Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t19.24

c7.s3.t19.24

The Paramatthamañjusā,¹ in commenting upon this portion of the Visuddhimagga, argues in its own way for the existence of Nibbāna. It starts by saying that Buddha can never utter an untruth; so when he says “atthi bhikkhave ajātam etc.”, it has to be admitted that the unconstituted dhātu, Nibbāna, in the highest sense, does exist. It cannot be abhāva (absence of anything) because of the fact that Buddha described Nibbāna as deep, immeasurable, difficult to be understood, etc. These can be said only of an existent state or object, and not of anything non-existent. Anything non-existent must in every way be non-existent. The following question may, however, arise as to the nature of abhāva of kilesas, to which attention is drawn by the Theravādins as an aspect of Nibbāna: Whether the abhāva of kilesas existing in beings is one or many. If the abhāva be one, then it should be effected by one path (magga) and there is no need of many maggas (evidently referring to the four maggas sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi, anāgāmi, and arahatta), and all beings should attain Nibbāna at the same time. This objection is answered thus: If the abhāva be taken as one, then it is the abhāva of kilesas which is effected by the realisation of Nibbāna. It is in fact not an effect of magga, it is a thing to be envisaged. The opponents may say that there is no need of maggas, as it is not necessary to give up the kilesas, and there being no question of giving up kilesas and putting an end to dukkha, what is the use of the realisation (sacchikiriyā) of kilesā- bhāva. The objection is answered thus: Each magga has some definite function to perform. The sotāpattimagga removes the first three saṃyojanas, the sakadāgāmimagga reduces rāga, dosa and moha to their minimum, while the anāgāmimagga eradicates them, and lastly the arahatta puts an end to all saṃyojanas. Abhāva is really one, and it should not be inferred that there are many abhāvas because many kinds of kileśas are eradicated, i.e., it does not follow that because there are sakkāyadiṭṭhi-abhāva, rāga-abhāva and moha-abhāva, there are so many abhāvas. Abhāva is really one and does not vary according to the nature of the object, of which, there is abhāva; so the abhāvas are not to be regarded as five, because the five saṃyojanas are removed. It is only the common usage of the term that implies the existence of many abhāvas. The state of abhāva (absence of anything) cannot but be one, so Nibbāna is not many but one. The Ṭīkā concludes its argument by saying that the abhāva is effected by maggas, each magga producing its own effect, and that abhāva is not to be envisaged (na sacchikātabbo), while Nibbāna is to be envisaged; hence, the abhāva of kileśas is not identical with Nibbāna.