Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s2.t13.10

c7.s2.t13.10

Nāgārjuna by denying the existence of a so-called Tathāgata does nothing more than what the Prajñāpāramitās endeavour to establish. His point is that, if bhavasantati (series of existence) be admitted then the existence of a Tathāgata should also be admitted,² for the Tathāgata represents the ultimate state of this bhavasantati; it is a state attained by a being after a long series of existence. As in reality (paramārthataḥ) there is no bhavasantati, there is also no Tathāgata—that being who is supposed to have become Tathāgata after practising mahākaruṇā and other virtues, and thereby attaining omniscience. If the Tathāgata had really existed, he would either be the same as five skandhas or different from them, or the skandhas would be in him or he in the skandhas, but as he is none of these nor any one of these is he, he cannot have any real existence. By these and other similar arguments Nāgārjuna asserts that there is no Tathāgata. By such denial he only establishes that the Tathāgata as the ultimate state of bhavasantati does not exist.