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Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c18.s5: (v) Ariyasaccas

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c18.s5

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(v) Ariyasaccas

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It has been already pointed out that by *sammā-diṭṭhi* the early Buddhists meant the comprehension of the four truths, *dukkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* and *magga*.¹ These can be expressed in several ways, of which the following appear to be a fair generalisation; *pavattı* (origin), *nıvattı* (cessation), and *tad ubhayahetu* (causes of the above mentioned two); *ālaya* (desires), *ālayāramatā* (attachment to desires), *ālayasamugghāta* (uprooting of desires), and *ālayasamugghātupāya* (means of uprooting of desires);² *akusalam* (evil), *akusalamūlam* (source of evils), *kusalam* (good), *kusalamūlam* (source of goodness);³ *idam* (this = *dukkha*), *hīnam* (low = *dukkhasamudaya*), *paṇītam* (excellent = *dukkhanirodha*), *imassa saññāgatassa nissaraṇam* (getting rid of the misconceptions = *dukkhanirodhagāminī-paṭipadā*).⁴ These various modes of expressions show that the early Buddhists did not mean that the four truths should be confined to the four terms: *dukkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* and *magga*. But as these terms are widely and frequently used, their traditional interpretations are given below:

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¹ See above, p. 248; *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 206-7.

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² *Vism.*, p. 497.

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³ *Majjhima*, I, p. 46.

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⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

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(1) *Dukkha*: Birth is *dukkha*, so are old age, death, grief, lamentation due to the death of friends and relatives, etc.; physical and mental pain; meeting uncongenial persons; separation from dear ones; disappointment in obtaining the desired objects. In short, the congregation of five *khandhas* is *dukkha* as it is always accompanied by pain, being subject to change, and ultimately decay.⁵ (2) *Samudaya*: It is attributed to *taṇhā* (desires, thirst) which may be for (i) worldly objects, (ii) repeated existence or (iii) dissolution of bodies.¹

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⁵ Cf. *Dīgha*, II, p. 306; *Majjhima*, III, p. 249 f., *Vibhaṅga*, p. 99, *Vism.*, p. 498. See *Vism.*, p. 499 for seven kinds of *dukkha*: *dukkha-dukkha*, *vipariṇāmadukkha*, *saṅkhāradukkha*, *paṭicchannadukkha*, *appaṭicchanna-dukkha*, *pariyāyadukkha*, *nippariyāya-dukkha*. Cf. *Kośasthāna*, V.

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¹ Kāma, bhava and vibhava taṇhā. See *Digha*, II, p. 305.

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(3) *Nirodha*: It is the cessation of *samudaya*, complete detachment from *taṇhā* (desire), relinquishment of all worldly objects and desires for their possession. It is tranquil, beyond death, signless and free from all characteristics. It is not non-existent like the horns of a hare as it can be realised if the right means be adopted. It is, however, not a fruition of the right means as it exists for ever, only its realisation is effected by the right means. It is eternally existing but not like atoms (*aṇu-paramāṇu*) of the Vaiśeṣikas, for, atoms, according to the early Buddhists, are also caused. It is unborn (*ajātam*), unoriginated (*abhūtam*), uncreated (*akatam*) and unconstituted.² It is called *sa-upādisesa* when one who has removed all impurities and realised the truth but still retains the remnants of his past *upadhi*, e.g., an arhat before he lays down his mortal frame. It is called *anupādisesa* when the arhat lays down his body for ever and never takes re-birth.

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² *Itivuttaka*, p. 37; *Udaña*, p. 80 cf. *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 172 f.

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(4) *Magga*: It is the eight-fold path leading to the cessation of grief as explained above (pp. 199 ff).

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The effects of insight into each of the four truths (i) *dukkha* (ii) *samudaya* (iii) *nirodha* and (iv) *magga* leads to the removal of the following beliefs respectively:

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(i) Belief in a self (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*); it shakes the mental tranquility of those who cling to the view that the constituted things are everlasting (*dhuva*), happy (*sukha*) and good (*subha*).

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(ii) Belief that there is no after-life (*uccheda-diṭṭhi*)¹ and that the world is a creation of the God or issued out of *Prakṛti* or Time (*kāla*).

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¹ See above, p. 71.

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(iii) Belief in the eternality of self (*sassatadiṭṭhi*)² and in the existence in *arūpaloka* as the highest.

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² See above, p. 49

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(iv) Belief in non-action (*akiriya-diṭṭhi*);³ it leads to the rejection of the path of ease and pleasure, and the path of rigorous asceticism and self-mortifications.

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³ See above, p. 39.

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After explaining in detail the *ariyasaccas*, Buddhaghosa reminds us of the non-existence of any individual (*anatta*) by quoting the following stanza:

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Dukkham eva hi na koci dukkhito, kārako na kiriyā va vijjati
atthi nibbuti, na nibbuto pumā, maggam atthi, gamako na vijjati ti.

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[There is grief but none suffering from grief, there is no doer but there is action, there is quietude but none being quieted, there is the path but none going along the path].

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(vi) P a ṭ i c c a s a m u p p ā d a

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*Paṭiccasamuppāda* or the law of causation is regarded as a contribution of Buddha to the philosophical thoughts of India of the 5th century B.C. By this law Buddha wanted to establish that the constituted world is neither a creation of God nor has issued out of the ever existing *Prakṛti* nor it is a composite of eternal atoms (*aṇu-paramāṇu*). It shows that the things of the world have only a dependent origination and hence are impermanent and sources of misery, and that there is nothing except Nibbāna and Ākāsa that is not originated by cause and condition. This law has been utilised to show that all that is caused and conditioned are without any substance. It explains the fixed unchangeable and this-conditioned (*idappaccayatā*) nature of things and as such it is a key to the eternal truth. The moment a being realises the truth of this law, he sees the reality (*yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati, yo dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati*).¹ All the Buddhist texts, whether Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, identify this law with Buddha and Dhamma.² It was this solution of the truth that appealed to the philosophical mind of Sāriputta and led to his conversion to Buddhism.³

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¹ *Majjhima*, I, p. 191.

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² *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 51.

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³ *Ibid.*, p. 208-9.

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"Many scholars, who have dealt with this formula, have attempted to elicit from it Buddha's theory of the origin of a being and some of them have actually drawn parallels between the links of the formula and the causal series of the Sāṃkhya.⁴ It is noteworthy that such attempts were also made in Buddhaghosa's time. Buddhaghosa has, however, pointed out that *avijjā*, the first link of the chain, must not be regarded as similar to *pakati* (*prakṛti*) of the Pakativādins (Sāṃkhya) because *avijjā* is neither uncaused (*akāraṇam*) nor is it the primary cause (*mūlakāraṇam*) of the world. It owes its origin to impurities (*āsavas*). The reason adduced by Buddhaghosa for its being made the first link in the chain is that Buddha used '*avijjā*' or '*bhavataṇhā*' for commencing (*sīsabhāvaṃ*) his discourses on topics which by their nature are without any beginning or end (*vaṭṭa-kathā* or *anamatagga*).¹ It is apparent therefore that *avijjā* need not necessarily be the first link in the chain of causation but that it is one of the terms found suitable by the author of the formula to begin the chain. It could as well be commenced by *bhava-taṇhā*.² In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*,³ the formula starts with *āhāra* as the first link. Hence, we see that the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is not meant to be an explanation of the origin of the world but just a chain of instances to illustrate the law of *idappaccayatā* (this-conditioned nature, *i.e.*, dependent origination) of things. Those scholars, who expected to find in it a key to the origin of the world, have been disappointed and have condemned it as illogical and incongruous. The author of the formula could not anticipate that his arrangement of the illustrations in a series would give rise to confusion.⁴ The chain was not meant to demonstrate a line of evolution. All that is intended to demonstrate is that any two links are related to each other in one or more of the twentyfour ways (*paccayas*), for which the usual general expression is "*imasmim sati idaṃ hoti*" (this being so that happens). There are in the *Paṭṭhāna* twentyfour such relations,⁵ viz., *hetu* (root-cause), *ārammaṇa* (basis, objective cause), *anantara* (immediate c.), *samanantara* (concomitant c.), *sahajāta* (co-existent c.), *aññamañña* (interdependent c.), *nissaya* (supporting cause as earth to tree), *upanissaya* (immediately effective cause), *purejāta* (preceding c.), *pacchājāta* (succeeding c.), *āsevana* (cause which requires repetition, e.g. study), *kamma* (previous actions), *vipāka* (fruition of previous actions), *āhāra* (sustenance), *indriya* (predominating factors), *jhāna* (meditation), *magga* (the eight-fold path), *sampayutta* (associated cause), *vippayutta* (dissociated cause), *atthi* (present cause), *natthi* (non-present cause), *vigata* (absent cause) and *avigata* (non-absent cause). It is in one or more of these relations that the two consecutive links are related to each other, e.g., *viññāṇa* is related to *nāmarūpa* as *aññamañña*; *jāti* is related to *jarā-maraṇa* as *purejāta* and *upanissaya*, and so forth. The law implies that any two links should be taken up for consideration for realising the *idappaccayatā* of worldly things.

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⁴ See Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 46 f; for other refs., see Poussin, *Theories des douze causes*, p. vii, fn. 2.

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¹ *Vism.*, p. 525.

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² *Ibid.*, p. 525: purimā, bhikkhave, koṭi na paññāyati avijjāya (or bhavataṇhāya), ito pubbe avijjā (or bhavataṇhā) nāhosi atha pacchā sambhavi ti. Evaṃ c'etaṃ bhikkhave, vuccati, atha ca pana paññāyati idappaccayā avijjā (or bhavataṇhā). Cf. *Saṃyutta*, II, p. 178; III, p. 149

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³ *Saṃyutta*, II, pp. 101-3, *Mahāniddesa*, I, pp. 25-6.

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⁴ *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 208-9.

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⁵ Cf. *Vism.*, p. 532; translation, p. 635; Intro. to *Paṭṭhāna* (P.T.S.).

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Buddhaghosa observes that by *samuppāda* is not meant origin (*uppāda*), pure and simple. It is not also the doctrine of nothingness (*natthitā*). It negatives the doctrines of *sassata* and *uccheda*.¹ By the word *paṭicca* is meant that a thing originates not by itself (*ekekato*) nor without a cause (*nāpi ahetuto*); it originates by depending on certain other things (*paccayasāmaggim paṭicca*) as a fruition (*phalavohārena*). By the compound word *paṭiccasamuppāda* is meant that a cause leads to an effect (*patimukham ito = gato*) unalterably, and the cause and effect are not separable from each other; cause and effect are mutually dependent and which mutual dependence is unalterably fixed.

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¹ See above, pp. 39, 41.

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The twelve terms composing the law of causation are explained thus:

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(1) *Avijjā* or lack of true knowledge

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The etymological meaning of the word *avijjā* is that it makes a person learn what should be unlearnt and unlearn what should be learnt. It debars a person from taking a true view of worldly things. It makes a person see happiness in misery, good in evil, and vice versa, regard the unreals as reals, make differentiation where no differentiation exists, and so forth. The usual meaning attributed to it in the Nikāyas is non-comprehension of the ariyasaccas¹ while in the Abhidhamma, it is non-comprehension of pubbanta and aparanta, sassata and uccheda,² and of idappaccayatā.³ Avijjā screens the truth, and it is by the removal of avijjā that the vijjā or truth (i.e. Nibbāna) flashes before the eyes of an adept.

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² See above, pp. 49 ff.

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³ See above, p. 266. Cf. Dhammasaṅgaṇi § 1162.

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(2) Saṅkhārā or thought-constructions, impressions

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By the word saṅkhārā is meant the impressions or traces left in the mind by taking wrong view of things due to avijjā.¹ On account of the lack of true knowledge, a person has the impression that desires conduce to happiness, that performance of sacrifices and practice of extreme austerities lead to liberation and so forth. The relation (paccaya) of saṅkhārā to avijjā may be one or more of the following four, viz., ārammaṇa, adhipati, kamma, and upanissaya. The impressions left on the mind by avijjā lead one to perform deeds which are (i) meritorious (puñña) such as gifts and observance of moral precepts, (ii) sinful (apuñña) such as killing and stealing, and (iii) neither meritorious nor sinful such as beliefs in sassata and uccheda. These three kinds of deeds may be (i) physical (kāyika), or verbal (vācasika) or mental (mānasika). Again, the impressions or thought constructions (*saṅkhārā*) may be limited or unlimited, high or low, right or wrong, definite or indefinite. *Puññābhisankhārā* cause rebirth in heavens, while *apuññābhisankhārā* in hells and *āneñjābhisankhārā* in the Arūpalokas.¹ The function of *saṅkhārā* is to produce the *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* (or *citta*) (the thought with which a being is reborn) and the mental states (*viññāṇas*) that follow the *paṭisandhi-citta*, which are all dependent on its previous deeds (*kammapaccaya*).²

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¹ See above, p. 263.

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⁴ This term saṅkhārā should be distinguished from the word saṅkhārā in phrases like aniccā vata saṅkhārā, where it means all that is constituted.

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¹ See above, p. 255-6.

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² *Vism.*, p. 558.

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(3) *Viññāṇa* or perception &
(4) *Nāma-rūpa* or mind and matter

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The appearance of *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa* marks the inception of the present life of a being. The very fact of a being’s having a fresh existence implies that the being could not get rid of *avijjā* and its consequence *saṅkhārā* in its past life. An Arhat or Buddha only gets rid of the same and so does not have fresh *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa*. The *saṅkhārā* lead to the reappearance of *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*, and the other *viññāṇas* immediately succeeding it, and it is around this *viññāṇa* that the other four *khandhas* cluster, forming a complete being with mind and matter.

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Of these four *khandhas*, one is *rūpa* (matter) and the other three are *saññā*, *vedanā* and *saṅkhārā* which along with *viññāṇa*, separately stated in the formula, are collectively called *nāma*. Buddhaghosa derives *nāma* from the root *nam*, to bend, and says *saññā*, *vedanā* and *saṅkhārā* are called *nāma* because they bend, direct the *viññāṇa* to the object (*ārammaṇa*). In the formula of twelve links, *viññāṇa* is made the *paccaya* of *nāma-rūpa*, but *nāma* also includes *viññāṇa*. In some enumerations,³ *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa* are shown to be interdependent.

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³ *Digha*, II, p. 56.

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The reason for making viññāṇa an independent link is that saṅkhārā can be the paccaya (i.e. kamma and upanissaya) of viññāṇa only¹ and not of the other three khandhas or of rūpa. The paṭisandhiviññāṇa is of nineteen kinds.² Viññāṇas, which follow the paṭisandhicitta and cuticitta, are the five perceptions derived through the five sense-organs. Besides these five, there is the mano-viññāṇa which may be sub-divided into thirty-two kinds.³

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¹ Vism, p. 559-560.

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² For details, see Vism, pp. 547 ff.

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³ Cf. Vism., p. 555-6; kāmāvacarassa kusalassa katattā upacitattā vipākaṃ cakkhuviññāṇaṃ uppannaṃ hoti ti. See IHQ, vol. XV: The Dhammasaṅgaṇi (analysed).

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Now the viññāṇas, which appear after paṭisandhi-viññāṇa, gradually lead to saññā (perception), vedanā (feelings), and fresh saṅkhārā (thought-constructions), all of which become ultimately the paccaya of rūpa (matter).⁴ The relation of nāma to rūpa is one of the four paccayas, e.g. sahajāta, aññamañña, nissaya and vipāka.⁵ It is clearly stated in the Vibhaṅga⁶ that the sense-organs as also other matters in their subtlest state originate out of mind. This subtle rūpa is nourished by the food taken by the mother and shaped by the force of previous karma.

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⁴ Vibhaṅga, pp. 144, 147: nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanṃ.

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⁵ Vism., p. 561.

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⁶ Vibhaṅga, p. 147.

(5) Saḷāyatana or six sense-organs

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Nāma-rūpa are mentioned as the paccaya of the six sense-organs. By nāma is meant here the three khandhas, vedanā, saññā and saṅkhārā. By rūpa is taken the four great elements (mahābhūtas), the six objects (vatthus) viz., rūpa, sadda, gandha, rasa, phoṭṭhabba and dhamma, and vitality (jīvita). The above rūpa consisting of eleven elements takes its own course of evolution (sa-santanti pariyāpannam) and is related to saḷāyatana as sahajāta, aññamaññā, nissaya, vippayutta, atthi and avigata.¹ Nāma also have the above relations to the six sense-organs with the distinction that it is sampayutta and not vippayutta paccaya and it is also a vipāka paccaya.² But these two nāma and rūpa must come together to be a paccaya of the six sense-organs and not otherwise.³

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¹ Vism., p. 564.

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² Ibid., p. 563.

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³ Ibid., p. 562.

(6) Phassa or contact

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There are as many kinds of phassa (contact) as there are āyatanas, that is, six. Phasso appears as a result of the āyatanas taking their own course of evolution (sakasantati-pariyāpannam).⁴ The only point to be remembered is that phasso is put in the singular number as it is only one though there may be more than one sense-organ functioning, but one form of phasso is limited to one āyatana. The āyatanas are related to phasso in six or nine ways.⁵ The phasso can also be sub-divided like viññāṇa into thirty-two kinds.⁶

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⁴ Ibid., p. 565.

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⁵ Ibid., p. 566.

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⁶ Ibid., p. 565.

(7) Vedanā or feeling

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There are as many feelings as there are doors, i.e., the sense-organs. Vedanā like viññāṇa may be sub-divided into 89 kinds.⁷ Cakkhuppasāda, etc., are related to feeling in eight ways.⁸

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⁷ See above, p. 255.

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⁸ Vism., p. 567.

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(8) Taṇhā or thirst, desire

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There are as many kinds of thirst as there are sources i.e., the six objects of the sense-organs, viz., rūpa-taṇhā, sadda-taṇhā and sc forth.¹ Each taṇhā may be of three kinds,² kāma, bhava and vibhava. When the taṇhā rouses a taste for the objects, rūpa, sadda, etc., it is called kāma. When it is associated with the belief that the world is eternally existing (sassata) and rouses an attachment (rāga) for future existence, it is called bhavataṇhā. When it is associated with the belief that there is no after-life (uccheda), and one becomes regardless of this life, it is called vibhava-taṇhā.

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¹ Vibhaṅga, p. 380.

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² See above, p. 263.

(9) Upādāna or strong attachment

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The previously mentioned taṇhās lead to upādāna and are related to it in seven or eight ways.³ There are four kinds of upādāna, kāma, diṭṭhi, sīlabbata and attavāda. Kāmataṇhā is the cause of kāmupādāna, which is the firm grasping of the object, it is thirst for objects not obtained and firmly holding the objects already obtained. Diṭṭhūpādāna is the firm adherence to wrong views, i.e., firm belief in the doctrine that there is no good effects of gifts or sacrifices, or belief in any one of the indeterminable problems: sassata or uccheda, anta or ananta etc.⁴ as true. Sīlabbatupādāna is the firm adherence to the belief that rituals or particular ascetic practices lead to liberation. Attavādupādāna is the firm belief in the existence of a soul, and in its identification with one of the five khandhas.⁵

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³ Vism., p. 570-1.

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⁴ See above, p. 45-6

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⁵ See above, p. 85.

(10) Bhava or desire for existence

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It has two distinct meanings, one is existence according to one's past deeds, called kammabhava, and the other is the plane of existence wherein a being is reborn, called uppattibhava. The former is regulated by the three kinds of saṅkhārā, puñña, apuñña and āneñja in their two grades low and high. But *saṅkhārā* are not mentioned as the *paccaya* of *bhava*, so we are to ascertain how *upādāna* is the *paccaya* of *bhava*. Buddhaghosa points out that *kāmupādāna* leads to such actions which cause a being to be reborn in the *kāmabhava* and so it can be described as *kammabhava*. Other *upādānas* viz., *diṭṭhi*, *sīlabbata* and *attavāda* make a person adhere to wrong views, and influenced by those views he performs actions which lead to existences in *kāma* and other words, so in this sense, it can be called *kammabhava*. By *uppattibhava* is meant the several planes of existence, such as Kāma, Rūpa or Arūpa lokas. Some of these may be *asaññā* (without perception) and some may be with *saññā* (perception) but so subtle that it is incapable of perceiving any object (*nevasaññā-nāsaññā*). *Uppattibhava* may also be classified according to the number of *khandhas*, a being may possess, e.g. *kāma*- or *rūpa-bhava* have five *khandhas* while *arūpa* and *nevasaññānāsaññā* have only four, *asaññābhava* has one.

(11) Jāti or birth

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*Jāti* is controlled by *kammabhava* and not *uppattibhava*. It is related to *bhava* in two ways, *kamma* and *upanissaya*. Birth is dependent on certain external circumstances, but assuming those as common in two beings, one notices differences between the two. This difference is due to the nature of *kamma-bhava*, in other words, deeds of past life, so it is said *kammam satte vibhajati, yad idaṃ hīnapaṇītatāyā ti*.¹

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¹ *Majjhima*, III, p. 203.

(12) Jarāmaraṇa-soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa or old age, death, grief, lamentation, and sorrow

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These are all due to *jāti* but the relation of these to *jāti* is only two, viz., *upanissaya* and *purejāta*.

Cites (18)