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History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c22.s1: Niyativāda Dialectic

History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c22.s1

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Niyativāda Dialectic

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The usual Buddhist criticism of the Ājīvika *Niyati* doctrine was pragmatic. Thus, the *Sandaka Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* ² condemns the four "antitheses to the higher life" (*abrahmacariya-vāsā*), which include the doctrines elsewhere ascribed to Makkhali, Pūraṇa, Pakudha, and Ajita. The fatalism of Makkhali entails the antinomianism of Pūraṇa. Since there is no possibility of modifying one's destiny by good works, self-control, or asceticism, all such activity is wasted. The Ājīvika doctrines are, in fact, conducive to luxury and licentiousness. This practical criticism of the Ājīvika philosophy might have been easily countered by the Ājīvikas with the claim that ascetics performed penances and led righteous lives under the compulsion of the same all-embracing principle as determined the lives of sinners, and that they were ascetics because *Niyati* so directed it. This very obvious argument occurs nowhere in the Buddhist scriptures, though it was known to the Jaina commentator Śīlāṅka, ³ who quoted it as one of the arguments used by *niyativādins*.

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² *Majjhima* i, pp. 513 ff. Cf. V, supra, pp. 18-19.

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³ *Ibid.*

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Although orthodox Hindu literature rarely mentions the Ājīvikas, we have some evidence that Hinduism was not wholly unaware of them. The doctrine of *Niyati* is mentioned in the compendium of Suśruta, among a number of other theories on the nature and origin of the universe. ⁴ The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* gives a list of first causes according to the unorthodox systems, which includes most of the hypothetical entities referred to with disapproval by the Jaina commentators—time, nature, destiny, chance, the elements, and the Sāṅkhya category of Puruṣa.¹ Commenting on this passage Śaṅkara ascribes belief in Niyati to the Mīmāṃsakas, no doubt erroneously, and describes it as " karma characterized by the equal (reward) of good and evil ". He briefly dismisses the theory by stating that Destiny is variable (in its operation).²

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⁴ *Ibid.*

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¹ Kālaḥ, svabhāvo, niyatir, yadṛcchā, bhūtāni, yoniḥ, puruṣ’, (sic) eti cintyāḥ. Samyoga eṣām nanu ātma-bhāvād, Ātm’ apy anīśaḥ sukha-duḥkha-hetoḥ. Śvetāśvatara, i, 2.

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² Niyatir avisaṃa-puṇya-pāpa-lakṣaṇam karma. Niyatir iti Mīmāṃsakāḥ. Niyater api anaikāntatvād dūṣitam etan matam. Śaṅkara to Śvetāśvatara, loc. cit.

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Jaina criticisms of Ājīvika determinism are based both on logic and common sense. Of the triter sort is the argument of the Uvāsaga Dasāo, attributed to the Jaina layman Kuṇḍakoliya in his debate with the Ājīvika deva.³ The latter praises Gosāla’s determinist theory and disparages Mahāvīra’s doctrine of qualified free-will. Whereupon Kuṇḍakoliya asks the deva whether he attained his own divine status by any efforts on his part. He replies that he obtained heavenly bliss without effort (anuṭṭhāṇeṇam). " Why then," asks Kuṇḍakoliya, " are not those other living beings in whom there is no effort . . . also devas ? "⁴ This argument, though blatantly illogical, is sufficient to convince the deva of the wrongness of his views, but we may be sure that the early Ājīvikas had their rejoinders to such feeble attacks.

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³ Uv. Das. vi, 166–8. V. supra, p. 133.

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⁴ Je . . . ṇam jīvāṇam ṇ’ aṭṭhi uṭṭhāṇe . . . te kiṃ na devā? Uv. Das. vi, 168.

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Another amusing argument of a similar nature is ascribed to Mahāvīra himself, in the account of his conversion of the Ājīvika potter, Saddālaputta.⁵ Mahāvīra asks whether the potter’s ware is made by dint of exertion or not, to which the Ājīvika replies that it is made without exertion. Mahāvīra then asks what Saddālaputta would do if one of his workmen stole or broke his pots, or made overtures to his wife. To this the potter indignantly replies that he would berate and strike the culprit, or even kill him. But such actions, Mahāvīra retorts, would be quite inconsistent with the doctrine of *Niyati* and of no exertion. If all things are unalterably fixed (*niyayā savvabhāvā*) and there is no exertion, no man can steal or break the pots, and the potter cannot revile or strike or kill the culprit. Yet such things do happen in everyday life, and so the claim that there is no exertion and that all things are determined is false. No doubt the Ājīvika had his answer to this appeal to common sense, which reminds us of Dr. Johnson’s famous refutation of Berkeleian idealism. We may surmise that the *niyativādin* explained the apparent existence of freedom of choice by the postulate of a double standard of truth. In other and more exalted Indian philosophical systems such a double standard of practical and empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and absolute (*pāramārthika*) truth existed, and its adoption by the Ājīvikas would solve the apparent antinomy of a postulated determinism and an inner conviction of free-will. In everyday life, and for all practical purposes, free-will existed, and the Ājīvika layman like Saddālaputta acted on that assumption. But ultimately free-will was illusory—*Niyati* was the only determining factor, and human power and effort were completely ineffectual.

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⁵ Ibid., vii, 198–9. V. supra, pp. 52, 132.

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The Jaina commentators give us a better impression than do the Buddhist and Jaina Prākrit texts of the *niyativādin*’s powers of logical argument. Thus Śīlāṅka in his commentary to the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, quotes the arguments of the *niyativādins*, who, although not expressly identified with them, must surely have been Ājīvikas. “If happiness is experienced as a result of human activity there should be no difference in the reward (of equal exertion), nor should there be lack of reward when equal effort is exerted, whether by servants, merchants, or, peasants etc. Yet it is often seen that even when no means of livelihood such as service, etc., is followed, rich reward is obtained. So nothing is achieved by human effort.”¹ This is another example of the argument used by Mahāvīra against Saddālaputta, the argument from human experience; but here it is employed by the Ājīvika against his opponents. The successes and failures of men of equal ability prove that their happiness does not depend on their own powers. Man is not an effective factor in the universal process.

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¹ *Yadi puruṣakāra-kṛtaṃ sukhādy anubhūyeta tataḥ sevaka-vaṇik-karṣak’-ādīnāṃ samāne puruṣakāre sati phala-viśeṣo na syāt, na ca phala-vaiṣamyaṃ syāt, tulyapuruṣakāreṣu ca tulyaphalatvaṃ bhavet. Kasya cit tu sev’-ādi-vināpi mahā-phalam upalabhyate, kaścit tu sev’-ādi-kṛtāyāṃ api na kiñcid upalabhyate, iti dṛśyata iti. Ato na puruṣakārāt kiñcid āsuayate.* Śīlāṅka to Sū. Kṛ. 1, 1, 2, 2, fol. 30.

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Continuing his discussion of *niyativāda* Śilāṅka, with commendable impartiality, temporarily adopts the determinist attitude, and considers possible causes of the manifest inequalities of the world. "What then (is the cause)? Only Destiny. . . . Time is not the agent, for the variety of results (of effort) in the world is inconsistent with the uniformity of time. Variation in the effect arises from variation in the cause, not from uniformity." ¹

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¹ *Kim tarhi? Niyater ev' eti . . . . N' api kālaḥ kartā, tasy' aikarūpatvāj jagati phala-vaicitry'-ānupapatteḥ. Kāraṇa-bhede hi kārya-bhedo bhavati, n'ābhede. Śilāṅka, loc. cit.* The commentator continues very tersely: *Tathā viruddha-dharm'-ādhyāsaḥ* that variations in fact occur, and that they must have a cause. Thus the kālavādin has committed the fallacy of ascribing contrary qualities to Time, since the cause must itself be variable. He simultaneously asserts the uniformity of Time and the variety of its effects.

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After thus dismissing Time as a possible prime mover, Śilāṅka considers the theistic explanation from the Ājīvika point of view. "Likewise happiness and grief do not come about through the agency of God. (If they do,) is God formed or formless? If he has form he has no more the capacity to create all things than has the ordinary man (who also has form). If he is formless, his inactivity must be greater than that of empty space (which is also formless). Moreover, if he be subject to passion and other (emotions), since he is not superior to us (mortals), etc., he is not the maker of the universe. And if he were devoid of passion the variety of good and evil fortune, of lord and poor man, which he has caused in the world, would not come about. Therefore God is not the creator." ² The logic of this passage seems to be that, as all beings, who are subject to passions, are created and ineffectual, so God, if also subject to passions, must also be created and share the ineffectuality of the creature. On the other hand, if he were devoid of passions he could not be responsible for the inequalities and injustices in the world.

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² *Tath' īśvara-kārtrke 'pi sukha-duḥkhe na bhavataḥ. Yato 'sāv Īśvaro mūrto 'mūrto vā? Yadi mūrtas, tataḥ prākṛta-puruṣasy' eva sarva-kārtrtv'-ābhāvaḥ. Ath' āmūrtas? Tathā saty ākāśasy' eva sutarām niṣkriyalvam. Api ca yady asau rāgādimāms, tato 'smad-ādy-avyatirekād viśvasy' ākart' aiva. Ath' āsau vigata-rāgas latas tatkṛtam subhaga-durbhag'-īśvara-daridr'-ādi-jagad-vaicitryam na ghaṭām prāñcati. Tato n' Īśvaraḥ kart' eti. Śilāṅka, loc. cit.*

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Śīlāṅka, still writing as a *niyativādin*, next dismisses the *svabhāvavādin*, who, as we have seen, held a doctrine very similar to that of the Ājīvika: "Moreover the causing of joy and sorrow cannot be ascribed to inherent character (*svabhāva*). For is this different from a man or the same as he? If it is different it is not capable of causing the joy and sorrow which befall him, on account of that difference. Nor (if it is) the same (as he). For, if it were, it would be a mere man, and it has been shown that man cannot be an effective agent." ¹

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¹ *Tathā svabhāvasy' api sukha-duḥkh'-ādi-kartṛtv'-ānupapattiḥ. Yato 'sau svabhāvaḥ puruṣād bhinno 'bhinno vā? Yadi bhinno na puruṣ'-āśrite sukha-duḥkhe kartum alam tasmād bhinnatvād iti. N' apy abhinnah. Abhede puruṣa eva syāt, tasya c' ākartṛtvam uktam eva. Śīlāṅka, loc. cit.*

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Karma, the favourite Indian scapegoat for all human misfortune and inequality, is disposed of similarly. "Nor is *karma* a possible cause of joy, sorrow, etc. For is a man's *karma* different from the man or the same as (he)? If the same, *karma* is mere man, and the flaw (in this argument) has already been stated. If it is different, then is it conscious or unconscious? If conscious, there are two consciousnesses in one body. If unconscious, how can it be an effective agent in the production of joy and sorrow, when it is as devoid of freedom as is a mere block of stone." ² After thus exhausting the possible causes of man's joy and sorrow Śīlāṅka states the *niyativādin's* view, that these are caused by chance or one's lot (*saṅgati*) of which Niyati is the essential nature (*bhāvam*). This passage we have paraphrased above.³

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² *N' api karmaṇaḥ sukha-duḥkham prati kartṛtvam ghaṭate. Yatas tat karma puruṣād bhinnam abhinnam vā bhavet? Abhinnam cet, puruṣa-mātrat'-āpattiḥ karmaṇaḥ, tatra c' ūkto doṣaḥ. Atha bhinnam. Tat kim sacetanam acetanam vā? Yadi sacetanam, ekasmin kāye caitanya-dvay'-āpattiḥ. Ath' acetanam. Tathā sati kutas tasya pāṣāṇa-khaṇḍasy' eva' āsvatantrasya sukha-duḥkh'-otpādanam prati kartṛtvam iti? Śīlāṅka, loc. cit.*

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³ V. supra, p. 227.

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An even more important passage on the arguments of the *niyativādins* is contained in the same text. A chapter in the second part of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* deals with four schools of false teaching, the *Lokāyata* or materialist, the atomist, the theist, and the determinist. The chief argument of the last is paraphrased by Śīlāṅka at the outset in terms similar to those of the earlier passage. "Of those who put forth equal effort only one has material success, through the force of Fate. Hence only Fate is the cause.”¹ He then quotes one of the verses paraphrased above.²

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¹ *Samāna-kriyāṇāṃ kasya cid eva Niyati-balād artha-siddhiḥ. Ato Niyatir eva kāraṇam.* Śīlāṅka, loc. cit.

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² V. supra, p. 221.

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The text of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* then states the thesis of the niyativādin. “Here are two men. One maintains (the efficiency of) action, the other does not. . . . Both equally and alike are affected by (a single) cause.³ To this Śīlāṅka adds: “. . . One of them maintains (the efficiency of) action, saying that action, such as going from one country to another, is (characteristic) of a man, not of something compelled by time, or by God, etc. But (actually it pertains to) one driven by Fate. And likewise with inaction. If they, not being free, follow the doctrines of action and inaction (respectively), both (may be) equal (in fortune), owing to their subservience to Fate. But if they were free, then, owing to the difference between action and inaction, they would not be equal (in fortune). Hence, being alike dependent on a single cause, by the force of Fate they have taken to the doctrines of determinism and free-will respectively.”⁴ This argument is a repetition of the previous one. The man who exerts himself and the passive believer in Destiny may both enjoy equal fortune. But if their efforts were really effective the energetic man would be more fortunate than the other. Both are, in fact, dependent on Destiny, and their very belief or disbelief in the Ājīvika doctrine of *Niyati* is also dependent on that principle.

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³ *Iha khalu duve purisā bhavanti. Ege purise kiriyam āikkhaī, ege . . . no kiriyam . . . Dovi te purisā tullā egaṭṭhā kāraṇam āvannā.* Sū. kr. ii, 1, 12, fol. 287.

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⁴ . . . *Ekaḥ kriyām ākhyāti. “Kriyā hi deśād deśāntar’-āvapti-lakṣaṇā, kāl’-eśvar’-ādinā coditasya bhavati.” Api tu Niyati-iyā ‘pi. Yadi tāv asvatantrau kriyāvādam akriyāvādam . . . Yadi punas tau svatantrau . . . Ata ekārthāv eka-kāraṇ’-aiva tau niyati-vādam aniyati-vādam c’ āśritāv ye*, fol. 288.

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The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* continues that the fool imagines that he is responsible for his own sorrow, as others are responsible for that which befalls them. But the wise man recognizes that he is not the cause of his own grief.⁵ Śīlāṅka expands this passage: “By Destiny, though against his will, he is so made that he suffers a series of sorrows. . . . So the determinist, rejecting the visible human action and having recourse to the doctrine of invisible destiny, is ironically called a wise man.”¹ This last sentence is another appeal to common sense, of the sort used by Mahāvīra in his argument with Saddālaputta.² But Śīlâṅka continues with his exposition of the Ājīvika standpoint. “In this world (*atra*) grief does not arise for a man, even though he delight in evil courses, while for another virtuous man it does. Therefore only Destiny is the cause. Thus, with the doctrine of Destiny established, in order to show everything else to be subject to Destiny, he maintains that, so determined, all beings . . . have union with new bodies; a (new) body is not obtained by anything else such as *karma*, etc. So they experience under the compulsion of Destiny (*niyatitā*) the varied stages of life from childhood to old age. Under the compulsion of Destiny they are separated from their bodies. And under the compulsion of Destiny they experience various repulsive conditions, such as being hump-backed, one-eyed, . . . a dwarf, . . . death disease, and sorrow.”³ The text of this section of the *Sūtrakṛtâṅga* concludes with a passage which is repeated for all four types of heretic, accusing them of ignorance and licentiousness.

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⁵ *Mehāvī puṇa evam vippaḍivedenti (sic) . . . “aham amsi dukkhāmi vā soyāmi vā . . . ṇo aham evam akāsi”. Sū. kr., loc. cit.

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¹ *Niyaty’ aiv’ āsāv anicchann api tat kāryate yena . . . . . . bhavati . . . Pare’ py evam eva yojanīyam . . . Sa puruṣakāraṃ parityajy’ ādṛṣṭa-niyati-vād’-āśrayeṇa manuvivek ity evam ullāṅthyate.* Śīlâṅka to above, fol. 288.

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² V. supra, pp. 229–30.

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³ *Atra . . . duḥkham utpadyate, parasya . . . iti. Tad evam niyativāde . . . iti darśayitum āha . . . ye ke ca na . . . . . . ‘arīra-sambandham āgacchanti; n’ ā . . . . . . . . . Tathā bāla- . . . vṛddh’-āvasth’-ādikaṃ vividha-paryāyaṃ niyatitā ev’ ānubhavanti; tathā niyatitā eva . . . śarīrāt pṛthagbhāvam anubhavanti; tathā niyatitā eva vividham . . . avasthā-viśeṣaṃ kubja kāṇa . . . vāmana- . . . maraṇa-roga-śok’-ādikaṃ bībhatsam . . . op. cit., fols. 288–9.*

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Śīlâṅka then proceeds to demolish the *niyativādin’s* arguments. Is *Niyati* determined by its own nature or by another *niyati*? If by its own nature, why are not all other entities so determined? If by a higher *niyati*, that too must be determined similarly, and so on in an infinite regression.⁴ Again, owing to the character of Niyati as inherent nature (Niyater svabhāvatvāt), things must come about through it (Niyati) with its determined nature, and not through (a Niyati possessing) various inherent natures. But, since Niyati itself is single that which it causes should be uniform, in which case there should be no variety in the world. This, however, is not borne out by experience.¹

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⁴ *Asau Niyatiḥ kiṃ svata eva . . . yayā niyatyā niya-myate? . . . Tatra yady asau . . . sarva-padārthānām eva tathā-svabhāvatvaṃ kiṃ na . . . yayā niyatyā tathā*

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¹ Tathā Niyateḥ svabhāvatvān niyata-svabhāvay’ ānayā bhavitavyam, na nānā-svabhāvay’ ēti. Ekatvāc ca Niyates tat-kāryen’ āpy ekākāren’ aiva bhavitavyam. Tathā ca sati jagad-vaicitry’-ābhāvaḥ, Na c’ aitad dṛṣṭam iṣṭam vā. Ibid.

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Śilāṅka dismisses the Ājīvika argument for determinism from the fact of human inequality by recourse to the doctrine of karma. The man who is prosperous and fortunate is enjoying the fruits of virtuous conduct in past lives.

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A similar but shorter discussion of Niyativāda occurs in Guṇaratna’s commentary to the Ṣaddarśana-samuccaya, where a further argument for determinism is put forward, based on the uniformity and regularity of natural processes. Niyati, declares Guṇaratna, taking the determinist point of view, is the principle by which all things are manifested in determined form. Everything whatever is found to exist in a determined form. Otherwise, in the absence of a controlling agent, there would be no laws of cause and effect, and no fixed form of anything. What man skilled in logic can deny Niyati, the existence of which is proved by the determinate nature of the effects (of like causes) ?²

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² Niyatir nāma tattv’-āntaram asti yad-vaśād ete bhavāḥ sarve ’pi niyaten’ aiva rūpeṇa prādur-bhāvam aśnuvate, n’anyathā . . . . Yad yadā yato bhavati tat tadā tata eva niyaten’ aiva bhavad upalabhyate. Anyathā kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-niyamaḥ syāt. Tataś ca kārya-naiyatyataḥ pratīyamānām enām Niyatim ko nāma tarkikaḥ bādhitum kṣamate. Op. cit., p. 12.

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