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The Philosophy of the Upanishads c10.s5: X. The Origin of the Sâṅkhya System

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c10.s5

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X. The Origin of the Sâṅkhya System

1. Brief Survey of the Doctrine of the Sâṅkhya

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The rise of the Sâṅkhya system, the authorship of which is attributed to the entirely mythical Kapila, is one of the most difficult and obscure problems in the region of Indian philosophy. Our previous investigations will enable us to face this question from the right standpoint. It will be shown that the Sâṅkhya in all its component parts has grown out of the Vedânta of the Upanishads, and is nothing more than an extreme carrying out of the realistic tendency, whose appearance and gradually increasing influence we have already traced within the limits of Upanishad teaching itself, in the pantheistic cosmogonistic and theistic changes of the fundamental idealistic view. We premise a brief summary of the leading points of the later Sâṅkhya teaching, since this is essential for the understanding of what follows.

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The fundamental conception and ultimate assumption of the system is the dualism of *prakṛiti* (nature) and *purusha* (spirit). There exist together with and in one another from eternity two entirely distinct essences, but no attempt even is made to derive them from a higher unity or to trace them back to it.

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(1) The *purusha*, already existing from the first as a plurality, the knowing subject, as it is disengaged from and contrasted with all that is objective.

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(2) The *prakṛiti* (*pradhānam*), comprising everything that is not *purusha* or subject, everything therefore which in any way has merely an objective existence, whether it is still undeveloped (*avyaktam*, natura naturans), or already developed (*vyaktam*, natura naturata).

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*Purusha* and *prakṛiti*, subject and object, are closely connected together from eternity, or rather appear to be so, and the sufferings of existence are dependent on this apparent connection, the removal of which the Sânkhya system sets before itself as its proper aim.

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This object is attained as soon as the *purusha* recognises its entire distinctness (*viveka*) from the *prakṛiti*. This separateness has existed in fact from the beginning, but unknown to itself; when once this knowledge has been gained, none of the sufferings of the universe are any longer its sufferings. But they are also no longer those of *prakṛiti*, since all the latter’s sufferings, as soon as it ceases to be “reflected” in the *purusha*, or “enlightened” by him, are no longer experienced and consequently are no longer sufferings. Deliverance is found in the dissolution of this bond between *purusha* and *prakṛiti*, which has an only apparent existence from eternity. For the *purusha* this consists merely in its ceasing to illuminate the sufferings of *prakṛiti*; for *prakṛiti*, on the other hand, in that its sufferings are no longer illuminated, consequently are no longer experienced, and therefore cease.

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to be sufferings. Deliverance is therefore an event which does not concern the purusha (to it nothing happens), but the prakṛiti; whence is derived the assertion, strange at first sight, that “not the purusha, but the prakṛiti only is fettered, is a wanderer, and delivered.” ¹

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¹ Sâṅkhya-kârikâ 62.

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This process of deliverance is to be conceived as individual. There are a multitude of purushas existing from the beginning. Some of these attain to knowledge, others do not; the prakṛiti which is attached to the one gains deliverance, but not that which is bound to the other. The inference is that for prakṛiti also the process of deliverance is not cosmical but psychical and individual. The plurality of purushas involves a plurality if not of the prakṛiti, yet of that element in it which enters into activity. Behind the prakṛiti again, individualised as the liṅgam, stands the universal cosmical prakṛiti, of which no further mention is made. In any case, the entire process, which we have now to describe, is to be conceived as repeated for each individual purusha, and therefore as psychical and individual.

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The prakṛiti, in order to bring about in the purusha the recognition of its distinctness, and therewith its own release, unfolds itself repeatedly before the eye of the purusha. Since the purusha is individual, the self-unfolding of the prakṛiti, which ceases in the case of the purushas that have been delivered, but is perpetually renewed in the case of the imprisoned ones until they gain deliverance, must be conceived as individual. It consists in the evolution of the Mahân (the Buddhi, “the great,” “the consciousness”) from the prakṛiti, of the Ahaṅkâra (the “I-maker”) from the Mahân, and from the Ahaṅkâra on the one hand manas and the ten indriyas (the organs of knowledge and of action), and on the other hand the five tanmâtras (subtle elements), and from these finally the five *bhûtas* (elements). The following scheme may serve to mark the relation :—

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The eighteen first products of *prakṛiti*, viz.—*mahân*, *ahaṅkâra*, *manas*, *indriyas*, and *tanmâtras*, form the subtle body, which surrounds the soul, and accompanies it on all its wanderings. It is termed *liṅgam*, because it is the “mark” by which the different *purushas* are distinguished; for in themselves these collectively are mere knowing subjects and nothing more, and would consequently be completely identical and indistinguishable, if they had not their proper *liṅgas* (empirical characteristics), differing from one another. All *liṅgas* of course originate from the one *prakṛiti*; but the latter consists of the three *guṇas* (best translated “factors”; cp. *guṇayati*, “to multiply”) *sattvam* (the light, clear, intellectual), *rajas* (the active, strenuous, emotional), and *tamas* (the dark, gloomy, inert); and the different qualities of the *liṅgas* depend upon the different combination of the three *guṇas*. The proportion of the three *guṇas* in the *liṅgam* appears to vary, and to this cause are due the fifty *bhâvas* or states of the *liṅgam*.

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Every life-history is a new self-unfolding of the *prakṛiti* before the *purusha* concerned by means of the *liṅgam*. From the *tanmâtras* contained in the *liṅgam* arise (afresh, as we must suppose, at each self-unfolding, each life-history) the *bhûtas* or gross elements (ether, wind, fire, water, earth). The consequence is (1) that each *purusha*, as it has its own *liṅgam*, possesses also its own gross world of matter, arising out of it; and (2) that for the *purusha* which has gained deliverance, since there is no further unfolding of the *liṅgam*, no gross world of matter any longer exists. So that the Sâṅkhya system also is essentially idealistic, strenuous opponents as its interpreters are of the idealism of the Buddhists.

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Certainly behind the individual unfoldings of *prakṛiti* by *mahân*, *ahaṅkâra*, *manas*, etc., there must exist a corresponding general unfolding of a cosmical *mahân*, *ahaṅkâra*, *manas*, etc. Yet this thought occurs quite incidentally, plays no part, and seems like a forced concession to realism. It is impossible in fact to see what purpose it would serve, since each *liṅgam* evolves from itself afresh in each life-history the five gross elements, and therefore the external world of matter.

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The original purpose of the system appears to have been different. The entrance of the *ahaṅkâra* or "I-maker" into the order of development points to this, and is only intelligible if it is in it that the transition lies from an evolution that is universal and cosmical to one that is psychical. The *prakṛiti* common to all is undoubtedly cosmical, and the *buddhi* also seems to be cosmical, as its name *mahân*, "the great," indicates, as the intelligence that issues from the unconscious and sustains the phenomenal universe;¹ a psychical offshoot of it however as individual *buddhi* is introduced into the *liṅgam*. The essential element of the *liṅgam* is therefore the *ahaṅkâra*, as the principle of individualisation, from which are derived on the one hand the individual intelligence (*manas* and the *indriyas*), on the other hand the *tanmâtras*, and from the latter the gross elements, renewed for each individual. When finally the interpreters justify the series *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, *manas* by pointing out that the *manas* frames the ideas, the *ahaṅkāra* appropriates them to itself individually, and the *buddhi* stamps them as resolves (*adhyavasāya*), a dependence of the *buddhi* on *ahaṅkāra* and *manas* would be inferred; which again would lead us to expect precisely the reverse genealogical succession.

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¹ The *Hiraṇyagarbha* of the Vedânta.

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The more closely this system is investigated the more unsatisfactory and incomprehensible from a philosophical point of view will it be found to be. The whole becomes intelligible for the first time when we regard it as the final resultant and the blending together of a series of very heterogeneous ideas, which have been handed down from earlier times, and the origin of which we propose now to point out in detail.

2. Origin of Dualism

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As there can be, to use popular language, only one God and no more, so it is involved in the nature of a philosophical principle to be a unity, from which the variety of the phenomenal universe is derived. It follows that monism is the natural standpoint of philosophy, and wherever dualism has appeared in its history it has always been the consequence of antecedent stress and difficulty, and as it were a symptom of the wane of the philosophising spirit; just as the dualism of Empedokles, Anaxagoras and Democritus was occasioned by the apparently irreconcilable opposition of the doctrines of Heracleitus and Parmenides, and the dualism of Descartes had its ultimate source in the unnatural separation of the abstract and the concrete representations (*cogitatio* and *extensio*), which began with Plato and Aristotle. In a similar way the dualism of the Sāṅkhya doctrine also cannot be regarded as a primitive view of nature; for how should two principles like *purusha* and *prakṛiti*, distinct from first to last, be accidentally lighted upon in infinite space and infinite time, and further be so marvellously suited to one another that they could unite to evolve a universe? The result attained is rather to be conceived as the consequence of a natural disintegration of the doctrine of the Upanishads, as we propose now to show.

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The thought of the Upanishads in its pantheistic form asserted, as above shown, that Brahman created the universe and then as soul entered into it.¹ The individual soul is in no respect different from Brahman, but is very Brahman complete and entire. Individuality as much as the plurality of souls is mere appearance. This appearance however is transformed into reality as the method of empirical knowledge gains acceptance. Pantheism becomes theism, according to which the individual soul makes its appearance over-against the supreme soul with a reality of its own, and the result is the plurality of individual souls,—the first dogma which divides the Sânkhya from the Vedânta, and consequently the first *reductio ad absurdum* of this theory of the universe. For the soul remains as before, in accordance with Yâjñavalkhya’s teaching, the knowing subject. A plurality of knowing subjects! What philosophical mind can admit this thought? The knowing subject is in me (*aham brahma asmi*) and nowhere else, for everything beside me is object, and for this very reason not subject.

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¹ *tat sṛiṣṭvâ tad eva anuprâvis’at*, Taitt. 2. 6.

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A further consequence of theism is atheism. The division of the âtman into supreme and individual souls must lead to the destruction of the one branch, the supreme soul, since it had derived its vital force solely from the âtman existing in me, which indeed alone exists. After its separation from the latter it could only with difficulty be maintained at all. No more was necessary than to transfer the creative faculties (the *guṇas*, viz.—*sattvam*, rajas and tamas) to matter itself, and God became superfluous. The S'vet. Up. protests in vain against the irruption of the realistic tendency, in vain asserts that it is the divine power that lies hidden in its own guṇas,¹ that the threads of the web of the pradhânas proceed only from God,² that indeed the entire prakṛiti is only an illusion wrought by God.³ When the existence of God was no longer certified by my âtman, the attestation of him in general ceased to be sufficiently strong to prevent his being abandoned by the unscrupulous realism of the Sânkhya; and in this way from the ancient trinity (god, universe, and soul), which was in reality a unity,⁴ the dualism of prakṛiti and purusha originated. Nothing further could then be determined as to their origin, or how they came to be so suited to one another as to be able to combine for a common end, as the strong man blind and the lame man with sight.⁵

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¹ S'vet. 1. 3.

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² S'vet. 6. 10.

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³ S'vet. 4. 10, mâyâm tu prakṛitim vidyâd, mâyinam tu mahes'varam.

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⁴ S'vet. 1. 7. 12, etc.

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⁵ Sânkhya-kârikâ 21.

3. Origin of the Evolutionary Series

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As early as the cosmogony of the Ṛigveda there usually appears at the head of the development of the universe a triad of principles, in so far as (1) the primal being evolves from out of himself, (2) primitive matter, and himself takes form in the latter as (3) the first-born of creation.⁶ This series of the three first principles, which becomes more and more typical, is the ultimate basis of the three highest principles of the Sânkhya,--(1) purusha (2) prakṛiti, and (3) mahân (buddhi); except that the purusha, in consequence of its division into supreme and individual souls, and the consequent inevitable destruction of the first (the primal being), continues to exist only in its derivatives, the individual souls. And these last as such are no longer a first principle, but, as was shown in the previous section, appear in co-ordination contrasted with the prakṛiti. An early foreshadowing of this view may be found already in Bṛih. 1. 4. 6, when it is said:—"This only, food and eater, is this entire universe." These words are at any rate interpreted of prakṛiti and purusha in the oldest exposition of the Sâṅkhya philosophy known to us¹ in a chapter which by the direct contrast it sets up between purusha and prakṛiti opposes itself not only to the teaching of the Upanishads, even where a tendency towards the Sâṅkhya is already observable, but also to the remaining parts of the same Upanishad.² This origin of the three highest principles of the Sâṅkhya explains also the phenomenon which was formerly unintelligible, that the intellectual element, after having been assigned to the purusha (the knowing subject), and therefore apparently dismissed, re-appears on the objective side as *buddhi* or *mahân*, i.e. "the great." This term appears (as far as we know) in all the passages where the gender can be determined to be masculine,³ and is found as early as the Upanishads. So perhaps in the verse quotation Kaush. 1. 7 in the form *ṛishir brahmamayo mahân*; as the *mahân âtmâ* of Kâṭh. 3. 10, 13 and 6. 7; as the *agryaḥ purusho mahân* of S'vet. 3. 19, understanding the expression to mean "the first arisen great purusha," and therefore identifying it with the *hiraṇyagarbha* of 3. 4, 4. 12, the *ṛishiḥ kapilaḥ agre prasûtaḥ* of 5. 2, the *jñaḥ sarvagaḥ* of 6. 17, and the *Brahmân* of 6. 18, to whom the primal being delivered the Vedas, and from whom ancient wisdom has issued forth in 4. 18. It is, as a comparison of these passages proves, *Hiraṇyagarbha*, first-born in Ṛigv. X. 121 from the primeval waters, the intelligent principle of the universe, the mind as sustainer of the phenomenal universe, which divested of mythological form comes forth in the Sâṅkhya as the *mahân*, the cosmical *buddhi*, from the prakṛiti. From this in turn the *ahaṅkâra* as the individual principle is evolved, on which again depend the individual organs of knowledge (*manas* and *indriyas*), and their objects (*tanmâtras*, *bhûtas*). By its entrance into the liṅgam (the psychical organism) the *mahân* or *buddhi* acquires a psychical significance as the organ of judgement by the side of its original cosmical meaning.

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⁶ Hiraṇyagarbha, Brahmân; sup. p. 182 f.

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¹ Maitr. 6. 10.

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² e.g. 5. 2 and 6. 11-13.

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³ It occurs mostly in compounds as *mahad-âdi*, *mahat-tattvam*, "the essence of the great."

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At the basis of the entire formation of this series appears to be the thought that evolution from the primeval being adopts the same order as the return into it, only in a reverse direction. Now the Upanishads teach a threefold return into Brahman,—(1) in sleep, (2) in death, and (3) in yoga; and in the description of this threefold entrance into Brahman all the principles gradually come to light which in the evolutionary scheme of the Sâṅkhya are united into one. We will establish this in a few leading passages.

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(1) In the deep sleep, which is an entrance into Brahman, according to Chând. 4. 3. 3, speech, eye, ear and *manas* enter into the *prâṇa*; and according to Pras'na 4, in dream-sleep the *indriyas* enter into *manas*, and both in deep sleep into the *tejas*. In the words that follow¹ the entrance of the five *bhûtas* and the five *tanmâtras* into the *âtman* is described, together with the five organs of knowledge and the five of action, and also *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkâra*, *c'ittam*, *tejas*, *prâṇa*, and the functions that belong to them. It is not expressly stated that the order of entrance corresponds to the series given from last to first, but on the analogy of other passages it is quite admissible.

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¹ Pras'na 4. 7 ff.

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(2) At death, according to Chând. 6. 8. 6,¹ speech enters into manas, manas into prâṇa, prâṇa into tejas, tejas into the supreme godhead. Just as here by speech all the indriyas are apparently intended, so by tejas we seem to be obliged to understand all the three primeval elements (tejas, âpas, annam, of which indeed, according to Chând. 6. 5. 4, speech, prâṇa and manas consist), which, as we shall see later, have been developed into prakṛiti with its three guṇas.

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¹ cp. 6. 15. 2.

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(3) In yoga, according to Kâṭh. 3. 10–13,² the senses and their objects are absorbed into manas, the latter into buddhi (=jñânâ’ âtmâ = sattvam), this again into mahân âtmâ, and this finally into avyaktam (=s’ânta’ âtmâ), by which means the purusha is isolated from them all, and its deliverance is effected. We should thus obtain for the return into the first principle at death yoga and deep sleep respectively the following succession :³—

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² Kâṭh. 6. 7–11 is in essential agreement.

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³ The order in Pras’na 4 is doubtful.

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| AT DEATH (Chând. 6. 8. 6). | IN YOGA (Kâṭh. 3. 10–13, 6. 7–11). | IN DEEP SLEEP (Prâs’na 4. 7). |
| *parâ devatâ* | *purusha* | *âtman* |
| *tejas (âpas, annam)* | *avyaktam (s’ânta’ âtman)* | { *prâṇa* *tejas* |
| *prâṇa* | { *mahân âtmâ* *buddhi* | { *cittam* *ahaṅkâra* *buddhi* |
| *manas* | *manas* | *manas* |
| *vâc’ (etc.)* | *arthâḥ and indriyâṇi* | *tanmâtra, bhûta, indriya* |

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With these steps of the involution into the primeval essence (that are found at death, in deep sleep, and in yoga) should be compared the steps of the evolution of things from the primeval essence, as they appear first in Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 8–9, 2. 1. 2–3 (not yet perfectly distinct, a few points remaining doubtful) and in a more intelligible form in the later Sâṅkhya :¹—

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¹ First perhaps in Maitr. 6. 10.

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| Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 8–9. | Muṇḍ. 2. 1. 2–3. | The Later Sâṅkhya. |
| *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ, sarvavid* | *purusha* | } *prakṛiti* || *purusha* |
| *annam* (=*avyâkṛitam*, | *aksharam* | |
| *Sâṅk.*) | | |
| *prâṇa* (=*Hiraṇyagarbha*, | *prâṇa* | { *mahân* |
| *Sâṅk.*) | | *ahaṅkâra* |
| *manas* | *manas*, and | *tanmâtra* *manas* and *indriyas* |
| | organs of sense | |
| *satyam, lokâḥ, karmâṇi* | the elements | *bhûtas* |

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A comparison of these tables renders it very probable that the true motive for the order of evolution in the Sâṅkhya doctrine is, together with the triad of first principles adopted from the Ṛigveda (primal being, primitive matter, Hiraṇyagarbha, which become purusha, prakṛiti and mahân), the succession of entrance into Brahman in deep sleep, death and yoga, which is taught in the Upanishads. And thus it becomes intelligible that when the later followers of the Sâṅkhya endeavour to justify their order by the psychological process in learning, they can do it only in an artificial way that from a philosophical point of view is unsatisfactory.

4. Origin of the Doctrine of the Guṇas

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The most characteristic feature of the Sâṅkhya system is the doctrine of the three *guṇas*, which depends upon the thought that the three forces that are active in the psychical organism, viz.—*sattvam, rajas* and *tamas* (which approaches the modern distinction of sensibility, irritability and reproduction) are also present in prakṛiti, and constitute its entire substance.² Novel as this doctrine appears on its first introduction in the S'vetâs'vatara Upanishad,¹ it yet depends upon older premisses. We begin accordingly with the verse S'vet. 4. 5:²—

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² The prakṛiti is in essence nothing but potentiality (therefore *avyaktam*), *i.e.* the aggregate of the three factors (*guṇa*, formed after *dviguṇa, triguṇa*, etc.,

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¹ 3, 4. 5, 5. 7, 6. 3–4, 6. 11, 6. 16.

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² = Mahânâr, 10. 5.

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The one she-goat, red and white and blackish,
Casts many young, which are fashioned like to her;
The one ram leaps on her in the ardour of love,
The other ram abandons her, his companion.

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That this verse expresses the fundamental thought of the Sânkhya doctrine is not open to question. The manifold relations of the many purushas to the one prakṛiti cannot be more effectively illustrated than by the manifold relations of the many rams to the one she-goat. Under these circumstances the reference of the description of the she-goat as "red, white and black" (*lohita-s'ukla-kṛiṣṇa*, according to the reading of S'ankara) to the three guṇas of which prakṛiti consists is inevitable. At the same time however these three expressions, both by the names themselves and by their order, which according to the Sânkhya doctrine ought to be different, point back to Chând. 6. 4, where everything in the universe is shown to consist of the three elements (which have proceeded from the one existing being), heat, water and food. There is present in all things (fire, sun, moon and lightning are given as examples) the red (*lohita*) heat, the white (*s'ukla*) water, and the black (*kṛiṣṇa*) food. The recurrence of these expressions in the same order in S'vet. 4. 5 proves that they are beyond question correctly referred by Bâdarâyaṇa and S'ankara³ to Chând. 6. 4. We must

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³ Sûtra 1. 4. 8–10.

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cp. *guṇayati*, to multiply), which are involved in all existing things; and all psychical organisms (*liṅga*) together with material nature (*bhûta*), which is merely their foil, are derived from the various combinations of these (*anyonya-abhibhava-âs'raya-janana-mithuna*). Everything that is is therefore a product of *sattvam* (joy, φιλία), *rajas* (pain, νεῖκος), and *tamas* (indifference, apathy).

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nevertheless agree with the opponent whom S'aṅkara introduces in referring the verse with the following words to the Sâṅkhya doctrine:—"In this verse by the words 'red and white and black' are to be understood rajas, sattvam and tamas. The red is rajas (emotion), because it naturally makes red (puts into agitation, rañjayati); the white is sattvam (essentiality, good), because it naturally makes bright; the black is tamas (darkness), because it naturally darkens. It is the equilibrium of these guṇas, which is described here according to the quality of the parts of which it consists as 'red and white and black.' And because this is primitive it is called ajâ (the she-goat, and also 'the unborn'), while the followers of the Sâṅkhya say of it,—'primeval nature creates, but is not created.'¹ . . . That primitive substance therefore brings forth many young endowed with the three guṇas; and of it is it said that the one unborn (or ram, ajâ), i.e. the one purusha, 'cherishes' (leaps upon) 'her in the ardour of love,' in inclination, attachment; while he in consequence of ignorance regards her as his own self, and accordingly from inability to distinguish looks upon himself as the vehicle of lust, indifference and blindness (which compose the essence of sattvam, rajas and tamas), and therefore remains ensnared in the migration of souls; while on the contrary another 'unborn,' i.e. a purusha, who has gained the knowledge of difference and is no longer attached to it ('it,' that is to say, the primeval substance), 'abandons' her, 'the companion,' whose enjoyment has come to an end; he therefore abandons her, that is to say, he is delivered from her."

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¹ Sâṅkhya-kârikâ 3.

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In this controversy both sides are right. The Vedântist, inasmuch as the verse unquestionably refers back to Chând. 6. 4; and the Sâṅkhyist, inasmuch as the three constituent elements, which according to Chând. 6. 2 proceed from the ‘one without a second,’ and of a mixture of which everything in the universe consists, have been psychologically transformed into the three guṇas. These three likewise are the primal elements, only that each of these primal elements has become the vehicle and expression of one of the three fundamental psychical forces which rule in our inner being. Since the word guṇa (factor) would apply equally well to the primal elements and the primal forces (there is implied in it nothing more than that everything which originates from the primeval substance is “threefold,” triguṇam); and since in all the passages of the S’vet. Up., in which it occurs for the first time,¹ it may very well be understood still as fundamental element in the sense of Chând. 6. 2, and the related verse S’vet. 4. 5, nothing prevents us from assuming that that transformation of the three primal elements into three primal forces,—or rather, the conception of each of the three primal elements as vehicle of a definite primal force,—has been first developed later on in direct connection with the above verse.² The process was completed with and by the introduction of the names sattvam, rajas and tamas, which in the sense here in question are not authenticated earlier than Maitr. 3. 5, 5. 2, etc.³

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¹ 3, 4. 5, 5. 7, 6. 3-4, 6. 11, 6. 16.

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² S’vet. 4. 5.

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³ On Atharvav. X. 8. 43, cp. Allgemeine Einleitung, p. 324.

5. Origin of the Doctrine of Emancipation

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Both Vedânta and Sâṅkhya proclaim as their fundamental view the proposition:—Deliverance is gained by knowledge. This proposition is in harmony throughout with the assumptions of the Vedânta teaching, but not with those of the Sâṅkhya.

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According to the doctrine of the Upanishads, the âtman alone is real. The manifold universe is an illusion. This illusion is penetrated by the awakening of knowledge, and it is in this that deliverance consists. Here all is perfectly consistent.

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It is otherwise in the Sânkhya. Here matter is as truly real as the soul, and therefore cannot be recognised by the latter as an illusion, as in the Vedânta. The illusion, which has to be penetrated, is concerned in this case solely with the union between prakṛiti and purusha. This thought however cannot be sustained from a philosophical point of view. For a union either really subsists, or it does not. If it is real no advance of knowledge can lead to a dissolution of the union, but at the most to a clear consciousness of it, whereby however it is still far from being dissolved. The keen sword of knowledge can cleave the mist of an illusion, but cannot sever an actually existing union. If, on the other hand, the union between the two realities purusha and prakṛiti is not real, it has no existence at all. It is then not true that purusha “enlightens” prakṛiti, not true that prakṛiti “is reflected” in purusha; and this illumination or reflection may not be employed to explain the phenomenon of suffering, for it does not itself exist.

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The pessimism also by which the Sânkhya system is dominated testifies to the derivative character of its theory of emancipation. Even the ancient Upanishads occasionally refer to the painful nature of existence,¹ and according to them too with the illusion of empirical existence the possibility of the suffering involved in it disappears.² This however is still only an indirect result, and the chief stress is laid on the deliverance from natural avidyâ by the knowledge of the âtman. It is otherwise in the further course of development. The pessimistic view comes increasingly to the front. It occupies a greater space already in Kâṭh. 1, a still greater in the speech of Bṛihadratha in Maitr. 1. The climax of this pessimistic movement is reached in the Sâṅkhya system, which regards philosophy as a whole as no more than a search for means to avert the threefold suffering.¹ Such a standpoint, where it makes its appearance in philosophy, is everywhere a symptom of exhaustion. Philosophy is originally based on a pure desire for knowledge, and knows no other aim than the search for truth. Only when this desire is weakened does philosophy become a mere means to an end, a *remedium* for the suffering of existence. This was the case in Greece in the schools that succeeded Aristotle; it was so also in India in the Sâṅkhya system and in Buddhism.

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¹ ato 'nyad ârtam, Bṛih. 3. 4. 2, 3. 5. 1, 3. 7. 23.

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² tarati s'okam âtmavid, Chând. 7. 1. 3.

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¹ Sâṅkhya-kârikâ 1.

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