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Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c18.s5.28

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c18.s5.28

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v1.c18.s5.28

"Many scholars, who have dealt with this formula, have attempted to elicit from it Buddha's theory of the origin of a being and some of them have actually drawn parallels between the links of the formula and the causal series of the Sāṃkhya.⁴ It is noteworthy that such attempts were also made in Buddhaghosa's time. Buddhaghosa has, however, pointed out that *avijjā*, the first link of the chain, must not be regarded as similar to *pakati* (*prakṛti*) of the Pakativādins (Sāṃkhya) because *avijjā* is neither uncaused (*akāraṇam*) nor is it the primary cause (*mūlakāraṇam*) of the world. It owes its origin to impurities (*āsavas*). The reason adduced by Buddhaghosa for its being made the first link in the chain is that Buddha used '*avijjā*' or '*bhavataṇhā*' for commencing (*sīsabhāvaṃ*) his discourses on topics which by their nature are without any beginning or end (*vaṭṭa-kathā* or *anamatagga*).¹ It is apparent therefore that *avijjā* need not necessarily be the first link in the chain of causation but that it is one of the terms found suitable by the author of the formula to begin the chain. It could as well be commenced by *bhava-taṇhā*.² In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*,³ the formula starts with *āhāra* as the first link. Hence, we see that the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is not meant to be an explanation of the origin of the world but just a chain of instances to illustrate the law of *idappaccayatā* (this-conditioned nature, *i.e.*, dependent origination) of things. Those scholars, who expected to find in it a key to the origin of the world, have been disappointed and have condemned it as illogical and incongruous. The author of the formula could not anticipate that his arrangement of the illustrations in a series would give rise to confusion.⁴ The chain was not meant to demonstrate a line of evolution. All that is intended to demonstrate is that any two links are related to each other in one or more of the twentyfour ways (*paccayas*), for which the usual general expression is "*imasmim sati idaṃ hoti*" (this being so that happens). There are in the *Paṭṭhāna* twentyfour such relations,⁵ viz., *hetu* (root-cause), *ārammaṇa* (basis, objective cause), *anantara* (immediate c.), *samanantara* (concomitant c.), *sahajāta* (co-existent c.), *aññamañña* (interdependent c.), *nissaya* (supporting cause as earth to tree), *upanissaya* (immediately effective cause), *purejāta* (preceding c.), *pacchājāta* (succeeding c.), *āsevana* (cause which requires repetition, e.g. study), *kamma* (previous actions), *vipāka* (fruition of previous actions), *āhāra* (sustenance), *indriya* (predominating factors), *jhāna* (meditation), *magga* (the eight-fold path), *sampayutta* (associated cause), *vippayutta* (dissociated cause), *atthi* (present cause), *natthi* (non-present cause), *vigata* (absent cause) and *avigata* (non-absent cause). It is in one or more of these relations that the two consecutive links are related to each other, e.g., *viññāṇa* is related to *nāmarūpa* as *aññamañña*; *jāti* is related to *jarā-maraṇa* as *purejāta* and *upanissaya*, and so forth. The law implies that any two links should be taken up for consideration for realising the *idappaccayatā* of worldly things.