History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c22.s1.30

c22.s1.30

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* continues that the fool imagines that he is responsible for his own sorrow, as others are responsible for that which befalls them. But the wise man recognizes that he is not the cause of his own grief.⁵ Śīlāṅka expands this passage: “By Destiny, though against his will, he is so made that he suffers a series of sorrows. . . . So the determinist, rejecting the visible human action and having recourse to the doctrine of invisible destiny, is ironically called a wise man.”¹ This last sentence is another appeal to common sense, of the sort used by Mahāvīra in his argument with Saddālaputta.² But Śīlâṅka continues with his exposition of the Ājīvika standpoint. “In this world (*atra*) grief does not arise for a man, even though he delight in evil courses, while for another virtuous man it does. Therefore only Destiny is the cause. Thus, with the doctrine of Destiny established, in order to show everything else to be subject to Destiny, he maintains that, so determined, all beings . . . have union with new bodies; a (new) body is not obtained by anything else such as *karma*, etc. So they experience under the compulsion of Destiny (*niyatitā*) the varied stages of life from childhood to old age. Under the compulsion of Destiny they are separated from their bodies. And under the compulsion of Destiny they experience various repulsive conditions, such as being hump-backed, one-eyed, . . . a dwarf, . . . death disease, and sorrow.”³ The text of this section of the *Sūtrakṛtâṅga* concludes with a passage which is repeated for all four types of heretic, accusing them of ignorance and licentiousness.