The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c15: Chapter XI: The Maratha Navy under the Angrias
The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c15
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Chapter XI: The Maratha Navy under the Angrias
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AFTER Shivaji's death the Marathas passed through a great crisis. During the stormy days of Sambhaji and Rajaram most of their older leaders passed away. At one time it appeared that the nascent Maratha power might be crushed out of existence by the sheer weight of the Mughal empire, but the unusual crisis brought a number of young men of exceptional energy and ability to the forefront, and the new leaders not only saved the newly founded kingdom from imminent extinction but added to its power and prestige both by land and sea. And while Balaji Vishwanath, the founder of the Peshwa family, was gaining Shahu’s confidence, the chief command of the Maratha fleet had already passed to Kanhoji Angria, the founder of a family which made itself feared and respected by all the sea powers of the coast, Indian and European.
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The principal commander of Shivaji’s fleet, as has been stated, were mostly Musulmans; but apparently the prospects of the sea-service had quickly attracted ambitious Maratha youths, and early in Sambhaji’s reign Santaji Pavla, Govindaji Jadhav and Govind Kanho had earned some reputation as naval officers,¹ though Mai Naik, Daulat Khan and Sidi Misri still directed the destinies of the Maratha fleet. But before Sambhaji’s downfall a Maratha Admiral, competent to assume the responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief, had already been found in Bhim Rao, otherwise known as Sidoji Gujar. Kanhoji Angria was one of his lieutenants.
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¹ Malhar Ram Rao Chitnis, Sambhaji Maharaj ani Thorle Rajaram Yanchin Charitern, ed. K.N. Sane, pp. 14-15.
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Kanhoji’s origin was obscure, and he certainly did not belong to the nobility of the land. Of his early career little or nothing is known. A Portuguese Viceroy states that he started life as a humble servant of other Hindus in the island of Versova.² The rapid growth of his power, however, soon attracted the wondering notice of his contemporaries, and all sorts of probable and improbable stories about his birth and early career obtained currency among the credulous seamen who frequented the ports of western India. These stories were widely disseminated through the literary efforts of an English sailor, Clement Downing,¹ and the account of Angria’s Arabian origin was so commonly accepted that an unknown writer, who claimed to narrate an ‘authentic history and fighting adventures’ of Kanhoji’s son, Tulaji, had no hesitation in calling him ‘the Arabian pirate’.² Among modern writers, Enthoven believes in the Abyssinian origin of the Angrias, but he adduces no evidence for his belief.³ According to the official history of his family, Kanhoji was a Maratha Kshatriya by birth and the original surname of his ancestors was Sankpal. The new name of Angria was supplied by the village of Angarvadi, where the family had long resided.⁴ Tukoji, father of Kanhoji, had served under Shivaji;⁵ and the son had naturally followed in the footsteps of the father. Malhar Ram Rao Chitnis says that when Rajaram sought refuge in Jinji he was accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief of the navy, Sidoji Gujar, and Kanhoji was left in charge of Suvarnadurg. Here he distinguished himself against the Sidis of Janjira who had reconquered their lost possessions on the mainland and was appointed Subhedar of the Armada by Rajaram with the title of Sarkhel. When exactly this happened we do not know, but by 1703 he had attained so much importance that Caetano de Mello e Castro, Viceroy of Goa, addressed a friendly letter to him, sent him some presents and permitted the merchants of Chaul to purchase a vessel which Kanhoji had probably captured as a prize and was anxious to dispose of.⁶ In 1710 he captured a Dutch sloop.⁷ In 1712 he was simultaneously at war with the Portuguese, the Sidi and his own countrymen of Shahu’s party, while his relations with the English were at breaking point, but his power on the sea was so well recognised that a Portuguese writer did not hesitate two years later to compare him with the famous Barbarossa.¹
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² Biker Manuscripts (Archive Ultramarino of Lisbon, Fundo geral 8548) p. 149; Instruccam que deixou o Conde de Ericeira Dom Luiz de Menezes V. Rey e Capitao Geral da India a Francisco Jose de Sampayo que lhe foy succeder no dito emprego no anno 1721. (Bibliotheca Publica of Evora cod. CV/1-1) fols. 201-3.
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¹ Clement Downing, *A History of the Indian Wars*, pp. 7-9.
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² *The Arabian Pirate; or Authentic History and Fighting Adventures of Tulagee Angria*.
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³ Enthoven, *Castes and Tribes of Bombay*; Vol. I, p. xiii.
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⁴ Mawjee and Parasnis, *Kaifiyats Yadis*, p. 1.
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⁵ Malhar Ram Rao Chitnis, *Thorle Shahu Maharaj Hyanchen Charitra*, ed. Sane, p. 38.
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⁶ Sen, *A Preliminary Report on the Historical Records at Goa*, p. 59.
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⁷ Press List of Ancient Dutch Records from 1657 to 1825 (Madras Records Department), pp. 7-8.
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¹ Relacam dos Progressos das armas Portuguezas no Estado da India no anno 1713, Pt. I, p. 19.
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Kanhoji had not the genius or imagination of Shivaji. But the Maratha navy had been an active unit for nearly forty years when he succeeded to the chief command. Its aims and objects were well known and clearly defined. The Maratha merchantmen were to be protected from the pirates who infested the Malabar coast, Maratha subjects were to be protected against the depredations of the Sidi and the sovereignty of the sea was to be secured for the Maratha State. It was, however, no easy task and Kanhoji had to contend against no less than five rivals, the Sidi of Janjira, the Savants of Wari, the English of Bombay, the Dutch at Vingurla and last but not least the Portuguese of Goa. The Sidis demanded his attention first. They had taken the fullest advantage of the Mughal occupation of Maharashtra and had re-established their dominion on the mainland. It was Kanhoji’s duty to drive them back to their island retreat and recover the lost possessions of his master. The Sidis were no longer so formidable at sea, as they once had been, but the Maratha fleet consisted of no more than eight or ten small vessels, as we learn from Conde de Ericeira, when Kanhoji was called upon to assume its command.² Money was, therefore, needed for additional ships and for the enlistment of more men for the army; and money could be obtained in one way only, namely, by exercising the sovereignty of the sea as Shivaji and his sons had done and compelling alien traders to purchase Kanhoji’s *cartaz*. This at once brought him into conflict with the Portuguese.
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² Instruccam que deixou o Conde de Ericeira (Bibliotheca Publica of Evora, Cod. CV/I-1) fol. 201.
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When exactly Kanhoji first challenged the Portuguese supremacy of the seas we do not know, but his first victim was not a merchantman. It was a Portuguese pal-of-war, richly laden and carrying on board the retired Governor of Chaul, who ultimately died from the rigours of his imprisonment.³ Kanhoji next fought two manchuas-of-war belonging to the Portuguese fleet of the North. He burnt one and captured another with 27 Portuguese prisoners. They were all put to the sword, according to a Portuguese official account, except one captain who purchased his life and liberty by paying a ransom of 12,000 Xerafins.¹ Many merchantmen sailing under Portuguese colours shared the same fate and contributed to Kanhoji’s coffers; but the richest spoil that he obtained at the cost of his Portuguese neighbours was in 1712 during the viceroyalty of Rodrigo da Costa, when he boldly attacked the merchant fleet sailing for the ports of the North. The fleet was convoyed by two frigates under the command of Luiz da Costa. Kanhoji fell upon the frigates with his Pals, dismantled the Portuguese flagship, and captured no less than forty Parangues. This was a great blow to Goa, for a large number of its citizens lost all the capital they had invested in this mercantile enterprise.² The next year the merchant fleet was better convoyed, but Kanhoji did not hesitate to attack two Pals that were lagging behind. The engagement lasted for two days and nights and Angria’s fleet had at last to retire with much loss.³
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³ Biker Manuscripts, p. 150.
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¹ Ibid.
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² Instruccam que deixou o Conde de Ericeira, fol. 161, Biker, *Tratados da India*, Vol. V. pp. 292-3.
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³ Biker, *Tratados da India*, Vol. V. p. 293.
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The Portuguese, however, found themselves in a very sorry plight. Their possessions on the Bombay coast had been isolated and Angria was in a position to cut off their communications by land and sea. Success had augmented his self-confidence and he exacted a fee not only from Portuguese subjects fishing in the sea and the estuaries, but also levied a contribution on their villages. In 1713 he gave the Portuguese authorities further offence by attacking a frigate of 34 guns that had just landed a Portuguese force at Chaul. In this combat also the Angria’s fleet, though numerically superior, was discomfited; whereupon the Viceroy resolved to take the offensive and sent Antonio Cardim Froes with a fairly numerous flotilla to reduce Kolaba. Having sailed with six Pals and some Gallivats, he blockaded the port. The Angria, who was not inclined to hazard a naval action, responded by hauling his fleet ashore out of range of the Portuguese guns and leaving Froes to continue his ineffectual blockade.⁴ Three months later the Portuguese Captain was forced to depart by the receipt of news of the arrival of the Arab fleet at Surat. In consequence, possibly of the Viceroy’s complaints against the Sidi¹ for lukewarmness, the latter in December, 1713 also sent an expedition against Kolaba;² but as Angria obtained his provisions by land, the Abyssinian was no more successful than his European ally.
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⁴ Ibid, pp. 304-5.
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¹ J. A. Ismael Gracias, *Uma Dona Portugueza na Corte do Grao Mogol*, p. 139.
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² Relacao do Successo que houve no Estado da India no anno de 1714 sendo Viceroy e Capitao geral do mesmo estado Vasco Fernandes Ceaser de Menezes (a contemporary letter in Archivo Ultramarino de Lisbon Fundo, geral 465), pp. 91-2.
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The Portuguese and the Sidi were not the only enemies that Kanhoji had to reckon with. In 1712 he had captured the Governor of Bombay’s armed yacht with another English vessel, the *Anne* of Carwar. As a partisan of Tara Bai, he had waged a successful war against Shahu and extended his dominions on the mainland by the reduction of the strong fortresses of Lohagad, Tung and Tikona. Shahu’s Peshwa, Bahiro Pant Pingle, had been taken a prisoner by his forces. But these successes did not turn Kanhoji’s head. As a practical man he realised the limits of his resources and decided to conclude peace with Shahu and the English so that he might be free to defend his territories against the joint efforts of the Sidi and the Portuguese. A treaty with the English involved little difficulty, but peace with Shahu was not so simple an affair. Consequently, he decided to come to terms with the English at once, and sent a messenger to Bombay in February 1713 with proposals for peace, offering to deliver the captured vessels if an Englishman of credit was sent to Kolaba. The Governor and Council proposed the following terms:
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(1) ‘That he deliver up all that he has taken that belonged to the Company and our people.’
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(2) ‘That upon no pretence whatever he meddle with any English ships or with the ships belonging to the merchants who live under the protection of the English as Madrass, Bengall or any other factorys or colonys belonging to the English whatsoever.’
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(3) ‘That whatever ships or vessels belong to any nation whatsoever that are coming into our harbour and in sight thereof he is not (to) meddle with them that is between Mahim stakes and Cundry and at their going out the same rule is to be observed.'
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(4) 'That he grants our merchants the free liberty of his ports they paying usuall customs being conformable to the rules thereof. If any vessells belonging to Sevagee Rana (Raza) or Sow Razah shall take or molest any vessells belonging to Bombay they having his convoy which he is obliged to give he shall be answerable for the damage.'
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(5) 'Wee on our parts promise that wee will permit no ships or vessells whatever to wear English colours, but what belong to the subjects of the English nation, which shall be incerted in all their ships.'
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(6) 'Wee grant him free liberty of our port of Bombay to buy sell and merchandise he paying the usuall custome and observing the rules of our port, which if he complys with that wee send the *Blenheim Ann* and *Manchua* to fetch the Companys effects which he has taken and our people.'¹
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¹ Bombay Public Consultations, Range CCCXLI, No. 4, (Consultation 12 February 1712-13).
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These terms were accepted by Kanhoji, as they imposed little or no sacrifice on him. If his ports were to be thrown open to the Bombay traders, he at any rate obtained similar concessions from the English; and this no doubt was to the mutual advantage of both parties. The English, it is true, refused to supply him with 'powder and shott' and did not consent to give him a place for manufacturing powder, while to a proposal of mutual military assistance in times of need they gave only an evasive answer. But as regards 'mariners and inhabitants of Bombay that of their own free will will serve him' the English promised 'not to hinder them'; and they also consented to another request of his 'that his Groabs and Galevatts have free liberty to come and return to and from this port (of Bombay) without impediment'. Kanhoji was henceforth to desist from interfering with all ships coming to or going from Bombay; but complete immunity was granted only to vessels belonging to the Company and their subjects, while foreign vessels that came to or sailed from Bombay would be safe only within a certain specified distance. He obtained a further undertaking from the English that they would convoy foreign vessels only 'out of sight' of Bombay after which, as the tenor of the correspondence indicates, Kanhoji would be free to deal with them as he pleased. The most important clause of the treaty was the fifth which obliged the English not to permit foreign ships or vessels to fly their colours.¹ It was the interpretation of this last term which led to hostilities a few years later between Kanhoji and the English.
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¹ Ibid, (Consultation, 14 February 1712-13).
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In his treaty, or more accurately his agreement, with Shahu, Kanhoji showed wisdom and moderation. Recognising that his strength lay mainly in the sea, he relinquished his recent conquests on the mainland. The possession of the coast, on the other hand, was essential not only for the maintenance of uninterrupted communication between different ports, but also its revenue on which the navy, as in Shivaji's days, ordinarily depended. He, therefore, received from Shahu Rajmachi and other places and the important island of Kenery.² In acknowledging Shahu's supremacy, he recognised the right of the stronger of the two claimants to the headship of the Maratha Government; and although he thereby incurred the displeasure of Sambhaji of Kolhapur, he practically secured himself from any invasion from the mainland by the promise of the Peshwa to help him whenever occasion should arise. This treaty was concluded in the latter part of 1713 or in the earlier months of 1714. As an immediate result of it the Sidi after further territorial losses came to terms with the Angria and withdrew altogether from the struggle, leaving the Portuguese to carry on the war alone. This explains the bitter complaints made by the Viceroy in 1715 against the Chief of Janjira. In 1716 the Portuguese sought a new ally in the Raja of Kolhapur with whom they concluded an offensive and defensive alliance against Kanhoji;³ but Sambhaji of Kolhapur possessed neither energy nor ability and the net result of these diplomatic efforts was nil. The Angria’s fleet rode the sea boldly, seizing merchantmen of all nationalities which had omitted to purchase his passports, and the Portuguese found themselves powerless to circumscribe his activities. Of all their possessions on the coast, Chaul suffered most; for the main source of its income was the volume of dutiable commerce which suffered heavily from Angria’s interference. His fleet, which originally consisted of eight or ten small Gallivats, now comprised far more than forty vessels of varying type; and adventurers of all nationalities, European and Asiatic, flocked to his service. It was, indeed, reported that Kanhoji boasted that he could capture Chaul whenever he liked. But luckily for the Portuguese they soon found an ally more formidable than the weak Sidi or the incapable Sambhaji. In 1721, only eight years after the conclusion of their treaty with Kanhoji, the English formed an offensive and defensive alliance with the Portuguese against him, though their actual breach with the Maratha admiral had taken place much earlier.
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² Malhar Ram Rao Chitnis, *Thorle Shahu Maharaj Hyanchen Charitra*, pp. 39-40; Mawjee and Parasnis, *Treaties Agreements and Sanads*, pp. 197-9.
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³ Biker, *Tratados da India*, Vol. VI, pp. 2-4.
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The amicable arrangement between Kanhoji and the English was short-lived. Though he had promptly restored the two captured English vessels after the conclusion of the treaty, he had omitted to return their cargo. This was, however, not the only source of dissatisfaction. In 1715 Kanhoji complained to Governor Boone ‘of ill usage in return for the good offices he had done’, while in March 1716 Boone wrote to his masters at home that he was not pressing the outstanding claims against Angria ‘as they were not in a good posture to oppose him’.¹ He was temporising in expectation of a suitable opportunity of vindicating English claims. The matter was eventually brought to a head by Kanhoji’s capture of three ships in succession and his forcible appropriation of some timber from one of the Company’s vessels.
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¹ Foster, Downing’s History of the Indian Wars, p. xiii.
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The first ship that Angria captured was the Success. The English contended that it belonged to their broker Govardhan Das and was therefore an English ship. As the Bombay authorities were still unable and unwilling to break with Kanhoji, the President permitted the broker to try private negotiation; and it was ultimately settled that the ship should be returned in exchange for some presents.
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But owing to mutual distrust and suspicion the arrangement fell through, and another ship, the *Robert*, was captured by Angria’s officers. On 3 January 1717-18 the Bombay Council met to discuss yet another act of aggression by Kanhoji, ‘Cannojee Angria’, we read in the Bombay Public Consultations, ‘two or three days since having carried the Rt. Hon’ble Companys Surat boat into Collaby one of his ports and taken out some pieces of timber, brought in a debate in what manner we should resent this insult, on consideration that wee are not in a very good condition, being so bare of ammunition, soldiers and seamen to perform anything with our arms. Tis agreed that the President expostulate the affair with him by letter, and endeavour by that means to bring him to reason and prevent if possible such insults for the future’.¹ For identical reasons the Council decided on 22 January, to send a Prabhu to Captain Henry Cornwall who was then in one of Kanhoji’s ports in connection with the negotiation about the *Success* with instructions to expostulate with Angria about the *Robert*.²
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¹ Bombay Public Consultations, Range CCCXLI, No. 4, p. 2. ² Ibid, p. 11. ³ Ibid (Consultation 6 February 1717-18), pp. 31-3. ⁴ Ibid.
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Kanhoji positively refused ‘to deliver up the ship *Robert* or free the Englishmen belonging to her, on pretence of her belonging to the Moors’.³ The English were still unable to retaliate. ‘Our condition at present obliging us to dissemble these insults and the President embarquing to-morrow for Surat directed that Mr. Parker during his absence endeavour by Rama Comatec to get the Europeans taken in said ship set at liberty, but that wee do not appear in it ourselves till a more favourable opportunity should offer.’⁴ Kanhoji having captured another ship, the *Otter*, the Council decided on 5 April ‘to serve him in the same kind’ and authorised the Governor to issue private instructions to the English frigates to take and destroy Kanhoji’s ‘grabbs should they fall their way’. But war had not yet been declared. Open hostilities were hastened by the detention at Mahim of a *Shibar* belonging to Angria’s port Alibag, which evoked a wrathful letter to Boone from Kanhoji.
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‘Our friendship is over,’ said he, ‘and from this day forward what God gives I shall take.’ Angry correspondence followed, which was not calculated to improve the impaired relations between the two powers and Boone and Kanhoji freely and in no ambiguous language cast reflections upon each other’s good faith.¹ At last, on 17 June 1718, war was openly declared against Kanhoji Angria by a proclamation published at Bombay.²
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¹ For these letters *see* Bombay Public Consultations, Range CCCXLI, No. 4, pp. 58-61 (Consultation 13 April 1718) and pp. 77-83, (Consultation 7 May 1718).
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² Ibid, p. 96.
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The nationality of the three captured ships was a highly controversial question. The owners of the ships were not English, but the cargo belonged to English subjects, and Kanhoji contended that they were not entitled to exemption from the ordinary rules of passports. He wrote to Captain Cornwall ‘that the ships belonging to Bombay, Bengall or Madras shall not be molested by him but that if the English will freight on countrey shipping they must expect that he will make prise of them.’³ This he reiterated in his letter to Boone. ‘The English’, he wrote, ‘freight the ships of foreign merchants and lade them with their goods, and receive no molestation they having English colours. This is gain to the owners of the ship; yet how can they carry on their trade without a pass. To-day you freight the ship Sacry; to-morrow Your Excellency will say that you have a mind to freight fifty or a hundred ships of the Surat merchants. If so what occasion have they to take a pass they always took of mee, and if Your Excellency intends to carry on the trade alone under your colours, why did the Bombay merchant who hired the ship of the Duan of Chaul write to mee and take my pass for her?’ To this Boone retorted: ‘Let the bottom be whose it will, the money lent on it is worth more than the ship, and the goods are English you well know, or else you would not have attempted so barbarously to beat the Captain and other Englishmen into a confession of what made for your purpose.’
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³ Ibid, (Consultation 5 February 1717-18), pp. 31-32.
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Modern practice will not uphold Boone’s contention that a ship loses its original nationality when it carries foreign cargo of superior value; but Kanhoji’s excuse for taking the East India Company’s timber was palpably unsound. He pleaded necessity: ‘I had wrote Your Excellency before the necessity I was in for timber, and then I had timber coming from Bombay of foreign merchants, which was chosen by my people, which I gave you notice of, and had your licence for a carpenter to come from thence, which you repealed and hindred the timber to be brought. In this manner things go on, demonstrating that tis not Your Excellency alone that governs. Your Excellency has no intention to do anything contrary to our friendship, but you find it necessary to act according to what is told you by bad men who live with you. As I had a great necessity for timber, when the boat came from Surat, I brought her in, in a friendly manner, believing that you observed the friendship without scruples, and what’s a little timber? Had I wrote to you, you would have given it mee, but as it might have hapned that somebody or another would have stopt it, as they did before, and my work thereby be put to a stand, I took the timber here and wrote Your Excellency to let mee know the price thereof, and had for answer you wanted timber, which I took well, expecting when mine would come to repay you. In this there is no cause of difference.’
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Kanhoji’s excuse for retaining the cargo of the *Anne* and the Company’s yacht was equally ingenious, but neither the cargo nor the timber mentioned above would have proved an insuperable obstacle to peace. The real ground of contention was that the English had to load foreign boats with their goods and demanded for these boats the same immunity to which ships of undoubted English nationality were entitled. Kanhoji was unwilling to grant this demand, which would have meant financial loss to him. Five years earlier he might have been more compliant, but his treaty with Shahu had strengthened his position on the mainland, and his victory over the Sidi and the Portuguese had added to his confidence, while the English had suffered a loss of prestige after the ill success of the Carwar expedition in 1717. But while unwilling to make concessions to the English, Kanhoji was prudent enough not to offer any additional offence to the Portuguese. Conde de Ericeira tells us that Kanhoji did not give Portuguese subjects any trouble.
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during the term of his Viceroyalty.¹ One enemy at a time was enough for him.
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¹ Instruccam que deixou o Conde de Ericceira (Bibliotheca Publica of Evora, Cod. CV/1-1), fol. 201.
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The English commenced the war with resolution and vigour and sent a number of minor expeditions against Kanhoji's coast. The following extracts from Bombay Public Consultations will give some idea of their scope and frequency:²
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² Bombay Public Consultations, Range CCCXLI, No. 4, pp. 87-90.
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'Sunday 25th May:—Sailed our Galevats in order to make further depredation in the territories of Angria.
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Monday June 2nd:—Last night sailed two Galevats with about thirty sepoys to make a descent in another part of Angria's country.
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Wednesday 4th June 1718:—This morning returned the two Gallevats from Angria's country having pillaged one town and brought sixteen prisoners.'
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Similar expeditions were sent out in July, September and October, but they were not always successful. The failure was attributed in some cases to adverse weather and in others to the unwillingness of the men to land. Boone did not rely solely on these punitive expeditions; he realised that he could not bring Kanhoji to terms unless some of his principal strongholds were reduced. Before embarking, however, on any serious enterprise, he tried to exploit the difference between Angria and his quondam sovereign, the Raja of Kolhapur. On the same day that the war was proclaimed at Bombay, 'The President wrote a short letter to Mr. George Taylor Chief of Carwar acquainting him of our breach with Angria and directing him to lay before Sambajee Rajah, the many injuries done to us by him and to acquaint said Rajah if he will chastise him, as soon as the fortresses in his possession are delivered up to him wee shall lay down our arms, or else endeavour to exterpate said pyrate ourselves tho' far from any design against His Highness or any of his loyal subjects'.³ The English negotiation with Sambhaji in 1718 seems to have had no better result than the Portuguese treaty of 1716. A defensive and offensive alliance with the Portuguese against the common enemy was discussed in October 1718, but how far it progressed we do not know. Conde de Ericeira, however, writes of a sound scheme which he had planned for capturing or burning the Angria’s Pals at Gheria, which he complains, was frustrated by carelessness on the part of the English.¹ We read of a futile attempt by the English to burn the Ghurabs at Vissundroog² in November 1719, and apparently therefore, the alliance, if ever seriously concluded, must have ended after this event. Conde de Ericeira, moreover, was highly suspicious of the English and did not think much of their military resources, which were at that moment undoubtedly limited and insufficient.
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³ Ibid, p. 98.
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¹ Instruccam que deixou o Conde de Ericeira (Bibliotheca Publica of Evora, Cod. CV/1-1), pp. 202-3.
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² Vijaidurg.
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The first serious expedition was led by Boone in person and was made against the island stronghold of Kenery, first fortified by Mai Naik in 1679 and now held by Angria’s men. After a severe cannonade a landing was effected but no more than forty persons could be induced to volunteer for an assault. The assault made by such a small party naturally failed, though the failure was attributed to the treachery of Ramji Kamathi, a Hindu inhabitant of Bombay. He was accused of carrying on treasonable correspondence with Angria and was condemned, though without sufficient evidence, to life imprisonment, while his property was confiscated.
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From Kenery the fleet sailed to Kolaba and bombarded the place at intervals, without however effecting any appreciable loss, and they then left for Gheria. All that they effected was to capture from one of Kanhoji’s squadrons four of their prizes; the Ghurabs escaped as there was very little wind.³
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³ Foster, Downing’s History of the Indian Wars, p. xvi.
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While the English fleet was sailing to the south, some of Kanhoji’s Ghurabs appeared near Bombay. They were sighted by Captain Eustace Peacock of the Morrice, who hastily returned with other vessels to Bombay for safety and did not resume his voyage until the enemy had been put to flight by the frigates Victoria, Revenge, Defyance, and the galleys Hunter and Hawk in the third week of January, 1719. About this time peace proposals were made by Shahu and hostilities were for the time being suspended.¹
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¹ Bombay Public Consultations, Range CCCXLI, No. 4 (Consultation 30 January 1719).
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On 30 January 1719, the President informed the Council that Shahu Raja had sent an envoy to him to conclude a peace with the English nation, ‘in which Cannojee Angria his servant should be included and the Angria had also requested his permission to send his servants’. Certain preliminary Articles proposed by the President were agreed to by the Maratha envoy but the gist of these is unknown. Captain John Milles was sent with the President’s letter to Kolaba to bring the English prisoners. He returned on 12 February without his compatriots, who were at Gheria. Kanhoji promised to send the English prisoners quickly with one of his own officers but informed Boone that he had certain objections to the Articles sent to him. What his objections were we do not know. Some Articles alone were discussed, but the treaty was not ratified by Kanhoji,² and the English, after another futile expedition against Kolaba and the capture of the ship *Charlotte* by Angria in 1720, concluded an alliance with the Portuguese which resulted in their joint expedition against Kolaba in December 1721.
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² Robert Cowan in his letter (3 January 1721-22) to Baji Rao says: ‘Two years since His Excellency the Shaw Rajah sent his envoy Sevajee Vissanat who with Damajee Pillaji in behalf of Angria agreed with the President and Governor sundry articles of peace and signed them but Angria has never complyed with these articles.’ Ibid, No. 5.
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An alliance between the two European neighbours against their common Indian enemy was perhaps the most obvious course to pursue in existing conditions, but mutual suspicion had so long stood in its way. The Portuguese had very reluctantly parted with Bombay, and the steady growth of English influence on the Malabar coast was certainly not to their liking. They often suspected the English of piratical practices, and the Conde de Ericeira seriously believed that Angria got his artillery and ammunition from Bombay. He also feared that the English would quietly withdraw from the war when they saw the Portuguese involved in it. Moreover, the man-power at the disposal of the Bombay Government was not calculated to create confidence. He informed his successor that Bombay had no more than eighty Englishmen, all of whom were merchants and clerks. The Count, therefore, strongly urged the new Viceroy not to conclude any alliance with the English, the only power whom he could recommend as reliable being the Sidi of Janjira.¹ But when Robert Cowan, the English agent, reached Goa in March 1721, they had been at war with Angria for three long years, and the loss they had suffered probably provided sufficient evidence of their resolution. Moreover, a squadron of four ships under Commodore Thomas Mathews had left England for the East in February of that year, and the news must have reached the European settlements in India sometime before the conclusion of the treaty, which was signed on 20 August 1721, only a week before the arrival of the English fleet at Bombay. The treaty consisted of fourteen Articles and provided for equal division of the spoils of the war and the conquered territories. Of the naval strongholds of the Angria, Kolaba was to be awarded to the Portuguese, while Gheria was to fall to the English. Evidently, the allied powers were planning the complete conquest of the Angria’s possession and the total destruction of his power. It was therefore decided that no peace proposal was to be entertained by either of the allies; all such questions were to be jointly decided.²
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¹ Instruccam que deixou o Conde de Ericeira, pp. 201-3.
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² Biker, Tratados da India, Vol. III, pp. 242-4; Sen, A Preliminary Report on the Historical Records at Goa, pp. 63-6.
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The success of the scheme depended upon its secrecy. But the Portuguese began to enlist Pathan mercenaries at Bassein, and before long Kanhoji became aware of the new menace that threatened him. He promptly tried to avert the danger by diplomacy and sent peace proposals to the Portuguese authorities.³ The Viceroy, however, curtly rejected Kanhoji’s offer and continued his warlike preparations. The Angria not only strengthened his position by enlisting fresh forces but applied for help and reinforcements from his liege-lord, the Chhatrapati of Satara.
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³ Angria’s letter to the Captain of the Province of the North was, according to a manuscript chronicle in Archivo Ultramarino of Lisbon (Noticias da India desde o fim do governo do Vice Rey Vasco Fernandes Ceaser (de Menezes) athe o fim do anno 1738 em que governava o Viceroy Conde de Sandomil, fundo geral 465), addressed a fortnight before the Anglo-Portuguese agreement was signed.
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We need not go into the details of this expedition; suffice it to say, that it totally failed. Angria, forewarned of the coming danger, was well prepared to face it. The morale of the Bombay men, ‘habituated to defeat in their attacks on Angrian strongholds’, was naturally not very high. Mathews was a brave officer but did not possess tact and other qualities of leadership. The first serious reverse so infuriated him that he insulted his Portuguese colleague, and the breach between the allied armies was so great that Col. Biddulph thinks that ‘a little more enterprise on the part of the Mahrattas would have destroyed the whole force’.
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Kanhoji Angria was a diplomat of uncommon ability. We have already seen how he had tried to prevent the conclusion of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. In his letter he had made a pointed reference to the English failure in 1719 against Kolaba and Kenery, and although he had refrained from mentioning it, the Viceroy was well aware of the results of the Portuguese expedition against Angria’s headquarters under Antonio Cardim Froes in the following year. Better success was expected from the reinforcements Mathews had brought; but enthusiasm and confidence aroused at Goa by the arrival of the English fleet had now been rudely shaken. The Maratha Admiral did not fail to exploit the mutual recrimination and suspicion which now recurred and again made peace proposals to the Portuguese. In spite of the best efforts of the allies Angria’s fleet still kept the sea and the Viceroy learnt that Angria’s captains had captured a Portuguese boat near Diu.¹ Kolaba itself was well provisioned and strongly garrisoned with one thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry. Fresh reinforcements from Poona and Satara were daily hurrying to the field of war. First Pilaji Jadhav and then Baji Rao had appeared in the neighbourhood with an enormous Maratha horde that now numbered twenty-five thousand cavalry. Whatever chance of success there had been at the earlier stage of the campaign now completely vanished. The Portuguese Viceroy, therefore, deemed it wise to accept peace proposals and return to Goa. But his English ally would not agree to such a course, and, according to the lately concluded treaty, he was unable to come to terms with Kanhoji without the concurrence of the English. A way out of this difficulty was soon discovered. Peace was negotiated not by Kanhoji but by Baji Rao, and the Portuguese came to terms not with the Angria but with his master, Shahu. This point was emphasised not only by the Viceroy but also by the Bishop of Nanking, then at Goa, and by Joseph Ferreira de Horta in their letters to Conde de Unhao.¹ The treaty was thus observed in the letter, though it was violated in the spirit. The Viceroy had, it is true, invited the English agent, Robert Cowan, to take part in the peace conference, but he naturally complained that the Portuguese had sacrificed English interests and the English took no part in the negotiations. On 9 January 1722, a treaty was formally concluded between the Peshwa and the Viceroy at the camp of Alibag. The Portuguese undertook not to convoy ships belonging to the enemies of the Marathas but to help the Marathas against their enemies, who were not at peace with the Portuguese. The ports of the two nations were thrown open to the merchants of either party, and the Portuguese promised to furnish the Peshwa with ammunition at a just price, while the Marathas on their side undertook to restore the Portuguese ships captured by the Kolaba fleet.² A copy of this treaty was delivered to Robert Cowan and the English were called upon to accept similar terms within eight days.³ Thus ended the short-lived Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The English were left alone to fight the Angria as best they could.
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¹ Biker Manuscripts, p. 277.
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¹ Varias Cartas da Asia ao Conde de Unhao (Bibliotheca Publica of Evora, Cod. CXX 2-1).
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² Biker, Tratados da India, Vol. VI, pp. 10-12.
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³ Bombay Public Consultations, Range CCCXLI, No. 5, the Portuguese Viceroy's letter to Robert Cowan, dated 15 January, 1722.
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The ill-success of the Anglo-Portuguese expedition undoubtedly contributed to Kanhoji's prestige, and he was soon free to seek his enemies at sea. On 14 March 1722, Goa received the news of a naval victory he had scored. His fleet, consisting of four Pals and twenty Gallivats, had attacked two English Pals between Chaul and Rajapore. One of the two English vessels was burnt and the other was put to flight.⁴ About the same time Angria captured a big English ship richly laden with coins and valuable goods. But his success was by no means uniform; for one of his ships surrendered to the English near Henery sometime between March and October. In October 1722, Kanhoji sailed in person with five thousand men from Kolaba, leaving his eldest son in charge of the government. The Portuguese say that he openly declared that he would not return so long as the name of the English was heard on that coast.¹ It does not appear that he achieved anything. He tried his best to conclude an offensive alliance with the Portuguese against his enemies of Bombay. The Portuguese Government was notoriously short of funds and would not embark on a policy of aggression, although their relations with their former allies were far from friendly, but Kanhoji offered the Viceroy whatever financial assistance he might require and was ready ‘to swear perpetual friendship on the head of his sons’. Jealous as the Portuguese were of their prosperous European neighbour, they were nevertheless more suspicious of the rising power of the Maratha Admiral, and they promptly composed their differences with the English.²
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⁴ Noticias da India desde o fim do governo do Vice Rey Vasco Fernandes.
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¹ Noticias da India desde o fim do governo do Vice Rey vasco Fernandes Ceaser (de Menezes) athe o fim do anno 1738; fols. 118-19.
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² The Portuguese Government referred the points of difference to their masters in Europe.
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In 1724 Kanhoji addressed a letter to William Phipps, who had succeeded Charles Boone as Governor of Bombay in January 1722,³ proposing a treaty of peace. Phipps replied in a haughty tone, commenting on the character of Kanhoji’s government, but Kanhoji renewed his proposal of exchanging prisoners, adding retorts to Phipps’ criticism, which were full of sarcasm. He was impelled to make this proposal, as we are informed by a Portuguese writer, by the desire of securing the liberty of Shivaji Naik, one of his captains, who had been taken prisoner when a Pal of Angria’s fleet surrendered to the English near Cape Rama. Eventually, an exchange of prisoners was effected in 1725, though the main
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³ Forrest, Selections from the Letters, Despatches and other State Papers, Home series, Vol. II, pp. 37-8.
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Ceaser (de Menezes) athe o fim do anno 1738 (Archivo Ultramarino of Lisbon, fundo geral 465) fol. III. The battle was fought on 27 February, see Bombay Public Consultations, No. 4, Consultation 22 March 1721-22.
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differences between the two combatants still remained unadjusted.¹
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¹ Noticias da India desde o fim do governo de Vice Rey Vasco Fernandes Ceaser (de Menezes) athe o fim do anno 1738, fols. 122-3. The exchange of prisoners was effected in the Portuguese island of Karanja on 26 July 1725. See Bombay Public Consultations, Range CCXLI, No. 6.
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But Kanhoji had stronger grounds than the Portuguese suspected for soliciting a cessation of arms. In 1723 he came to blows with the Savant of Kudal with whom he had hitherto maintained friendship and amity. The quarrel arose, as Captain Alexander Hamilton informs us, out ‘of a dispute about a Prize which Connajee Angarie laid claim to’.² The Chief of Kolaba was by far the stronger of the two, and he captured and burnt the Savant’s fleet and then effected a landing near Vingurla and burnt and destroyed the villages near that port. The Savant was hardly a match for him; but Kanhoji was aware of the danger of his allying himself with his European rivals, and about this time rumours reached his ears of the machinations of his enemies at Shahu’s court.³ The Savant in his distress had already applied to the Portuguese for help, and Kanhoji considered it wise not to give them any fresh cause for offence. Prudence also induced him to volunteer proposals of peace to the English. About this time fresh dissensions had taken place between himself and the Sidi of Janjira, who appeared in 1725 before Kolaba with a large fleet of twelve Pals, two frigates and one hundred Gallivats.⁴ It is quite impossible that Kanhoji should have been ignorant of the intended invasion, and this offered an additional ground for his pacific attitude. For reasons unknown to us, the Maratha Admiral considered it unsafe to face the Sidi on the sea, and, as was usual in that age, silver served to avert the danger when steel offered little or no remedy.
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² Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies*, Vol. I, p. 245.
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³ The suspicion of intrigue at Satara was not without basis. See Bombay Public Consultation, Range CCCXLI, No. 4, 23 January 1722.
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⁴ Noticias da India desde o fim do governo do Vice Rey Vasco Fernandes Ceaser (de Menezes) athe o fim do anno 1738, fol. 123. The ineffectual Dutch invasion of Kolaba in 1724 must have also added to Kanhoji’s anxiety; it explains, in part, his moderation and caution.
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The last three or four years of Kanhoji’s life were probably quiet and uneventful. His rivals at sea caused him no anxiety, and in 1725 he considered conditions sufficiently peaceful to justify his leaving his headquarters and journeying to Satara to pay his respects to his sovereign and liege-lord. He was received there with great honour and respect and after a short absence returned to Kolaba, where he died on 20 June 1729.¹
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¹ This date is given by Noticias da India desde o fim do governo do Vice Rey Vasco Fernandes Ceaser (de Menczes) athe o fim do anno 1738 fol. 142. Grant Duff and Nairne think that Kanhoji died in 1728 (Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 87) while Grose and Low are of opinion that he died in 1731. The writer of the Kolaba volume observes in a footnote (Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. XI, p. 149): ‘The fact that Kanhoji’s name is mentioned in the treaty between the English and the Savantvadi Chief in 1730, supports Grose’s date.’ The treaty was concluded on 12 January 1729-30, and the text is to be found in Bombay Public Consultations, CCCXLI, No. 7, pp. 49-50. Article 5 mentions ‘the sons of Conajee Angria’, and we can safely assume that he was not alive when this treaty was concluded.
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Kanhoji Angria may be regarded as the second founder of the Maratha navy, just as Baji Rao I has been styled the second founder of the Maratha empire. He was inspired, as he wrote in his letter to Governor Phipps, by Shivaji’s example, and whatever may be said of his naval practices, he undoubtedly re-established Maratha prestige at sea. Even when he was at open war with the Portuguese, their subjects acknowledged his naval supremacy by purchasing his passports for their trading vessels. He defied the joint efforts of the English, the Portuguese and the Sidi, and in his wars by land and sea he had given evidence not only of good seamanship but also of wise diplomacy. In his foreign relations he could hardly be accused of treachery or faithlessness. Regarding the interpretation of Article 5 of the treaty of 1713, which provided the immediate cause of his war with the English in 1718, there was room for an honest difference of opinion. He never violated the treaty which his master, on his behalf and on behalf of the Maratha State in general, had concluded with the Portuguese State in India in January 1722. In October of that year his fleet met some Portuguese boats on the high seas but permitted them to proceed on their journey as soon as their nationality was known.² In 1723 he permitted Portuguese vessels to take provisions at the port of Gheria,¹ and, according to Portuguese accounts, the Angrias never interfered with their merchantmen or fighting fleet until they were at war with the Peshwa's Government. On the other hand, one eminent Portuguese writer, who was intimately acquainted with the inner policy of the Goa Government, cynically informs us that they secretly helped the Sardesai of Kudal in his war against Kanhoji Angria, because they preferred to have the weaker of the two combatants as their next door neighbour.²
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² Noticias da India desde o fim do governo do Vice Rey Vasco Fernandes Ceaser (de Menezes) athe o fim do anno 1738, fols. 118-19.
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¹ Ibid, fol. 117.
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² Ibid, fols. 118-19.
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As to his methods of enlistment and payment we know very little. But he made no improvement in naval strategy and armaments, which remained in the days of his sons as crude and as primitive as when Shivaji launched his fleet on the Arabian Sea. But he left an extensive province and a strong and respectable fleet to his heirs, who, had they possessed his prudence and moderation, might have added immensely to the prestige and power they had inherited from their famous father.
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Kanhoji left many children by his wives and concubines. Of these six are known to history, Sekhoji, Sambhaji, Manaji, Tulaji, Yesaji and Dhonji.³ Sekhoji was probably the eldest, for his succession to his father's office was uncontested and his authority was acknowledged and respected by his brothers without reluctance. It was during his regime in 1731 that Portuguese vessels at sea were again attacked. The Marathas had made inroads into Portuguese territories to demand and enforce the payment of *sardeshmukhi*; and the Portuguese had retaliated by sending a punitive expedition against Kalyan. The Viceroy despatched a fleet to assist his countrymen in the province of the North. This fleet was driven by inclement weather to take shelter near Angria's stronghold of Gheria and was attacked by him.⁴ The Portuguese accused Sekhoji of treachery, but it should be remembered that the treaty of 1722 had been concluded between the Peshwa as the representative of Shahu on one side and the Portuguese State on the other. Sekhoji’s father was included in the treaty as a servant of Shahu; he was not a principal. Consequently, Sekhoji could not be held responsible for the breach of peace, which was due to the aggressions committed by the Peshwa’s officers. As the hereditary Admiral of the Maratha navy he could not permit Portuguese vessels carrying reinforcements against his master’s territories to make free use of his ports or to proceed to their destination unimpeded. Once peace was terminated Sekhoji did not hesitate to harass Portuguese trading vessels. In 1731 he captured two merchant Pals and one Gallivat,¹ and in 1733 eleven of his Gallivats appeared near the bar of Goa and prevented free navigation until they were driven off.
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³ J.F.M. Mascarenhas, in his *Epanaphora Indica*, Pt. V, pp. 28-33, gives an interesting account of Kanhoji and his sons. He mentions another son, Appaji. Appaji may, by a process of elimination, be identified with Dhondji. Sen, *Early Career of Kanhoji Angria and other Papers*, pp. 20-5.
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⁴ Noticia da India desde o fim do governo do Vice Rey Vasco Fernandes Ceaser (de Menezes) athe o fim do anno 1738, fols. 151-2.
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¹ Ibid, 152.
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Sekhoji made an attempt to compose his differences with the English.² Their alliance with the Savant of Wari in 1730, though fruitless and ineffective, was a warning which he did not ignore. In 1731 the Portuguese fleet had again agreed to co-operate with the English against their common enemy at sea. Sekhoji, therefore, in June 1733 sent two envoys with proposals of peace to Bombay, but events over which he had no control prevented their acceptance. In that very year Peshwa Baji Rao had commenced a war against the Sidi of Janjira. The English and the Portuguese could not remain indifferent witnesses of the extermination of the only country power which offered any check to the naval supremacy of the Marathas. The Viceroy of Goa sent Antonio Cardim Froes with two ships to Janjira, ostensibly to mediate between the two combatants, but really to help the Sidi openly, should such assistance be absolutely necessary. The English openly sided with the Chief of Janjira, and this involved them in open hostility with Sekhoji, who was co-operating with the Peshwa. His brother, Manaji, had inflicted a defeat on the Sidi’s fleet and but for English intervention the island of Henery would certainly have changed masters. The English occupied the little island and hoisted their own flag there, to which Angria responded by an ineffectual bombardment from the neighbouring stronghold of Kenery. Shortly afterwards, the career of Sekhoji was cut short by his death, which occurred in September 1733. With his demise the most successful period of Maratha naval history came to a close.
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