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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t20: The Abhidharmakośa on Nirvāṇa

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t20

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The Abhidharmakośa on Nirvāṇa

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In the Abhidharmakośa Vasubandhu expatiates on the Vaibhāṣika conception of Nirvāṇa. He first asserts that Nirvāṇa is one of the Asaṃskṛtas (unconstituted), and as against the objection of the Sautrāntikas that it might be a result produced by the mārga, he says that the mārga leads to the attainment or possession of Visamyoga (disconnection) or Nirvāṇa and that it is self-existent and not the fruit of mārga.¹ In answering the question of the Sautrāntikas as to the nature of the dharma called Visamyoga or Pratisamkhyā-nirodha, the Vaibhāsikas state that it is a dharma, the nature of which is real and inexpressible; only the Āryas realise it inwardly and individually. It is only possible to indicate its general characters, when the Pratisamkhyā-nirodha is said to be an entity (dravya), real, good, eternal, and distinct from others, it is called the Visaṃyoga.

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¹ See Kośa, ii. 55. Cf. Vis. M., p. 508 dealt with before for a similar argument against the Sautrāntikas.

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The Sautrāntikas in their zeal to establish that Nirvāṇa is abhāva (absence of passions, etc.) argue that the Asaṃskṛtas (the unconditioned) are not real like the entities rūpa (form), vedanā (feeling), etc. They cite the instance of Ākāśa, which is, according to the Sarvāstivādins, an Asaṃskṛta-dhātu, and point out that Ākāśa (space) is nothing but the absence of something tangible, or in other words, of any resisting substance. Just as a man in darkness says it is ākāśa (vacuity or space) when he is not cognisant of the existence of anything tangible or resistible, so also the Ākāśa of the Sarvāstivādins should be understood. Analogically they assert that the second Asaṃskṛta-dhātu of the Sarvāstivādins, namely, the Pratisamkhyā-Nirodha, is really the destruction of anuśayas (desires) and existence already produced, and the non-origination of any further anuśayas; and as this is achieved by means of knowledge (pratisamkhyā), it is called Pratisamkhyā-nirodha. The third Asaṃskṛtadhātu, the Apratisamkhyā-nirodha, is the absence or non-origination of dharmas on account of the complete absence of causes¹ independent of the force of knowledge (apratisamkhyā), e.g., when death before its time interrupts the existence, it is said that there has been Apratisamkhyā-nirodha of dharmas which would have been born in course of this existence if the existence had continued.²

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¹ Yamakami Sogen prefers "condition" (pratyaya) to causes. See his Systems etc., p. 164. He explains Apratisamkhyānirodha (p. 167) as the "non-consciousness of dharmas or things which would have forced their way into our consciousness but for the engrossment of our attention by something else. Apratisamkhyānirodha, accordingly, is a thing of daily occurrence in everybody's life."

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² Kośa-vyākhyā (B. Buddhica), pp. 16-18.

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In this connection the Sautrāntikas mention the opinion of Sthavira Śrīlābha, also a Sautrāntika teacher, who interpreted the pratisamkhyā-nirodha as the future non-origin of passions due to knowledge (prajñā), and the apratisamkhyā-nirodha as the future non-origin of duḥkha, i.e., of existence due to the disappearance of passions and not directly due to knowledge. The former, it is said, refers to sopādiśeṣa- and the latter to anupādiśeṣa-nirvāṇadhātu.¹ The Sautrāntikas did not approve of the distinction made by Śrīlābha between Pratisamkhyā and Apratisamkhyā. According to them, the future non-origin of duḥkha implies pratisamkhyā; so, in fact, apratisamkhya-nirodha is included in the pratisamkhyā-nirodha.

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¹ Cf. Vis. M., dealt with above. See Prof. La Vallée Poussin's article on the two Nirvāṇadhātus according to the Vibhāṣā in I. H. Q., vol. vi, pp. 39-45.

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The Sautrāntikas considered also the opinion of another school, supposed to be the Mahāsānghikas according to the Japanese editor of the Kośa. The Mahāsānghikas define apratisamkhyā-nirodha as the posterior non-existence (paścād abhāva) of dharmas already born by virtue of their spontaneous destruction. In this definition, apratisamkhyā-nirodha is not eternal in view of the fact that it does not arise as long as the anuśayas do not perish.

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The object of the Sautrāntikas is to show through these definitions that the pratisamkhyā-nirodha implies an antecedent, viz., pratisamkhyā and hence it cannot be eternal (nitya), because, if the antecedent be wanting, the consequence also becomes wanting. The Sarvāstivādins met this by arguing that the Sautrāntikas were not entitled to say that pratisamkhyā is anterior and the non-origin of unborn dharmas posterior. The fact is, as the Sarvāstivādins thought, that the non-originated always exist by themselves; so when the pratisamkhyā is lacking, the dharmas are born; and when pratisamkhyā arises, the dharmas are not born absolutely. The efficacy (sāmarthya) of the pratisamkhyā in regard to the non-origin of dharmas is shown thus:

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(i) before pratisamkhyā there is no obstacle in the way of the origin of dharmas; and

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(ii) after pratisamkhyā, i.e. pratisamkhyā being given, the dharmas, the origin of which has not been stopped previously (akṛtotpattipratibandha), are not born.

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(1) Then as against the view of the Sautrāntikas that Nirvāṇa is simply non-production (anutpāda) of dharmas, the Sarvāstivādins cite a sūtra from the *Samyukta Āgama* (26.2) in which it is stated that the practice and culture of the five faculties, faith etc., have for their result the abandonment of duḥkha, past, present, and future. In fact, this abandonment (prahāṇa) refers to nothing else than Nirvāṇa and is solely of a future dharma and not of a past or present dharma. The Sautrāntikas cannot accept it and interpret this passage somewhat differently, saying that the "abandonment" refers to the abandoning of passions (kleśas) relating to duḥkha, past or present, and citing some other passages from the *Samyukta Āgama* in support of their contention. They argue that the passions, past and present, produce in us some germs to originate future passions: when these germs are killed, the passions, past and present, are abandoned. It is with reference to this fact that one says that the action (karma) and the result (phala) have been destroyed. Therefore by the abandonment of a future duḥkha or future passion one understands that the duḥkha or passion will not be born any more owing to the absence of germs.

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(2) The Sarvāstivādins then take up a second argument, found also in the *Visuddhimagga*,¹ which inquires why it has been stated in the *Samyukta Āgama* (31.12) that "of all dharmas, constituted or unconstituted, virāga (detachment) is the best". If a dharma be non-existing, how can a statement like the above be made? The Sautrāntikas explain this by asserting that they admit its existence, as they admit that a sound which has no existence before it is produced and after it has died away. The quotation praising "virāga" may well refer to a non-existent unconditioned thing, the absolute non-existence of everything evil.

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¹ *Vis. M.*, p. 507.

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(3) The third argument of the Sarvāstivādins is that if the Pratisamkhyā-nirodha or Nirvāṇa be non-existent, why is it mentioned as one of the Truths. The Sautrāntikas answer that truth (satya) is taken in the sense of "not-inexact" (aviparīta). The Āryas realize what exists and what does not exist in a "not-inexact" manner; in that which is suffering (duḥkha) they see only duḥkha; in the non-existence of duḥkha, they realize the fact of the non-existence of same. Really, there is no contradiction in taking the "non-existence of duḥkha" or the pratisamkhyānirodha as a Truth. And this non-existence is the third Truth, because the Āryas see and proclaim it immediately after the second.

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(4) The Sarvāstivādins then have recourse to the fourth argument that if the asaṃskṛtas be non-existent, how is it that knowledge has non-existent things as its basis (ārammaṇa). The Sautrāntikas dismiss this objection by remarking that they find in it nothing against their theory, and say that they will explain it in connection with the discussion of the past and the future.¹

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¹ For which see Kośa, v. 25.

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(5) The fifth argument of the Sarvāstivādins relates to the nature of the consequence found by the Sautrāntikas in the maintenance of their theory that the unconditioned really exist. The Sautrāntikas point out the unreasonableness of regarding the existence of a non-existent thing as real. In fact, they say that the unconditioned can neither be apprehended by the senses (pratykṣa) like rūpa (form), vedanā (feeling), etc., nor can they be known by inference (anumāna) from their activities, i.e., through the organs of sense.

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(6) In the sixth argument, the Sautrāntikas become the questioners and inquire how, if Nirodha be a thing in itself, a genitive construction like ‘duḥkhasya nirodhaḥ’ can be justified. The Sautrāntikas understand by Nirodha (destruction of a thing) the "non-existence of a thing", so also by the "destruction of duḥkha" they understand the "non-existence of duḥkha". They do not admit the existence of any relation of cause and effect between two things existing by themselves. To this the Sarvāstivadins reply, that, according to them, destruction is a thing in itself. Nevertheless one can specify the relation between "destruction" and the "thing destroyed", for, according to them, nirodha with reference to a thing indicates “obtaining possession” (prāpti) of the “destruction” at the moment when one is dispossessed of the thing. The Sautrāntikas would however inquire, what it is that determines or specifies the taking of possession of the “destruction”.

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(7) The seventh argument of the Sarvāstivādins is: if Nirvāṇa be non-existence, if it be only abhāva, what is that thing which is obtained by a bhikṣu in this life? The Sautrāntikas explain it by saying that a bhikṣu in Nirvāṇa attains a stage (āśraya) in which neither passion (kleśa) nor a new existence is possible.

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(8) In the eighth argument the Sautrāntikas cite a text from the Saṃyukta Āgama (13.5) where Nirvāṇa is described as a disappearance (vyantibhāva), a decay (kṣaya), a destruction (nirodha), an appeasement (vyupaśama), a detachment (virāga), a passing away (astaṅgama) of duḥkha, and as a non-reproducer (apratisaṃdhi) of duḥkha, and infer therefrom that Nirvāṇa is abhāvamātra. The Sarvāstivādins do not accept this interpretation, stating that the passage refers to Nirvāṇa as a thing in itself, in which there is no appearance (aprādurbhāva) of duḥkha. The Sautrāntikas do not agree with the Sarvāstivādins regarding the force of the locative case used in the passage.

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(9) The ninth argument put forward by the Sautrāntikas is that the simile of the flame used in the famous line, “Pajjotass’ eva nibbānaṃ vimokkho cetaso ahu” (as the nirvāṇa of the flame, so is also the deliverance of thought)¹, suggests only the passing away (atyaya) of the flame, and not a thing existing by itself.

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¹ See above for a discussion of this passage.

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(10) The tenth and the last argument advanced by the Sautrāntikas is that the Abhidharma, on which the Vaibhāṣikas rely most, contains the statement: “What are the avastuka dharmas? They are the Asaṃskṛtas”. In this, the term “avastuka” signifies to the Sautrāntikas “unreal”, “without true nature”, but it is differently interpreted by the Vaibhāṣikas. According to them the term “vastu” is employed in five different senses, viz., (i) svabhāva vastu (a thing in itself), (ii) ālambana vastu (object of knowledge), (iii) saṃyojanīya (cause of attachment), (iv) hetu (cause), and (v) parigraha (act of appropriation). In the present passage, vastu has been used in the sense of hetu; here “avastuka” signifies “that which has no cause”. The unconditioned, although real, being always devoid of any activity, have neither any cause which produces them nor any fruit produced by them.

Cites (4)