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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c6.s3.t4: 4. Brahman as pure Intelligence

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c6.s3.t4

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4. Brahman as pure Intelligence

c6.s3.t4.1

Sûtram 1, 1, 5--11.

c6.s3.t4.2

Prefatory Remark. When we consider the weakness and frailty of man's intellect, we can only wonder at the unanimity with which, in Indian, Greek and modern philosophy, Intelligence is ascribed as an essential attribute to “the Thing-in-itself.” It is well worth while to follow out the motives which have led the thinkers of ancient and modern times to declare so feeble a faculty, which works only intermittently, is bound up with organic life and perishes with it, to be the essence of the being of Beings. These motives are especially clearly seen in the deeply founded structure of the Vedânta philosophy. Metaphysics must above all seek a firm and immovable point of certainty, in order to attack the subject, and this can only be found in the consciousness of the philosophising subject; hence the Cartesian: *cogito, ergo sum*, and the corresponding statement of our work, which we have given above p. 127 ff. Here, within our own Self, we gain an infallible guide to the absolute Being which we are seeking: that which cannot be laid aside must also be the imperishable, the unchangeable must also be that which lies at the basis of every thing changeable, a conviction, which is most clearly expressed by calling the Principle of all Being the *Âtman*, that is, the Self. We reach it as, in the manner described above p. 58, and in note 29, we gradually separate from our "I" everything which is "not-I," hence not only the outer world, the body and its organs, but also the whole apparatus of *Buddhi* or intellect (the *indriyas* and the *manas*). What remains, should consequently be spoken of only as unconscious; but they could not go so far, without removing the whole phenomenon from the region of perceptibility. Consciousness, therefore, in which all this process of elimination proceeds, was left as the terminus, so that not only was the necessity avoided of abandoning, along with the organs of perception, their function also,—perception,—but also the very noteworthy objections of the adversary, which we shall presently detail, were set at defiance.

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Many times, as *Çaṅkara* says in the passage, with which we are concerned, intellect is ascribed to the Principle of world-creation in the Veda. So when it is said: "He designed (*aikshata*): I will become many, I will procreate" (Chând. 6, 2, 3);—"He designed: I will create worlds" (Ait. 1, 1, 1);—"He formed the design, then he created Breath" (Praçna 6, 3. 4);—"He who knows all, understands all" etc. (Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 9).—From this it follows that we must ascribe to the Brahman omniscience, absolute, unlimited knowledge, that, as a later passage (3, 2, 16) explains, Brahman is pure spirituality (*caitanyam*) and this alone.—Against these arguments the Sâṅkhyas raise the following objections:

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First Objection: An eternal cognition in Brahman would take away the freedom of Brahman with reference to the action of cognition (p. 93, 1).—To this *Çaṅkara* replies: to begin with, it is to be held that only an eternal actual, and not a potential, cognition (such as the Sâṅkhyas ascribe to the *sattva-guṇa* of their primordial matter) satisfies the demands of omniscience.⁷¹ A cognition of this kind does not take away the freedom of Brahman; for in the case of the sun also, although it continually gives forth heat and light, we say "it warms," "it shines" and thereby indicate that it does this of itself, of its own accord [p. 95, 16; that is to say: the following out of the law of its own nature does not take away the freedom of a being].

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⁷¹ p. 95, 10. The passage seems corrupt; it would be a help if we might read: katham nitya-jñāna-akriyatve asarvajñatva-hānir, by which what follows becomes consistent.

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Second Objection: a cognition is only possible, if there is also an object of perception (karman, literally "a product," in contrast to karaṇam, organ), which was not the case before the creation (p. 96, 1).—Answer: as the sun also shines, when there is nothing for it to shine on, so Brahman might know without having an object of cognition (cf. p. 649, 10). Yet one existed, even before the creation. What is this pre-cosmic object?—It is (p. 96, 6) "the Names and Forms which are neither "to be defined as beings nor as the opposite, which are not "evolved, but striving towards evolution (avyākrite, vyācikîrshite), "the Names and Forms" of the world [which as the words of the Veda, as we saw above p. 71, hovered before the spirit of the Creator before the creation].

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Third Objection: Cognition cannot proceed without organs of perception, body, senses, etc. (p. 93, 4. 96, 11).—Answer: because cognition inheres in Brahman, as shining in the sun, as an eternal law of its nature, it requires no organs to this end, like the individual soul (p. 97, 1), which, as is provisionally set forth on p. 98, is nothing but the Brahman itself, limited by the Upādhis like the body etc., and therefore only separate from the Brahman from the standpoint of Ignorance (cf. above p. 58 ff.). The individual soul (p. 100—101) is the Self of Brahman, and the Brahman is the Self of the individual soul; for of Brahman it is said: (Chând. 6, 3, 2) "this "divinity designed: good! I will enter into these three divinities "[Fire, Water, Earth] with this living self!" and again it is said (Chând. 6, 8, 7): "whose being is this universe, that is the “Real, that is the soul (the Self), that art thou, o Çveta-ketu!”—That Self means the own nature; a spiritual power, like the individual soul, cannot have an unspiritual as its own nature (p. 100, 18. 104, 9).—On this ground, which for our authors is unassailable, they take their stand further on, when, to prove the spirituality of the Existent or the Godhead, they refer to two phenomena, that of liberation, and that of dreamless sleep. Liberation is a return into Brahman (p. 102, 8); and from another point of view it is only a coming to consciousness of one’s own Self (p. 103, 7), it follows, therefore, that Brahman is simply this Self, and therefore spiritual. As Liberation is an eternal union with the Existent, that is, with Brahman, the cause of the world, so deep, dreamless sleep according to the scripture (Chând. 6, 8, 1) is a temporary union with the Existent (p. 109, 2); the word “he sleeps” (svapiti) means, however, “he has entered into himself” (svam apita); a spiritual power, like the individual soul, cannot enter into an unspiritual as into its own self (p. 108, 10).

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