Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c7.s3.t5.1

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c7.s3.t5.1

Language
English

c7.s3.t5.1

The Hinayānic Nirvāṇa thus according to the *Puṇḍarīka*¹ is a haven of peace and rest and is a *vimukti* (emancipation) so far as the *kleśas*² (afflictions) are concerned. It further says that there may be people who may look upon this form of existence as Nirvāṇa and regard the Hinayānists as right in their ways of thinking and practising. In order to counteract such a supposition it states that there is one and only one Nirvāṇa, not two or three, and that one is and can be attained only by a thorough comprehension of the sameness of all things (*sarvadharma-samatāvabodhat*)³. The conception of *Samatā* (sameness) has been developed in the *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, which gives five meanings of same. It says that a being after comprehending *Dharmasamatā* (sameness of things) and realising the non-substantiality of things (*dharmanairātmya*) sees that in the series of existences whether of himself or of others, there is no difference as regards *nairātmya* (essencelessness) and *duḥkha* (misery); that the desire for the removal of misery from himself as well as from others is the same; that the remedy applicable is the same for himself as well as for others; and that the knowledge attained by the bodhisattvas is the same as that attained by him⁴. The *Laṅkāvatāra*⁵ explains *samatā* (sameness) by saying that it is the sameness of the world (*saṃsāra*) and its cessation (*nirvāṇa*), *i.e.*, *saṃsāra* bears to *nirvāṇa* the same relation as waves bear to water. The *Pañcaviṃśati*⁶ explains *samatā* by the illustration of *Ākāśa* (space). It says that Ākāśa has no direction like east or west, no past, present or future, no increase or decrease, no contamination or purification. It has no origin, continuity or decay. It cannot be a subject of thought. It can neither be heard nor seen; it is neither known nor unknown. It has nothing to do with the Kāma, Rūpa or Arūpa dhātus, with attachment or non-attachment, with hatred or non-hatred and so forth. It has no concern with the various cittotpādas (i.e., the development of citta for attainment of bodhi), bhūmis (stages of spiritual progress), phalas (fruits of spiritual sanctification), or any conceptions like happiness (sukha), misery (duḥkha), quietude (śānta), excellence (paṇīta), etc. This is what is called the samatā (sameness) of Ākāśa. It is in this light that the things of the world are to be seen. What the Pañcaviṃśati contends for is that, from the standpoint of reality, the things seen, heard or known by us are, in fact, the outcome of our imagination. What we should do is to regard these things as our fancies, because they are really the same as Tathatā, of which nothing can be predicated, just as nothing can be predicated of Ākāśa.

Cites (4)