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The Philosophy of the Upanishads c9: First Part of the System of the Upanishads: Theology, or the Doctrine of Brahman

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c9

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English

Contents

First Part of the System of the Upanishads: Theology, or the Doctrine of Brahman

I. On the Possibility of Knowing Brahman

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1. Is the Veda the Source of Knowledge of Brahman?

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BÂDARAYÂNA begins the *Sârîraka-mîmâmsâ*, in which is contained the oldest systematic epitome of the Vedânta doctrine, with the following four sûtras:—(1) *atha ato brahma-jijñâsâ, iti*, “next what is called the search after Brahman”; (2) *janma-âdi asya yata’, iti*, “(Brahman is that) from which is the birth etc. (*i.e.* birth, continuance, and end) of this (universe)”; (3) *s’âstra-yonitvâd, iti*, “an account of its originating from the (sacred) canon” (*i.e.* according to one explanation, because the sacred canon is the source of the knowledge of Brahman as already defined. To the objection that the canon has in view not knowledge but worship, it is then said); (4) *tat tu, samanvayât*, “that however on account of the agreement” (of the assertions respecting Brahman, which, if they concerned acts of worship alone, would be unnecessary, or even impossible). To establish in particular cases this agreement of all the Vedânta texts in their assertions respecting Brahman is the aim of the entire work of Bâdarâyana and S’ankara. For them the whole of the Veda is of supernatural origin, breathed forth by Brahman (according to a passage to be discussed immediately), and therefore infallible. From it they construct their entire doctrine, and only in instances where the meaning of the Vedânta text is doubtful do they call in the aid of experience to give the casting vote.

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The question arises, what is the teaching of the Upanishads themselves with regard to the sources from which the knowledge of Brahman is to be derived?

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The very oldest Upanishad texts take for granted a rich store of literary works (transmitted of course only orally). In Bṛih. 2. 4. 10, for example, it is said:—“Just as, when a fire is laid with damp wood, clouds of smoke spread all around, so in truth from this great Being have been breathed forth the Ṛigveda, the Yajurveda, the Sâmaveda, the (hymns) of the Atharvans and the Angirases, the narratives, the histories, the sciences, the mystical doctrines (upanishads), the poems, the proverbs, the parables, and expositions,—all these have been breathed forth from him.”

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This passage is in many respects instructive. In the first place we infer from it that there are only three Vedas,¹ and that the hymns of the Atharvans and Angirases are not yet recognised as Veda. The first trace of such recognition is perhaps Bṛih. 5. 13, where, together with *uktham*, *yajus* and *sâman*, a fourth *kshatram* is named. This may denote the Atharvaveda, which stands in a closer relation to the warrior caste, and serves especially to ward off misfortune (*trâyate kshaṇitos*, as *kshatram* is etymologically explained). To the same purport is Bṛih. 6. 4. 13, where a son who has studied one, two, or three Vedas is distinguished from one who knows “all the Vedas,” *i.e.* probably all four. The *âtharvaṇa* first appears as a fourth veda in Chând. 7. 1. 2, and under the name *atharva-veda* in Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 5; the latter name therefore is first met with in the Atharva Upanishads.

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¹ So generally in the older Upanishad texts, cp. the index to my “Upanishads” under “Triple knowledge.”

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The above passage from Bṛih. 2. 4. 10 further enumerates a series of works the meaning of which is sometimes doubtful, but which have probably been in part incorporated in the Brâhmaṇas, in part mark the beginnings of the later epic. It is, however, especially noticeable that the "mystical doctrines" (*upaniṣadaḥ*) appear only in the eighth place after *itihāsaḥ*, *purāṇam*, and *vidyā*, and are therefore under no circumstances reckoned to belong to the Veda. They had not yet become Vedânta. If therefore, finally, the later teachers of the Vedânta found on this passage their dogma that the entire Veda is breathed forth from Brahman and is therefore infallible, their conclusion would carry with it the infallibility also of the other works enumerated, and is certainly incorrect. For the passage originally asserts only that, like all other natural phenomena, the products of the mind also throughout the universe are derived from Brahman.¹ Precisely the same series of literary works, though with a few additions, is enumerated again by Yājñavalkhya in Bṛih. 4. 1. 2, is explained as "speech" (*vāc*), and is found to be inadequate to convey a knowledge of Brahman. At the close of this discussion therefore, Janaka, although he has "equipped his soul with that mystical doctrine," has "studied the Vedas and listened to the mystical doctrine,"² yet is unable to give any account of the fate of the soul after death. From this it is clear that what was then understood by *upaniṣad* did not of necessity include an exposition of the highest questions; exactly, indeed, as in Chând. 8. 8. 5 the erroneous teaching that the essential being of man consists in the body is characterised as *asurāṇām upaniṣad*.

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¹ The passage is taken up also in S'vet. 4. 18, "from him wisdom proceeded forth at the very beginning" (cp. S'vet. 6. 18, Muṇḍ. 2. 1. 4), and further in Maitr. 6. 32.

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² *adhītaveda* and *ukta-upaniṣatka*, Bṛih. 4. 2. 1.

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The insufficiency of all Vedic, and in general of all existing knowledge is still more clearly laid down in Chând. 7. 1, where Nârada acknowledges to Sanatkumâra:—"I have studied, most reverend sir, the Rigveda, Yajurveda, Sâmaveda, the Atharvaveda as fourth, the epic and mythological poems as fifth veda, grammar, necrology, arithmetic, divination, chronology, dialectics, politics, theology, the doctrine of prayer, necromancy, the art of war, astronomy, snake-charming, and the fine arts,—these things, most reverend sir, have I studied; therefore am I, most reverend sir, learned indeed in the scripture, but not learned in the âtman. Yet I have heard from such as are like you that he who knows the âtman vanquishes sorrow. I, however, most reverend sir, am bewildered. Lead me then over, I pray, to the farther shore that lies beyond sorrow."

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Another proof that the study of the Veda does not touch the most important questions is afforded by the great transmigration text, which has been preserved in a threefold form in Chând. 5. 3–10, Brih. 6. 2, and with considerable variations in Kaush. 1. In all three recensions S'vetaketu professes to have been taught by his father Âruṇi, but fails to answer the eschatological questions propounded by the king Pravâhaṇa (in the Kaush., C'itra), and returning in anger to his father reproaches him:—"So then, without having really done so, you have claimed to have instructed me";¹ "it was imagination, then, when you previously declared that my instruction was complete."²

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¹ Chând. 5. 3. 4.

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² Brih. 6. 2. 3.

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The same thought is expressed in Chând. 6. 1, where (in a manner otherwise irreconcilable with the passages already quoted) S'vetaketu is sent from home by his father Âruṇi to study the Brahman (i.e. the Veda). After twelve years "he had thoroughly studied all the Vedas (i.e. the Saṃhitâs only of the *ṛic*, *yajus*, and *sâman*, for from these only is he subsequently tested infra Chând. 6. 7. 2), and returned home full of conceit and arrogance, believing himself wise.” He fails, however, to answer his father’s questions on the One, the Self-existent, with whose knowledge everything is known, —“ assuredly my reverend teachers did not themselves know this; for had they known it, why did they not tell it to me?” Whereupon Aruṇi imparts to him the perfect instruction.

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This is the standpoint of the Taittirîya Upanishad also, when it teaches¹ that the âtman of the mind (*manomaya*, “composed of manas”) consists of *yajus*, *ṛic*, *sâman*, instruction (*âdes’a*, i.e. probably the Brâhmaṇa) and the hymns of the Atharvas and Aṅgirases; and proceeds to explain this entire âtman of the mind as a mere husk, which we must strip off in order to penetrate to the real essence of man or of nature.

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¹ Taitt. Upan. 2. 3.

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The doctrine set forth in these examples finds direct expression also at an early period:—“So then, after that the Brâhman has rejected learning (*pâṇḍityam nirvidya*), he abides in childhood”;² “He sought not after the knowledge of the books, which only gives rise to words without end”;³ “Before whom words and thought recoil, not finding him”;⁴ “Not by learning is the âtman attained, not by genius and much knowledge of books.”⁵ In Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 5 also the four Vedas are enumerated, and together with the six Vedâṅgas are reckoned as inferior knowledge (*aparâ vidyâ*), through which the imperishable Being is not known.

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² Bṛih. 3. 5. 1.

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³ Bṛih. 4. 4. 21.

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⁴ Taitt. 2. 4.

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⁵ Kâṭh. 2. 23.

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This attitude of aloofness towards the Vedic knowledge is altered at first gradually and in general, as the texts of the Upanishads gain fixity, and become the Vedânta.¹ Henceforth they, and the Veda with them, are regarded as sources of the highest knowledge. A first trace of this change is shown in Bṛih. 3. 9. 26, where Yâjñavalkhya inquires after the purusha of the upanishad doctrine (*aupanishada purusha*); this Ś’akalya does not know, and thereupon acknowledges defeat. Further, in Chând. 3. 5. 4, where the Veda is explained to be nectar, the Upanishads, the *guhyâ’ âdes’âḥ*, are the nectar of nectar. In Kena 33 the Upanishads are apparently attached to the Veda, or more precisely comprise a brief summary of the entire Vedic material of instruction under the Veda; for there the Vedas are explained to be “the sum of the parts” (*vedâḥ sarvângâni*), the “secret doctrine of Brahman” (*brâhmî upanishad*, in contrast with other unrecognised Upanishads, such as the *asurâṇâm upanishad* referred to above). With the adoption of the name Vedânta the Upanishads are seen to be completely naturalised in the Veda. The term first occurs in S’vet. 6. 22:—“From of old was the deepest secret disclosed in the Vedânta.” This transfer of the Vedânta to antiquity (*purâkalpa*) seems to show that the author looks back to the Bṛih., Chând., and other Upanishads of which he makes use from a certain distance. It might, however, be understood as a mere expression of the high value attached to them, a value that increases with the lapse of time. The Vedânta texts appear completely established in their later position as sources of the knowledge of Brahman, which is to be gained through the interpretation they offer, in the verse which occurs Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 6:²—*vedânta-vijñâna-sunis’cita-arthâḥ*, etc., “they who have correctly (*su*) penetrated the meaning of the Vedânta knowledge.” With this Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 3-4 agrees, where the Upanishads, and the syllable *Om* as their most essential element, are described as the bow, with which men shoot at Brahman as the mark. It is otherwise, however, in Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 5, where all the four Vedas are rejected. The latter passage seems therefore to be derived from an earlier period.

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¹ sup. p. 21.

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² Also Mahân. 10. 22, Kaivalya 3.

2. Preparatory Means to a Knowledge of Brahman

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In later times a kind of *via salutis* was constructed in the four *âśramas*, or life-stages, according to which every Indian Brâhman was under obligation to devote himself first as a *brahmacârin* to the study of the Veda, then as *gṛihastha* to the duties of the sacrifice and other good works, next as *vânaprastha* to the practice of asceticism in the jungle, and finally towards the end of life as *parivrâjaka* (*bhikshu*, *sannyâsin*) to a wandering existence without possessions or home, awaiting only his soul's release and its reception into the supreme âtman.

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As originally conceived we find these three *âśramas* in Bṛih. 4. 4. 22 :—"The Brâhmans endeavour to know him by study of the Veda (*brahmacârin*), by sacrifice and almsgiving (*gṛihastha*), by penance and fasting (*vânaprastha*); he who knows him becomes a *muni*; to him the pilgrims journey, when they yearn for home (*parivrâjaka*)." Here a certain value as preparatory means to a knowledge of Brahman appears to be assigned to the duties of the later *âśramas* (i.e. study of the Veda, sacrifice, asceticism).

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In Chând. 2. 23. 1 it is still more clearly expressed :—"There are three branches of duty : sacrifice with study of the Veda and almsgiving is the first (*gṛihastha*); asceticism is the second (*vânaprastha*); the student (*brahmacârin*) who lives in the house of his teacher is the third, provided that he remains always (as *naishṭhika*) in the teacher's house. These all carry as their reward the divine worlds ; he, however, who abides steadfast in Brahman wins immortality." This passage names only three *âśramas*, recognises their value, but contrasts with all three the “abiding steadfast in Brahman”; and this last is then subsequently developed into a fourth âs'rama. Another passage¹ endeavours by a series of bold etymologies to prove that sacrifice, silence, fasting, and a life in the forest (the pursuits, that is to say, of the grihastha and vânaprastha) are essentially brahmac'aryam; which term must be understood to include here not only the student-period, but in a broader sense, as the repeated reference to it shows, the entire course of life of a Brâhman regarded as the way that leads to the âtman. In all that this aim requires—that would seem to be the meaning of the passage—lies the peculiar value of the observances of the âs'ramas. More definitely in Kena 33, asceticism, self-restraint, and sacrifice (tapas, dama, karman) are described as the preliminary conditions (pratishthâh) of the brâhmî upanishad, i.e. of the real mystical doctrine which reveals Brahman. And in Kâth. 2. 15 all the Vedas, all the practices of tapas and the brahmac'aryam, are described as means by which the syllable Om (here equivalent to the knowledge of Brahman) is to be sought as the final aim. The observances of the âs'ramas are recognised also in Mund. 2. 1. 7, in so far as these (tapas, s'raddhâ, satyam, brahmac'aryam, vidhi) are here described as a creation of Brahman.

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¹ Chând. 8. 5.

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With regard to the particular âs'ramas, the study of the Veda has been already discussed above, and we propose here merely to summarise the most important teaching of the Upanishads concerning sacrifice and asceticism.

3. The Sacrifice

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The older Upanishads were so deeply conscious of the hostile character of the entire ritualistic system of the Brâhmans that they could concede to it only a relative recognition. It is true that direct attacks are rarely found in the extant texts. Antagonistic explanations, however, of the sacrificial rites are all the more frequently offered by way either of allegorical interpretation or of the substitution of other and usually psychological ideas in their place.

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There is a note almost of mockery in Bṛih. 1. 4. 10 when it is said :—" He who worships another divinity (than the âtman), and says ‘it is one and I am another,’ is not wise, but he is like a house-dog of the gods. Therefore just as many house-dogs are useful to men, every individual man is useful to the gods. Now the theft of only one house-dog is displeasing, how much more of many? Therefore it is displeasing to them that men do not know this." The remark of Yâjñavalkhya also, in Bṛih. 3. 9. 6, sounds very contemptuous :—" What is the sacrifice ?—brute beasts!" nor is it less so in Bṛih. 3. 9. 21, where it is said that Yama (the god of the dead) has his abode in the sacrifice, but the sacrifice in the fees.

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Daring remarks like these we do not find in the Chândogya, unless it be in the "Song of the Dog" in Chând. 1. 12, which seems to have been originally a satire on the greedy begging propensities of the priests, to which in later times an allegorical interpretation was given. In Chand. 1. 10-11 also the story is told, not without a malicious pleasure, how the three priests assembled at the sacrifice were put to confusion by a wandering beggar; and in Chând. 4. 1-3 Jânas'ruti, "rich in faith, open-handed, munificent" (s'raddhâdeyo, bahudâyî, bahupâkyaḥ), is compelled not without humiliation to seek instruction from a poor vagrant.

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According to the general view, sacrifice and good works give admission only to the "way of the fathers" (pitriyâna), which after a temporary sojourn in the moon leads back to a new earthly existence. As early as Bṛih. 1. 5. 16 it is said :—" by the labour (of the sacrifice) is the world of the fathers won, by knowledge the world of the gods”; and other passages describe the way of the fathers which leads back again to earth as the fate of those “who worship in the village with the words ‘Sacrifice and deeds of piety are our offering,’”¹ “who by sacrifice, almsgiving and ascetic practices gain the (heavenly) worlds,”² “who worship with the words ‘Sacrifice and deeds of piety are our work,’”³ “regarding sacrifice and deeds as the highest good, they know no better and are befooled.”⁴

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¹ Chând. 5. 10. 3.

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² Bṛih. 6. 2. 16.

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³ Praśna 1. 9.

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⁴ Muṇḍ. 1. 2. 10.

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Not rarely a meaning suitable to the new doctrine is read into the existing sacrificial rites. In Bṛih. 1. 4. 6, for example, the five daily offerings (*mahâyajñâḥ*) are interpreted as a sacrifice to the âtman; and in Chând. 4. 11–14 the three sacrificial fires are explained as forms of the âtman’s manifestation (*eṣhâ asmadvidyâ âtmavidyâ ca*).

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Yet more frequently conditions of the âtman, as embodied in the world of nature or of man, were substituted for the ceremonies of the ritual. In Bṛih. 3. 1, in place of the four priests as organs of the gods, there are found speech, eye, breath and manas as organs of the âtman. In Chând. 4. 16 the wind is explained to be the essence of the sacrifice, mind and speech the essence of the sacrificing priests. In Ait. Âr. 3. 2. 6, Bṛih. 1. 5. 23, and Kaush. 2. 5, inhalation and speech replace the *agnihotram*; and this thought is further developed on the basis of Chând. 5. 11–24 into the theory of the *prâṇâgnihotram*, a fuller discussion of which will be given below. The substitution also for the sacrifice of the man, his organs and bodily functions, is greatly favoured. For example, in Chând. 3. 16 the three life-periods take the place of the three pressings of the soma, in Chând. 3. 17 human activities of the various acts of the soma festival, and in Mahânâr. 64 the bodily organs of the implements of the sacrifice. This last thought is carried out in extreme detail in Prâṇâgnihotra Up. 3–4. The verse Taitt. 2. 5 also belongs here, inasmuch as, correctly translated, it asserts,—“He presents knowledge as his sacrifice, knowledge as his works.”

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It is first in the later Upanishads that we meet with a more friendly attitude towards the sacrificial cult. In Kâṭh. 1. 17, in a style altogether excessive and opposed to the upanishad spirit, there is promised for the fulfilment of certain ceremonies and works “the overstepping of birth and death,” “entrance into everlasting rest”; and in Kâṭh. 3. 2 the Nâciketa fire is explained as the bridge which bears the sacrificers to the supreme eternal Brahman, to the “fearless shore.” Here even if we make allowance for poetical extravagance of expression, a co-operation at least with the cult for the attainment of salvation is asserted. S'vet. 2. 6–7 marks a further step in advance:—

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Where Agni from the chips of wood
Darts forth, where Vâyu too appears,
Where the Soma also flows freely,—
There is the manas developed.

By Savitar, at his impulse,
Delight yourselves in the ancient prayer;
If there you take your stand,
The deeds of the past soil you no more.

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The expression here used, “Delight yourselves in the ancient prayer” (*jusheta brahma pûrvyam*) indicates that a former practice is reintroduced and held in honour. This reaction attains its climax in the Maitrâyaṇîya Up., which explains at the very outset¹ that “the fire-laying for the ancestors” is in truth “a sacrifice to Brahman”; and in the fourth Prapâṭhaka ventures the thought that without study of the Veda, observance of caste-duties, and the following of the due brâhmanical order of life according to the âśramas, the deliverance of the natural ātman and its re-union with the supreme ātman are impossible. The key to the understanding of this reaction is given by the polemic against the heretics which is found in Maitr. 7. 8–10. Brāhmanism, in view of the consequences which the attitude of the earlier Upanishads had entailed in Buddhism and similar manifestations, returns to its original position.

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¹ Maitr. 1. 1.

4. Asceticism (tapas)

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A feeling of admiration has always been excited when, contrary to the natural desires which all experience for life, pleasure and prosperity, there has been exhibited a self-mastery, which voluntarily submits to privations and sufferings either for the sake of the well-being of others, or independently of this external and as it were accidental aim, which indeed as far as the real worth of the respective actions is concerned is in itself without significance. An act of self-denial would seem the more pure the less it were combined with any external end, and the more it were undertaken with the sole object of subduing the selfish impulses of nature. It were as though a superhuman, supernatural power had been thereby manifested in man, which, springing from the deepest roots of his being, exalted the doer far above the world of men with its selfish interests, yea even above the world of the gods, and in another and higher order of things than ours assigned to him his place.

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It is a tribute to the high metaphysical capacity of the Indian people, that the phenomenon of asceticism made its appearance among them earlier and occupied a larger place than among any other known people. (We leave out of consideration at this point the later misuse of asceticism in the interest of merely selfish aims to excite wonder or to secure profit.)

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As early as the creation myths we saw how the creator of the universe prepared himself for his work by the practice of *tapas*; in which word the ancient idea of the "heat" which serves to promote the incubation of the egg of the universe blends with the ideas of the exertion, fatigue, self-renunciation, by means of which the creator is transmuted (entirely or in part) into the universe which he proposes to create. According to this conception, everything that is great in the universe is dependent on *tapas*. In a later hymn of the Rigveda also,¹ truth and right, and with them the entire universe, are born of *tapas*. From *śrama* (toil) and *tapas* the first-born Skambha arose and permeated the universe,² in *tapas* he was rocked on the surface of the primeval waters.³ By the *tapas* with which he discharges his duties the student of the Veda, according to another hymn,⁴ satisfies his teacher, the gods, and the realms of space, ascends on high as the sun, protects both worlds, etc., in his course of life as a Brâhman. By *tapas* the ruler protects his kingdom, the gods have escaped death, the student of the Veda practised *tapas* in the primeval ocean, when he, creating the universe, stood on the water's surface. And as early even as the Rigveda the seven rishis together betake themselves to the practice of *tapas*;⁵ and the souls on their entrance into heaven are apostrophised:—

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¹ X. 190. 1.

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² Atharvav. X. 7. 36.

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³ Atharvav. X. 7. 38.

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⁴ Atharvav. XI. 5.

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⁵ Rigv. X. 109. 4.

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Which invincible by tapas,
Have won their way by tapas to the light,
That have accomplished the severest tapas—,
To these now enter in!⁶

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⁶ Rigv. X. 154. 2.

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Another hymn of the Rigveda⁷ portrays the inspired *muni* as with long hair, in dirty yellow robes, girt only with the wind he roams on the desert paths. Mortals behold only his body. But he himself, endowed with supernatural power, flies through the air, drinks with the storm-god from the bowl of both the oceans of the universe, on the track of the wind is raised aloft to the gods, transcends all forms, and as companion of the gods co-operates with them for the salvation of mankind.

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⁷ Rigv. X. 136.

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By the time of the oldest Upanishad texts the ascetic life has already been elevated into a special “calling,”¹ which assumes equal rank by the side of the position of householder. Men abandon household goods and family, as Yâjñavalkhya does in Bṛih. 2. 4, and depart into the solitude of the forest in order to practise tapas, and by gradually increasing privations and penances to destroy in themselves the last remains of dependence on earthly existence.

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¹ dharmaskandha, Chând. 2. 23.

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It remains to inquire what attitude was adopted by the authors and defenders of the doctrines of the Upanishads in presence of this cult of an ascetic ideal.

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The Chândogya Upanishad sets before us in the first place Upakosala, a student of the Veda, who grieves² that the teacher refuses to impart to him knowledge, and falling sick declines to take nourishment. To the invitation to eat he replies:—“Alas, in mankind there are such troops of desires. I am full of sickness, and incapable of eating.” (In these words the characteristic motive of Indian, as of all asceticism, is evident.) Thereupon the three sacrificial fires take pity on him, and the instruction which they give to him begins with the words:—“Brahman is life, Brahman is joy (kam), Brahman is space (kham).” It is implied in these words that Brahman, as the principle of life, of bliss (kam = ânanda, as in Chând.

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² tapto brahmacârî, 4. 10. 2-4.

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7. 23 sukham), and of infinity, is not to be attained by the way of a gloomy asceticism.

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In Chând. 2. 23 *tapas* is spoken of as the especial obligation of the anchorite. As such, a recognised position is accorded it by the side of the student and householder. All three “bring as their reward the divine worlds; he, however, who abides steadfast in Brahman wins immortality.” This is not in contradiction with the statement of Chând. 5. 10. 1, that the way of the gods, which leads to Brahman without return, and marks still for the present time the loftiest aim, is promised to those *ye c'a ime 'raṇye 'sraddhâ tapa' iti upâsate*; for these words mean, “those who worship in the forest using the words ‘faith is our asceticism.’” The reference is to the anchorite; but something else—viz. faith—is here substituted for the asceticism which is his calling.

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To the same effect the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upan. expresses itself when, reproducing this passage in an appendix,¹ it yet more definitely opens up the prospect of the way of the gods to those alone “who observe faith and truth in the forest”; but on the other hand offers only the way of the fathers in return for sacrifice, almsgiving, and asceticism. Of these last it is said² that through them men seek to know Brahman, *vividishanti*. More directly still Yājñavalkhya expresses himself in Bṛih. 3. 8. 10:—“Of a truth, O Gârgî, he who does not know this imperishable one, and in this world sacrifices and distributes alms and does penance (*tapas tapyate*) for many thousands of years, wins thereby only finite (reward).” Bṛih. 5. 11 again teaches that sickness the procession to the grave and cremation are the best asceticism (*paramam tapas*). Here, then, the sufferings of life and death are rated higher than artificially induced penances.

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¹ Bṛih. 6. 2. 15.

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² Bṛih. 4. 4. 22.

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We meet with a disposition more favourable to asceticism as early as the Taittirîya Upanishad. The first part which is appointed for the student demands of him¹ asceticism and the study of the Veda, and quotes in this connection the views of two teachers, of whom the one requires “asceticism alone,” the other only study of the Veda, “for this is asceticism.” The Upanishad adopts an intermediate position by its demand for asceticism combined with the study of the Veda. In the last and latest part² a higher value is placed upon asceticism, where Bhṛigu is repeatedly urged by his father Varuṇa:— “By *tapas* seek to know Brahman, for *tapas* is Brahman.” Following his injunction, by progressive *tapas* he rises step by step to the recognition of food, the vital breath, manas, knowledge, and finally bliss as Brahman, and with this last the highest degree attainable by *tapas* is reached. The Mahânârâyaṇa Upan., which is attributed to the Taittirîya school, is much later still; in 62. 11 it sets *nyâsa*, “renunciation,” above asceticism, thereby preparing the way for the standpoint of the Sannyâsa Upanishad; of which later. Kena 33 also, as already mentioned, reckons *tapas* among the foundations (*i.e.* the presuppositions, *pratiṣṭhâḥ*) of Brahman; and according to S'vet. 1. 15, 16; 6. 21, the knowledge of Brahman is based upon *âtmavidyâ* (the text of the Vedânta) and *tapas*.

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¹ Taitt. 1. 9.

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² Taitt. 3.

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A step, however, far beyond all the preceding is taken by the Muṇḍaka and Pras'na in their reproduction of the above-mentioned theory of the Chând. and Bṛihad. concerning the ways of the gods and the fathers with a characteristic variation. In Muṇd. 1. 2. 11 the way of the gods is promised to those “who practise asceticism and faith in the forest” (*tapaḥ-s'raddhe ye hi upavasanti araṇye*); and Pras'na 1. 10 offers it to those “who have sought the âtman by asceticism, the manner of life of a Brâhman, faith and knowledge.” It is remarkable that in Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 4 a spurious tapas is mentioned (*tapas aliṅgam*), i.e. probably one that lacks the characteristic mark of knowledge.

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As was to be expected, in the Maitr. Upan. is revived the ancient Vedic standpoint in regard to tapas, in presence of Buddhist and other errors. It is true that asceticism alone does not suffice, for in Maitr. 1. 2 it is practised in the severest form by Bṛhadratha without procuring for him the knowledge of the ātman. As a preliminary condition, however, it is indispensable:—"without being an ascetic it is impossible either to attain the knowledge of the ātman, or to bring work to fruition."¹

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¹ *na atapaskasya ātmajñâne 'dhigamaḥ, karmasiddhir vâ*, Maitr. 4. 3.

5. Other Preliminary Conditions

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In the older Upanishads we are repeatedly met by the prohibition to communicate a doctrine or ceremony to anyone except a son or a pupil adopted by the rite of upanayanam. In Ait. Ār. 3. 2. 6. 9 the mystical meaning of the combinations of the letters must be "communicated to no one, who is not a pupil, who has not been a pupil for a whole year, who does not propose himself to be a teacher."² In Chând. 3. 11. 5 the doctrine of Brahman as the sun of the universe should "his father make known as Brahman to his eldest son alone, or to a trusted pupil, but to no one else, whoever he may be. And though he were to be offered in return for it all the kingdoms of the ocean-girdled earth, yet should he bethink himself 'the other is of greater value.'" In Bṛh. 6. 3. 12 also the ceremony of the mixed drink "must be communicated to none but a son or a pupil."

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² cp. also Ait. Ār. 5. 3. 3. 4.

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Similarly in the Upanishads we find men and gods taking the fuel in their hands, and submitting to the conditions of pupilage, just as according to Chând. 8, 11. 3 Indra himself was obliged to live with Prajâpati as a pupil for one hundred and one years in order to obtain the perfect instruction. Other examples are Kaush. 1. 1, 4. 19, Bṛih. 2. 1. 14, Pras'na 1. 1, Muṇḍ. 1. 2. 12.

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Yet in the earlier period this demand is still not absolute. In Chând. 4. 9. 3 it is merely said that "the knowledge which is gained from a teacher (as opposed to supernatural instruction by beasts, fire, geese or ducks¹) leads most certainly to the goal"; and in Chând. 5. 11. 7 the king As'vapati instructs the six Brâhmans who approach him with the fuel in their hands (in token of their wish to become pupils) *anupanîya*, "without first admitting them as his pupils." So also in Bṛih. 2. 4 Yâjñavalkhya instructs his wife Maitreyî, and in Bṛih. 4. 1-2, 3-4 the king Janaka, who yet were not strictly his pupils; and in Bṛih. 3 he imparts information on the deepest questions (as *e.g.* Bṛih. 3. 8, in the conversation with Gârgî) in the presence of a numerous circle of hearers, and only exceptionally, when he desires to explain to Ârtabhâga the mystery of the soul's transmigration, does he retire with him into privacy.² Ordinarily, however, a teacher is necessary to disperse the mist of empirically acquired knowledge from our eyes (ἀχλὺν δ'αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἕλον, ἣ πρὶν ἐπῆεν,—as Schopenhauer represents the spirit of Kant saying to him in the words of Homer), and of this in particular the beautiful passage in Chând. 6. 14 treats:—"Precisely, my dear sir, as a man who has been brought blindfold from the country of Gandhâra (beyond the Indus), and then set at liberty in the desert, goes astray to the east or north or south, because he has been brought thither blindfold, and blindfold set at liberty; but after that someone has taken off the bandage, and has told him, ‘In this direction Gandhâra lies, go in this direction,’ instructed and prudent, asking the road from village to village, he finds his way home to Gandhâra; even so the man, who in this world has met with a teacher, becomes conscious, ‘To this (transitory world) shall I belong only until the time of my release, thereupon shall I go home.’” The teacher is represented as indispensable to knowledge in Kâṭh. 2. 8:—“Apart from the teacher there is no access here”; from which the incidental conclusion may be drawn, that at the time of the Kâṭh. Upan. the older Upanishads were not yet committed to writing.

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¹ *Tauchervogel*, "divers."

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² Bṛih. 3. 2. 13.

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The later Vedânta mentions, side by side with the external (*vâhya*) means to a knowledge of Brahman (study of the Veda, sacrifice, almsgiving, penance, fasting), as more direct (*pratyâsanna*) means the following: tranquillity of mind, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, collectedness.¹ This requirement may be traced back to Bṛih. 4. 4. 23:—“Therefore he who knows this is tranquil, self-restrained, self-denying, patient, and collected.” It is true that a doubt arises whether this passage has reference to the means of acquiring the knowledge of Brahman, or rather to the fruits of that knowledge (whether *bhûtvâ* here signifies “after that he has become,” or “since he is”). By the later Upanishads it is understood already, as later still by S’ankara, in the first sense, *e.g.* Kâṭh. 2. 24:—“No one who has not ceased from violence, who is restless, unsubdued, whose heart is not yet tranquil, can by searching attain unto him.” The expressions here used, *avirata*, *as’ânta*, *asamâhita*, refer back unquestionably to the *s’ânto*, *dânta’*, *uparatas*, *titikshuḥ*, *samâhito bhûtvâ* of the passage from the Bṛihadâraṇyaka. The same is true also of *pras’ântac’ittâya*, *s’amânvitâya*, declared in Muṇḍ. 1. 2. 13 to be presuppositions of instruction.

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¹ Cp. also Vedântasâra 17–23.

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In later Upanishads this preliminary requirement is connected with the demand already referred to for a teacher. *E.g.* S'vet. 6. 22 :—" Impart it to no one, who is not tranquil (*na apras'ântâya*), who is not a son or a pupil (*na aputrâya as'ishyâya vâ*)." Similarly, and perhaps with a reminiscence of this passage, in Maitr. 6. 29 :—" This profoundest mystery of all is to be revealed to no one, who is not a son or a pupil (*na aputrâya, na as'ishyâya*), and who has not yet become tranquil (*na as'ântâya*)."

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The finding a teacher, and the five requirements of tranquillity of mind, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, collectedness, are the preliminary conditions that continually recur. With them others are occasionally mentioned; for example, in Chând. 7. 26. 2, purity of food, and as a consequence purity of nature (*sattva-s'uddhi*). The latter, like so much besides from Chând. 7, is reproduced in Muṇḍ. 3 in the verse 3. 2. 6, and thence passed over into Mahânâr. 10. 22 and Kaivalya 3–4. In Kâṭh. 6. 9 an indefinite requirement is laid down, that a man should be "prepared in heart and feeling and spirit"; and in Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 10–11 participation in the Brahmavidyâ is combined with the preliminary condition of the fulfilment of the "vow of the head" (*s'irovratam*), by which is probably to be understood, not as S'ankara *sirasi agnidhâraṇam*, but merely the practice, which is already implied in the name Muṇḍaka, of shaving the head bare. In still later Upanishads also we occasionally meet with special limitations on this participation. Thus Nṛisimhap. 1. 3 prohibits the communication of the maxims of the members (not the king of the maxims¹) to a woman or a S'ûdra, and Râmap. 84 enjoins that the diagram must not be imparted to common (illiterate, *prâkṛita*) men.

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¹ Mantrarâja, i.e. the charm or magical song.

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6. The Standpoint of Ignorance, of Knowledge, and of superior Knowledge in relation to Brahman

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The general view that lies at the basis of the Upanishads is that Brahman, *i.e.* the âtman, is an object of knowledge. "The âtman, in truth, should be seen, heard, comprehended, reflected upon."¹ "The Self . . . that should we search for and endeavour to know."² To the same effect are numerous other passages. And the aim of all the Upanishad texts is to communicate this knowledge of Brahman.³

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¹ Bṛih. 2. 4. 5.

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² Chând. 8. 7. 1.

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³ *brahmavidyâ*, *âtmavidyâ*.

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Very soon, however, it came to be realised that this knowledge of Brahman was essentially of a different nature from that which we call "knowledge" in ordinary life. For it would be possible, like Nârada in Chând. 7. 1. 2, to be familiar with all conceivable branches of knowledge and empirical science, and yet to find oneself in a condition of ignorance (*avidyâ*) as regards the Brahman. This thought, originally purely negative, became in course of time more and more positive in its character. It was negative in so far as no experimental knowledge led to a knowledge of Brahman; and it was positive in so far as the consciousness was aroused that the knowledge of empirical reality was an actual hindrance to the knowledge of Brahman. The conception of *avidyâ* was developed from the negative idea of mere ignorance to the positive idea of false knowledge. The experimental knowledge which reveals to us a world of plurality, where in reality only Brahman exists, and a body where in reality there is only the soul, must be a mistaken knowledge, a delusion, a *mâyâ*. This is a very noteworthy step in advance. It is the same which Parmenides and Plato took when they affirmed that the knowledge of the world of sense was mere deception, *εἴδωλα*;

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which Kant took, when he showed that the entire reality of experience is only apparition and not reality ("thing in itself"). It is of the greatest interest to follow up the earliest foreshadowings of this thought in India, and to trace how the term *avidyâ* passed from the negative idea of ignorance to the positive idea of a false knowledge.

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The first suggestion of this is found already in the Rigveda, where in X. 81. 1 it is said of the great All-father that he, when he entered into the lower world, was *prathamach'had*, "veiling his original nature."¹ Further, an obscure passage of the S'atapatha Brâhmaṇa² describes how Brahman, when creating the upper and the lower worlds together with their gods, "revealed" himself, how he projected himself into them by means of his two "great immensities" (*abhva*), his two "great appearances" (*yaksha*), that is to say by means of his names and forms, but how he himself "entered into the half beyond" (*parârdham agac'chat*).

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¹ *mukhyam, nishprapanc'am, pâramârthikam rûpam âvṛiṇvan*, Sâyaṇa.

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² 11. 2. 3.

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The further development of these thoughts is found in the Upanishads. In Bṛih. 1. 6. 3 the world of names, forms, and works is defined (by means of one of those brief mystical formulæ, of which perhaps the most ancient "Upanishads" consisted, *sup.* p. 16 f.) as *amritam satyena c'hannam*, "the immortal (Brahman) veiled by the (empirical) reality." The explanation of the formula is added immediately:—"The Prâṇa (*i.e.* the âtman) to wit is the immortal, name and form are the reality; by these the Prâṇa is veiled." As here (and in Taitt. 2. 6,—"as reality he becomes everything that exists; for reality is the name given to it"), so also in Bṛih. 2. 1. 20 the word *satyam* denotes the reality of experience; in this latter passage it is said in another "Upanishad" with an added explanation:—"Its Upanishad is 'the reality of reality,' (satyasya satyam); that is to say, the vital spirits (together with the worlds, gods, and living creatures, as we may infer from that which precedes) are the reality, and he is their reality.” He is—so we are to understand—in the so-called reality that part of it which is actually real. This is also the meaning of the illustrations in Bṛih. 2. 4. 7–9: the ātman is the musical instrument (drum, conch, lyre), the phenomena of the universe are its notes; just as the notes can only be seized when the instrument is seized, so the world of plurality can only be known when the ātman is known; only of him is there knowledge, all else is “not knowledge.” Similarly Chând. 6. 1. 3 teaches that the “transformation” of the ātman into the manifold world of phenomena is only vāc’ārambhaṇam, “a matter of words,” or nāmadheyam, “a mere name,” and that “in reality” there exists only the One Being, i.e. the Ātman. It is only of him therefore that a real knowledge is possible. All experimental knowledge, the four Vedas and the whole series of empirical sciences, as they are enumerated in Chând. 7. 1. 2–3, are, as is there said, nāma eva, “mere name”; and Nārada, deeply versed as he is in them, finds himself in “darkness,” from which first by the knowledge of the ātman is he guided across to the other shore.¹ Souls and the “real desires” by which they are affected for continued life after death in the world of Brahman are, as expounded in Chând. 8. 3. 1–2, by the empirical knowledge which teaches annihilation at death “veiled in unreality. They really exist, but unreality is spread over them.” And “just as he who is ignorant of its hiding-place fails to find the golden treasure, though he pass and repass it continually, so all these creatures fail to find this world of Brahman though they daily enter into it; for by unreality are they turned aside.”

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¹ Chând. 7. 26. 2.

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What is here described as empty word, mere name, darkness, unreality, *i.e.* the entire empirical knowledge of things, is further denoted by *avidyâ*, “ignorance.” This term occurs perhaps for the first time in Bṛih. 4. 4. 3, 4, where it is said of the soul, when it casts off the body in death, that it “dismisses ignorance” (*avidyâm gamayitvâ*). Ignorance is henceforth the knowledge that rests on experience; true knowledge is only of Brahman. Like Plato’s teaching that only the eternal is an object of ἐπιστήμη, while of the world of phenomena subject to the flux of Heraclitus only a δόξα is possible, in S'vet. 5. 1 the explanation is given:—“Ignorance is the fleeting, knowledge is the eternal,”¹ *i.e.* it is an object of knowledge. Kâṭh. 2. 1–6 contrasts ignorance and knowledge with poetic vividness; the goal of ignorance is pleasure (*preyas*), the goal of knowledge is salvation (*s'reyas*). The former says, “this is the world” (*ayam loko*); the gaze of the latter is directed on another world:—

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¹ *ksharam tu avidyâ hi amṛitam tu vidyâ.*

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Widely different indeed and contrasted are the things
Which men call knowledge and ignorance,
I see Nac'iketas endeavouring to gain knowledge;
The troop of pleasures has not deluded thee.

Wandering in the depth of ignorance,
Deeming themselves wise and learned,
Thus aimlessly fools tramp hither and thither,
Like blind men led by comrades blind as they.

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The last verse is further amplified in Muṇḍ. 1. 2. 8–10; and both verses are quoted in Maitr. 7. 9. The subject is similarly treated in the verses Bṛih. 4. 4. 11–12, which are a later insertion (cp. Kâṭh. 1. 3):—

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These worlds indeed are joyless,
Shrouded in thick darkness;
Into them after death all go
Who are unenlightened and ignorant.

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Yet he who perceives the âtman,
And is conscious that "I am he";
What desire what love could he still have
For the body racked with pain!

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The infatuation of ignorance is yet more strongly depicted in Îsâ 3:—

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This universe indeed is demon-haunted,
Shrouded in thick darkness,
Therein go to death all
Who have slain their own souls.

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Since the knowledge of the âtman is contrasted with the reality of experience as the realm of ignorance, it cannot be gained by mere speculation (*tarka*) concerning it, but only by a revelation communicated through the teacher.¹ According as the âtman is conceived as a divine person, this revelation is represented as an act of his grace:²—

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¹ Kâṭh. 2. 7–9.

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² Kâṭh. 2. 23, repeated in Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 3.

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Not through instruction is the âtman won,
Not through genius or much book-learning;
Only by the man whom he chooses is he comprehended:
To him the âtman reveals his essence.

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Another verse,³ which in all probability originally promised the vision of the âtman concealed in the heart to him who "by pacifying the organs of sense"⁴ has become "indifferent" (*akratu*), has received a theistic colouring in S'vet. 3. 20 and Mahânâr. 10. 1, in that it represents the knowledge of the âtman (whose abode is here also still in the heart) as received "by the favour of the creator."⁵ A still more pronounced theism, that has wandered far from the original conceptions of the doctrine of the âtman, is exhibited by the entire S'vetas'vatara Upanishad, and especially by the prayers for spiritual enlightenment to Savitar, Rudra, and Brahman which are interwoven with it in 2. 1-5, 3. 1-6, 4. 1.

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³ Kâṭh. 2. 20, as read by S'ankara.

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⁴ *dhâtu-prasâdâd*; cp. Chând. 6. 15, *âtmani sarvendriyâṇi sampratishṭhâpya*.

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⁵ *dhâtuḥ prasâdâd*.

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The doctrine thus far set forth, according to which Brahman or the âtman becomes known by virtue of a (metaphysical) knowledge, is transcended within the limits of the Upanishads themselves by another and undeniably more profound conception, according to which there neither is nor can be a knowledge of the âtman as the sole all-pervading essence of things. For such knowledge assumes a knowing subject and a known object, and therefore a dualism; the âtman, however, forms an absolute unity. We propose briefly to trace the development of this thought under the guidance of the texts.

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The primitive source of the entire conception of the unknowableness of the âtman is to be found in the speeches of Yâjñavalkhya in the Bṛihadâraṇyaka; and the daring and abruptness with which the doctrine is here introduced, as well as the originality of the method by which it is established, seem to point to an individual as its author. In his discourse with Maitreyî Yâjñavalkhya propounds, in Bṛih. 2. 4. 12, the paradoxical assertion,—"after death there is no consciousness"; and proceeds to confirm it with the words:—"For where there is as it were a duality (in reality there is not), there one sees the other, smells, hears, addresses, comprehends, and knows the other; but where everything has become to him his own self, how should he smell, see, hear, address, understand, or know anyone at all? How should he know him, through whom he knows all this, how should he know the knower?" On careful consideration two thoughts will be found to be implied here: (1) the supreme âtman is unknowable, because he is the all-comprehending unity, whereas all knowledge presupposes a duality of subject and object; but (2) the individual âtman also ("through whom he knows all this") is unknowable, because in all knowledge he is the knowing subject ("the knower"), consequently can never be object. Essentially these two thoughts are one; for the individual âtman is the supreme âtman, and in proportion as we rise to this knowledge the illusion of the object vanishes, and the knowing subject alone remains without object; and this subject, alike in its waking hours and in dreams, fashions the objects outside of itself,—"for he is the creator."¹ The same thought is found in five other passages in the speeches of Yâjñavalkhya, and these we quote partly abridged:—"Thou canst not see the seer of seeing, thou canst not hear the hearer of hearing, thou canst not comprehend the comprehender of comprehending, thou canst not know the knower of knowing."² "In truth, O Gârgî, this imperishable one sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, comprehends but is not comprehended, knows but is not known. Beside him there is no seer, beside him there is no hearer, beside him there is none that comprehends, beside him there is none that knows."³ The same words recur almost unaltered in Bṛih. 3. 7. 23 at the close of a paragraph, and on this account the association of the thread of the universe with the inner guide appears to be less primitive. In Bṛih. 4. 3. 23–31 it is said of the deep sleeper:—"When then he does not see, yet still he is seeing, although he sees not; since for the seer there is no interruption of seeing, because he is imperishable; but there is no second beside him, no other distinct from him, for him to see." The same is then repeated of smell, taste, speech, hearing, thought, sensation, and knowledge. "For (only) where there is as it were another is the other seen, smelt, tasted, addressed, heard, conceived, felt, and known." And in Bṛih. 4. 4. 2, of the dying it is said:—"Because he has become one, therefore he sees not as they say (in reality he continues ever seeing), because he has become one, therefore he does not smell, taste, address, hear, conceive, feel, or know the other, as they say.”

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¹ Bṛih. 4. 3. 10.

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² Bṛih. 3. 4. 2.

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³ Bṛih. 3. 8. 11.

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If we consider the originality, the close reasoning, and (as we shall see later) the agreement of the thoughts in the passages quoted with the other views of Yâjñavalkhya, we shall be led to regard as very probable the dependence of all the passages that remain to be quoted, and therefore of the entire further development of the doctrine of the unknowableness of the âtman, on the thoughts, perhaps even on the text of the Bṛihadâraṇyaka. The two passages from the Chândogya, which we have now to cite, may be regarded as early examples:—“His relations seat themselves around the dying man, and ask him, ‘Do you recognise me; do you recognise me?’ As long as his speech has not yet entered into the manas, his manas into the prâṇa, his prâṇa into the heat, the heat into the supreme godhead, he recognises them. But after that his speech has entered into the manas, his manas into the prâṇa, his prâṇa into the heat, the heat into the supreme godhead, then he no longer recognises them.”¹ This passage, self-contained as it is, nevertheless appears in its leading ideas to be dependent already on the last-named passage of the Bṛih. 4. 4. 2, since the reverse relation is not in any case admissible. In Chând. 6. 9 and 6. 10 also the doctrine of unconsciousness on entrance into the Existent, set forth in the illustrations of the bees and the rivers, seems to be indebted to the passage first adduced from Bṛih. 2. 4. 12:—“After death there is no consciousness.” And similarly the following words in Bṛih. 2. 4. 14 are echoed in Chând. 7. 24. 1:—“If a man sees no other (beside himself), hears no other, knows no other, that is the infinite (bhûman); if he sees, hears, knows another, that is the finite (*alpam*). The infinite is the immortal, the finite is mortal." The suddenness and disconnectedness with which this idea is introduced seems to indicate dependence on the thoughts of Yâjñavalkhya.

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