Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t20.19

c7.s3.t20.19

(6) In the sixth argument, the Sautrāntikas become the questioners and inquire how, if Nirodha be a thing in itself, a genitive construction like ‘duḥkhasya nirodhaḥ’ can be justified. The Sautrāntikas understand by Nirodha (destruction of a thing) the "non-existence of a thing", so also by the "destruction of duḥkha" they understand the "non-existence of duḥkha". They do not admit the existence of any relation of cause and effect between two things existing by themselves. To this the Sarvāstivadins reply, that, according to them, destruction is a thing in itself. Nevertheless one can specify the relation between "destruction" and the "thing destroyed", for, according to them, nirodha with reference to a thing indicates “obtaining possession” (prāpti) of the “destruction” at the moment when one is dispossessed of the thing. The Sautrāntikas would however inquire, what it is that determines or specifies the taking of possession of the “destruction”.