Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t19.6

c7.s3.t19.6

Buddhaghosa’s conception of Nibbāna is well brought out also in his arguments against the Sautrāntika view of the non-existence (abhāva) of Nibbāna.² He starts with the assertion that Nibbāna brings peace of mind (santi), and has the taste of imperishableness (accuti) and solace (assāsakaraṇa), and brings one to a state of mind which is inexpressible (nippapañca), and in which differentiations disappear (animitta). He then takes up the view of his opponents, evidently the Sautrāntikas, that Nibbāna does not exist like the horn of the hare because of its non-perceptibility (anupalabbhaniyato), and meets it by saying that Nibbāna does exist and is realisable if the right path be followed—the realisation being similar to the cognizance of others’ thoughts in the transcendental plane (lokuttara-citta)³ by the power of knowing the thoughts of others (cetopariyāyañāṇa).⁴ One is not justified in saying that a thing does not exist because it cannot be perceived by ordinary men. He states further in support of his contention that if the existence of Nibbāna be denied, the practices of Sammādiṭṭhi, etc., become fruitless (vañjhābhāvo āpajjati). To this the opponent answers: The practices are not really fruitless since they lead to realisation of abhāva (i.e., Nibbāna as total absence of every thing).