The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c6.s3.t4.7

c6.s3.t4.7

Third Objection: Cognition cannot proceed without organs of perception, body, senses, etc. (p. 93, 4. 96, 11).—Answer: because cognition inheres in Brahman, as shining in the sun, as an eternal law of its nature, it requires no organs to this end, like the individual soul (p. 97, 1), which, as is provisionally set forth on p. 98, is nothing but the Brahman itself, limited by the Upādhis like the body etc., and therefore only separate from the Brahman from the standpoint of Ignorance (cf. above p. 58 ff.). The individual soul (p. 100—101) is the Self of Brahman, and the Brahman is the Self of the individual soul; for of Brahman it is said: (Chând. 6, 3, 2) "this "divinity designed: good! I will enter into these three divinities "[Fire, Water, Earth] with this living self!" and again it is said (Chând. 6, 8, 7): "whose being is this universe, that is the “Real, that is the soul (the Self), that art thou, o Çveta-ketu!”—That Self means the own nature; a spiritual power, like the individual soul, cannot have an unspiritual as its own nature (p. 100, 18. 104, 9).—On this ground, which for our authors is unassailable, they take their stand further on, when, to prove the spirituality of the Existent or the Godhead, they refer to two phenomena, that of liberation, and that of dreamless sleep. Liberation is a return into Brahman (p. 102, 8); and from another point of view it is only a coming to consciousness of one’s own Self (p. 103, 7), it follows, therefore, that Brahman is simply this Self, and therefore spiritual. As Liberation is an eternal union with the Existent, that is, with Brahman, the cause of the world, so deep, dreamless sleep according to the scripture (Chând. 6, 8, 1) is a temporary union with the Existent (p. 109, 2); the word “he sleeps” (svapiti) means, however, “he has entered into himself” (svam apita); a spiritual power, like the individual soul, cannot enter into an unspiritual as into its own self (p. 108, 10).