Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t11.5
Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t11.5
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c7.s3.t11.5
In view of the fact mentioned above, it is doubtful how far Prof. Stcherbatsky was right in attributing to Buddha the views found in the *Kośa* that "(i) Buddha was led to a denial of every permanent principle, (ii) that the originality of Buddha's position consisted in denying substantiality altogether, and (iii) that forsaking the Monism of the Upaniṣads and the Dualism of the Sāṃkhya, he established a system of the most radical pluralism".³ These might have been the views of the later Vaibhāṣikas but were certainly not those of the early Buddhists, not to speak of Buddha himself. Many passages can be, and have been, cited from the Piṭakas⁴ to show that Nirvāṇa is a reality, that it is unspeakable and possesses the sign of peacefulness, the taste of immortality, that it offers consolation, that it is unborn, uncreated, and indestructible. In the face of the glowing descriptions that are to be found of the state of Nirvāṇa in early post-canonical works,⁵ it is difficult to agree with Prof. Stcherbatsky that Nirvāṇa is nothing but eternal death and that it is an unconstituted element (asaṃskṛta-dhātu), because it is tantamount to the absolute annihilation of the constituted elements (saṃskṛta-dharmas) —"a kind of entity where there is no consciousness".¹ In fact, Prof. Stcherbatsky's opinion makes it resemble one of the heretical doctrines condemned by Buddha, viz., Asaññi attā hoti arogo paraṃ maraṇā (the soul remains after death as an unconscious but healthy entity).² Without multiplying instances, we can refer to the last few lines of the Kevaddha Sutta³ to show that there are passages in the early Buddhist works which go directly against the conclusions of Prof. Stcherbatsky. If Nibbāna is extreme happiness (paramasukha), a place of perfect peace⁴ (santivarapadam), an object of realisation (sacchikiriyā),⁵ it is safer to accept the opinion of Prof. Poussin that Nirvāṇa is the highest conceivable paradisaical existence than to agree with Prof. Stcherbatsky that Nirvāṇa is simply an end of the saṃskṛta dharmas—a stone-like life without a vestige of consciousness.