The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c15.76

c15.76

Kanhoji Angria was a diplomat of uncommon ability. We have already seen how he had tried to prevent the conclusion of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. In his letter he had made a pointed reference to the English failure in 1719 against Kolaba and Kenery, and although he had refrained from mentioning it, the Viceroy was well aware of the results of the Portuguese expedition against Angria’s headquarters under Antonio Cardim Froes in the following year. Better success was expected from the reinforcements Mathews had brought; but enthusiasm and confidence aroused at Goa by the arrival of the English fleet had now been rudely shaken. The Maratha Admiral did not fail to exploit the mutual recrimination and suspicion which now recurred and again made peace proposals to the Portuguese. In spite of the best efforts of the allies Angria’s fleet still kept the sea and the Viceroy learnt that Angria’s captains had captured a Portuguese boat near Diu.¹ Kolaba itself was well provisioned and strongly garrisoned with one thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry. Fresh reinforcements from Poona and Satara were daily hurrying to the field of war. First Pilaji Jadhav and then Baji Rao had appeared in the neighbourhood with an enormous Maratha horde that now numbered twenty-five thousand cavalry. Whatever chance of success there had been at the earlier stage of the campaign now completely vanished. The Portuguese Viceroy, therefore, deemed it wise to accept peace proposals and return to Goa. But his English ally would not agree to such a course, and, according to the lately concluded treaty, he was unable to come to terms with Kanhoji without the concurrence of the English. A way out of this difficulty was soon discovered. Peace was negotiated not by Kanhoji but by Baji Rao, and the Portuguese came to terms not with the Angria but with his master, Shahu. This point was emphasised not only by the Viceroy but also by the Bishop of Nanking, then at Goa, and by Joseph Ferreira de Horta in their letters to Conde de Unhao.¹ The treaty was thus observed in the letter, though it was violated in the spirit. The Viceroy had, it is true, invited the English agent, Robert Cowan, to take part in the peace conference, but he naturally complained that the Portuguese had sacrificed English interests and the English took no part in the negotiations. On 9 January 1722, a treaty was formally concluded between the Peshwa and the Viceroy at the camp of Alibag. The Portuguese undertook not to convoy ships belonging to the enemies of the Marathas but to help the Marathas against their enemies, who were not at peace with the Portuguese. The ports of the two nations were thrown open to the merchants of either party, and the Portuguese promised to furnish the Peshwa with ammunition at a just price, while the Marathas on their side undertook to restore the Portuguese ships captured by the Kolaba fleet.² A copy of this treaty was delivered to Robert Cowan and the English were called upon to accept similar terms within eight days.³ Thus ended the short-lived Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The English were left alone to fight the Angria as best they could.