Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t16.11

c7.s3.t16.11

The few passages of the *Dīgha* and *Majjhma Nikāyas*, in which Nibbāna has been equated to infinite consciousness (anantaviññāṇa) do not, however, find support in other portions of the same works, which throw light on the conception of Nibbāna. All that can be said under the circumstances is that these passages were later interpolations made at a time when the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* was being compiled. The account of the death of Vakkali with apatitthitaviññāṇa and not paṭisandhiviññāṇa hints that the constituted viññāṇa of an Arhat passes away and mixes up indistinguishably with an ever existing infinite consciousness. This seems to be an anticipation of the Vijñānavāda school of philosophy, but we cannot deny the existence of a trend of thought like this among the early Buddhists. The more accurate conception of Nibbāna would certainly be that it is a state beyond the domain of word and thought and possible of realisation only within one’s own self.