is backed up by several other concepts which may be regarded as its logical feeders. First is the concept of the gradation of rulers in the scale of *aiśvarya* (sovereignty). The *Rig Veda*,³ the *Śatapatha Brâhmaṇa*,⁴ and other ancient documents recognize a hierarchy or graded rank of states from the lowest unit up. According to the *Aitareya Brâhmaṇa*⁵ the smallest nationality is a *râjya*. From this rung the ladder gradually takes us through higher or larger “powers” like the *sâmrâjya*, *svârâjya*, *vairâjya*, and *mahârâjya* up to the greatest power, known as the *âdhipatya*.

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³ IV, 21, 1.

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⁴ XI, 3, 2, 1, 6.

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⁵ VIII, 4, 1.

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Another scale of small nationalities, medium states, and great powers is furnished in the following schedule of the *Śukra-nîti* thus:⁶

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⁶ Ch. I, lines 365—374. Vide Rao’s “Kings, Crowns, and Thrones in Ancient and Mediaeval India” in the *Mod. Rev.*, Feb. 1917.

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| *Title* | *Annual Income in Silver Karṣa*⁷ |
| 1. *Sâmanta* | 1 to 3 hundred thousand |
| 2. *Mândalika* | 3 hundred thousand to 1 million |
| 3. *Râjâ* | 1 million to 2 million |
| 4. *Mahârâja* | 2 million to 5 million |
| 5. *Svarât* | 5 million to 10 million |
| 6. *Samrât* | 10 million to 100 million |
| 7. *Virât* | 100 million to 500 million |
| 8. *Sârva-bhauma* | 500 million and up |

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⁷ A little more than 25 cents in present United States currency.

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The *sârva-bhauma* is further described as being that ruler “to whom the earth with its seven islands is ever bound.”

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This concept of a scale of nationalities or a rank of states, as “first class powers” or “great powers” and “small nations” or the like, according to income and title, is essentially linked up in Hindu theory with the concept of political *yajnas*, sacrifices and rituals, which are fully described in the *Brâhmanas*. The *Gopatha Brâhmana*¹ says that Prajâpati became *râjâ* by *râjasûya* sacrifice, *samrât* by *vâjapeya*, *svarât* by *aśvamedha*, *virât* by *puruṣamedha*, and so forth. We need not go into the details of these rituals. We have only to note that not every ruler is entitled to perform any and every sacrifice. Each sacrifice has its own value or mark of sovereignty attached to it; the dignity, might and rank of states being dependent on the character of the sacrifice performed.

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¹ Part I, pp. 77, 78, in the *Bibl. Ind.*; *vide* Law’s “Forms and Types of States in Ancient India” in the *Mod. Rev.*, Oct., 1916.

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According to the *Śatapatha Brâhmaṇa*,² again, the office of the king is the lower and that of the emperor the higher, and therefore one becomes king by offering the *râjasûya*, and by the *vâjapeya* one becomes emperor. But the *râjasûya* is known to be the highest sacrifice in the *Taittirîya Brâhmaṇa*,³ for according to this work, it can be performed only by universal monarchs exercising sovereignty over a large number of princes as the lord of an imperial federation. The *Aitareya Brâhmaṇa*⁴ also says that by virtue of the *râjasûya*, Janamejaya, Saryâta and ten other rulers, “subdued the earth” and became “paramount sovereigns.” In the *Âpastamba Śrauta Sûtra*,⁵ however, *aśvamedha* (horse-killing) sacrifice possesses the greatest dignity, for it can be performed by a *sârva-bhauma* (the ruler of the whole earth).

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² V, 1, 1, 13.

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³ Rajendralal Mitra’s *Indo-Aryans*, Vol. II, p. 2, 3.

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⁴ VIII, 21–23.

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⁵ XX, 1, 1.

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It is obvious that authorities differ as to the relative importance of the political sacrifices, but all are united in the concept that the rituals have a state-value on their face, and that it is the greatest power or the largest nationality alone that is entitled to the highest sacrifice (be it the *râjasûya* or the *aśvamedha*, or what not). The concept of *yajna*, like that of the scale of the states, is therefore an important element in the theory of *Weltherrschaft*, world-monarchy or federated universe embodied in the doctrine of *sârva-bhauma*.

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Last but not least in importance as a foundation for the doctrine of *sârva-bhauma* is the concept of *dig-vijaya*¹ or conquest of the quarters. It implies that there is no longer a mere *vijigîṣu* or aspirant, awaiting his chance, mewing his might, or watching the conjuncture for “the next war.” The Siegfried has conquered the quarters of the globe, he has realized his highest ambitions. The wheel of his chariot has rolled to the very extremities of the world, and there is none to question his power and prestige. All rival states have been subdued by him. He has brought them to subjection almost in the manner that Napoleon wished when he said in 1804: “There will be no rest in Europe until it is under a single chief, an emperor who shall have kings for officers, who shall distribute kingdoms to his lieutenants, and shall make this one king of Italy, that one of Bavaria; this one ruler of Switzerland, that one governor of Holland, each having an office of honor in the imperial household.” *Dig-vijaya* has conferred on the *vijigîṣu* the chiefship of such a Napoleonic league of nations.

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¹ *Aitareya Brâhmaṇa*, VIII, 4, 1; for instances of *dig-vijaya* in Hindu political tradition *vide* Mookerji's *Fundamental*, p. 87.

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It is under these conditions of a “conquest of the quarters” that the hero of the *Raghu-vaṁśa* is authorized to celebrate the *viśva-jit* (indicating world subjugation) sacrifice at the end of his Alexandrine exploits. *Dig-vijaya* brings about a situation in which there is absolutely no scope for the doctrine of *maṇḍala* or international *mâtsya-nyâya*. The world is at peace under the undisputed sway of the lord of the *universitas quaedum*, the *sârva-bhauma*. The unstable equilibrium of a *vijigîṣu’s* hypothetical *maṇḍala* has given way to the *pax sârva-bhaumica* established by the *de facto* monopoly of world control through *dig-vijaya*.

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A natural concomitant of the concept of *dig-vijaya* is the idea that the *sârva-bhauma* has all the other rulers related to him not as to the *vijigîṣu* of a *maṇḍala*, that is, not as to the ambitious storm-centre of an international sphere, but bound as to a *râja-râja* or king of kings, to whom allegiance is due as overlord. With the rise of the *sârva-bhauma*, the *maṇḍala* necessarily disappears. The old order of the “enemy,” the “neutral” and other states has vanished, the new order of the world-state has arisen. An epoch of universal peace has replaced the age of warring nationalities, conflicting *ententes*, armed neutralities, and militant attitudes. The doctrine of *sârva-bhauma*, as the concept of federal nationalism, imperial federation, or the universe-state, is thus the keystone in the arch of the Hindu theory of sovereignty. The message of *Pax Sârva-bhaumica*, in other words, the doctrine of unity and concord is the final contribution of *nîti-śâstras* to the philosophy of the state.

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