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Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c5: Chapter II: Early Indian Thoughts & Beliefs

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c5

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Chapter II: Early Indian Thoughts & Beliefs

Vedic Beliefs

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The history of Indian religion and thought commences with the appearance of the Vedas, say about 3000 B.C. when the people were very simple in their habits and thoughts, and were in fact, children of nature, who looked upon the physical forces as so many friends and foes created by the Almighty Father for their reward and punishment. To them Dyaus (sky) was the father and Pṛthivī (earth) the mother, and other natural phenomena, viz., Uṣas, the Aśvins, Agni, Parjanya, Sūrya, the Ādityas, the Maruts and so forth¹ were the children of Dyaus. To Varuṇa, they accorded the place of the ruler, dispensing justice and preserving ethical laws of the world and maintaining at the same time the order of the universe (ṛta) in the interest of sentient beings. With the growth of cosmological ideas, Varuṇa was superseded by another god and that was Prajāpati who was made the creator, ruler and preserver of the universe.² He was self-created, the first principle, the unity behind the diversity of the universe, and to him all gods and sentient beings owed their origin. He was in short the "material and efficient cause of the world."³ As the highest being he had no concern with moral laws,⁴ the maintenance of which was entrusted to Varuṇa.

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¹ Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, p. 95; Dalal, *History of India*, pp. 51 ff.

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² Keith, *op. cit.*, pp. 101, 437.

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³ *Ibid.*, p. 438.

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⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

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Most of their hymns are nothing but invocations to and adorations of the gods to help them in gaining their worldly ends. They were optimistic and possessed a strong desire to live the life of the world. Their prayer was mainly for cattle and victory over the Dasyus,¹ who lived in fortified cities and offered them effective opposition. Their constant struggle with the Dasyus hardly gave them any respite to give their thoughts to matters spiritual.

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¹ Were they the builders of the cities discovered at Mohenjodaro and Harappa?

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They were not devoid of any religious belief: to them nature in her beneficent aspect was a constant friend, and to her they approached for having their wants fulfilled. They conceived of Indra and other gods as so many replicas of human beings, endowed with supernatural powers, which they exercised in aid of those who satisfied them by offering sacrifices. Indra was always ready to help his votaries; so also other gods whose aid was constantly sought for by their worshippers.² They were mainly physiolators. The pessimistic view of life in this world was yet unknown and hence to them, the question of liberation from the worldly existence did not arise.³ The theory of transmigration did not trouble them nor the influence of *Karma* in shaping one's destiny. They, however, had a fear for the unknown which in fact led them to perform sacrifices.⁴ They knew that a punctilious performance of the rituals of a sacrifice was all that was necessary for a happy life not only in this world but also in the next. A heavenly existence was all that they sought for by means of sacrifice.⁵ This outlook on life and the world continued among the Vedic Indians up to the close of the *Brāhmaṇa* period (8th century B.C.) and it was only with the appearance of the *Upaniṣads* that we notice a change in their outlook, their mind turning from the outward to the inward, culminating in the appearance of the philosophy of *anitya* and *Brahman*. In short, the physiolatry of the Vedic people gave way in course of time to the idolatry and sacrifices of the *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Upaniṣads* representing a further development from the objective to the subjective.

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² Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

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³ *Ibid.*, pp. 243-257.

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⁴ Dalal, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

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⁵ Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

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The simple hymns of the *Ṛg Veda* were followed up by the *Sāma* and *Yajur* which had already come to look upon the sacrifices as a means to worldly successes, heavenly bliss and emancipation and prescribed rituals for the sacrifices, the proper performance of which was believed to ensure to the sacrificer all the benefits prayed for by link.

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After these came the *Brāhmaṇas*, the well known *Śatapatha* and *Taittirīya*, the *Aitareya* and *Pañcaviṃśa* and several other texts devoted solely to the sacrificial rituals. Side by side with the *Brāhmaṇas* there grew up another class of sacrificial literature known as the *Āraṇyakas*, the only difference from the *Brāhmaṇas* being that these prescribed shorter rituals for the sacrifices suited to the conditions of the *Vānaprasthas* and *Yatis*, cogitation of the Supreme forming its chief feature.

Ancient Brāhmaṇas as depicted in the Pāli Texts

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An interesting picture of the ancient *Brāhmaṇas*¹ is furnished by the one of the latest Pāli texts, *Sutta Nipāta* (*Brāhmaṇa-dhammika-sutta*). It runs as follows:—

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¹ *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 50: Na kho brāhmaṇa sandissanti etarahi brāhmaṇā porāṇānam brāhmaṇānam brāhmaṇadhamme ti.

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"The ancient sages (*ṛṣis*) were ascetics (*tapassino*) and lived in self-control avoiding the five pleasures of sense. Their wealth

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consisted not of cattle, gold or grains but of learning and purity. They lived on food left at the door by the faithful and used the bed and clothes offered to them reverentially by the well-to-do. They were never harmed nor dominated, protected as they were by the *dhamma*, and their access to any house was never barred. They spent 48 years of their lives as *brahmacārins* in quest of knowledge and good conduct. Even when they married they lived a life of restraint. They held austerities, rectitude, tenderness, love and forbearance in high esteem. They performed sacrifices with rice, beds, clothes, ghee or oil, which they could collect by begging and never killed cows in sacrifices.

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"They possessed a noble stature and a tender and bright mien, and remained always engaged in their own pursuits. In course of time, however, they began to covet king's riches and splendour and objects of pleasure such as women with ornaments, chariots yoked with stately horses. With an eye to these gains they approached king Okkāka (Ikṣvāku), persuaded him to celebrate *aśvamedha*, *puruṣamedha*, *samyāprāsa*, *vājapeyya*,¹ and received as fees from him wealth, women and chariots, horses and cows, beds and clothes. Coveting more and more they again persuaded king Okkāka to celebrate sacrifices by the offering of cows, which, they said, constituted also wealth of men as are land, gold or grains, and as such were equally fit objects for offering. This slaughter of cows enraged the gods Brahmā, Indra, and even the Asuras and Rākṣasas and multiplied the diseases which were originally three, *viz.*, desires, hunger and decrepitude to ninety-eight and further caused to appear discord among the people and within the household, and to acts, improper and impious, among the various classes of men."

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¹ Cf. *Samyutta*, I, 76.

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It is stated in the *Subhasutta*¹ that the Brāhmaṇas are expected to observe five *dhammas*, namely, *saccam* (truthfulness), *tapam* (austerity), *brahmacariyam* (pure moral life), *ajjhenam* (study), and *cāgam* (gifts). In the *Sundaṅika-Bhāradvāja-sutta*² there is a reference to the Brāhmaṇas learning *Sāvitti* (*Sāvitrī*) consisting of three *padas* and twenty-four *akkhaṛas*, and in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, to the Vedic *Sākhās*, in these words:

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¹ *Majjhima*, II, p. 199. ² *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 79. ³ *Dīgha*, I, p. 237 (The Burmese reading is preferred here). ⁴ *Ibid.*, mantānam kattāro mantānam pavattāro; also *Dīgha*, I, p. 104; *Majjhima*, II, p 200. ⁵ *Dīgha*, I, p. 241.

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“All paths lead to *Brahma-sahavyatā* but the paths are different according to the different Brāhmaṇic schools, *viz.*, Addhariyā (= Sk. adhvaryu or White Yajurvedic), Tittiriyā (= Sk. Taittirīya or Black Yajurvedic), Chandokā (= Sāmavedic), Bavharija (= Bahvṛca or Ṛgvedic).”³

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Incidentally the names of *ṛṣis* or hymn-composers⁴ are referred to as Aṭṭhako, Vāmako, Vāmadevo, Vessāmitto, Yamataggi, Aṅgiraso, Bhāradvājo, Vāseṭṭho, Kassapo, and Bhagu. It is then pointed out that the Brāhmaṇas of Buddha’s time were merely repeaters of the hymns composed by these ancient sages.⁵

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According to the statements mentioned above as also according to the *Mahāgovinda* and other *suttas*, the goal of the Brāhmaṇas of the 6th century B.C. was mainly the attainment of Brahmaloka by acquisition of merit either through sacrifices or austere practices (*tapasya*).

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The ideal ancient Brāhmaṇas as envisaged in the *Brāhmaṇa-dhammika-sutta* must have been the ancient seers to whom the authorship of the Ṛgvedic hymns is attributed. They were, however, not conversant with the sacrificial system which we notice in the Ṛgveda. They, it seems, were given to intellectual culture alone and depended for their necessaries of life on the charity of the village-folk and towns-people. They belonged to the ancient families of priests like Aṅgirasas, Atharvans and Bhṛgus, who, according to Weber, were Indo-Iranian priests, and were, as Macdonell says, accorded a place intermediate between men and gods.¹ These ancient priests are treated in the Ṛgveda as semi-divine beings and are spoken of as ṛṣis, the exact term by which they are referred to in the Sutta-Nipāta.² They practised self-control and performed sacrifices with honey only.³ According to the Ṛgvedic tradition, Manu was the first of sacrificers, and he was followed by Aṅgiras, Bhṛgu, Atharvan and others.

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¹ See Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, p. 224.

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² Isayo pubbakā āsum saññatattā tapassino—*Sutta Nipāta*, p. 28.

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³ Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 224-225. Cf. *Kūṭadantasutta* in the *Dīgha*.

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The time when Brāhmaṇas began to approach for sacrifice to the kings, the first of whom was Okkāka (Ikṣvāku), the eldest son of Manu, must have been the time when the Ṛgveda was about to take its present shape; for, in it are found already the various classes of priests required for a sacrifice, e.g., Hotṛ, Adhvaryu, Brahman, and the system of taking the aid of a priest by the yajamāna for performing a sacrifice, a custom not prevalent in the pre-Ṛgvedic period. The practice of the yajamāna giving rich rewards to the priests had already become current at the time of the completion of the Ṛgveda, while by the time of the Yajurvedas, it became an indispensable religious necessity.

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It is in the period of the Brāhmaṇas and the Śrauta-sūtras, that we notice an abnormal increase in the avarice of the priests officiating at the sacrificial ceremonies. The references in the Pāli texts are to the state of things as found in the Yajur *Vedas* and the *Brāhmaṇas*. The different *śākhās* viz., *Adhvaryū*, *Tittirīyā*, *Chandokā* and *Bavhṛjā* evidently refer to *Śuklayajurveda*, *Kṛṣṇa-yajurveda*, *Sāmaveda* and *Ṛgveda* respectively. In a sacrifice, the presence of priests of these four classes was compulsory, each being in charge of a particular function.¹

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¹ For details, see Law, *Ancient Indian Polity*, ch. IX.

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In the early *Ṛgvedic* days, according to the *Sutta Nipāta*, the objects of offering consisted of rice, ghee, beds and clothes which the *Brāhmaṇas*, who were generally *brahmacārins* engaged in study and meditation, had to collect by begging. Later on, the offering of animals in a sacrifice came into vogue and it was certainly a fine reasoning, as we find it in the account of the *Sutta Nipāta*, that in the days when cows were treated as wealth like gold, they came to be included among the objects of offering, and perhaps it was this idea that prompted the *Brāhmaṇas* of a very early period to introduce the system of offering cows in a sacrifice. With the lapse of time the original idea passed out of people's minds but cows continued to be sacrificed, bringing in its train the system of killing all sorts of beings in a sacrifice. The *Pāli* texts abound in references to such prevalence of animal sacrifices, against which Buddha raised his voice of protest,² but it is a matter of note that Buddha was not alone or the first in suggesting the various objects of offering in a sacrifice in an descending scale from animals to barley³ but that a similar suggestion is also to be found in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, one of the late works of the *Brāhmaṇa* period. It runs thus: "At first the gods offered up a man as the victim. When he was offered up, the sacrificial essence went out of him. It entered into a horse; they offered up the horse.” In this way the horse was replaced by the ox, the ox by the goat, and the goat by barley and rice.¹

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² Dutt, *Early History of the Spread of Buddhism*, pp. 5, 6.

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³ *Ibid.*

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¹ “The sacrificial essence then entered into this earth . . . They found it in . . . rice and barley. Therefore . . . as much efficacy as those sacrificed victims would have for him, so much efficacy has this oblation of rice . . .” See Dalal’s *History of India*, pp. 128-9 quoting from Eggeling’s translation of *Ś. Br.*

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This shows that about the sixth century B.C., the practice of offering animals in a sacrifice had already become repugnant to a section of the Brāhmaṇic society, and this feeling found the strongest expression in Buddhism. In this connexion, we have also to take into consideration the appearance of the Āraṇyakas and the method of sacrifice prescribed in them. Among the Brāhmaṇas there was a section who favoured the ancient Brāhmaṇic ideal of living the life of a recluse and earning merit by the performance of sacrifices by means of meditation, and repetition of Vedic hymns,² and disliked offering of animals. From the Pāli texts it is apparent that at the time of the rise of Buddhism, the system of killing animals in a sacrifice was as much in vogue as that of meditation and repetition of mantras. We have in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, pp. 343-4) a clear hint to that effect.³ “A king or a rich brāhmaṇa sometimes gets a hermitage (*santhāgāra*) built outside the town and lives there after having his hair and beard shaven and putting on rough skins. He is accompanied by his queen and purohita. He sleeps on bare ground and lives on a portion of the milk of a cow, and tends the sacrificial fire. He, however, orders that for sacrifice so many cows, calves, goats, etc., be killed, so many trees be cut down for *yupa*, *dabba*, etc.” This account shows that the Brāhmaṇas of the 5th century B.C. combined asceticism with animal sacrifices, but there is no adequate evidence to prove that they took to the extreme forms of self-mortification,¹ to which references are so frequently found in the *Nikāyas*. It seems that these extreme forms of ascetic practices were confined to the Jainas, Ājīvikas and such other non-Brāhmaṇic ascetic orders.

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² Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 490.

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³ See also *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 207.

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¹ The following is a stock passage occurring repeatedly in the Pāli texts: *Idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo acelako hoti muttācāro hatthāpalekhano na chibhadantiko etc.* See *Infra*, p. 18.

The Goal of Life

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We shall now consider the value of the remark found in the Pāli texts that the ancient Brāhmaṇas of different schools believed that all paths led to union with Brahmā (*Brahma-sahavyatā*).² In the cosmological accounts of the Pāli texts, Brahmaloka is deemed as the highest sphere of existence, next to Ābhassarā and the gods who first appeared there regarded themselves as the first born and as such the lord and creator of all beings who originated after them.³ They deemed themselves as eternally existing.⁴ In the *Mahāgovinda-suttanta*, it is clearly stated that the highest ambition of Mahāgovinda was to visualize Brahmā the highest god, and a graphic description⁵ is also given of Brahmā Sanaṃkumāra. Brahmaloka, the highest sphere of existence, according to Buddhism, was attainable through the practice of the four brahmavihāras, viz., *mettā*, *karuṇā*, *muditā*, and *upekkhā*. The Buddhist accounts of Brahmā and Brahmaloka are practically an echo of the notions current among the ancient Brāhmaṇas, with this difference that the attainment of union with Brahmā was possible, according to the *Brāhmaṇa* texts,¹ through the study of the Vedas or the performance of a sacrifice correctly, while, according to the Buddhist texts, it was possible only by becoming a recluse, leading an austere life of a brahmacārin and practising the four *brahmavihāras*.²

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² See *Digha*, II, p. 251; Barua, *Pre-Buddhist etc*, pp. 43-44.

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³ *Digha*, I, p. 18: Aham asmi Brahmā Mahābrahmā abhibhū anabhibhūto aññad-atthu-daso vasavattī issaro kattā nimmātā seṭṭho sañjātā va pitā bhūta-bhavyānam.

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⁴ *Digha*, I, p. 18: nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāma-dhammo.

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⁵ *Digha*, II, p. 240: vaṇṇavā yasavā sirimā etc.

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¹ *Ś. Br.*, XI, 44: 5, 6, 9 quoted in Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

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² *Dīgha*, II, p. 241:

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The conception of Brahmā as the first born can be traced in the Ṛgvedic account of Prajāpati or Viśvakarman who is described thus: "He is the god who is the first born, the golden germ, Hiranyagarbha, who creates the whole universe, who gives life, whose commands the gods obey, whose shadow is death and immortality, who is lord of man and beast, of the mountain and the sea."³ In the *Brāhmaṇa* period too, Prajāpati is given the place of the creator, the supreme god, the ruler of the universe.⁴

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³ Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

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⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 442.

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Though to Prajāpati the highest place is accorded in the Vedic texts, and the same finds corroboration in the tradition preserved in the Buddhist texts, the idea of unity behind the diversity, the absence of any being at the very beginning appear also in the Vedic texts, though not in the earlier section i.e.,

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Hitvā mamattaṃ manujesu brahme
Ekodibhūto karuṇādhimutto
Nirāmagandho virato methunasmā
Etthaṭṭhito ettha ca sikkhamāno
Pappoti macco amataṃ brahmalokan ti.

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See also *Majjhima*, II, p. 207.

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(Maṇḍalas, II-IX) of the *Ṛgveda*. The earliest trace of this conception of unity is found in the *Ṛgvedic* hymn X. 86 of Dīrghatamas, where it is said: "They call it Indra, they call by many names, Agni, Yama, Mātarisvan."' It is further developed in the hymn X. 129 where is stated: "in the beginning there was neither being nor not-being: there was no atmosphere nor sky . . . . there was neither death nor immortality, nor night nor day: there was nothing else in the world save the One which breathed, but without wind, of its own power."² The above-mentioned two conceptions are linked up together in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* thus: "the first thing is stated to be not-being, then arises Prajāpati, who is the same as Puruṣa, and then the Brahman, the holy science, . . . ."³ In the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* again, the order is changed: the first entity is not-being, then springs into life mind i.e., the Brahman, and then Prajāpati.⁴ In the same *Brāhmaṇa* again, we notice a further development, viz., the identification of Brahman with Ātman and the enunciation of the theory that the knowledge of the Ātman can free one from his actions—a notion traceable in the *Śatapatha* also.⁵ Its development into the philosophy of *tat tvam asi* or *so'ham* which we find in the early Upaniṣads followed as a matter of course. Buddhism did not go so far as to identify Brahman with Ātman, but like the *Taittirīya* and *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇas*, asserted that Brahmā was preceded by 'not-being,' which was also, according to it, the beginning or the real form of the manifest, which began with the god Mahābrahmā. The 'not-being' in Buddhism is termed *Nirvāṇa* or *Buddhatva*, and hence one who attains that state is placed above the Brahmaloka or Brahman the personal. Buddhism only kept up the logical sequence by looking upon Brahman or the beings that originated after him as essentially anātman and avoided the illogical step of deriving a being (ātman) from the non-being. It is this little but vital difference that made the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇic schools, though issuing, in fact, from the same line of thought, separate from each other wider and wider. Hence Buddhism and Upaniṣadic thoughts may be treated as contemporary developments, the former paving the way for the advent of non-Brāhmaṇic schools of thought, and the latter bringing forth in its train the various systems of Brāhmaṇic philosophy.

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¹ Keith, *op cit*, p 435.

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² *Ibid*, pp 435-6.

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³ *Ibid*. p. 443.

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⁴ *Ibid*. p. 444

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⁵ *Ibid*. p. 450.

Asceticism

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As the ancient brāhmaṇas were mainly occupied with sacrifices, they practised asceticism only so far as was necessary for their proper performance. Neither in the Pāli nor in the early Vedic texts, there are references to Brāhmaṇas practising extreme self-mortifications as were common among the non-Brāhmaṇic religious sects (samaṇa-brāhmaṇa) and a few ascetic orders which claimed to be Brāhmaṇic. In the Āraṇyakas too, there is not much of ascetic practices, and the central theme of this literature also is the performance of sacrifices, the only difference being that emphasis is laid in it more on meditational exercises than on rituals. In the Pāli text the extreme ascetic practices are spoken of generally in connexion with the paribbājakas and the non-Brāhmaṇic sects. Side by side with the sacrificial rituals of the Brāhmaṇas, there grew up a belief among a certain class of men that śuddhi (purity), or vimukti (emancipation), or svarga (heavenly existence) could be obtained by means of self-mortifications alone. The Nigaṇṭhas, e.g., held that sukha or duḥkha or aduḥkha-asukha vedanā was due to previous karma; hence, if by ascetic practices (tapas) one could purge off the effects of his former deeds and avoid performing fresh acts, he could put an end to his karma. On the complete stoppage of karmaic effects, advent of duḥkha would be arrested, and without duḥkha there could be no vedanā (feeling), and absence of vedanā led to an end of duḥkha.¹ Such reasoning could not but encourage rigorous ascetic practices and in fact it did among the non-Brāhmaṇic religious people.²

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¹ Majjhima, II, p. 214. Cf. B. C. Law, Mahāvīra p. 67. See Infra.

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² See IHQ, II, pp. 698 ff.

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The ascetic practices appear in the Nikāyas in a stereotyped form with hardly any change. These may be summarised as follows: There are ascetics some of whom remain almost naked (acelaka), some are devoid of social manners (muttācāra), some take food by licking hand, while some do not accept food if invited or if any courtesy be shown to them or if food be offered from any form of storing vessel or the interior of a house or by women in certain circumstances, or from a place infested with flies, or where dogs look for food. They do not drink any intoxicating liquors, restrict their visits for alms to one or two or at most seven doors, or limit the quantity of alms to one or two or at most seven pots and so forth. There are some again who live on self-grown vegetables, fruits, or food rejections, and even grass. There are some who put on barks, rags, skins, rough hair-blankets or feathers. There are some who shave their heads, moustaches etc., take to different kinds of sitting postures, use beds of spikes, sleep in the open sky or accept for bed whatever comes to them by chance. There are some who bathe thrice to wash away sins, or are extremely careful in injuring the smallest beings, and sometimes even go to the length of not cleaning their body lest they might injure any being. There are some who live on cow-dung and such other loathsome food or live on just one small fruit and so forth.¹ It will be observed that these ascetic practices are enumerated with a view to show that they are not of much use for *citta-vimutti* (mental freedom), and that Buddha himself in his Bodhisattva stages practised most of these and realised for himself their inefficacies.

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¹ *Dīgha*, I, Kassapasihanādasutta; *Majjhima*, II, Mahāsihanādasutta.

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In the account given in the *Mahāniddesa*² of the various superstitious beliefs current among the ancient Indians for the attainment of purity, a few ascetic practices are mentioned, e.g., strict observance of *sīlas* (moral precepts), living the life of animals, e.g., elephant, horse, cow and so forth, rubbing the body by earth, cow-dung, etc. In the *Jātakas* also, we get a picture of ascetic life,³ but as the dates of composition of the above mentioned works are still under controversy, we leave the details for our present purpose.

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² The *Mahāniddesa* (I, pp. 89) furnishes us with two lists of religieux (*samaṇabrāhmaṇā*) who seek emancipation through the performance of *Vatas* (vowed observances) and *Mutas*. The Vata-suddHikas are Hatthivatika, Assav., Gov., Kukkurav., Kākav., Vāsudevav, Baladevav, Puṇṇabhaddav., Maṇibhaddav. The MutasuddHikas are those who in proper time rub their body by earth, *harita*, gomaya, etc. Cf. "Browsers." "These were solitaries of Mesopotamia, and were so called because they lived on grass like cattle." *E.R.E*, VIII, p. 783.

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³ See *Indian Culture*, IV, pp. 211-216.

The Upanisads

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Strangely enough the Pāli texts as also the Buddhist-Sanskrit literature do not breathe a word about the Upanisads or the Upanisadic teachers. Now that it has been definitely settled that some of the Upanisads like the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Aitareya, Kauśitakī, Taittirīya, Chāndogya, Kena are pre-Buddhistic,¹ the silence of the Buddhist texts needs some words of explanation. One explanation that may be offered is ‘that the Buddhists accepted the principal philosophic viewpoints of the Upanisads with certain modifications, and hence had nothing to say against them.

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¹ Radhakrishnan, Philosophy of the Upanisads, pp. 17-18.

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The Upanisads and the Buddhist texts, in fact, are at one about the highest reality with this vital difference that according to the Upanisads the highest reality is ātman, the self par excellence, the soul of the universe, and it is manomaya while according to the Buddhists, excepting the Vijñānavādins, the highest reality is anātman, indescribable, and is absolutely without any attributes (suññatā) and it is not even manomaya and also not vijñaptimātra as the Vijñānavādins would have us accept. The Chā. Up. (vi. 7) is emphatic in its assertion that there is a very subtle substance (sa ya eṣo’ṇimā) which becomes apparent to us as diverse objects which therefore exist only in appearance not in reality. With the help of several similes the underlying oneness of all objects has been explained to Śvetaketu by his father.

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² मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भा-रूपः सत्यसंकल्पः आकाश-आत्मा सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसं सर्वमिदं अभ्यत्तोऽवाक्य अनादरः । For refs. to Chā., see Indian Culture, IV. i, p. 155. For parallel thoughts see Br. Up. V, 6; Muṇḍ. III, i, 7; Śvet. III, 20. IV, 4, etc.

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The Mūlapariyāya Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya attempts also to establish that the so-called objects are not really what they appear to be, that even the so-called Nirvāṇa is unreal, but the Sutta does not drop any hint about the nature of the reality as the Upaniṣads do. The similes of saline taste of all waters, the same water having different names in different places, clay as a common material for different earthen objects and so forth are utilised alike in the Upaniṣads and in the Buddhist texts.

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In the early Pāli texts, any attempt to give an idea of the reality has been avoided as far as possible. The only hints thrown out are that the Reality, the Tathāgata, is outside the four-fold probabilities, that is, it cannot be said to exist, or not exist, or both exist and not exist, or neither exist nor not exist.¹ It is by silence that the definition of Nirvāṇa has been given and the only positive account available in the early Pāli texts is that it is *nipuṇo paṇḍitavedanīyo atakkāvacaro paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi* (subtle, comprehensible by the wise, indescribable and realisable only within one's own self). In the course of criticism of the Brāhmaṇic conception of soul, the Pāli texts distinctly maintain that the real soul, if any, can never exist in the body and that the soul of the body can only be an empirical self. In the words of Prof. Radhakrishnan, we may say that the Pāli texts like "the Upaniṣads refuse to identify the self with the body or the series of mental states or the presentation continuum or the stream of consciousness."² It is a fact that the Buddhists maintain that a being is *skandhasantāna*, a continuous series of mental and physical states but it is without any persisting entity.

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¹ (i) Hoti Tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā?
(ii) Na hoti Tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā?
(iii) Hoti ca na hoti Tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā.
(iv) Na hoti ca na na hoti Tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā?

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² Radhakrishnan, *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 35 See Stcherbatsky's *Soul Theory of the Buddhists*.

Karma

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The *skandha-santāna* is admitted by the Buddhist as subject to the effects of karma. A being can never get away from the effects of his karma,¹ a law accepted almost universally. The Vedic belief that performance of sacrifices can bring all that a man desires was at a discount in the Upaniṣadic period when *karma* came to be regarded as the inexorable law. The *Bṛ. Up.*, (iii. 2. 13) after discussing the various theories relating to *karma*, concludes “*puṇyo vai puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati pāpāt pāpeneti*” (merits accrue from meritorious acts while demerits from demeritorious acts). Likewise in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (iii. p. 203) we have “Ko nu kho, bho Gotama, hetu ko paccayo yena manussānam yena satam manussabhūtānam dissati hīnappaṇītatā ti?” “*kammassakā, māṇavo, sattā kammadāyādā kammayoni kammabandhu kammapaṭisaraṇā kammam satte vibhajati yad idaṃ hīnappaṇītāyā ti*.” (What is the reason of men being in good and bad circumstances? O māṇava, beings inherit the effect of their own deeds, they are produced by karma, they are dependent on karma, it is karma that divides men into good and bad). The Sutta-nipāta (654, 666) expresses in a similar strain that a being is subject to his karma and that none can evade its effects. Buddhism, however, teaches at the same time that effects of the kamma can be neutralised by one following the Buddhist principles. Kamma is like a bija (seed) growing only in a suitable soil which is lobha or rāga (desire), dosa (hatred) and moha (delusion) and so it is ineffective in the case of a person who is without rāga, dosa and moha;¹ arhats are therefore not subject to kamma. Buddha's pain caused by Devadatta or his illness was not due to kamma.² The Brāhmaṇic philosophical schools hold a similar view. According to them, karma is ineffective for a person who has acquired the highest knowledge (tattvajñāna). Kamma is described as the bija (seed), ātmā the soil, false knowledge as water, karmaphala as sprout and the knowledge of the highest truth as summer-heat.³ For an average being who is not an arhat, kammavipāka is unavoidable whether in this life or the next or the following.⁴ It follows the person like the unavoidable shadow.⁵ Kamma may be both internal and external. It is internal when a person enters into samādhi and remains externally inactive, and it is external when one performs a deed by the movement of his physical limbs. The effects of kamma cannot be counteracted by *iddhi* (miraculous power).¹ Buddha vehemently criticised the teachers like Makkhali Gosāla or Pūraṇa Kassapa who taught *natthi kammam* (acts), *natthi kiriyam* (deeds), *natthi viriyam* (energy), and declared himself as a *kammavādin*, *kiriyavādin* and *viriyavādin*.²

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¹ There are six kinds of *karma* viz.,
(i) Diṭṭhadhammavedaniya-karma.
(ii) Uppajjavedanīya-karma.
(iii) Aparāparavedaniya-karma.
(iv) Yadāsanna-karma.
(v) Upapīḷaka-karma.
(vi) Upatthambhaka-karma. See Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 447. Kamma=saṅkhāra, it is one of the links of the Paṭiccasamuppāda, see Childers, sv. Kamma, *Majjhima*, II, p. 220; Cullakammavibhaṅgasutta in *Majjhima*, III, pp. 202 ff., *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 186; *Milindapañha*, p. 65. Cf. *Mahākarmavibhaṅga* edited by S. Lévi. 1932; *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* translated into French by Prof. Lamotte in *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, 1936.

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¹ Aṅguttara I, pp. 134-6; 263-4; V, p. 262. 2 See Milindapañha, p.

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¹³⁵ It adds that there may be accidents which are not Kamma-mūlam. Cf. Aṣṭa Major, II, p. 49. 3 Hindu-darśan by Candrakanta Tarkalaṅkāra p. 26. 4 Aṅguttara, III, p. 415. 5 Milindapañha, p.

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⁷² It adds that Kamma before fructification cannot be pointed out, as mangoes before they have sprouted cannot be located on any branch:—abbhocchinnāya santatiyā na sakkā tāni kammāni dassetum: idha vā idha tāni kammāni tiṭṭhantīti.

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¹ *Milindapañha*, p. 189

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² *Digha*, I, p. 132.

Metempsychosis or Rebirth

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The ancient brāhmaṇas and the Buddhists were in agreement in the belief that the karma of a previous existence shaped a being's subsequent existence, but the two systems differed in respect of the carrier of the karma from one existence to another. The Brāhmaṇic system insisted on the conception of an undying soul (*ātman*) as the unit keeping up the link between two existences while the Buddhists vehemently denied any such entity and maintained in its stead a changing group of entities called *skandhas* which are divided into two classes, viz., *rūpa* (matter) and *nāma* (mental states) such as *vedanā* (feeling, good, bad and indifferent), *saṃjñā* (vague perception), *saṃskāras* (impression), and *vijñāna* (clear perception by the organs of sense). The *skandhas*, according to the Buddhists, may be of the grossest or the subtlest form, and are changing every moment (*kṣaṇika*) and as such they are having their normal course even when a being dies and takes rebirth, which event also is a momentary affair. Of the five *khandhas*, *viññāṇa* is sometimes misconceived as the unit maintaining the link between one existence and another. A discussion relating to this misconception and the Buddhist attitude towards metempsychosis is clearly brought out in the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhayasutta*:¹ a bhikkhu Sāti, son of a Kevaṭṭa, gave out that the *viññāṇa* is the speaker, feeler and enjoyer of the fruits of karma, good or bad,² and that it is the self-same *viññāṇa* which passes from one existence to another.³ Buddha condemned the view of Sāti as wrong and corrected him by pointing out that *viññāṇa* can originate only through cause and condition⁴ and may well be compared to fire. As fire is given a name according to the nature of the fuel, so *viññāṇa* is given a name in accordance to its source and sphere of function, e.g. when it originates by means of *cakkhu* and have *rūpa* as its basis, it is called *cakkhu-viññāṇa*, and so forth. In the formulae of the chain of causation, it is shown that *viññāṇa* originates out of *saṅkhārā* which in their turn issue out of *avijjā* (ignorance of the truth) or *taṇhā* (desire) or *āhāra* (food), hence *viññāṇa* cannot have an independent existence of its own. Its appearance is always dependent on an immediately preceding cause and condition (*paṭiccasamuppanna*). In short, the Buddhists excepting the Sammitīyas rejected the Brāhmaṇic view that a soul (*pudgala*) or *viññāṇa* keeps a link between two existences, and held that it is as momentary as any one of the other khandhas.

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¹ *Majjhima*, I, pp. 256 ff.

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² *Ibid.*, p. 258: Katamaṃ taṃ Sāti viññāṇaṃ ti? Yvāyaṃ vado vedeyya tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedetīti.

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³ *Ibid.*, p. 256: tad ev' idaṃ viññāṇaṃ sandhāvāti saṃsarati anaññaṃ.

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⁴ *Majjhima*, p. 259: aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇasa sambhavo ti. Buddhaghosa in commenting upon the view of Sāti says that Sāti was merely a *Jātakabhāṇaka* (reciter of the Jātakas), he was misled by the concluding words in a Jātaka, in which Buddha identified himself with the Bodhisatta. A similar reason is assigned by Buddhaghosa in his comments on the view held by the Pudgalavādins. See Dutt, *Doctrines of the Three Principal Schools of Buddhism* 1939.

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