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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t19: The Visuddhimagga on Nirvāṇa

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t19

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The Visuddhimagga on Nirvāṇa

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In the *Visuddhimagga*,⁵ Buddhaghosa retains the conception found in the *Kathāvatthu* and selects only those passages from the Nikāyas which lend support to his view. In describing its guṇas, he comments on a passage of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (ii. 34) where Nibbāṇa is described as suppressing pride, removing lust, destroying ālaya (of the five kāma-guṇas), and arresting the cycle of existence in the three worlds. While commenting on the etymology of the word Nibbāṇa,⁶ he says that it is the going out of the ‘vana’ which is a synonym of taṇhā and is so called because it acts as a hindrance to the four kinds of birth (yonis), five forms of existence (gatis), seven viññāṇa existences (*i.e.* the planes of existence above the Arūpa worlds) and nine sattāvāsas (abodes of sentient beings). This shows only the aspect of quietude (upasama) of Nibbāṇa. He then takes up the well-known passage of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (iv. 362, 369 ff.)⁷ to show that Nibbāṇa is truth, transcendental, difficult to be seen, without decay, eternal, indescribable immortal, happy, peaceful, wonderful, healthy, pure and is an island of refuge. It appears from the selection of passages made by Buddhaghosa that he is a supporter of the view that Nibbāna is eternal and that it is a lokottara¹ state beyond the Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus.

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⁵ *Vis. M.*, pp. 293, 294.

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⁶ *Ibid.*

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⁷ Also dealt with by Prof. Poussin in his *Nirvāṇa*, pp. 153, 154.

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¹ Cf. Dh. S. 1447; Laṅkā., p. 157 see ante.

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Buddhaghosa’s conception of Nibbāna is well brought out also in his arguments against the Sautrāntika view of the non-existence (abhāva) of Nibbāna.² He starts with the assertion that Nibbāna brings peace of mind (santi), and has the taste of imperishableness (accuti) and solace (assāsakaraṇa), and brings one to a state of mind which is inexpressible (nippapañca), and in which differentiations disappear (animitta). He then takes up the view of his opponents, evidently the Sautrāntikas, that Nibbāna does not exist like the horn of the hare because of its non-perceptibility (anupalabbhaniyato), and meets it by saying that Nibbāna does exist and is realisable if the right path be followed—the realisation being similar to the cognizance of others’ thoughts in the transcendental plane (lokuttara-citta)³ by the power of knowing the thoughts of others (cetopariyāyañāṇa).⁴ One is not justified in saying that a thing does not exist because it cannot be perceived by ordinary men. He states further in support of his contention that if the existence of Nibbāna be denied, the practices of Sammādiṭṭhi, etc., become fruitless (vañjhābhāvo āpajjati). To this the opponent answers: The practices are not really fruitless since they lead to realisation of abhāva (i.e., Nibbāna as total absence of every thing).

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² Vis. M., pp. 507-9.

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³ See Shwe Zan Aung’s Comp. of Phil., p. 12: transcendental consciousness beyond Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus.

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⁴ It is one of the Abhiññās possessed by Arhats, see Vis. M., p. 431.

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Buddhaghosa: If Nibbāna be merely abhāva, then the absence (abhāva) of past and future would also be Nibbāna, but it is surely not.

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Opponent: The absence of the present might be Nibbāna.

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Buddhaghosa: The absence of the present (vattamāna) is not possible, for it is self-contradictory, because it must be either past or future. Besides, it would also be incorrect to say that the absence of the present is Nibbāna, for in the present life at a certain moment (vattamānakkhandhanissitamaggakkhaṇe)¹ one obtains the sopādisesa-nibbānadhātu (i.e., Nibbāna with corporal residue).

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¹ For Maggakkhaṇa see Paṭis., M., I, pp. 69f; Vis. M., pp. 681, 682. For Phalakkhaṇa see Vis. M., p. 680.

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Opponent: Would it not be equally incorrect to say that at that moment there was the non-presence of kilesas (impurities)?

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Buddhaghosa: To deny the non-presence of kilesas would be to deny the efficacy of the Ariyamagga, and that is impossible.

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This reply of Buddhaghosa did not, it seems, convince his opponent who passed on to the next argument as to whether the khaya, i.e., destruction of attachment (rāgakkhaya), etc. should be taken as Nibbāna.² Buddhaghosa answered in the negative, saying that in that case arhathood would also be mere extinction. Besides to take Nibbāna as khaya (destruction) of something would make Nibbāna impermanent, constituted, and disconnected with sammāvāyāma, etc. To this the opponent replied: It would not be wrong to say that because a thing after its decay has no more origination, it has attained Nibbāna.

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² Cf. M. Vṛ., p. 525: Sautrāntikas say: Nanu ca yo'sya nandirāgasahagatāyās tṛṣṇāyāḥ kṣayo virāgo nirodho nirvāṇam ityuktam.

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Buddhaghosa: Decay of this sort does not enter into the question; even if it be so considered, it would not support the contention of the opponent, for it is the ariyamagga which produces (lit. turns into) the state of Nibbāna (bhāva), and it is the ariyamagga which destroys evil and prevents its reappearance, because it is the stage (upanissayatta) for final destruction without the possibility of further origination (anuppattinirodhasaṅkhatassa khayassa); that of which it forms the basis (upanissaya) is destroyed by conduct.

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The opponent then took up the third argument inquiring why Nibbāna had not been given a description (sarūpen’ eva kasmā na vuttan ti ce?).

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Buddhaghosa: Because it is exceedingly subtle; so extremely subtle, indeed, that Buddha even once thought of not preaching it at all; it can be seen by ariyacakkhu only (i.e., realisable by Arhats only). Being associated with the magga, it is extraordinary (asādhāraṇa), and its beginning being absent, it is devoid of origin. Opponent: It is not without origin because it originated out of the magga. Buddhaghosa: It was not originated by the magga; it can be attained only by following the magga; hence it is originless, and consequently decayless and deathless; being without origin, decay and death, it is eternal (nicca).

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A fourth argument was put forward by the opponent, which is as follows: Opponent: Would it not be objectionable to regard Nibbāna as eternal like the aṇu (atom)? Buddhaghosa: No. Nibbāna has no hetu (cause) as aṇus have; so it cannot be compared to the aṇu. Opponent: Is Nibbāna eternal on account of its eternal nature (i.e. does any quality of eternalness adhere to Nibbāna)? Buddhaghosa: That cannot be, in view of the fact that the aṇu, etc., are not realised (asiddh atta) by the magga.

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Buddhaghosa in conclusion said that for the reasons he had put forward Nibbāna is eternal and, being devoid of the nature of form, is formless (arūpa). There is only one Nibbāna, and not different Nibbānas for different Buddhas. He then showed that it is called sopādisesa-nibbāna when there remains a corporal residue (upādisesa), though a complete destruction of impurities has been effected by meditation (bhāvanā). It is called nirupādisesa-nibbāna¹ on the disappearance of upādisesa, which happens on account of the absence of any kind of manifestation after the last thought of kammaphala. This is due to the stopping and uprooting of samudaya (causes of origin). In short, it cannot be said that Nibbāna does not exist in view of the fact that it is attainable by means of special knowledge obtained by unflagging zeal; that its existence is indicated by the words of the omniscient Buddha; and lastly that it exists in reality (paramatthena sabhāvato) is indicated by the words: Atthi bhikkhave ajātam abhūtam akatam asaṅkhatam (Itiv., p. 37; Ud., p. 80).

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¹ For sopādisesa and nirupādisesa nibbāna, see also M. Vṛ., p. 519.

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The Paramatthamañjusā,¹ in commenting upon this portion of the Visuddhimagga, argues in its own way for the existence of Nibbāna. It starts by saying that Buddha can never utter an untruth; so when he says “atthi bhikkhave ajātam etc.”, it has to be admitted that the unconstituted dhātu, Nibbāna, in the highest sense, does exist. It cannot be abhāva (absence of anything) because of the fact that Buddha described Nibbāna as deep, immeasurable, difficult to be understood, etc. These can be said only of an existent state or object, and not of anything non-existent. Anything non-existent must in every way be non-existent. The following question may, however, arise as to the nature of abhāva of kilesas, to which attention is drawn by the Theravādins as an aspect of Nibbāna: Whether the abhāva of kilesas existing in beings is one or many. If the abhāva be one, then it should be effected by one path (magga) and there is no need of many maggas (evidently referring to the four maggas sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi, anāgāmi, and arahatta), and all beings should attain Nibbāna at the same time. This objection is answered thus: If the abhāva be taken as one, then it is the abhāva of kilesas which is effected by the realisation of Nibbāna. It is in fact not an effect of magga, it is a thing to be envisaged. The opponents may say that there is no need of maggas, as it is not necessary to give up the kilesas, and there being no question of giving up kilesas and putting an end to dukkha, what is the use of the realisation (sacchikiriyā) of kilesā- bhāva. The objection is answered thus: Each magga has some definite function to perform. The sotāpattimagga removes the first three saṃyojanas, the sakadāgāmimagga reduces rāga, dosa and moha to their minimum, while the anāgāmimagga eradicates them, and lastly the arahatta puts an end to all saṃyojanas. Abhāva is really one, and it should not be inferred that there are many abhāvas because many kinds of kileśas are eradicated, i.e., it does not follow that because there are sakkāyadiṭṭhi-abhāva, rāga-abhāva and moha-abhāva, there are so many abhāvas. Abhāva is really one and does not vary according to the nature of the object, of which, there is abhāva; so the abhāvas are not to be regarded as five, because the five saṃyojanas are removed. It is only the common usage of the term that implies the existence of many abhāvas. The state of abhāva (absence of anything) cannot but be one, so Nibbāna is not many but one. The Ṭīkā concludes its argument by saying that the abhāva is effected by maggas, each magga producing its own effect, and that abhāva is not to be envisaged (na sacchikātabbo), while Nibbāna is to be envisaged; hence, the abhāva of kileśas is not identical with Nibbāna.

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¹ Visuddhimagga Ṭīkā of Ānanda (Burmese ed.) edited by Saya U. Pye, 1910, vol. II, pp. 618-620.

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