Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

An Introduction to Tantric Buddhism c6: Chapter I. Preliminary

An Introduction to Tāntric Buddhism c6

Language
English

Contents

Chapter I. Preliminary

(i) Mission of the Tantras in General and the Buddhist Tantras in Particular

c6.s1.1

The primary concern of the Buddhist Tantras is not to establish a definite system of metaphysical thought. Just as the Hindu Tantras, taking for granted the fundamental tenets of the Darśanas, apply them to a practical effort of realisation, so the Buddhist Tantras, on the basis of the Mahāyāna principles, dictate practical methods for the realisation of the supreme goal. Ideas, current in other religious circles, are also incorporated. These Tantras are primarily concerned with the Sādhanā or the religious endeavour, but not with any system of abstract philosophy. The philosophical portions introduced here and there can neither successfully explain the various practices and rituals, nor are they always relevant to the topics with which the Tantras are generally concerned. The main object of the Tantra literature is to indicate and explain the practical method for realising the truth, and so, the abstract metaphysical speculations could never find any prominence in it. The different metaphysical systems deal with the nature of the reality and the philosophic method for its realisation; whereas the Tantras lay stress on the esoteric methods for realising that reality. In short, the Tantra, whether Hindu or Buddhistic, has to be regarded as an independent religious literature, which utilised relevant philosophical doctrines, but whose origin may not be traced to any system or systems of philosophy; it consists essentially of religious methods and practices which are current in India from a very old time. The subject-matter of the Tantras may include esoteric yoga, hymns, rites, rituals, doctrines and even law, medicine, magic and so forth.

c6.s1.2

Etymologically the word *Tantra* may be taken to mean any kind of elaboration (if derived from the root *tan*, to spread), or to mean knowledge (if derived from the root *tantri*).¹ Taking the first derivation, *Tantra* may be explained as that which spreads knowledge (*tanyate, vistāryate jñānam anena iti tantram*). There is thus a wider connotation of the word *Tantra* to mean any ‘expanded’ literature which deals elaborately with any department of study either in a theoretical or in a practical manner. Thus some systems of philosophy have often been referred to as *Tantras*, e.g., *Nyāya-tantreṣu*, *Sāmkhya-tantreśu*, or *Cikitsā-tantreṣu*, and so on. But it has also a limited connotation inasmuch as the word *Tantra* means an esoteric literature of a religious and practical nature. It is difficult to say how the use of the word *Tantra* in this limited sense became so important that in common parlance the word seems to have acquired almost entirely this specialised sense. The treatment herein followed is limited to this specialised *Tantra* literature as a practical esoteric science.

c6.s1.3

¹ See an article *General Introduction to Tantra Philosophy* by Dr. S. N. Dasgupta in his *Philosophical Essays* (Calcutta University).

c6.s1.4

Because of this practical nature of the *Tantras*, they have never been the subject for pure academic discussion. They have always been transmitted from the preceptor to the disciple in the most secret manner and it has always been held an unpardonable crime on the part of a *Sādhaka* to let the uninitiated into the secret of their *Sādhanā*.

c6.s1.5

A critical study of the nature of Tāntric Buddhism will reveal that there is no organic relation between Tāntricism and Buddhism of any form. It is not a fact that Buddhism, in the course of evolution in any of its aspects, developed within its arena the composite practices known as Tāntricism; on the other hand, Buddhism, in the later phases of Mahāyāna, seems to have adopted these practices, which were a growth of the soil and as such a common heritage both of the Hindus and the Buddhists. In short, Buddhism did not evolve them out of its own materials. We have said that as a religious science Tāntricism has its independent history ; its association with Buddhism may historically be explained with reference to the spirit of catholicity which characterises Mahāyāna Buddhism as a whole. It will be more correct to say that the Tāntric theological speculations that are found in the Buddhist Tantras represent the gradual transformation of later Mahāyānic ideas, effected through the association of the various Tāntric practices, than to say that the practices are there because of the theological speculations.

c6.s1.6

There seems to be no essential difference between Tāntricism within the province of Hinduism and that within the province of Buddhism. Apart from the multifarious accessories, to judge by the essentials, Tāntricism, both Hindu and Buddhist, lays stress upon a theological principle of duality in non-duality. Both the schools hold that the ultimate non-dual reality possesses two aspects in its fundamental nature,—the negative (nivṛtti) and the positive (pravṛtti), the static and the dynamic,—and these two aspects of the reality are represented in Hinduism by Śiva and Śakti and in Buddhism by Prajñā and Upāya (or śūnyatā and karuṇā). It has again been held in the Hindu Tantras that the metaphysical principles of Śiva-Śakti are manifested in this material world in the form of the male and the female ; Tāntric Buddhism also holds that the principles of Prajñā and Upāya are objectified in the female and the male. The ultimate goal of both the schools is the perfect state of union—union between the two aspects of the reality and the realisation of the non-dual nature of the self and the not-self. The principle of Tāntricism being fundamentally the same everywhere, the superficial differences, whatever these may be, supply only different tone and colour. While the tone and colour of the Hindu Tantras are supplied by the philosophical and religious ideas and practices of the Hindus, those of the Buddhist Tantras are supplied by the ideas and practices of the Buddhists.

c6.s1.7

If we analyse the Buddhist Tantras we shall find three elements in them, *viz.*, (1) the unsystematised metaphysical fragments taken from the different schools of Buddhistic thought, particularly from Mahāyāna Buddhism and also from cognate Hindu thought; (2) a Tāntric theology, which, though substantially the same as found in the Hindu Tantras, utilised relevant later Mahāyānic ideas; (3) practices. Apart from the fundamental theological position, we find in the Hindu Tantras the ideas of Vedānta, Yoga, Sāṁkhya, Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, the Purāṇas and even of the medical sciences and the law books—all scattered here and there; so also in the Buddhist Tantras we find fragments of metaphysical thought, which are all taken from the leading schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism as influenced by Upaniṣadic monism. Ideas are often put side by side indiscriminately without knowing their import and importance, and as a result we find Śūnya-vāda, Vijñāna-vāda and Vedānta all confusedly jumbled together. The leading tenets of early Buddhism also lie scattered here and there side by side with the Mahāyānic and Brahminic ideas and the other Indian systems like Sāṁkhya and Yoga also have been frequently introduced in a rather distorted form.

c6.s1.8

For all practical purposes, let us first of all try to take a general survey of the philosophical and theological background of the Buddhist Tantras and then the three elements, spoken above, will be taken into consideration in order.

(ii) The Salient Features of Mahāyāna as Contrasted with Hīnayāna

c6.s2.1

Buddhism has been historically as well as philosophically divided into two great schools, *viz.*, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. By Hīnayāna is generally meant the Pāli Buddhism of the earlier period and it is also popularly known as the Southern Buddhism and its followers are found in the Southern countries like Ceylon, Burma, Siam, Java, Sumatra, etc.; by Mahāyāna Buddhism on the other hand is meant the later Sanskrit Buddhism current in the Northern countries like China, Japan, Tibet, Nepal, etc.¹ The later Buddhists would style their school as the Mahāyāna or the ‘great vehicle’ in contrast to the narrow and orthodox school of the Buddhists of earlier times, whom they would designate as belonging to the Hīnayāna or the ‘little vehicle’. In the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra of Asaṅga the Hīnayāna has been condemned as very narrow because of its five points of difference with the Mahāyāna. These are, firstly, the narrow aim of self-liberation and, secondly, the narrow teachings to realise that aim, thirdly, the narrow method applied for this realisation, fourthly, insufficiency of equipment and, fifthly, the shortness of time within which final liberation is guaranteed.² In fact, the Mahāyāna school is always characterised by a broadness of outlook, and deep sympathy for the suffering beings. But it may be observed in this connection that as on the one hand this freedom of thought, broadness of outlook and the spirit of liberalism saved Buddhism from the walls of narrow scholastic dogmatism and raised it from the selfish hankering after personal liberation to the sublimity of a religion for the suffering humanity, on the other hand, it contained also germs of indiscipline and revelry of wild thoughts which were responsible for the incorporation of all sorts of practices in Buddhism.

c6.s2.2

¹ Many Mahāyāna scholars of recent times, however, think that the Mahāyāna view is as old as the Hīnayāna.

c6.s2.3

² āśayasyo’ padeśasya prayogasya virodhataḥ| upastambhasya kālasya yat hīnam hīnam eva tat || Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra. Ch. I, Verse 10. — Lévi’s Edition.

c6.s2.4

The word Mahāyāna, as we find it mentioned in the *Awakening of faith in Mahāyāna* (*Mahāyāna-śraddho-tpāda-sūtra*) of Aśvaghoṣa,¹ meant the highest principle or reality, or the knowledge which is the primordial source of the universe as a whole; and all the objects, animate and inanimate, are nothing but the manifestations of that one unchanging and immutable principle, and only through it final salvation of all beings is possible.² But historically Mahāyāna refers to the school of Buddhism which is styled by its adherents to be the great way to salvation because of the universality and generosity of its tenets. It is held traditionally that after the death of Buddha, there arose a great controversy among his disciples as to the correct interpretation of the sayings of the Master and also about the rules of discipline indispensable for a monk. Great councils were convened to settle these controversies. It is said that in the second council held in Vesālī the controversy finally ended in a split up among the Buddhists and the dissenters convened another great assembly (*Mahāsaṅgha*) to have a separate school of their own and they were known as the Mahāsāṅghikas. In this way, as time was passing on, the controversy between these radicalists and the orthodox elders (*thera*) began to be gradually accelerated and it finally resulted in the growth of the two separate schools; the canonical tenets of the elders being styled as Hīnayāna, and that of the latter as Mahāyāna. Without entering into the details of the historical development of the Mahāyāna doctrine, it will be sufficient for our purpose here to draw an outline of the leading tenets of the Mahāyāna school and its points of controversy with Hīnayāna.

c6.s2.5

¹ Modern scholars are, however, loath to accept Aśvaghoṣa as the author of the work *Mahāyāna-śraddho-tpāda-sūtra*. There is again a great deal of controversy over the time of Aśvaghoṣa; but Teitaro Suzuki says,—"Suffice it to say that he lived at the time extending from the latter half of the first century before Christ to about 50 or 80 A.D."

c6.s2.6

¹ —*Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna*, p. 17.

c6.s2.7

² *Ibid.*, pp. 58-54.

(A) The Final Goal

c6.s2.t1.1

As for the final goal the Mahāyānists believe that every man—nay, every being of the world is a potential Buddha; he has within him all the possibilities of becoming a *Samyak-sambuddha*, i.e., the perfectly enlightened one. Consequently the idea of Arhathood of the Hinayānists was replaced by the idea of Bodhisattvahood of the Mahāyānists. The general aim of the Hinayānists was to attain Arhathood and thus through *nirvāṇa* or absolute extinction to be liberated from the cycle of birth and death. But this final extinction through *nirvāṇa* is not the ultimate goal of the Mahāyānists; their aim is to become a Bodhisattva. Here comes in the question of universal compassion (*mahā-karuṇā*) which is one of the cardinal principles of Mahāyāna. The Bodhisattva never accepts *nirvāṇa* though by meritorious and righteous deeds he becomes entitled to it. He deliberately postpones his own salvation until the whole world of suffering beings be saved. His life is pledged for the salvation of the world, he never cares for his own. Even after being entitled to final liberation the Bodhisattva works for the uplift of the whole world and of his own accord he is ready to wait for time eternal until every suffering creature of the world attains perfect knowledge and becomes a Buddha Himself. Ordinary people of little merit would always take refuge in the all-compassionate Bodhisattva. To pray for the compassion of the Bodhisattva was deemed as one of the best ways of being relieved of all suffering.¹ The grand example of Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva’s renunciation of Nirvāṇa in favour of suffering humanity, described in the *Kāraṇḍa-vyūha*, will inspire a feeling of sublime reverence for all time to come.¹ The whole of Mahāyāna literature breathes this spirit of universal compassion, and all the metaphysical and religious discourses are introduced avowedly with the intention of rendering help to the afflicted in getting rid of their afflictions. In the text *Bodhi-caryā-vatāra* we find the Bodhisattva praying for the distressed:—"With clasped hands do I pray to all the perfectly enlightened ones in all the quarters,—light the lamp of religion for all that are fallen in sorrow for attachment. With clasping hands do I beseech all the self-controlled wise, who are bent on attaining the final extinction, to wait for innumerable ages,—let not this world be dark (without them). Let by all the good I have thus attained through these (righteous) performances all the sorrows of all the beings be completely pacified. . . . All my existence—all my happiness—all my good in the three worlds unconditionally do I renounce for the fulfilment of the desire of all beings. My mind is bent on *Nirvāṇa*, and everything has to be renounced for the sake of *Nirvāṇa*, but if I am to sacrifice everything let all be given to all things. . . . Let them sport with my body—let them laugh—and amuse ; when the body is dedicated to them why should I take any more thought of it? Let them do any work they please to do with this body of mine ; my only prayer is,—let not any evil come to them with reference to me. Let all that will speak ill of me—that will do harm to me, that will laugh at me—be entitled to attain perfect knowledge.”¹

c6.s2.t1.2

¹ *Cf. samanvāharantu māṃ buddhāḥ kṛpā-karuṇā-cetasaḥ | ye ca daśa-diśi loke tiṣṭhanti dvipado-ttamāḥ || yac ca me pātakaṃ karma kṛtaṃ pūrvaṃ sudāruṇam | tat sarvaṃ deśayiṣyāmi sthito daśa-balā-grataḥ || etc.* —*Śikṣā-samuccayaḥ*. Bendall’s Edition, pp. 160-61.

c6.s2.t1.3

¹ "It is said that when Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva, after obtaining *Nirvāṇa*, was about to merge himself in the eternal *śūnya* from the summit of the Sumeru mountain he heard an uproar from a very remote quarter and became remorseful. He sat there forthwith in intense meditation, and immediately realised that the uproar was nothing but the wailings of the people at the disappearance of Avalokiteśvara, the all-compassionate Bodhisattva. In their utter helplessness at the prospect of losing the support of Avalokiteśvara, who was their only saviour from their worldly miseries and sufferings, they rent the sky with their bitter wailings. Avalokiteśvara was deeply moved and when he came to know about this he resolved within himself not to accept his well-merited emancipation so long as even a single individual on earth remained unemancipated." *An Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism*—by Dr. B. Bhattacharya, p. 29.

c6.s2.t1.4

¹ Ch. III, Verses 4-6, 10-11, 18-15. O. P. 105-2

c6.s2.t1.5

This feature of universal compassion was one of the most important factors that popularised Buddhism very much in the lands far and wide and gave the religion a deep humanitarian tone. It is by this emphasis on compassion and also on devotion that Mahāyāna Buddhism could very easily attract the sympathy and attention of millions of people and could also harmonise itself with the current religious trend of India.

(B) The Three Schools,—Śrāvaka-yāna, Pratyeka-buddha-yāna and Bodhisattva-yāna

c6.s2.t2.1

In connection with this question of universal compassion we may mention the general scheme of classifying the Buddhists into the Śrāvakas (i.e., the hearers), the Pratyeka-Buddhas (i.e., the individualistic Buddhas) and the Bodhisattvas (i.e., those whose very essence is knowledge). The Śrāvakas are those who always listen to the preachings of the learned and try to follow them in their life. They try to understand the four noble truths (ārya-satya) and to attain parinirvāṇa through a right comprehension of them. They have mastery over the ten good actions, possess mental power (citta), but they have not the universal compassion (mahā-karuṇā) which might inspire them for the well-being of the suffering world. They are always busy with themselves and so are regarded as the lowest in the rank. The middle place is assigned to the Pratyeka-Buddhas. They are bent on self-control and generally lead a solitary retired life. They do not require the instructions of any teacher to guide them at every step. They can comprehend the cause and conditions (hetu-pratyaya) of things, and through a right comprehension of the nature of causality attain salvation for themselves. They too do not possess karuṇā and so are ranked below the Bodhisattvas. The Bodhisattvas are those who are more purified, have full control over their passions, have the right knowledge of all the expedients, have great resolution; perfect enlightenment is their only support. Through their upward march through the ten stages (daśa-bhūmi) and through the constant practice of the pāramitās (the best virtues) they attain Buddhahood; and they attain Buddhahood never for their own sake, but for saving the whole world. In them mahā-karuṇā has got the fullest scope and so they are the best of men.

(C) The Pāramitās

c6.s2.t3.1

In this connection we should also have a cursory glance at the Mahāyānic conception of the six pāramitās or the best moral virtues and the conception of the Bodhicitta or the mind as enlightenment, and the production of the Bodhicitta (bodhi-citto-tpāda). The pāramitās are the moral virtues through the practice of which the aspirer crosses the sea of existence and reaches the other shore.¹ These are charity (dāna), good conduct (śīla), forbearance (kṣānti), spiritual energy (vīrya), meditation (dhyāna) and knowledge (prajñā). After these virtues are acquired and the moral ground is prepared the aspirer is to produce a strong resolution in his heart for the realisation of his citta as perfect enlightenment. This is what is called the production of the Bodhicitta. The Bodhicitta proper involves within it two elements, viz., perfect enlightenment of the nature of void (śūnyatā) and universal compassion for the beings (karuṇā); these śūnyatā and karuṇā combined together give rise to Bodhicitta. After its production, the Bodhicitta proceeds on in an upward march through ten different stages which are called the bodhisattva-bhūmis (i.e., the stages of the Bodhisattva). The first of these is the stage of *Pramuditā* or the stage of delight or joy. Here the Bodhisattva rises from the cold, self-sufficing and nihilistic conception of *nirvāṇa* to a higher spiritual contemplation. The second is styled as the *Vimalā* or the stage free from all defilement. The third is the *Prabhākarī* or that which brightens; in this stage the Bodhisattva attains a clear insight—an intellectual light about the nature of the dharmas. The fourth stage is the *Arciṣmatī* or ‘full of flames’,—these flames are the flames of Bodhi which burn to ashes all the passions and ignorance. At this stage the Bodhisattva practises thirty-seven virtues called *bodhi-pākṣikas* which mature the *bodhi* to perfection. The next is the *Sudurjayā* stage or the stage which is almost invincible. This is a stage from which no evil passion or temptation can move the Bodhisattva. The sixth stage is called the *Abhimukhī*, where the Bodhisattva is almost face to face with *prajñā* or the highest knowledge. The seventh is the *Duraṅgamā* which literally means ‘going far away’. In this stage the Bodhisattva attains the knowledge of the expedience which will help him in the attainment of salvation. Though he himself abides here by the principles of void and non-duality and desirelessness, yet his compassion for beings keeps him engaged in the activities for the well-being of all the creatures. The eighth is the stage of *Acalā*, which means ‘immovable’. The next is the *Sādhumati* or the ‘good will’; when the Bodhisattva reaches such a stage all the sentient beings are benefited by his attainment of the highest perfect knowledge. The tenth or the last is the stage of *Dharma-megha* (literally the ‘clouds of dharma’), where the Bodhisattva attains perfect knowledge, great compassion, love and sympathy for all the sentient beings. When this last stage of *Dharma-megha* is reached, the aspirer becomes a perfect Bodhisattva.¹

c6.s2.t3.2

¹ Pāramitā literally means that which takes one to the other shore.

c6.s2.t3.3

¹ For a detailed study of the subject see *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism And Its Relation to Hīnayāna*, by Dr. N. Dutt, Ch. IV.

(D) The Docetic Conception of the Three Kāyas

c6.s2.t4.1

Another departure of the Mahāyānists from the Hinayānists is in the docetic conception of the personality of Buddha. The Hinayānists conceived Buddha only as a historical personage in the life and activities of Śākyamuni. But with the Mahāyānists Buddha is no particular historical man,—he is the ultimate principle as the totality of things or as the cosmic unity. But this highest principle has three aspects which are known as the three kāyas of the Buddha. These are,—(i) Dharma-kāya, (ii) Sambhoga-kāya and (iii) Nirmāṇa-kāya. The word Dharma-kāya is often explained as the body of the laws (*dharma*); and it may also be remembered that Buddha is said to have told his disciples that his teachings should be recognised as his own immortal body. But the word *dharma* is generally used in the Mahāyāna texts in the sense of ‘entity’; and the Dharma-kāya means the ‘thatness’ (*tathatā-rūpa*) of all the entities; it is in other words the *dharma-dhātu* or the primordial element underlying all that exists. It has been also termed as the Svabhāva-kāya’, i.e., the body of the ultimate nature. It is described as devoid of all characters, but possessing eternal and innumerable qualities. It is neither the mind, nor matter—nor something different from them both. The nature of the Dharma-kāya is described in the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra*² in the following manner:—"The Dharmakāya, though manifesting itself in the triple world, is free from impurities and desires. It unfolds itself here, there, and everywhere responding to the call of karma. It is not an individual reality, it is not a false existence, but is universal and pure. It comes from nowhere, it goes to nowhere; it does not assert itself, nor is it subject to annihilation. It is for ever serene and eternal. It is the One, devoid of all determinations. This body of Dharma has no boundary, no quarters, but is embodied in all bodies. Its freedom or spontaneity is incomprehensible, its spiritual presence in things corporeal is incomprehensible. All forms of corporeality are involved therein, it is able to create all things. Assuming any concrete material body as required by the nature and condition of karma, it illuminates all creations. Though it is the treasure of intelligence, it is void of particularity. There is no place in the universe where this body does not prevail. The universe becomes, but this body for ever remains. It is free from all opposites and contraries, yet it is working in all things to lead them to Nirvāṇa.”

c6.s2.t4.2

¹ But we shall see later on that Svabhāva-kāya or Sahaja-kāya or Vajra-kāya was another kāya invented by the Vajrayānists and the Sahajiyās as the ultimate stage even after the Dharma-kāya. This stage has also been styled as the Mahāsukha-kāya.

c6.s2.t4.3

² Quoted in Suzuki's *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 228-24.

c6.s2.t4.4

The Sambhoga-kāya is generally explained as the ‘body of bliss’ or the refulgent body of the Buddha. It is a very subtle body which manifests itself in the various conditions of bliss in the superhuman beings for preaching the noble truths and for arousing in the mind of all the Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-Buddhas and the lay Bodhisattvas joy, delight and love for the noble religion (sad-dharma). It has been explained in the Śata-sāhasrikā and the Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā as “an exceedingly refulgent body, from every pore of which streamed forth countless brilliant rays of light, illuminating the lokadhātus as innumerable as the sands of the Ganges. When this body stretched out its tongue, innumerable rays of light issued forth from it, and on each ray of light was found a lotus of thousand petals on which was seated a Tathāgata-vigraha (an image of the Tathāgata, a sort of Nirmāṇa-kāya), preaching to Bodhisattvas, Gṛhasthas (householders), Pravrajitas (recluses) and others the dharma consisting of the six pāramitās.”

c6.s2.t4.5

¹ See *Aspects Of Mahāyāna Buddhism And Its Relation To Hīnayāna* by Dr. N. Dutt, p. 118.

c6.s2.t4.6

The Nirmāṇa-kāya is the historical personage of the Buddha or the ‘Body of Transformation’. The historical Buddha is regarded as an incarnation of the eternal Tathāgata or the manifestation in condescension of the Dharma-tathatā. Śākyasiṃha Buddha is only one of the incarnations of the Dharma-kāya Buddha and his life and teachings are sought to be explained as the ‘apparent doings of a phantom of the Buddha-kāya’,—‘a shadow image created to follow the ways of the world’ only to convince the ignorant people of the world that it is not beyond the capacity of a man to attain perfection. It is generally taken that the human Buddhas (Mānuṣi Buddha) like Dīpaṅkara, Kaśyapa, Gautama Buddha, Maitreya and others represent the Nirmāṇa-kāya; the Dhyānī Bodhisattvas (Vairocana, Akṣobhya and others) in their body of supreme happiness represent the Sambhoga-kāya and the Dhyānī Buddha in Nirvāṇa in a state of complete union with all the truths for time eternal represents the Dharma-kāya.

c6.s2.t4.7

This Tri-kāya theory of the Mahāyānists developed these cosmological and ontological significance only in course of its evolution. Before it developed these cosmological and ontological meanings, the theory as mere Buddhalogy would be explained in the following manner:—¹

c6.s2.t4.8

¹ See an article, *The Three Bodies of a Buddha* by Prof. La Vallée Pousin in the J.R.A.S., 1906, pp. 945-46.

c6.s2.t4.9

The quintessence of Buddha is Pure Enlightenment (bodhi) or perfect Wisdom (prajñā-pāramitā), or knowledge of the Law (dharma), i.e., the absolute truth. By attaining this knowledge nirvāṇa is also attained; the Dharma-kāya Buddha is the Buddha in nirvāṇa (Samādhi-kāya). Again, before he is merged into nirvāṇa he possesses and enjoys, for his own sake and for others’ welfare, the fruit of his charitable behaviour as a Bodhisattva, and this is the Body of Enjoyment or the Beatific Body (Sambhoga-kāya). Again, human beings known as the Buddhas, who are created by the magical contrivances represent the Created Body (*Nirmāṇa-kāya*).

c6.s2.t4.10

But after the Tri-kāya theory acquires an ontological and cosmological meaning, Dharma-kāya means the void and permanent reality underlying the things (*dharma*), or, in other words, the uncharacterised pure consciousness (*vijñapti-mātra*). Sambhoga-kāya means the Dharma-kāya evolved as Being, Bliss, Charity, Radiance, or the Intellect, individualised as the Bodhisattva. Nirmāṇa-kāya is the Transformation Body, which is the same as consciousness defiled and individualised as ‘common people’ (*pṛthag-jana*). Later on, this Buddhalogy, cosmology and ontology were all confusedly mixed up,—and we find the three Kāyas mentioned more often in their composite sense than either as pure Buddhalogy or as pure ontology.

(E) Predominance of Philosophical Thoughts

c6.s2.t5.1

Another notable phase of Mahāyāna Buddhism is the exuberant growth of philosophical thought in it. The sayings of the Master were sought to be brought to their logical and metaphysical conclusions, and there developed distinct systems of philosophical thoughts with a host of staunch exponents. The most remarkable is the evolution of the import of the word *śūnyatā*. In the old canonical works the term *śūnyatā* probably implied the momentary or the transitory nature of all entities; but the Mādhyamikas built up a new system of uncompromising nihilism through a different interpretation of the word *śūnyatā* and the Vijñānavādins again in their turn contradicted the Mādhyamikas offering another interpretation of the word.

c6.s2.t5.2

But we should not lay undue stress on the divisions of schools or sects thus made. It has often been said that these divisions of the *yānas* are merely provisional; they may be regarded as being relative and as having only methodological interest; the *Laṅkāvatāra* says, they (the *yānas*) are but different methods suitable to different persons ; when the mind returns to its original abode, there is neither the path nor any one who adopts it.¹ *Śrāvaka-yāna*, *Pratyeka-Buddha-yāna* and *Bodhisattva-yāna* have often been said to be the different stages in the same school of faith,—a *Śrāvaka* by further endeavour becomes a *Pratyeka-Buddha*, and he again by further endeavour becomes a *Bodhisattva* and the *Bodhisattva* becomes the *Buddha* himself.

c6.s2.t5.3

¹ *citte tu vai parāvṛtte na yānaṃ na ca yāyinaḥ* || *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*. Lévi’s Edition, p. 822. *Cf.* also:— *parāvṛtte tu vai citte na yānaṃ nāpi yāninaḥ* || *Advaya-vajra-saṃgraha*, p. 22. *Cf.* also:— *upāya-kauśalya mameva rūpaṃ* *yat trīṇi yānāny upadarśayāmi*| *ekaṃ tu yānaṃ hi nayaś ca eka* *ekā cyaṃ deśanā nāyakānām* || *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*, Ch. II, Verse 69. The Bibliotheca Buddhica Publication.

(iii) Philosophical Systems

c6.s3.1

Now, after taking this general survey of the main features of Mahāyāna Buddhism let us take a bird’s-eye-view of the philosophical systems of Mahāyāna; and as the metaphysical fragments, found in the different Tāntric literature, are nothing but indistinct echoes of these schools of Mahāyāna philosophy, we think it proper to go into some detail of these systems of thought. The Buddhist Tantras are based more on the Yogācāra school than on the Śūnyavāda,—and the monistic tendency of the Yogācāra school has often been consciously and unconsciously drawn to pure Vedāntic thought. It is for this reason that we shall deal with the Yogācāra more elaborately and we shall also try to explain very briefly the philosophical affinity of Yogācāra with Vedānta.

c6.s3.2

Hiuen Tsang writes that when he came to India in the seventh century A.D. there were four schools of Buddhism, viz., Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda or Yogācāra. The former two belonged to Hīnayāna and the latter two to Mahāyāna. The Vaibhāṣikas took their stand on the *Abhidharma* literature and did not accept the authority of the *Sūtras*. They believed in the reality of the extramental world and according to them our knowledge of the external world is an exact copy of it and as such it is direct and real. The Sautrāntikas based their views on the *Sūtra* literature; they were also realists but like the Vaibhāṣikas they did not base the notion of the external existence on the evidence of our direct perception; it is but an inference. The point of discussion regarding the status of external objects between the Yogācārins and the Sautrāntikas may briefly be stated thus: the Yogācārins contend that the object of awareness and awareness itself are one and the same, *i.e.*, the different contents of knowledge as yellow, blue etc. are but diverse forms or transformation of knowledge itself; the Sautrāntikas hold that it may be admitted that the diverse contents represent the diverse forms of knowledge, or rather the content may be regarded as in some sense identical with the knowledge, if there must be something outside knowledge by the operation of which the diversity of the forms of knowledge or its contents could be explained or inferred.¹ Though the early schools of Buddhism were thus in a sense all realists they did not believe in the substantiality or the permanence of the world,—everything being momentary and as such ultimately void (*śūnya*).

c6.s3.3

¹ *Śāstra-dīpikā* (1-1-5).

c6.s3.4

Mahāyāna Buddhism has been roughly classed under two heads, viz., Śūnyavāda, and Vijñānavāda or Yogācāra. The distinction between the two schools is not, however, fundamental, and very often the one verges into the other. Nāgārjuna (100 A.D.) was the chief exponent of Śūnyavāda with its uncompromising spirit of negation. Another earlier current was flowing on with a spirit of compromise with the Upaniṣadic doctrine of monism. We find trace of the latter in as early a Mahāyāna text as the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, we find it somewhat systematised in the Tathatā doctrine of Aśvaghoṣa¹ and it took a definite turn of uncompromising idealism in the hands of the Vijñānavādins like Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubhandhu and others; and we may add here that this trend of thought attained fulfilment in the Vedāntic monism of Śaṅkara. Let us first of all understand the standpoint of the Śūnyavādins and then we shall try to trace the development of the other currents of thought in some detail.

c6.s3.5

¹ It has been hinted before that modern scholars are not sure about the authorship of the work Mahāyāna-śraddhotpāda-sūtra where we find the Tathatāvāda expounded.

(A) Mādhyamika Philosophy of Nāgārjuna

c6.s3.t1.1

The Mādhyamika-vṛtti of Nāgārjuna, commented upon by Candrakīrti, begins with the declaration that the Mādhyamikas have no thesis to prove, their business is to contradict any and every thesis that may be offered by any school of thought. First of all is taken the principle of ‘dependent origination’ (pratītya-samutpāda) realised and preached by Lord Buddha himself. The phrase pratītya-samutpāda has been interpreted in two different ways by former commentators;² but after refuting both these views Candrakīrti holds that the real significance of the theory of *pratītya-samutpāda* is no law about the ultimately real nature of things; it is a mere law about the relation of inter-dependence among the illusory appearances as things; the law is concerned purely with the provisional reality (*saṃvṛti-satya*). These illusory appearances which constitute the realm of our experiences have their origin in a law of inter-relation of dependence which is responsible for the world-process as a whole. The real import of this law of relativity of the Mādhyamikas is indeed very difficult to understand. Ultimately there is no origination neither cessation;—no destructibility—no permanence; no reality—no unreality; no coming—no going; no subjectivity—no objectivity; no knowledge—no knowable—everything is free from all the disturbances of birth, decrepitude and death. There is neither real origination of the thing by its own nature, nor by others—nor by a combination of both,—nor by any un-reason;—there is origination nowhere—at no time—and of none.¹

c6.s3.t1.2

² It may either be explained as the origination (samutpāda) of some existence (bhāva) getting hold of or obtaining (pratītya=pra + √i+tya=getting) some cause and conditions (hetu-pratyaya). Or it may be explained as the origination with reference to each and every destructible individual (√i=to go, to change, i.e., to be destroyed).

c6.s3.t1.3

¹ *na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpyahetutaḥ |* *utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana ||* Mādhyamika-vṛtti. Lévi's Edition, p. 12.

c6.s3.t1.4

Things cannot be self-originated; for, self-origination implies the existence of the thing before it originates itself. If a thing exists already by itself, there seems to be no satisfactory reason, why it should produce itself once more. Moreover, if the existent again require self-production, this will involve the fallacy of the vicious infinite.² The Sāṃkhya school,

c6.s3.t1.5

² As the Mādhyamikas had no thesis to prove, they would never lay any stress on the importance of formal logic. It has been held

c6.s3.t1.6

But Candrakirti dismisses both the interpretations as unsatisfactory. For, if we accept the latter interpretation, we cannot explain consistently all the passages of the scriptures where the phrase *pratītya-samutpāda* occurs. An attempt may be made to solve the difficulty by explaining the word ‘getting’ (*prāpti*) as *apekṣā* (dependence or relativity), and *pratītya-samutpāda* may simply be taken to imply,—that being there, it happens (*asmin sati idam bhavati*); but here the exact meaning of each of the component parts, *viz.*, *pratītya* and *samutpāda*, remains unexplained.

c6.s3.t1.7

however, may say that by causality and the identity of the cause and the effect they never mean that the effect is a new manifestation in a particular form (e.g., a jar); but by causality is meant only potentiality. It is said in reply that their argument does not stand to reason; for if by causality is meant the mere potentiality then the effect is never produced at all.¹

c6.s3.t1.8

¹ Mādhyamika-vṛtti, p. 21.

c6.s3.t1.9

The next consideration is about the possibility of the origination of a thing by, or from, anything else. But this position is assailed at once by the argument that the Mādhyamikas do not admit any difference in things, and so there cannot be any *parabhāva* (otherness) at all. Moreover, the quintessence of a particular thing cannot remain in the extraneous cause and conditions.² If the quintessence of anything could be found in anything else, we might have expected the possibility of darkness from the nature of light, and in that case anything might have come out of anything else. Neither can it be said that the things are produced by a combination of the self and the not-self; for, the combination of two things cannot possess the quality which they do never possess separately, and whatever absurdity and incongruity have been pointed out against them separately may as well be pointed out against their combination. Neither is it reasonable to hold that things originate without any reason,—for, if there be no reason behind origination, the conception of the world without having any sufficient reason will seem just like the colour and scent of a lotus growing in the sky.³ Neither any transcen-

c6.s3.t1.10

² Ibid., p. 86.

c6.s3.t1.11

³ Ibid., p. 88.

c6.s3.t1.12

by Candrakīrti that all the attempts of Bhāva-viveka (an earlier commentator on Nāgārjuna) to adduce formal reasons in his favour only bespeaks his own love of formal logic, but the Mādhyamikas do not require any formal logic at all. Moreover, had there been any reality in the data of our logical concepts, there might have been any question of formal logic at all, but as all realities are absolutely denied, there remains no scope and possibility of formal logic.

c6.s3.t1.13

dental being like God and others can produce the things,—for, any such being must also be included within the alternatives that have already been discussed. Thus the final conclusion arrived at is that there is nothing like production or origination; the world process is a mere eternal flux of successional series. The references to causality found in the scriptures through the mouth of the Lord himself do not refer to the immutable void nature of objects which reveals itself when the darkness of ignorance is removed; on the contrary, it refers to the objects of knowledge of those whose vision is vitiated by the darkness of ignorance.¹ The scriptural texts must not be interpreted literally and rigorously, we must try to get at the hidden meaning aimed at by the master.

c6.s3.t1.14

¹ Ibid., p. 41.

c6.s3.t1.15

The emphasis of Nāgārjuna is not only on the non-causality of things, but also on the non-substantial nature of things. Nothing has got any nature (*svabhāva*); for, had it any nature, that nature would remain in it even in the absence of the cause and conditions (*hetu-pratyaya*), and that self-sufficient nature would no more require the help of any cause and condition for its production. Neither is it correct to say that the nature of a thing does not exist before its production through the collocation of cause and conditions; for, in that case the nature of a thing would be created by something else; but the nature of a thing no more remains in its own nature when it loses its independence,—for *svabhāva* implies independence.² It may, of course, be argued that if all the *dharmas* are without *svabhāva*, words which are included in the totality of *dharmas* must also be devoid of essence,—and so there cannot even be the proposition that nothing exists, or that everything is void by nature. The Mādhyamikas will reply,—‘Suppose that a fool wrongly perceives a mirage as water, and that you argue against that wrong perception. The fact (viz., your arguing against the existence of water in the mirage) is just the same as that (viz., our arguing against the essence of the dharmas)’.¹ But it may further be objected,—‘If there is neither the perception nor the perceived, and the perceiver also be non-existent, then there is neither the refutation, nor the refuted and the refuter also does not exist.’² The reply is, —‘Suppose that one man created by magic (prevents) another man created by magic or that one Māyā-puruṣa (prevents) another Māyā-puruṣa (from doing something). The relation (lit. the meaning) of the refutation and the refuted is just like this.’³

c6.s3.t1.16

² Ibid., Ch. XV, p. 260.

c6.s3.t1.17

¹ Vigraha-vyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna, translated from the Chinese and Tibetan Texts by Tucci (G.O.S., Vol. XLIX, Verse No. xiii). ² Ibid., Verse No. xv. ³ Ibid., Verse No. xxiii. ⁴ Mādhyamika-vṛtti, Ch. XXV, p. 519. ⁵ Ibid., p. 522. ⁶ *aprahīnam asamprāptam anucchinnam aśāśvatam |* *aniruddham anutpannam etan nirvāṇam ucyate ||*

c6.s3.t1.18

The Śūnyatā-doctrine of Nāgārjuna may seem incompatible with the doctrine of nirvāṇa. If everything be void and there be neither origination nor destruction, then by the destruction or arrest of what should we attain nirvāṇa?⁴ The reply of Nāgārjuna is that nirvāṇa is not something which is to be attained through the destruction or the arrest of anything whatsoever; it is but the complete cessation of all mental constructions.⁵ It has been described as the destruction of nothing,—the attainment of nothing,—it is neither annihilation, nor eternally existent;—it is neither the arrested, nor the produced—this is the definition of nirvāṇa.⁶ Nothing is existent,—nothing is non-existent; so the question of annihilation or suppression does not arise at all. It is not the negation of any existence,—it is but the cessation of all notions of existence and non-existence.¹ All consciousness vanishes in *nirvāṇa* like a lamp extinguished. *Nirvāṇa* is no Ens, neither non-Ens, it is like a knot entwined by the empty space (*ākāśa*) and untied again by that same empty space.²

c6.s3.t1.19

¹ *bhāvā-bhāva-parāmarśa-kṣayo nirvāṇam ucyate* || Ratnāvalī, quoted in the *Mādhyamika-vṛtti*, p. 524.

c6.s3.t1.20

² *ākāśena kṛto ‘granthirākāśenaiva mocitaḥ* || Ibid., p. 540.

c6.s3.t1.21

As we have said, the exact position of Nāgārjuna is very difficult to understand; but it seems clear that his emphasis is more on negation, whereas the emphasis of the Vijñānavādins is on the existence of some transcendental absolute reality in the form of the ‘thatness’ (*tathatā*) of all entities or as pure consciousness. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* which is taken by scholars to be one of the early texts of Vijñānavāda says that *anutpāda* (uncreate) and *śūnya* (void) mean essencelessness of all that appear; but the reality remains as mere consciousness (*citta-mātra-vyavasthānam*) transcending all duality (*dvaya-bhāva*) of subjectivity and objectivity.³

c6.s3.t1.22

³ *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, Ch. III.

(B) The Tathatā-vāda of Aśvaghoṣa

c6.s3.t2.1

The ‘Tathatā’ doctrine of Aśvaghoṣa (? 80 A.D.) begins with a denial of the world of phenomena in both its subjective and objective aspects, but with an affirmation of an ultimate and absolute reality which is the uncreate, eternal and immutable cosmic principle underlying the diversity of the universe as a whole. Two aspects of this reality may be distinguished,—the aspect of pure ‘thatness’ or ‘suchness’ (*bhūta-tathatā*) and the aspect of the cycle of birth and death (*saṃsāra*),⁴ each being inseparably connected with the other.

c6.s3.t2.2

⁴ Compare the *Sallakṣaṇa* and the *Svalakṣaṇa* of the *abhūta-parikalpa* in the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*. Infra.

c6.s3.t2.3

The ‘thatness’ (*bhūta-tathatā*) is ‘the oneness of the totality of things (*dharma-dhātu*), the great all-including whole, the quintessence of the Doctrine’. In the essence of the ‘thatness’ there is nothing to be excluded, nothing to be added,—it has neither beginning nor end—it cannot be expressed by words and expressions which are but the representations of the empirical concepts,—its very nature is unspeakable and inexplicable,—it can only be indicated somehow as ‘thatness’.

c6.s3.t2.4

The external world, which appears under the particularised forms of individuation, is nothing but a creation of the mind with its inherited categories (*smṛti*), which are the mere products of ignorance. The production of the objective world through the disturbance of *smṛti*¹ in the all-conserving mind (*ālaya-vijñāna*) ‘may be illustrated by the simile of the water and the waves. Here the water can be said to be identical (in one sense) with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the water remains the same. When the wind ceases, the motion of the waves subsides; but the water remains the same. Likewise when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and clear, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (*avidyā*), the waves of mentality (*vijñāna*) make their appearance’.² So the external world, with all its variety and complexity, has no real existence and as such the fundamental nature of things is neither namable nor explicable. Things have no signs of distinction, they possess absolute sameness (*samatā*).

c6.s3.t2.5

¹ What the word Smṛti signifies in this context is not exactly known. Suzuki takes it to be the ‘confused subjectivity’. (See, *The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 56, f.n. No. 1); but Dr. S. N. Dasgupta suggests it to be used in the sense of Vāsanā (See, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 180, f.n. No. 1). This word however also reminds us of the ‘confused ideas’ of Spinoza.

c6.s3.t2.6

² *Aśvaghoṣa’s Awakening of Faith*, Suzuki’s translation, pp. 67-8.

c6.s3.t2.7

They are subject neither to transformation, nor to destruction. They are nothing but the one soul, for which ‘suchness’ is another designation. But how can all beings conform to and have an insight into suchness? The answer is,—‘As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is spoken of, or thought of, there is neither that which speaks, nor that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor that which is thought of; then you conform to suchness; and when your subjectivity is thus completely obliterated, it is said to have the insight’.¹

c6.s3.t2.8

¹ Ibid., p. 58.

c6.s3.t2.9

This ‘suchness’ of things may be viewed under two aspects, negative and positive. On its negative side (śūnyatā) it asserts the complete negation of all the attributes of all things; in its metaphysical origin it has nothing to do with things defiled, which are conditional or relative by nature,—it is free from all signs of distinction existing among phenomenal objects,—it is independent of unreal, particularising consciousness. The suchness is ‘neither that which is existence, nor that which is non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence; it is neither that which is unity, nor that which is plurality, nor that which is at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity and plurality. In a word, as suchness cannot be comprehended by the particularising consciousness of all beings, we call it the negation (śūnyatā).² The ‘tathatā’ is śūnya (void) for two reasons,—firstly, there is no content in it, it being the oneness of the totality of things; secondly, there is neither any subject to comprehend it; so that its nature involves the denial of both the subject and the object; there is neither that which is negated, nor that which negates—both being absorbed in the nature of the ‘tathatā’.

c6.s3.t2.10

² Ibid., pp. 59-60.

c6.s3.t2.11

But this ‘tathatā’ may also be viewed as something positive (aśūnyatā) in the sense that it contains infinite merits, that it is self-existent; in it we perceive the pure soul manifesting itself as eternal, permanent, immutable and completely comprising all things that are pure. By the non-void-nature of the ‘tathatā’ should never be meant any sort of affirmation on it,—we can have only a glimpse of the truth by transcending our subjective categories.

c6.s3.t2.12

As for saṃsāra, it evolves forth as the law of causation from the womb of the tathāgata (tathāgatagarbha). When the absolute reality assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation, it is called the all-conserving mind or the receptacle mind (ālayavijñāna). From the receptacle or all-conserving mind evolves through the influence of non-enlightenment an ego principle. ‘In the all-conserving mind ignorance obtains; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularises.’ Thus the phenomenal world, established only through ignorance and the root-instincts (smṛti=vāsanā) has no more reality than the images in a mirror—all modes of particularisation being the self-particularisation of the mind. But by the belief in the existence of the external world the mind becomes oblivious of the principle of sameness (samatā) that underlies all things. The quintessence of all things is one and the same, perfectly calm and tranquil, and shows no sign of becoming; ignorance, however, is in its blindness and delusion oblivious of enlightenment and on that account cannot recognise truthfully all those conditions, differences and activities which characterise the phenomena of the universe. The annihilation of ignorance is, therefore, the only way of liberation from the cycle of birth and death. But it should also be remembered that the mere eradication of ignorance is not sufficient to guarantee liberation, for, so long as there will remain a mind, ignorance may recur at any time; so the total extinction of mind is the safest course for attaining eternal liberation.

First 76 of 138 passages. Read on

Cites (23)