Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c5.s3: 4. The Upanishads of the Atharvaveda

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c5.s3

Language
English

4. The Upanishads of the Atharvaveda

c5.s3.1

The case is entirely different with the numerous Upanishads which have found admission into the Atharvaveda. It is true that several of them trace back their doctrine to S'aunaka or Pippalâda, or even (as the Brahma-Up.) to both together; and according to the tradition communicated by Nârâyaṇa and Colebrooke, not only single treatises, but complete series of Upanishads were attributed to the S'aunakîyas or Pippalâdis. But the contradictions of these accounts, as well as the circumstance that the most diverse Upanishads refer their doctrine to the alleged founders of the Atharvaveda S'âkhâs, S'aunaka and Pippalâda, suggest the conjecture that we should see in this little more than an arbitrary attachment to well-known names of antiquity; just as other Atharva-Upanishads trace back their doctrine to Yâjñavalkhya, to Aṅgiras or Atharvan, or even to Brahma Rudra and Prajâpati. Moreover the names of the Atharva-Upanishads (apart from a few doubtful exceptions, as Mâṇḍûkya, Jâbâla, Paiṅgala, Shavank) are no longer, as is the case with the Upanishads of the three older Vedas, formed on the model of the names of the S'âkhâs, but are derived partly from the contents and partly from any accidental circumstance. This proves that in the Atharva-Upanishads we must not expect to find the dogmatic text-books of definite Vedic schools.

c5.s3.2

Many indications (of which more will be said hereafter) point to the fact that the leading ideas of the Upanishads, the doctrine, namely, of the sole reality of the Âtman, of its evolution as the universe, its identity with the soul, and so forth, although they may have originated from Brâhmans such as Yâjñavalkhya, yet in the earliest times met with acceptance rather in Kshatriya circles¹ than among Brâhmans, engrossed as the latter were in the ritual. It was only later on that they were adopted by the Brâhmans, and interwoven with the ritual on the lines of allegorical interpretation.

c5.s3.3

¹ As an illustration of the different relation of Brâhmans and Kshatriyas to the novel doctrine of the Âtman, Bṛih. 3-4 may be referred to, where Yâjñavalkhya, as exponent of this new doctrine, is met with jealousy and doubt on the side of the Brâhmans, but by the king Janaka with enthusiastic assent. To this question we return later (infra, p. 17 ff.).

c5.s3.4

Under these circumstances it is very probable that the âtman doctrine, after it had been taken in hand by the S'âkhâs of the three older Vedas, was further prosecuted outside of these schools, and that consequently in course of time works were published, and have been partially at least preserved, which occupy a position as compared with the Upanishads of the Rig Sâma and Yajurvedas precisely similar to that of the Samhitâ of the Atharvaveda to their Samhitâs. And as at an earlier date hymns of various kinds found admittance into this Samhitâ, which were partly of too late composition for the older Samhitâs, and partly were despised by them; so now again it was the Atharvaveda which opened its arms to the late born or rejected children of the spirit of âtman research. The consequence of this generosity was that in course of time everything which appeared in the shape of an Upanishad, that is a mystical text, whether it were the expression merely of the religious philosophical consciousness of a limited circle or even an individual thinker, was credited to the Atharvaveda, or by later collectors was included in it without further hesitation. The regularity with which a given text reappears in the different collections forms, as far as we can see, the sole mark of its canonicity (if we may use the word in such a connection). Guided by this principle we have gathered together in our translation of the "Sixty Upanishads" all those texts which seem to have met with general recognition. Referring then for further details to the Introduction there to the Atharva-Upanishads, we propose here, for the sake of a general survey, merely to enumerate the more important of these works according to the fivefold classification which we have made of them.¹

c5.s3.5

¹ Following, in reality, Weber's example.

c5.s3.6

I. PURE VEDÂNTA UPANISHADS.—These remain essentially faithful to the old Vedânta doctrine, without laying more definite stress than is already the case in the older Upanishads on its development into the Yoga, Sannyâsa, and Vaishnavite or S'aivite symbolism :— *Muṇḍaka*, *Pras'na*, *Mâṇḍûkya* (with the Kârikâ); *Garbha*, *Prâṇâgnihotra*, *Piṇḍa*; *Âtma*, *Sarvopanishatsâra*, *Gâruḍa*.

c5.s3.7

II. YOGA UPANISHADS.—These from the standpoint of the Vedânta treat predominantly and exclusively of the apprehension of the Âtman through the Yoga by means of the moræ of the syllable Om :— *Brahmavidyâ*, *Kshurikâ*, *C'ûlikâ*; *Nâdabindu*, *Brahmabindu*, *Amṛitabindu*, *Dhyâna-bindu*, *Tejobindu*; *s'ikhâ*, *Yogatattva*, *Haṃsa*.

c5.s3.8

III. SANNYÂSA UPANISHADS.—As a rule these are equally one-sided, and enjoin and describe the life of the Sannyâsin as the practical issue of Upanishad teaching :— *Brahma, Sannyâsa, Âruṇeya, Kaṇṭhas'ruti;* *Paramahaṃsa, Jábála, Âs'rama.*

c5.s3.9

IV. S'IVA UPANISHADS.—These interpret the popularly worshipped S'iva (Is'âna, Mahes'vara, Mahâdeva, etc.) as a personification of the Âtman :— *Atharvas'iras, Atharvas'ikhâ, Nilarudra;* *Kâlâgnirudra, Kaivalya.*

c5.s3.10

V. VISHṆU UPANISHADS.—These explain Vishṇu (Nârâyaṇa, Nṛisiṃha, etc.) similarly in the sense of the Upanishad teaching, and regard his various avatâras as impersonations of the Âtman :— *Mahâ, Nârâyaṇa, Âtmabodha;* *Nṛisiṃhapûrvatâpanîya, Nṛisiṃhottaratâpanîya;* *Râmapûrvatâpanîya, Râmottaratâpanîya.*

c5.s3.11

5. *On the Meaning of the Word Upanishad*

c5.s3.12

According to S'ankara, the Upanishads were so named because they “destroy” inborn ignorance,¹ or because they “conduct” to Brahman.² Apart from these interpretations, justifiable neither on grounds of philology nor of fact, the word Upanishad is usually explained by Indian writers by *rahasyam* (i.e. “secret,” Anquetil's *secretum tegendum*). Thus it is said, for example, in Nṛisiṃh. 8 four times in succession *iti rahasyam*, instead of the earlier usual form *iti upanishad* (as is found *e.g.* at the close of Taitt. 2 and 3, Mahânâr. 62. 63. 64). In older passages also, where mention is made of Upanishad texts, such expressions are used as *guhyâ âdes'âḥ*,³ *paramam guhyam*,⁴ *vedaguhya-upanishatsu gûḍham*,⁵ *guhyatamam*.⁶

c5.s3.13

¹ S'ankara on Bṛih. p. 2. 4, Kâṭh. p. 73. 11.

c5.s3.14

² Id. on Taitt. p. 9. 5, Muṇḍ. p. 261. 10.

c5.s3.15

³ Chând. 3. 5. 2.

c5.s3.16

⁴ Kâṭh. 3. 17, S'vet. 6. 22.

c5.s3.17

⁵ S'vet. 5. 6.

c5.s3.18

⁶ Maitr. 6. 29.

c5.s3.19

The attempt to maintain secrecy with regard to abstruse and therefore easily misunderstood doctrines has numerous analogies even in the West. To the question why He speaks to them in parables Jesus answers, ὅτι ὑμῖν δέδοται γνῶναι τὰ μυστήρια τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν, ἐκείνοις δὲ οὐ δέδοται.¹ Pythagoras requires of his pupils μυστικὴ σιωπή, mystical silence. A saying is preserved of Heracleitus, τὰ τῆς γνώσεως βάθη κρύπτειν ἀπιστίη ἀγαθή. Plato finds fault with the art of writing on the ground that it οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ γε καὶ μή.² And Schopenhauer demands of his readers as a preliminary condition that they should have grappled with the difficulties of Kant.

c5.s3.20

¹ Mt. 13. 11.

c5.s3.21

² Phaedr. 275, E.

c5.s3.22

The same feeling inspires the warning repeated again and again in the Upanishads, not to impart a certain doctrine to unworthy students.

c5.s3.23

Ait. Ār. 3. 2. 6. 9 :—"These combinations of letters (according to their secret meaning, their *upanishad*) the teacher shall not impart to anyone who is not his immediate pupil (*antevâsin*), who has not already lived for a year in his house, who does not himself intend to be a teacher."

c5.s3.24

Chând. 3. 11. 5 :—"Therefore only to his eldest son shall the father as Brahman communicate it (this doctrine), but to no one else, whoever he may be."

c5.s3.25

Bṛih. 6. 3. 12 :—"This (the mixed drink, *mantha*, and its ritual) shall be communicated to no one, except the son or the pupil."

c5.s3.26

Śvet. 6. 22 :—"Give it (this supreme secret) to none who is not tranquil, who is not a son or at least a pupil."

c5.s3.27

Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 11 :—"None may read this who has not observed his vow."

c5.s3.28

Maitr. 6. 29 :—"This most mysterious secret shall be imparted to none who is not a son or a pupil, and who has not yet attained tranquillity.”

c5.s3.29

Nṛisimh. 1. 3 :—“But if a woman or a Sûdra learns the Savitrī formula, the Lakshmî formula, the Praṇava, one and all go downwards after death. Therefore let these never be communicated to such! If anyone communicates these to them, they and the teacher alike go downwards after death.”

c5.s3.30

Râmap. 84 :—“Give it not (the diagram) to common men.”

c5.s3.31

The same explanation is to be given of the striking feature, which is constantly recurring in the Upanishads, that a teacher refuses to impart any instruction to a pupil who approaches him, until by persistence in his endeavour he has proved his worthiness to receive the instruction. The best known instance of this kind is Naciketas in the Kaṭhaka Upanishad, to whom the god of death vouchsafes the desired instruction on the nature of the soul and its fate only after the young man has steadily rejected all attempts to divert him from his wish.¹ Indra deals in a similar way with Pratardana,² Raikva with Jânasruti,³ Satyakâma with Upakosala,⁴ Pravâhaṇa with Âruṇi,⁵ Prajâpati with Indra and Vairoćana,⁶ Yâjñavalkya with Janaka,⁷ S’âkâyanya with Bṛihadratha.⁸

c5.s3.32

¹ Kaṭh. 1. 20 f.

c5.s3.33

² Kaush. 3. 1.

c5.s3.34

³ Chând. 4. 2.

c5.s3.35

⁴ Chând. 4. 10. 2.

c5.s3.36

⁵ Chând. 5. 3. 7, Bṛih. 6. 2. 6.

c5.s3.37

⁶ Chând. 8. 8. 4.

c5.s3.38

⁷ Bṛih. 4. 3. 1 f.

c5.s3.39

⁸ Maitr. 1. 2.

c5.s3.40

From all this it follows that the universal tendency of antiquity, and of the circle which produced the Upanishads, was in the direction of keeping their contents secret from unfit persons, and that the Indian writers were practically justified in explaining the term upanishad by rahasyam, “secret.” Less easy is it at first sight to understand how the word upanishad has come to signify “secret meaning, secret instruction, a secret.” For *upanishad*, derived as a substantive from the root *sad*, to sit, can only denote a “sitting”; and as the preposition *upa* (near by) indicates, in contrast to *parishad*, *samsad* (assembly), a “confidential secret sitting,” we must assume, even if actual proof is wanting, that this name for “secret-sitting” was used also in course of time to denote the purpose of this sitting, *i.e.* “secret instruction.” Just as the German “college” has been transferred from the idea of “convention” to that of the subject-matter of instruction; so that in such an expression as “to read, to hear, etc. a lecture” the original meaning of college (from *colligere*, to collect) is altogether forgotten, as in the case of the Upanishads the original conception of “sitting.” Similar instances are quite common, as for example the φυσικαὶ ἀκροάσεις of Aristotle or the διατριβαί of Epictetus no longer signify lectures, conversations, but definite written compositions.

c5.s3.41

Another explanation of the word *upanishad* has been recently put forward by Oldenberg, according to which *upanishad*, precisely as *upâsanâ*, would have originally meant “adoration,” *i.e.* reverential meditation on the Brahman or Âtman.¹ The suggestion deserves attention, but is open to the following objections. (1) The words *upa* + *âs*, “to sit before someone or something (in adoration),” and *upa* + *sad* (*upa* + *ni* + *sad* does not occur in the Upanishads), “to seat oneself before someone (for the purpose of instruction),” are, according to prevailing usage, to be carefully distinguished from one another. Even if in the older texts the linguistic usage was not yet rigorously fixed, yet in the Upanishads (as a glance at Jacob’s concordance proves), *upa* + *âs* is always “to worship,” never “to approach for instruction,” and *upa* + *sad* always “to approach for instruction,” never “to worship"; and the reason for forming the substantive *upanishad* not from *upa + sad*, but from the rarer *upa + ni + sad*, was perhaps merely that the substantive *upasad* had been already adopted as the name of a well-known ceremony preliminary to the Soma sacrifice. (2) Even if mention is frequently made of worship of Brahman or the *âtman*, especially under a definite symbol (as *manas*, *prâna*, etc.), yet, strictly speaking, the *âtman* is not like the gods an object of worship, but an object of knowledge. Kena 1. 4 f.,—"that shouldest thou know as Brahman, not that which is there worshipped" (*na idam yad idam upâsaté*); Chând. 8. 7. 1,—"the self (*âtman*) . . . that ought man to search after, that endeavour to know"; Bṛih. 2. 4. 5,—"the self, in truth, should be seen, heard, understood, and reflected upon, O Maitreyî," etc. The two passages of the Upanishads also, which Oldenberg cites in proof of worship offered to Brahman, tell in reality in the opposite direction. In Bṛih. 2. 1, Gârgya declares his worship of this or that as Brahman, until finally the king breaks off the inquiry with the words, "with all that it is not yet known" (*na etâvatâ viditam bhavati*). Then he imparts the teaching concerning the deep sleeper, and closes with the words, "his *upanishad*" (secret name, not worship) "is 'the reality of realities,'" *i.e.* the essence which is implied in all empirical existence. And if in Bṛih. 1. 4 the proposition is laid down that not the gods but the *âtman* alone should be worshipped, by this is to be understood merely a polemic against the worship of the gods, not a demand to "worship" the *âtman* as though it were only a god. This word is applicable, therefore, solely to the gods, and is used of the *âtman* only by zeugma,¹ and the proof of this is found in what follows when it is said,—“He who worships another deity, and says ‘He is one, and I am another,’ that man is not wise.”¹ Without, however, such a conception of the âtman as “He is one, and I am another,” which is here interdicted, worship is altogether inconceivable, but not perhaps knowledge by immediate intuition (*anubhava*). (3) An attempt to apply the hypothesis under consideration throughout to the existing facts would demonstrate its impossibility. Thus in Taitt. 1. 3 the secret meaning (*upanishad*) of the combination of letters (*samhitâ*) is explained, and this being concluded various rewards are held out in prospect to him “who knows these great combinations as thus expounded” (*ya evam etâ mahâsamhitâ vyâkhyâtâ veda*). Here merely a knowledge of the combination of the letters is required; there is no mention of any worship in the entire paragraph. Or if we take the certainly ancient passage Kaush. 2. 1–2, where it is said of the beggar, who knows himself as the Self of all beings,—*tasya upanishad ‘na yâc’ed’ iti*, “his secret sign is not to beg”; it would be very difficult to say what suggestion of “worship” is found in phrases like these.

c5.s3.42

¹ Zeitschr. d. Deutsch. Morgenl. Gesellschaft, Bd. 50 (1896), p. 457 f.

c5.s3.43

¹ If this is disputed, then, to be consistent, from passages like Bṛih. 2. 4. 5,—"the *âtman* in truth should be seen and heard," etc., the conclusion must be drawn that the *âtman* is visible and audible.

c5.s3.44

¹ Bṛih. 1. 4. 10.

c5.s3.45

If the passages collected in my index to the Upanishads under the word Upanishad are examined, it will be at once evident that, taken together, they involve the meaning, “secret sign, secret name, secret import, secret word, secret formula, secret instruction,” and that therefore to all the meanings the note of secrecy is attached. Hence we may conclude that the explanation offered by the Indians of the word *upanishad* as *rahasyam*, “secret,” is correct.

Linked texts (13)