Prakrit Proper Names (Agamic Index I) v1.c5.s2.37

v1.c5.s2.37

e Ganahara of Titthayara Mahavīra⁴ Once he met Mahavīra in a park of Majjhimā Pāvā There he discussed with him the problem of the existence of soul and was fully convinced by the latter regarding its existence He was so impressed by him that along with his five hundred pupils he renounced the world and became Mahavīra’s first disciple The gist of the discus on held between Imdabhūi and Mahavīra in this connect— The existence of soul is doubtful since it is not directly perceived by the senses as is the case with a jar Whatever imperceptible does not exist in the world e g a sky flower The self is not an object of inference since inference too is preceded by perception and is the outcome of the recollection of invariable concomitance There has not been previously seen any connection between the self and its mark the recollection of which along with sight of the mark can lead us to a conviction about the existence of the self The self is not even within the range of scriptural authority since scripture is not entirely distinct from inference Moreover the soul is not directly perceptible to any one whose word are called scripture Besides the scriptural authorities are mutually contradictory Hence the existence of soul cannot be established by any of the means of valid cognition This is in brief the view of the opponent It is refuted in the following way The self is directly experienced by all of us in the form of ahampratyaya e the realisation as ‘I’ ‘I did’ ‘I do’ and ‘I shall do’—the realisation on which is associated with the functions pertaining to all the three tenses If there is no soul how do we realise ‘I’? How can there be a doubt whether the self is or not? Or if there is a doubt in whose case is this experience of ‘I’ justifiable? Without a doubter who is beyond all kinds of doubt but still remains in all doubts no doubt is possible The self which is the substratum of its attributes (cognition etc) is self-evident owing to the attributes being self-evident as is the case with a pitcher Thus it is proved that the soul exists