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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t11: Prof. Stcherbatsky on Nirvāṇa

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t11

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Prof. Stcherbatsky on Nirvāṇa

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Prof. Stcherbatsky protests strongly against the view of Prof. Poussin that Nirvāṇa is a sort of ultimate conceivable existence—a view suggested by the expression Amatapadam,² often used to describe Nirvāṇa, and by the descriptions of the same found in the Milindapañha and the Nikāyas. Prof. Stcherbatsky does not examine the various passages of the Piṭakas and other works, which influenced Prof. Poussin's conclusions. It would appear from the Conception of Nirvāṇa as well as from his earlier work the *Central Conception of Buddhism* that Prof. Stcherbatsky bases his findings purely on the study of the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu, and ignores the fact that the *Kośa* does not present us with the original doctrines which the Piṭakas are supposed to preserve. He also does not attach importance to the fact that the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins do not agree as to the nature of disintegration of constituted elements (saṃskṛtavastus), which is clearly hinted at in the discussion in the *Kathāvatthu*¹ on the theory of the Sarvāstivādins that "all exists".² In his treatment of the discussion of this topic, however, he refers to the fact that the Vibhajyavādins (=Theravādins) did not always agree with the Sarvāstivādins.

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² In this connection we may mention that Amatapadam does not always necessarily mean "heavenly state". The word 'mṛtyu' (Pāli maccu), in the lines of the Taitt. Upa. 2. I. I: Brahmavidāpnoti param, na punar mṛtyave, and Chā. Upa. 7. 26. 2: Tad ekam paśyati na paśyo mṛtyum paśyati, is explained by the commentators as neither heavenly existence nor eternal death but as pramāda (negligence, error) and moha (delusion). This comment is supported by the Dhammapada line: Pamādo maccuno padam. See P. T. S. Dict., sv. Maccu.

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¹ *Kvu.*, I. 6, pp. 115 f.

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² *Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 43, 76 ff.; Keith's *B. Phil.*, p. 168; *Con. of N.*, pp. 3, 27; for bibliography on the topic "All exists" see *Kośa*, v. 24, pp. 49, 50 fn.

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In view of the fact mentioned above, it is doubtful how far Prof. Stcherbatsky was right in attributing to Buddha the views found in the *Kośa* that "(i) Buddha was led to a denial of every permanent principle, (ii) that the originality of Buddha's position consisted in denying substantiality altogether, and (iii) that forsaking the Monism of the Upaniṣads and the Dualism of the Sāṃkhya, he established a system of the most radical pluralism".³ These might have been the views of the later Vaibhāṣikas but were certainly not those of the early Buddhists, not to speak of Buddha himself. Many passages can be, and have been, cited from the Piṭakas⁴ to show that Nirvāṇa is a reality, that it is unspeakable and possesses the sign of peacefulness, the taste of immortality, that it offers consolation, that it is unborn, uncreated, and indestructible. In the face of the glowing descriptions that are to be found of the state of Nirvāṇa in early post-canonical works,⁵ it is difficult to agree with Prof. Stcherbatsky that Nirvāṇa is nothing but eternal death and that it is an unconstituted element (asaṃskṛta-dhātu), because it is tantamount to the absolute annihilation of the constituted elements (saṃskṛta-dharmas) —"a kind of entity where there is no consciousness".¹ In fact, Prof. Stcherbatsky's opinion makes it resemble one of the heretical doctrines condemned by Buddha, viz., Asaññi attā hoti arogo paraṃ maraṇā (the soul remains after death as an unconscious but healthy entity).² Without multiplying instances, we can refer to the last few lines of the Kevaddha Sutta³ to show that there are passages in the early Buddhist works which go directly against the conclusions of Prof. Stcherbatsky. If Nibbāna is extreme happiness (paramasukha), a place of perfect peace⁴ (santivarapadam), an object of realisation (sacchikiriyā),⁵ it is safer to accept the opinion of Prof. Poussin that Nirvāṇa is the highest conceivable paradisaical existence than to agree with Prof. Stcherbatsky that Nirvāṇa is simply an end of the saṃskṛta dharmas—a stone-like life without a vestige of consciousness.

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³ *Con. of N.*, p. 3.

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⁴ See besides Prof. Poussin's *Nirvāṇa*, Heiler's *Die buddhistische Versenkung*, München, pp. 36-42; P. T. S. *Dict.* sv. Nibbāna.

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⁵ e.g., *Thera-* and *Theri-gāthā*; *Milindapañha*.

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¹ Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 53.

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² Majjhima, II, pp. 230 f.

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³ Dīgha, I, p. 223; for its commentary see Sum. Vil. in the I.H.Q., vol., II, i; see ante, pp. 148 ff.

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⁴ Majjhima, I, p. 257.

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⁵ Ibid., I, pp. 56, 63, 510.

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In short, Prof. Stcherbatsky makes Buddha a materialist and an annihilationist (Uccedavādin) so severely condemned by Buddha. Prof. Stcherbatsky admits this anomalous position of his exposition, and endeavours to extricate himself from the anomaly by stating that Buddha's materialism and annihilationism were of a modified nature, because, as he says, the elements constituting a being were not only material, but both material and spiritual, and hence, according to him, Buddha was not an out-and-out materialist like the Cārvākas, or like Ajita Kesakambalin and Pakudha Kaccāyana, but was partially so. Then, as regards Buddha being not an out-and-out annihilationist he points to the moral law, the strength and importance of which were recognised by Buddha; Buddha meant that the being, which is only a conglomeration of "evanescent elements", passes through a series of existences governed by the moral law, ultimately to be annihilated or, in other words, to attain Nirvāṇa or eternal death. Hence, according to Prof. Stcherbatsky, Uccheda or annihilation takes place not after one life but a series of lives.

Cites (9)