History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c22.s1.11

c22.s1.11

Another amusing argument of a similar nature is ascribed to Mahāvīra himself, in the account of his conversion of the Ājīvika potter, Saddālaputta.⁵ Mahāvīra asks whether the potter’s ware is made by dint of exertion or not, to which the Ājīvika replies that it is made without exertion. Mahāvīra then asks what Saddālaputta would do if one of his workmen stole or broke his pots, or made overtures to his wife. To this the potter indignantly replies that he would berate and strike the culprit, or even kill him. But such actions, Mahāvīra retorts, would be quite inconsistent with the doctrine of *Niyati* and of no exertion. If all things are unalterably fixed (*niyayā savvabhāvā*) and there is no exertion, no man can steal or break the pots, and the potter cannot revile or strike or kill the culprit. Yet such things do happen in everyday life, and so the claim that there is no exertion and that all things are determined is false. No doubt the Ājīvika had his answer to this appeal to common sense, which reminds us of Dr. Johnson’s famous refutation of Berkeleian idealism. We may surmise that the *niyativādin* explained the apparent existence of freedom of choice by the postulate of a double standard of truth. In other and more exalted Indian philosophical systems such a double standard of practical and empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and absolute (*pāramārthika*) truth existed, and its adoption by the Ājīvikas would solve the apparent antinomy of a postulated determinism and an inner conviction of free-will. In everyday life, and for all practical purposes, free-will existed, and the Ājīvika layman like Saddālaputta acted on that assumption. But ultimately free-will was illusory—*Niyati* was the only determining factor, and human power and effort were completely ineffectual.