Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c12.s2: XV. Emancipation

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c12.s2

Language
English

Contents

XV. Emancipation

1. Significance of the Doctrine of Emancipation

c12.s2.t1.1

Love of life is the strongest of all the instincts implanted in human nature. In order to preserve life we make any sacrifice. We desire a long life for ourselves and our friends; we congratulate those who attain it, and commiserate those who are called away before their time. And the reason of our mourning for one so prematurely deceased is (when once we give to ourselves a clear account of it) not so much that he is wanting to us, as rather that we are wanting to him. We pity him because he has been so early deprived of existence, as though this were a supreme good. When we console ourselves over the death of a relative by recalling the sufferings, perils and hardships, from which he has escaped, this is the voice of reflection. A purely natural feeling expresses itself differently. It tells us that the loss of life is the most serious by which a man can be overtaken; that the most severe punishment is always that of death. Indeed, so strong in us is the instinct for life, that our whole existence is nothing more than this desire unfolding itself in space as the body and in time as the life.

c12.s2.t1.2

How is it possible under these circumstances that in the course of development there could arise repeatedly amongst men and become established a disposition to regard that craving for life, upon which our entire empirical existence depends, as something which ought not properly to be? So that man's true duty is conceived to be not the satisfaction of the natural craving, but its suppression, and therefore the highest goal appears as a release (*moksha*), and that not such a release as death brings from a definite existence, but release from existence in general, which as our innate consciousness shows is not to be attained simply through death.

c12.s2.t1.3

This rarest of all changes of inclination may be traced nowhere more clearly than in India, where deliverance, unmodified by the play upon it of the accidental events of history, appears not as a ransom, an atonement, a propitiation, etc., but merely as a release from empirical existence with all its desires, these last being regarded as fetters (*bandha, graha*), as bonds (*granthi*), which bind the soul to the objects of sense. Even in India it was not always so, and a long period of development, a vast interval, separates the poets of the Rigveda, who, filled with a warm desire for life, shrink from death,¹ and wish for themselves and their posterity a life of a hundred years, from the words with which the greatest Indian poet closes his masterpiece :—

c12.s2.t1.4

¹ Rigv. VII. 89.

c12.s2.t1.5

May he, the god, who fashioned me by his almighty power,
Himself avert from me and destroy my re-birth.

c12.s2.t1.6

Yet the philosophy of the future will often turn its glance to India in order to study the doctrine of emancipation in the land of its birth. We propose now to do what we can to render intelligible this most remarkable of all doctrines.

2. Origin of the Doctrine of Emancipation

c12.s2.t2.1

Albrecht Weber in one of his very remarkable expositions² gave utterance to the conjecture that the doctrine of emancipation is necessitated by the dogma of transmigration. The idea that for the deeds of this brief life either eternal reward or eternal punishment must follow in the other world would have jarred upon the gentle disposition and thoughtful mind of the Indian. From this dilemma he tried to save himself by the dogma of transmigration. In reality however he only became deeper entangled, since on the eternal retribution *a parte post* is imposed yet another *a parte ante*. He therefore eventually saved himself by "cutting the knot," by representing the destruction of the entire individual existence as effected in emancipation; so that now that which in the olden time was reckoned as the severest punishment appears as the supreme reward of all endeavour. Apart however from the fact that the emancipation of pre-Buddhistic times was from beginning to end no annihilation, but rather the precise opposite, a transcending of that which was in itself worthless, this ingenious explanation fails to harmonise with the course of historical development, for the additional reason that, as we shall see, the doctrine of emancipation is older than that of transmigration, and cannot therefore be a consequence of the latter.

c12.s2.t2.2

² Zeitschr. d. D. M. G., ix. 239.

c12.s2.t2.3

The attempt has often been made to understand man's longing for deliverance from another side as the result of the heavy pressure upon the Indian people of the Brâhmanical system. Thereby, according to the view suggested, the ancient delight in existence had been ruined and lost in consequence of the subservience of the mind to the Brâhmans, and the body to the Kshatriyas. But not to mention that the conditions of life in the rich valley of the Ganges were in all probability hardly worse than formerly in the Panjâb, and that the idea of emancipation had certainly arisen not in the circle of the oppressed but rather in that of the oppressors, a disposition to pessimism, such as the theory assumes, was not at all peculiar to the times in which the doctrine of emancipation arose.¹ It is true that by emancipation suffering also with all its possibilities was removed; but Buddhism was the first to transform that which was a mere consequence into a motive, and by conceiving emancipation as an escape from the sufferings of existence, to make selfishness the ultimate mainspring of existence,—even if not to the extent that was done later by Islâm, which is never weary of depicting to the people the glories of heaven and the terrors of hell.

c12.s2.t2.4

¹ sup. pp. 140 f., 254 f.

c12.s2.t2.5

The doctrine in question cannot be derived from these or any other motives that have their seat in the will, for the very reason that it is the abrogation of all desire (yatra kâmâḥ parâgatâḥ), and that certainly as early as its very first appearance. Accordingly it remains to seek for its original motive in the sphere of the intellect; and here we shall find the doctrine of emancipation to be so entirely the necessary consequence and final consummation of the doctrine of the âtman, that it is to be regarded only as a personal and so to speak practical application of the Upanishad view of the universe as a whole, which we have hitherto been engaged in expounding. This we now propose to show.

c12.s2.t2.6

It is a natural idea that finds expression in all the systems of philosophy, when men regard that which for them is the first principle of things and the ultimate basis of the universe as at the same time the highest aim of personal endeavour. In olden times this was the gods, and thus union with the gods after death was the supreme wish of the ancient Vedic ṛishis, in order to attain to fellowship (sâyujyam), companionship (salokatâ), community of being (sarûpatâ) with Agni, Varuṇa, Indra, Aditya, etc. Later on the (impersonal) Brahman was exalted above the gods. This then became the final goal; and the gods were only the doors, through whom Brahman might be attained. “By Agni as the door of Brahman he enters in. When by Agni as the door of Brahman he enters in, he gains fellowship (sâyujyam), and companionship (salokatâ) with Brahman.”[1] In the final step the creative principle of the universe was conceived to be the âtman, the self, and as was to be expected union with the âtman became now the aim of all endeavour and longing. This took place before anything was yet known of transmigration, but only of a renewed death in the other world, as the following passages prove. “Only he who knows him (the purusha) escapes from the kingdom of death; by no other road is it possible to go";¹ "He who knows him, the wise long-emancipated youthful âtman, no more fears death";² "The self (âtman) is his pathfinder, he who finds him is no longer stained by action, that evil thing."³ The last expression in particular shows that here the thought of emancipation is already present in all its entirety. So also in the following passage, which has been already quoted above for another purpose:—"Himself (the âtman) is free from desire, in possession of all that he desires, no desire for anything whatever (tempts) him. With reference to this is the following verse:—

c12.s2.t2.7

¹ S'atap. Br. 11. 4. 4. 1.

c12.s2.t2.8

¹ Vâj. Saṁh. 31. 18.

c12.s2.t2.9

² Atharvav. 10. 8. 44.

c12.s2.t2.10

³ Taitt. Br. 3. 12. 9. 8.

c12.s2.t2.11

By knowledge they climb upwards
Thither, where desire is at rest;
Neither sacrificial gift reaches thither,
Nor the penance of the ignorant.

c12.s2.t2.12

For yonder world cannot be attained by sacrificial gifts or by asceticism by the man who does not know this. For that state belongs only to him who has this knowledge."⁴ The rejection of work and asceticism, the emphasising of knowledge, and the suppression of all desire, are proofs that this passage has in view emancipation as a union with the âtman. But this union is still represented in harmony with traditional ideas as an ascent to heavenly regions,—as though the âtman were to be sought elsewhere than in ourselves. Thus a few pages further on in the passage S'atap. Br. 10. 6. 3, already translated above,⁵ which teaches that destiny in the other world is determined by the degree of insight (kratu) which men have attained here below; and which then as the deepest insight imparts the knowledge of the âtman, who, filling all space and pervading all the universe, is greater than heaven and earth, and yet smaller than a grain of rice or millet, dwells in the inner self. In conclusion it is said:—"He is my soul (*âtman*); thither to this soul on my departure hence shall I enter in."¹ Who does not feel the inner contradiction of these words, and that if the *âtman* is really my soul, no further entrance into it is needed!

c12.s2.t2.13

⁴ S'atap. Br. 10. 5. 4. 15.

c12.s2.t2.14

⁵ Allgemeine Einleitung u. Philosophie des Veda, p. 264.

c12.s2.t2.15

¹ S'atap. Br. 10. 6, 3.

c12.s2.t2.16

A slight barrier only remained to be thrown down in order to see that that which is ever being sought at an infinite distance is nearer to us than anything else, and that the emancipation desired as union with God, union with Brahman, union with the *âtman*, does not require to be attained for the first time in the future after death, but is actually attained already here and now and from the very beginning,—by him "who knows this."

c12.s2.t2.17

It is Yâjñavalkhya of the Bṛihadâraṇyaka who meets us again as the man who drew this final consequence of the doctrine of the *âtman*.

3. The Knowledge of the Âtman is Emancipation

c12.s2.t3.1

Emancipation is not to be regarded as a becoming something which previously had no existence. In the first place, because in the sphere of metaphysical phenomena to which emancipation belongs there is in general no becoming but only a being (as all metaphysical thinkers, not only in India but in the West also, from Parmenides and Plato down to Kant and Schopenhauer, have recognised). The law of causation rules without exception everything that is finite, but nothing that lies outside and beyond, or like emancipation leads beyond. But for a further reason also emancipation cannot be a coming into being of that which did not previously exist, since it could not then be *summum bonum*. For everything that comes to be is transient; that which from nothingness became something may also return back from being something into its nothingness. What the wave threw up it may sweep away again ; τὸ μηδὲν εἰς οὐδὲν ῥέπει.

c12.s2.t3.2

If deliverance had a beginning,
Then it could not but have an end,

c12.s2.t3.3

as Gauḍapâda rightly says,¹ nor could it be *summum bonum*, or *id quo majus cogitari nequit*, for we might always think of as a higher good an emancipation which had not come into being, and therefore was not exposed to the danger of vanishing away.

c12.s2.t3.4

¹ Kârikâ 4. 30.

c12.s2.t3.5

Emancipation therefore (which we must not judge by our one-sided Western ideas which have been shaped from historical and therefore narrow conditions) is not properly a new beginning, a *καινὴ κτίσις*, but only the perception of that which has existed from eternity, but has hitherto been concealed from us :—

c12.s2.t3.6

All souls are originally
Free from darkness and without stain,
“Already awakened and delivered before the world was,
They rise up,” saith the Master.²

c12.s2.t3.7

² Gauḍap. 4. 98.

c12.s2.t3.8

We are all emancipated already (how could we otherwise become so !), “but just as he who does not know the place of a hidden treasure fails to find it, though he passes over it constantly, so all these creatures fail to find the world of Brahman, though they daily (in deep sleep) enter into it ; for by unreality are they turned aside.³ This unreality is removed by the knowledge “I am Brahman,” am in truth not an individual, but the âtman, the sum and substance of all reality, the first principle which creates, upholds and preserves all worlds. “And therefore to-day also he who knows this ‘I am Brahman’ becomes this universe ; and even the gods have no power to prevent his so becoming; for he is its soul (*âtman*).”⁴ This thought is briefly and strikingly expressed in Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 9 :—" In truth, he who knows that supreme âtman, he becomes Brahman," or more correctly "he is already Brahman" (*sa yo ha vai tat paramam brahma veda brahma eva bhavati*). For deliverance is not effected by the knowledge of the âtman, but it consists in this knowledge; it is not a consequence of the knowledge of the âtman, but this knowledge is itself already deliverance in all its fulness. He who knows himself as the âtman, the first principle of things, he is by that very knowledge free from all desires (*akâmayamâna*), for he knows everything in himself, and there is nothing outside of himself for him to continue to desire :—*âptakâmasya kâ spṛihâ*? "what can he desire who has everything?"¹ And further, he who knows himself as the âtman "is not inflamed by what he has done and left undone," whether it be good or evil,² his works consume away like the reed-stalk in the fire,³ and future works do not cling to him, as water does not remain on the leaf of the lotus flower.⁴ His individuality, the basis of all works, he has seen to be an illusion, in that he has gained possession of the knowledge of the âtman, and therein of emancipation :—

c12.s2.t3.9

³ Chând. 8. 3. 2.

c12.s2.t3.10

⁴ Bṛih. 1. 4. 10.

c12.s2.t3.11

¹ Gauḍap. 1. 9.

c12.s2.t3.12

² Bṛih. 4. 4. 22, Chând. 8. 4. 1, 8. 13, Muṇḍ. 3. 1. 3, Taitt. 2. 9, Kaush. 1. 4, 3. 1, Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 9, Maitr. 2. 7, 6. 34, etc.

c12.s2.t3.13

³ Chând. 5. 24. 3; cp. Bṛih. 5. 14. 8.

c12.s2.t3.14

⁴ Chând. 4. 14. 3.

c12.s2.t3.15

He who beholds that Loftiest and Deepest,
For him the fetters of the heart break asunder,
For him all doubts are solved,
And his works become nothingness.⁵

c12.s2.t3.16

⁵ Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 8.

c12.s2.t3.17

The Knowledge of the Âtman does not effect emancipation, it is emancipation.—If we seek for the origin of this thought that runs through the whole of the Upanishad literature, we are referred back to the discourses of Yâjñavalkhya that are presented in Bṛih. 3 and 4.¹

c12.s2.t3.18

¹ It is from the circle of his thought that the words of Bṛih. 1. 4. 10 also, already quoted above p. 345, are derived; cp. Bṛih. 1. 4. 3.

c12.s2.t3.19

We begin with Bṛih. 4. 2. Yâjñavalkhya addresses King Janaka, whom we are to consider as occupying the foremost position among the sages of his time (somewhat as Nârada in Chând. 7. 1):—"Since then you are now rich in attendants and goods, hast studied the Veda and hast listened to the mystical doctrine (art adhîtaveda and ukta-upanishatka), tell me, whither will you go when once you depart hence?" "I do not know, reverend sir, whither I shall go" (he does not know, in spite of devayâna and devaloka, of which assuredly mention was made in his Vedas and Upanishads; the king seems no longer to place absolute confidence in their revelations). Yâjñavalkhya rejoins:—"Then will I declare to you whither you will go." "Declare it, reverend sir." What are we to expect to hear? Something at any rate which could not be more forcibly indicated than by this introduction as absolutely new at that period.

c12.s2.t3.20

To begin with, Yâjñavalkhya describes the individual âtman, how it dwells in the heart, Indra and Virâj like as it were its feelers reach to the two eyes, and together with them are nourished by the blood-clots of the heart. Suddenly while he is speaking in so gross and materialistic a fashion of the individual âtman, a mist as it were is removed from our eyes:—"The anterior (eastern) regions of the heavens are his anterior organs, the right-hand (southern) regions of the heavens are his right-hand organs," etc., "all the regions of the heavens are all his organs. He however, the âtman, is not so, not so. He is inapprehensible, for he is not apprehended, indestructible, for he is not destroyed, unattachable, for nothing attaches itself to him; he is not fettered, he stirs not, he suffers no harm. O Janaka, you have attained peace. Thus Yâjñavalkhya spake.”

c12.s2.t3.21

The last expression leaves no doubt on the point that herein the intention is to impart the highest instruction, in which we are to seek for the answer to the initial question, “Whither will you go when once you depart hence?” And the answer asserts that the soul after death goes nowhere where it has not been from the very beginning, nor does it become other than that which it has always been, the one eternal omnipresent âtman.

c12.s2.t3.22

The doubts which in view of the abrupt form of the paragraph might be felt as to the correctness of this interpretation, are completely removed by the unmistakable teaching which Yâjñavalkhya imparts to Janaka in Bṛih. 4. 3–4. After that return to a new existence upon earth has been taught here as the fate of the kâmayamâna, “consumed by desire” (one who therefore does not yet know himself as the âtman), there follow words than which deeper, truer, more noble were never uttered by human lips:—

c12.s2.t3.23

“Now concerning the man free from desire (akâmayamâna). He who without desire, free from desire, desire being laid to rest, is himself his own desire, his vital spirits do not withdraw, but he is Brahman, and ascends to Brahman. On this subject is the following verse:—

c12.s2.t3.24

When every passion vanishes
That finds a home in the human heart,
Then he who is mortal becomes immortal,
Here already he has attained to Brahman.

c12.s2.t3.25

As the skin of a snake lies cast off and dead upon an antheap, so this body then lies. But the bodiless, the immortal, the life is pure Brahman, is pure light.”[¹]

c12.s2.t3.26

¹ Bṛih. 4. 4. 6–7.

c12.s2.t3.27

We propose in the first place to use these passages to throw light upon certain other expressions of Yâjñavalkhya which in themselves are obscure.

c12.s2.t3.28

“‘Yâjñavalkhya,’ thus he spake, ‘when a man dies, do the vital spirits wander forth from him or not?’ ‘By no means,’ said Yâjñavalkhya, ‘but they remain gathered together at the very same place; his body swells up, becomes inflated, and he lies there dead and inflated.’” ¹ In this passage, as has been already remarked,² no restriction to those who are already emancipated is implied, since inflation by the expanding gases may be observed in every body without distinction. Yet we are compelled, as seems to have been done already by the Mâdhyandinas, to interpret the words only of the emancipated, if we would not set ourselves in irreconcilable contradiction with the words of Yâjñavalkhya elsewhere:—“When the life departs, all the vital organs depart with it.” ³

c12.s2.t3.29

¹ Bṛih. 3. 2. 11.

c12.s2.t3.30

² See Deussen, Upan., p. 431.

c12.s2.t3.31

³ Bṛih. 4. 4. 2.

c12.s2.t3.32

Still more obscure is the following:—“‘Yâjñavalkhya,’ thus he spake, ‘when a man dies, what is it that then does not leave him?’ ‘The name,’ he answered, ‘for the name is infinite, infinite are the vis’ve devâh, and he gains with it the infinite world.’” ⁴ Here we are compelled to understand by the name the infinite “objective world,” as has been already shown.⁵ As long as this continues to subsist, the knowing subject also that sustains it preserves its existence.

c12.s2.t3.33

⁴ Bṛih. 3. 2. 12.

c12.s2.t3.34

⁵ Deussen, Upan., p. 431.

c12.s2.t3.35

It is in harmony with this explanation that Yâjñavalkhya asserts in Bṛih. 2. 4. 12,⁶ in answer to Maitreyî:—“After death there is no consciousness”; and explains this by saying that the imperishable indestructible âtman (avinâs’in, anuc’chittidharman⁷) has after death no further consciousness of objects, because as knowing subject he has everything in himself, nothing outside of himself, consequently "has no longer any contact with matter" (*mâtrâ-asamsargas tu asya bhavati*).¹

c12.s2.t3.36

⁶ = 4. 5. 13.

c12.s2.t3.37

⁷ 4. 5. 14.

c12.s2.t3.38

¹ 5. 4. 14 Mâdhy.; cp. Deussen, *Upan.*, p. 485 rem.

c12.s2.t3.39

The mystical declaration also of Bṛih. 3. 2. 10 concerning the water (of knowledge), which is able to quench the fire of death, is thus satisfactorily explained.

c12.s2.t3.40

Yâjñavalkhya has therefore entirely anticipated Schopenhauer's definition of immortality as an "indestructibility without continued existence."² Just as for the wise there is no longer any reality in the universe or in transmigration, so immortality also as prolonged existence after death is a part of the great illusion, the hollowness of which he has proved.

c12.s2.t3.41

² *Elements of Metaphysics*, § 249.

c12.s2.t3.42

From the numerous passages in the later Upanishads, which in a similar way to the speeches of Yâjñavalkhya hitherto discussed celebrate the knowledge of the âtman as emancipation, a few may here be set down.

c12.s2.t3.43

"Yet he who has in thought conceived himself as the Self,
How can he still wish to bind himself to the ills of the body?
Him who in the profound defilement of the body
Has awakened to a knowledge of the Self,
Him know as almighty, as the worlds' creator!
The universe is his, for he himself is the universe.

c12.s2.t3.44

The man who has beheld God
As his own self face to face;
The Lord of that which was and is to be,
He feels no fear nor hides himself in dread.

c12.s2.t3.45

At whose feet rolling on by days and years time advances, Whom the gods adore as light of lights, as immortality, On whom depends the fivefold host of living beings, together with space, Him know I as my soul, immortal the immortal.³

c12.s2.t3.46

³ Bṛih. 4. 4. 12–13, 15–17.

c12.s2.t3.47

The seer sees not death,
Nor sickness nor fatigue;
The All alone the Seer sees,
The All he everywhere pervades.⁴

c12.s2.t3.48

⁴ Chând. 7. 26. 2.

c12.s2.t3.49

He before whom words recoil And thought, failing to find him, Who knows this bliss of Brahman, He no longer fears aught.¹

c12.s2.t3.50

¹ Taitt. 2. 9.

c12.s2.t3.51

Only he who knows it not knows it, He who knows it knows it not. Unknown by the wise, Known by the ignorant.

c12.s2.t3.52

In whom it wakes to life, He knows it and finds immortality; Because he is it, manhood is his, Because he knows it, immortality.²

c12.s2.t3.53

² Kena 11–12.

c12.s2.t3.54

The one Lord and inner self of all living beings, He his one form expands in many ways. He who, the wise, sees himself dwelling in himself He alone, and no other, is eternally blessed.

c12.s2.t3.55

Not by speech, not by thought, Not by sight do we apprehend him; “He is!” By this word is he apprehended, And not in any other way.

c12.s2.t3.56

“He is!” thus may he be apprehended, So far as he is the reality of both; “He is!” who has thus apprehended him, To him his essential nature becomes manifest.

c12.s2.t3.57

When all the suffering vanishes, Which finds a home in the human heart, Then he who is mortal becomes immortal, Here already he attains to Brahman.

c12.s2.t3.58

When all fetters burst asunder That are woven around the human heart, Then he who is mortal becomes immortal, Thus far the doctrine extends.³

c12.s2.t3.59

³ Kâṭh. 5. 12, 6. 12–15.

c12.s2.t3.60

Yet he who here recognises again All living beings in himself, And himself in everything that lives, He no longer is vexed by any.

c12.s2.t3.61

Here where the knowing self
Becomes all living beings :—
How could error be, how pain,
For him who thus beholds the unity ?¹

c12.s2.t3.62

¹ Îsâ 6-7. ² S'vet. 4. 18. ³ Maitr. 6. 34. ⁴ Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 2, 2. 2. 8, 3. 2. 8. ⁵ Mâṇḍûkya-Kârikâ 1. 16.

c12.s2.t3.63

The darkness vanishes, there is no longer day nor night ;
Neither being nor not-being,—blessed alone is he ;
He is the syllable Om, Savitar's beloved light,
From him knowledge flowed forth in the beginning.²

c12.s2.t3.64

He who, his spirit purified by contemplation,
Plunges into the âtman,—what measureless blessedness he feels !
That for the expression of which words are of no avail
Must be experienced within in the inmost heart.³

c12.s2.t3.65

He who still craves for his desires and clings to them,
Will through his desires be born here and there ;
He whose desires are laid to rest, whose self is prepared,
From him all desires vanish here below.

c12.s2.t3.66

He who beholds that Loftiest and Deepest,
For him the fetters of the heart break asunder,
For him all doubts are solved,
And his works become nothingness.

c12.s2.t3.67

Like streams flow and disappear in the ocean,
Abandoning name and form,
So the wise, freed from name and form,
Enter into that supreme divine spirit.⁴

c12.s2.t3.68

In the world's false show that has known no beginning,
The soul slumbers ; when it awakes,
Then there wakes in it the Eternal,
Beyond time and sleep and dreams.⁵

c12.s2.t3.69

(The emancipated soul speaks):—

c12.s2.t3.70

That which as enjoyment, enjoyment's object,
And enjoyer knows the three states,
Distinct therefrom, O spectator,
Pure spirit I am ever blessed.

c12.s2.t3.71

In me the universe had its origin,
In me alone does the All subsist,
In me it vanishes, this Brahman,
The timeless, it is I myself.

c12.s2.t3.72

The smallest of the small I am, and none the less am I great, I am the motley rich universe, I am the Ancient, the spirit, the lord, Altogether of gold I am, the blessed Manifestation.

c12.s2.t3.73

Without hands or feet am I, yet infinitely powerful, I see without eyes, hear without ears; I am the wise, and beside me None other is wise in endless years.

c12.s2.t3.74

In all the Vedas I am to be known, I am the fulfiller of the Vedas, learned in the Vedas, Free from good and evil, imperishable, Unbegotten am I, without body or sensation; For me there is neither earth nor water, Nor fire, nor yet wind or ether.¹

c12.s2.t3.75

¹ Kaivalya 18–23. ² Bṛih. 3. 5. ³ Bṛih. 4. 4. 22.

c12.s2.t3.76

On the basis of this and other passages we propose finally to attempt here to give a brief characterisation of those who have gained release.

c12.s2.t3.77

The knowledge of the âtman does not effect emancipation, but it is emancipation; for he who possesses it has found the existence of the universe as well as his own bodily and individual existence to be an illusion (*mâyâ*). Everything else follows from this.

c12.s2.t3.78

(1) The wise man is *akâmayamâna*. Every wish, craving, desire, all hope and fear have for him been destroyed; for all this presupposes an object to which it is related. Such an object however no longer exists for the wise man. “In truth, after that they have become conscious of this soul, Brâhmans abstain from desire for children and possessions and the world, and wander about as beggars. For desire for children is desire for possessions, and desire for possessions is desire for the world; for all together are vain desire.”² “This the men of old time knew, when they ceased to long for descendants and said, ‘What need have we of descendants, we whose soul this universe is.’”³ Gauḍapâda sums this up briefly and strikingly in the words:¹—“What can he desire who has all?” The wise man therefore no longer experiences fear. “He who knows this bliss of Brahman is not afraid either now or at any time”;² he is no longer vexed by anything”;³ “for wherefore should he fear? since fear assuredly is of a second.”⁴

c12.s2.t3.79

¹ Kârikâ 1. 9. ² Taitt. 2. 4. ³ Kâṭh. 4. 5, 12. ⁴ Bṛih. 1. 4. 2. ⁵ Chând. 7. 1. 3. ⁶ Chând. 8. 12. 1. ⁷ Chând. 8. 4. 2. ⁸ Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 8. ⁹ cp. the passages quoted above, p. 345 f. ¹⁰ Chând. 4. 14. 3.

c12.s2.t3.80

(2) The knowledge of the âtman transcends individuality, and therefore the possibility of pain. “He who knows the âtman overcomes sorrow.”⁵ “He who is in the body is possessed by desire and pain, for because he is in the body no safeguard is possible against desire and pain. He however who is free from the body is not affected by desire and pain.”⁶ “He therefore who has crossed this bridge is like a blind man who gains his sight, like a wounded man who is healed, like a sick man who becomes whole.”⁷

c12.s2.t3.81

(3) “And his works become nothingness.”⁸ All works, the good as well as the evil, become of no effect for him who has attained knowledge, as is often affirmed.⁹ For the individuality which gave rise to them is for the wise only a part of that great universal illusion which he has succeeded in penetrating.

c12.s2.t3.82

(4) For the same reason future works no longer cling to him, as the water does not cling to the leaf of the lotus flower.¹⁰ For him to do evil is entirely excluded by his freedom from all desire. “Therefore he who knows this is tranquil, subdued, resigned, patient and self-controlled. He sees the Self only in himself, he regards everything as the Self. Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil . . . free from evil, free from suffering, and free from doubt, he becomes a Brâhman, he whose universe Brahman is.”¹ “Whereby does this Brâhman live? By living as chance may determine.”² His future condition, as far as the bodily state is concerned, which he has cast off like the skin of a snake, is entirely without importance:—

c12.s2.t3.83

¹ Bṛih. 4. 4. 23.

c12.s2.t3.84

² Bṛih. 3. 5.

c12.s2.t3.85

No matter whether a man wish for himself
A hundred years, pursuing his work;
Remain then, as thus thou art, not otherwise,
The stain of work clings not to thee.³

c12.s2.t3.86

³ Îsâ. 2.

c12.s2.t3.87

(5) “He who has reached this state in truth feels no doubt”;⁴ “for him all doubts are solved”;⁵ “free from doubt he becomes a Brâhman.”⁶ Because the knowledge of the âtman does not depend on reflection (*tarka*),⁷ but on immediate intuition (*anubhava*), therefore he can no longer be shaken by any doubt. The illusion, when once it has been penetrated, can no longer delude. The question of the possibility of a relapse is not and cannot be raised.

c12.s2.t3.88

⁴ Chând. 3. 14. 4.

c12.s2.t3.89

⁵ Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 6.

c12.s2.t3.90

⁶ Bṛih. 4. 4. 23.

c12.s2.t3.91

⁷ Kâṭh. 2. 9.

4. The Doctrine of Emancipation in Empirical Form

c12.s2.t4.1

(1) The âtman is unknowable.
(2) The âtman is the sole reality.
(3) The intuitive knowledge of the âtman is emancipation.

c12.s2.t4.2

In these three propositions is contained the metaphysical truth of the teaching of the Upanishads. Its further development consists in bringing down, though illegitimately, this metaphysical truth into the sphere where knowledge is possible (just as among the Greeks and in later philosophy), and clothing it in empirical form. (1) The âtman becomes an object of knowledge, which in truth it is not. (2) The reality of the universe is maintained, and the consequent contradiction is adjusted by the oft-repeated assertion that the universe is identical with the âtman. (3) Emancipation appears finally and wrongly in the phenomenal form of causality as a becoming something which previously had no existence, and in the phenomenal forms of time and space as the removal of a temporal and spiritual separation from the âtman, which never really existed and therefore does not need to be removed.

c12.s2.t4.3

This is the origin of the empirical and therefore mistaken view that deliverance (which actually subsisted from the very beginning, and in the very instant of recognition becomes ours perfectly and consciously) is first attained fully with the dissolution of the body. “To him shall I enter in when I depart hence”;¹ “to this (worldly sphere) shall I belong only until I am delivered; then shall I go home”;² “and when he has been delivered from the body (or, after that he has been delivered through knowledge), then (first ultimately in death) is he delivered,” *vimuktas' c'a vimuc'yate*.³ The comparison (of life) to the potter's wheel which ceases turning when the vessel (deliverance) is finished belongs to a later period,⁴ like the distinction between those who are first delivered in the hour of death (*videhamukti*), and those who are already delivered during their life-time (*jîvanmukti*). This distinction and the above comparison have their origin primarily from the realistic age of the Vedânta that finds itself drifting towards the Sânkhya. Neither of them meet us in the Upanishads (with quite late exceptions), and are opposed to the original meaning of the doctrine of emancipation. According to it, every man, as soon as he is in possession of the knowledge of the âtman, is *jîvanmukta*. The continuance or cessation of his bodily existence is to him, as everything else in the world, a matter of indifference. He gains nothing by death of which he was not in possession already beforehand, and is released from nothing from which he had not been already released previously by knowledge.

c12.s2.t4.4

¹ Chând. 3. 14. 4.

c12.s2.t4.5

² Chând. 6. 14. 2.

c12.s2.t4.6

³ Kâth. 5. 1.

c12.s2.t4.7

⁴ Syst. d. Ved., p. 459; Garbe, Sânkhyaphil., p. 182.

c12.s2.t4.8

As the theory of the *videhamukti* together with the passages of the Upanishads that anticipate it rests upon the false supposition that between us and the âtman a temporal separation exists; so the hypothesis of a spatial separation between the two, so that a departure hence is necessary in order to reach the âtman, is not less mistaken and depends upon an unwarranted application of the methods of empirical knowledge. Nevertheless this mode of representation also is not rare in the Upanishads, under the influence of the ancient ideas of a departure to the gods, to Brahman, to the âtman.¹ That the ideas which thus emerge are far from being consistent lies in the nature of things. We propose briefly to survey the most important passages.

c12.s2.t4.9

¹ sup. p. 343 f.

c12.s2.t4.10

In Bṛih. 3. 3 we have an altogether mythical description (though it is put into the mouth of Yâjñavalkhya) of the way by which the offerers of the *aśvamedha* as the highest sacrifice are led hence, between the two shells of the egg of the universe, into the other world where the wind receives them. The averting also of renewed death which is promised at the close to him who knows the mind as particular and universal (individual and cosmical prâṇa) proves that this chapter is still to be ascribed to the age preceding the Upanishad teaching. Bṛih. 5. 10 may be regarded as a continuation of it. Here a description is given of the reception of the departed (without distinction) by the wind in the other world, after which through the sun and moon they attain “the world that is free from heat and cold (*aśokam ahimam*, i.e. free from the contrasts of earthly existence).

c12.s2.t4.11

in order to remain there "perpetual years." The dying man takes his way to the sun in Bṛih. 5. 15¹ also. There however he recognises himself as identical with the purusha in the sun, an idea that already contains a suggestion of the âtman doctrine, although it is subordinated to traditional mythological conceptions. The same is true of Chând. 5. 13, where in the first instance the five prâṇas together with the five corresponding organs of sense and the five nature gods are called the five "openings of the gods" (devasushayas), and are described as "the five ministers of Brahman and doorkeepers of the heavenly world"; but then "the light which shines there on yonder side of heaven," which is to be reached through them, is identified with the light "which is here within in men." The eschatology also of Chând. 8. 1-6 exhibits this intermingling of mythological and philosophical ideas. Thus in Chând. 8. 6. 1-5 the way hence to the sun is described that leads by the veins and the sun's rays that join them, although previously in 8. 3 the world of Brahman had been shown to be not at an incalculable distance, but in the heart. That the fundamental view here is philosophical, and the mythical colouring a later embellishment, is proved quite unmistakably by the fact that in 8. 5. 3 from the word araṇyam, the "solitude," into which he who seeks Brahman retires, are invented "two seas in the world of Brahman in the third heaven from here" with the names ara and nya. To this a later hand added further glories of the world of Brahman (the lake Airammadîyam, the fig-tree Somasavana, the mountain Aparâjitâ, and the palace Prabhuvimitam). Perhaps the still more detailed description of the world of Brahman in Kaush. 1. 3 is already derived from this passage. Here among other things not only does the palace Aparâjitam (in this place neuter) recur, and a tree *Ilya* appear, but mention is made also of "the sea *Ara*." This latter name might well be a secondary formation from the sea *ara* of Chând. 8. 5. 3; and it would then be evidence for the dependent character of this passage. A different view from Chând. 8. 6. 1-5 is represented in the appended verse, Chând. 8. 6. 6, which recurs in Kâṭh. 6. 16. Here the separation of the emancipated as they ascend by the 101st vein is made to take place not on entrance into the sun, but immediately on quitting the body. With this is connected the path of the emancipated by the crown of the head, by fire, wind and sun, up to Brahman, as is described in Taitt. 1. 6. All these passages are under the influence of the thought of the Upanishads, which they clothe in empirical forms, while blending it with the traditional mythological ideas. This becomes obtrusive in Ait. 3. 4; Vâmadeva having recognised himself as the âtman has "ascended from this world, in yonder world of heaven attained all his desires, and has become immortal,"—very unnecessarily after he had already realised himself to be identical with the âtman, the first principle of all things.

c12.s2.t4.12

¹ Îśâ. 15-18.

c12.s2.t4.13

These conceptions are made clearer by the development of the theory of the *Devayâna*, as found in Chând. 4. 15. 5, and its connection with the analogous formation of the *Pitṛiyâna* in the doctrine of the five fires, the principal text of the doctrine of transmigration, which has been already discussed. We saw¹ how the souls of the emancipated were represented as attaining to Brahman through a series of bright stations (flame, day, bright half of the month, bright half of the year, year, sun, moon and lightning), whence "they no longer return on the downward path to this human existence." The Pitriyana was then next explained after the analogy of the Devayâna by means of the corresponding dark stations;¹ this however involved, as was shown, the making the moon common to both ways. This drawback the author of Kaush. 1. 2 endeavours to remove by omitting or ignoring the preliminary steps on either side that lead to the moon, and bringing all thither, whence the ignorant return back, and the wise tread the Devayâna, to which by way of compensation for the omitted stages a series of new stations are assigned (moon, the worlds of fire, wind, Varuṇa, Indra, Prajâpati and Brahman). By the later Vedântists these are simply placed side by side with the previous stations.² In other respects also the theory of the less authoritative Kaushîtaki has won a consideration not inferior to that of the Pañc’âgnividyâ supported by the authority of Chând. 5. 3–10 and Bṛih. 6. 2. On it depend almost all the later representations of the Devayâna, for example those especially that are found in Muṇḍ. 1. 2. 11, 3. 1. 6, Pras’na 1. 10. By its side the thought of Yâjñavalkhya that the knowledge of the âtman is in itself emancipation continues to hold its ground, and is often associated without any attempt at accommodation with the theory of the Devayâna, giving rise as a consequence to abrupt contradictions; compare for example Kâṭh. 6. 14–15 with 6. 16, or Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 2 with 3. 1. 10.

c12.s2.t4.14

¹ *sup.* p. 335.

c12.s2.t4.15

¹ sup. p. 335 f.

c12.s2.t4.16

² Syst. d. Ved., p. 475.

c12.s2.t4.17

An adjustment of this contradiction was sought by the later theory of the kramamukti or release by stages, according to which the souls that for their devotion ascend on the Devayâna to Brahman are not yet emancipated, since they still fall short of perfect knowledge; nevertheless they do not return back to earth, (for it is said:—“For such there is no return”),³ but attain perfect knowledge and therefore eternal deliverance in the world of Brahman before the end of the *kalpa*, when that world also is destroyed.¹ In the Upanishads the *kramamukti* appears to be already advocated by the S'vet. Up. 1. 4, 1. 11, 5. 7. The verse in Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 6 may however be still older :²—

c12.s2.t4.18

³ Bṛih. 6. 2. 15, Chând. 4. 15. 5, 8. 15.

c12.s2.t4.19

¹ cp. Syst. d. Vedânta, pp. 430, 472.

c12.s2.t4.20

² cp. Mahânâr. 10. 22, Kaivalya, 3–4.

c12.s2.t4.21

They who have grasped the meaning of the Vedânta doctrine,
Perfectly resigned, penitent, of unsullied purity,
In the world of Brahman at the end of time
Will all be set free by the Indestructible.

Linked texts (20)