The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c15.70

c15.70

An alliance between the two European neighbours against their common Indian enemy was perhaps the most obvious course to pursue in existing conditions, but mutual suspicion had so long stood in its way. The Portuguese had very reluctantly parted with Bombay, and the steady growth of English influence on the Malabar coast was certainly not to their liking. They often suspected the English of piratical practices, and the Conde de Ericeira seriously believed that Angria got his artillery and ammunition from Bombay. He also feared that the English would quietly withdraw from the war when they saw the Portuguese involved in it. Moreover, the man-power at the disposal of the Bombay Government was not calculated to create confidence. He informed his successor that Bombay had no more than eighty Englishmen, all of whom were merchants and clerks. The Count, therefore, strongly urged the new Viceroy not to conclude any alliance with the English, the only power whom he could recommend as reliable being the Sidi of Janjira.¹ But when Robert Cowan, the English agent, reached Goa in March 1721, they had been at war with Angria for three long years, and the loss they had suffered probably provided sufficient evidence of their resolution. Moreover, a squadron of four ships under Commodore Thomas Mathews had left England for the East in February of that year, and the news must have reached the European settlements in India sometime before the conclusion of the treaty, which was signed on 20 August 1721, only a week before the arrival of the English fleet at Bombay. The treaty consisted of fourteen Articles and provided for equal division of the spoils of the war and the conquered territories. Of the naval strongholds of the Angria, Kolaba was to be awarded to the Portuguese, while Gheria was to fall to the English. Evidently, the allied powers were planning the complete conquest of the Angria’s possession and the total destruction of his power. It was therefore decided that no peace proposal was to be entertained by either of the allies; all such questions were to be jointly decided.²