Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t20.3

c7.s3.t20.3

The Sautrāntikas in their zeal to establish that Nirvāṇa is abhāva (absence of passions, etc.) argue that the Asaṃskṛtas (the unconditioned) are not real like the entities rūpa (form), vedanā (feeling), etc. They cite the instance of Ākāśa, which is, according to the Sarvāstivādins, an Asaṃskṛta-dhātu, and point out that Ākāśa (space) is nothing but the absence of something tangible, or in other words, of any resisting substance. Just as a man in darkness says it is ākāśa (vacuity or space) when he is not cognisant of the existence of anything tangible or resistible, so also the Ākāśa of the Sarvāstivādins should be understood. Analogically they assert that the second Asaṃskṛta-dhātu of the Sarvāstivādins, namely, the Pratisamkhyā-Nirodha, is really the destruction of anuśayas (desires) and existence already produced, and the non-origination of any further anuśayas; and as this is achieved by means of knowledge (pratisamkhyā), it is called Pratisamkhyā-nirodha. The third Asaṃskṛtadhātu, the Apratisamkhyā-nirodha, is the absence or non-origination of dharmas on account of the complete absence of causes¹ independent of the force of knowledge (apratisamkhyā), e.g., when death before its time interrupts the existence, it is said that there has been Apratisamkhyā-nirodha of dharmas which would have been born in course of this existence if the existence had continued.²