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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s2.t13: Dharmakāya

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s2.t13

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Dharmakāya

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The three kāyas, of which we have so far spoken, belong strictly, to the realm of Saṃvṛti, worldly and transcendental, and as such they were treated as Rūpa- or Nirmāṇa-kāya by the early Mahāyānists, including Nāgārjuna. The only real kāya of Buddha is the Reality as conceived by the Mahāyānists, and is not different from the things or beings of the universe.² Though an attempt to define it by the current words and expressions is bound to be not only incorrect but misleading, the Mahāyānic texts tried to give an idea of it as far as the language permitted. The Kārikā and the Siddhi call it Svābhāvika or Svabhāva kāya. It is, according to them, immeasurable and illimitable. It fills all space. It is the basis of the Sambhoga- and Nirmāṇa-kāyas. It is devoid of all marks (i.e. mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇas) and is inexpressible (niṣprapañca). It is possessed of eternal, real and unlimited guṇas. It has neither citta nor rūpa, and again it is not different from them. There is one and only one Dharmakāya. Buddhas may have their individual Sambhogakāyas but they have all one Dharmakāya.³ It can only be realised within oneself and not described, for that would be like the attempt of the blind man to describe the sun, which he has never seen.¹

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² In a Buddhist inscription of Battambang, a stanza in salutation of Buddha brings out this idea. See Le Muséon, vol. VII.

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³ Cf. Vis. M., p. 508: Nirvāṇa is one for all Buddhas.

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¹ Masuda, *op. cit.*, p. 59; Suzuki, *Awakening of Faith*, p. 62.

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It is often questioned whether the conception of Dharmakāya can be traced in the *Prajñāpāramitās* and the works of Nāgārjuna, and whether the *Prajñāpāramitās* and the works of Nāgārjuna admit of such a reality, or rather preach pure and simple negativism? To put it in another way, was it the object of the *Prajñāpāramitās* and Nāgārjuna's works to point out only the incongruities of the world and worldly knowledge and avoid making any statement about the Reality or the truth?

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The *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and other *Prajñāpāramitās*, though unrelenting in their negation of every possible statement about the reality, never assert that Tathatā or Śūnyatā or Dharmakāya in its real sense is also non-existing. The statements like ‘tathatāvikārā nirvikārāvikalpā nirvikalpā’ (Suchness is immutable, unchangeable, beyond percept and distinctions)² show rather a positive conception of the Reality than a purely negative one. In regard to the Dharmakāya also the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* makes similar statements. It says that he who knows that the dharmas, existing in the world or preached by the Tathāgata, have no more existence than things in a dream and, does not enquire whence the Tathāgata comes and where he goes, realises the Tathāgata through Dharmatā.³ The Buddhakāya, that people speak of, arises through cause and condition like the sound of a flute; it involves really no appearance or disappearance. Those who run after the form and voice of the Tathāgata and conceive of his appearance and disappearance are far from the Truth.¹ No further statements than this can be made about the Reality, for that would be again prapañca. When the Aṣṭasāhasrikā asserts that the Tathāgata does not exist, it refers to that Tathāgata as conceived by one on reading the Mahāyāna texts. Even the Bodhisattvas, unless and until they reach the tenth bhūmi, cannot extricate themselves from a conception of the Tathāgatakāya, however subtle it may be (e.g. the Svasambhogakāya). They are still under a delusion and it is this delusion that the Prajñāpāramitās endeavour to remove by asserting that there is no Tathāgata.

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² *Aṣṭa.*, p. 307; cf. the passage: yā ca tathāgatatathatā yā ca sarvadharmatathatā ekaivaiṣā tathatā’dvayā’dvaidhīkārā’dvayatathatā na kvacit tathatā na kutaścit tathatā na kasyacit tathatā yataḥ sā na kasyacit tathatā tataḥ sā tathatā’dvayā’dvaidhīkārā’dvayatathatā. (That which is Tathāgata-tathatā and that which is all-things-tathatā are non-dual, one and the same, Tathatā is neither anywhere nor arises from anywhere, nor belongs to anything, hence as Tathatā does not belong to anybody, it is non-dual and one). For other passages of similar import, see *M. Vr.*, Ch. xxii.

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³ *Aṣṭa.*, p. 514: te dharmatayā tathāgatam prajānāti. Cf. *M. Vr.*, p. 448: dharmato buddhā draṣṭavyāḥ.

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¹ Aṣṭa., p. 513.

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Nāgārjuna by denying the existence of a so-called Tathāgata does nothing more than what the Prajñāpāramitās endeavour to establish. His point is that, if bhavasantati (series of existence) be admitted then the existence of a Tathāgata should also be admitted,² for the Tathāgata represents the ultimate state of this bhavasantati; it is a state attained by a being after a long series of existence. As in reality (paramārthataḥ) there is no bhavasantati, there is also no Tathāgata—that being who is supposed to have become Tathāgata after practising mahākaruṇā and other virtues, and thereby attaining omniscience. If the Tathāgata had really existed, he would either be the same as five skandhas or different from them, or the skandhas would be in him or he in the skandhas, but as he is none of these nor any one of these is he, he cannot have any real existence. By these and other similar arguments Nāgārjuna asserts that there is no Tathāgata. By such denial he only establishes that the Tathāgata as the ultimate state of bhavasantati does not exist.

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² M. Vṛ., p. 431: vidyata eva bhavasantatis tathāgatasadbhāvāt; Ibid., p. 432. Na hy ekena janmanā śakyam tathāgatatvam anuprāptum.

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Candrakīrti, in support of Nāgārjuna's arguments, quotes a passage from the Aṣṭasāhasrikā (p. 479), in which Buddha and his dharma are compared to māyā or svapna, but at the same time he says "we do not assert the non-existence (nāstitva) of the Tathāgata in every way, for then we would be guilty of apavāda (denial), and yet being desirous of describing the Tathāgata by means of vyavahāra-satya (conventionally) and by taking recourse to super-impositions (samāropa) we say that he is śūnya or aśūnya, or śūnyā-śūnya or naiva śūnya nāśūnya. But he who endeavours to realise the true Tathāgata by having recourse to statements and denials will never know him. Candrakīrti in support of this quotes the verses from the Vajracchedikā, to which the Aṣṭasāhasrikā also refers, viz., “he who endeavoured to see me through my form and voice could not see me because

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dharmato buddhā draṣṭavyā dharmakāyā hi nāyakāḥ,
dharmatā cāpy avijñeyā na sā śakyā vijānitum.

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[A buddha is to be seen in the sense of dharmatā (nature of dharmas), for the leaders (of men) have only Dharmakāya. That dharmatā is unknowable (so also is the Tathāgata)].¹

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¹ M. Vr., p. 448; cf. Aṣṭa., pp. 513, 514; Vajra., p. 43.

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Nāgārjuna concludes his examination of the Tathāgatakāya by identifying Tathāgata with the world (jagat),² or nature itself, and asserting that the Tathāgata, whom people or even Bodhisattvas have in view, is only a bimba (image) of kuśaladharmas and is not the real Tathatā or Tathāgata.³ A dialectician like Nāgārjuna cannot go further than this to establish the Reality. It is by denial of the existence of unreal things, including the so-called Tathāgata, that he points towards the Reality—the real Tathāgatakāya, the Dharmakāya.⁴

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² Tathāgato yatsvabhāvas tat svabhāvam idam jagat, Tathāgato niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvam idam jagat. M. Vr., pp. 448-9

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³ M. Vr., pp. 448-9.

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⁴ Prapañcayanti ye buddham prapañcātītam avyayam, Te prapañcahataḥ sarve na paśyanti Tathāgatam. See also M. Vr., p. 534.

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The conception of Dharmakāya was of special interest to the Yogācārins. The Laṅkāvatāra⁵ in describing it says that (Dharmatā) Buddha is without any substratum (nirālamba) and lies beyond the range of functioning organs of sense, proofs or signs and hence beyond the vision of Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas or the non-Mahāyānists. It is to be realised only within one’s own self. The *Sūtrālaṅkāra*¹ calls it Svābhāvika-dharmakāya. It is one and the same kāya in all Buddhas, very subtle, unknowable and eternal. The *Triṃśikā*² explains the Dharmakāya as the transformed āśraya (substratum)—the ālayavijñāna—the transformation being effected by knowledge (jñāna) and the suppression of the two evils (dauṣthulyas), viz., kleśāvaraṇa and jñeyāvaraṇa. The *Āloka*³ on the *Abhisamayālaṅkārakārikā* also explains the Dharmakāya in a similar way. According to it, there are two kinds of Dharmakāya, one being the Bodhipakṣika and other dharmas, which are themselves pure and productive of clear knowledge (niṣprapañcajñānātmakā) and the other the transformed āśraya of the same, which is then called Svabhāvakāya. Professor Stcherbatsky⁴ supplies us with nearly the same information that we find in the *Āloka* from some source, which he does not mention. He says that “according to the early Yogācāras the Dharmakāya is divided into Svabhāvakāya (ṅo-bo-ñid-sku) and jñānakāya (ye-śes-kyi-sku); the first is the motionless (nitya) substance of the universe, the second is anitya, *i.e.*, changing, living”. Evidently what the Professor means by Jñānakāya is the Dharmakāya, consisting of the Bodhipakṣika and other dharmas, of the *Āloka*. That the Svabhāvakāya is the nityakāya, as pointed out by him, is also supported by the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* and other texts.⁵

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⁵ Laṅkā., pp. 57, 60.

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¹ *Sūtrā.*, p. 45.

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² *Triṃśikā*, p. 44.

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³ *J.A.*, 1913.

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⁴ *Con. of N.*, p. 185n.

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⁵ *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* (B.T.S.), p. 8; *Laṅkā.*, p. 78; *Sūtrā.*, p. 46.

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The Chinese commentators on the *Siddhi* say that Dharmakāya is the metaphysical principle of real citta and rūpa of the Tathāgata. It is the real nature of things, and can be equated with Tathatā, Dharmadhātu or Tathāgatagarbha.⁶

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⁶ I have derived this information from Professor La Vallée Poussin. In *Laṅkā.* (pp. 77, 78) the Tathāgatagarbha is described as nitya, dhruva, śāśvata, śiva, etc., just as the non-Buddhists speak of their great soul as nitya, kartā, nirguṇa, vibhu, and avyaya.

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The goal of Bodhisattvas is to realise the Dharmakāya. Every being has the Dharmakāya, or the Dharmakāya comprises all beings of the world, but as they are blinded by avidyā do not realise this fact. What the Bodhisattva aims at is the removal of this avidyā and the realisation of the fact that he is the same as the Dharmakāya. The Āloka on the Kārikā¹ enumerates the steps through which a Bodhisattva passes, and points out that the last step of a Bodhisattva is to realise the Dharmakāya (dharmakāyā-bhisambodhena bhaviṣyati), after which it becomes easy for him to assume any one of the four kāyas. In the Laṅkāvatāra we notice that Mahāmati is anxious to know how a Bodhisattva after completing the ten bhūmis can attain the Tathāgatakāya or Dharmakāya and go to any one of the Buddhakṣetras or heavens. The Laṅkāvatāra also describes in rosy colours the prospect of attaining Dharmakāya. It says that a Bodhisattva after attaining the Mahādharmamegha in the ninth bhūmi is adorned with many jewels, and sits on a lotus in a jewelled palace surrounded by other Bodhisattvas of his status. He comprehends there the illusory nature of all things. He is anointed (abhiṣeka) by Vajrapāṇi as a son of Buddha. He then goes beyond the bhūmi of Buddhasutas by realising within himself the dharmanairātmya and confronts the Dharmakāya.² The Triṃśikā says that just as Vimuktikāya is the goal of the arhats, so Dharmakāya is the goal of the Bodhisattvas. It shows that as the arhats by getting rid of kleśāvaraṇa obtain a purified kāya, so also a Buddha by getting rid of both kleśāvaraṇa and jñeyāvaraṇa obtains the Dharmakāya.³ (c). The Doctrine of Nirvāṇa

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¹ J.A., 1913.

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² Laṅkā., pp. 51, 70.

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³ Triṃśikā, p. 44.

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