The Philosophy of the Upanishads c12.s3.t2.2

c12.s3.t2.2

This distinction may save us from being betrayed into an unjust judgement when we note, at first with some surprise, that amongst the ancient Indians, whose consciousness of human solidarity, of common needs and interests, was but slightly developed, the sense of the objective worth of moral action (that is, the worth it possesses for others) is very inferior to ours, while their estimate of its subjective worth (that is, its significance for the actor himself) was advanced to a degree from which we may learn much. In this sense the ethical system of the Upanishads concerns itself especially with the subjective interpretation of moral action, and less with their external results; although this latter consideration is by no means absolutely wanting, but is merely subordinated to the first. This we propose to show in the first place by a few examples.