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Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c7: Chapter IV: The Six Titthiyas

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c7

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Chapter IV: The Six Titthiyas

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Among the religious orders (*Saṅghas* or *Gaṇas*) that were prevalent in Aṅga and Magadha¹ about Buddha's time, six are often referred to as either contemporaneous with or anterior to the Buddhist Saṅgha. The names of the teachers of these six orders are:—

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¹ Cf. *Dīgha*, I, pp. 47 ff.; *Majjhima*, II, p. 2. Lābhā vata bho Aṅga-Māgadhānam.........yatth' ime samaṇabrāhmaṇā saṃghino gaṇino gaṇācariyā ñātā yasassino titthakarā sādhusammatā bahujanassa Rājagahaṃ vassāvāsaṃ osaṭā.

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(i) Pūraṇa Kassapa
(ii) Makkhali Gosāla
(iii) Ajita Kesakambali
(iv) Pakudha Kaccāyana
(v) Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, and
(vi) Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta.²

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² For details, see B. C. Law, *Historical Gleanings*, p. 21 ff.; *Buddhistic Studies*, pp. 73 ff.; see also his *Mahāvīra*, pp. 75 ff. for the light thrown on these teachers by the Jaina sources.

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These teachers were respected by wise men, nobles and even kings. In the Pāli texts their doctrines are occasionally referred to but these are given in such a stereotyped form that they are not of much use for a detailed treatment.

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In his *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, Dr. Barua has exhaustively dealt with the life and doctrines of each of these teachers by utilising all the available Buddhist and Jaina sources.

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We shall therefore confine ourselves to the bare doctrines of the six teachers as presented in the Pāli texts: —

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(i) *Pūraṇa Kassapa*

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This teacher held the view that a person earns neither merit by pious acts such as gifts, sacrifices or austerities nor demerit by impious acts such as killing, stealing, lying and so forth. In other words, he taught *Akiriya-vāda* (theory of non-action), in Dr. Barua’s words “passivity of soul.” Soul, according to this teacher, is inactive, and it is the body which acts; hence, soul remains unaffected by the results of good or bad deeds. This teaching is allied to that of Sāṅkhya as has been pointed out by the Jaina commentator Silāṅka, but it would be wide of the mark if we say Kassapa’s teaching is the same as that of Sāṅkhya, for the latter school of philosophy does not teach *akiriya* though it holds that *Puruṣa* is only an onlooker, an inactive agent, the functioning factor being the *Prakṛti*. It does not however deny the doctrine of karman and the theory of transmigration.¹ The Vedantic or the Mādhyamika view of the world also makes a person *niṣkriya*, for it teaches that the world in its diversity does not exist; hence all actions, a person is supposed to perform, are purely imaginary. Though it is risky to identify Pūraṇa’s teachings with those of Vedānta or Mādhyamika or Sāṅkhya, there is no reason why his teachings should be condemned as leading to moral depravity as the *Majjhima Nikāya*² wants to establish. The suggestion of Dr. Barua on the *Digha* that Pūraṇa’s teaching should be classified as adhiccasamuppanikavāda is more appropriate, i.e., things happen fortuitously without any cause or condition,¹ and have nothing to do with ‘soul’.

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¹ Cf. Keith, *Sāṅkhya System* (Heritage of India Series), p 33.

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² *Majjhima*, I, p. 404.

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³ *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, p. 279; *Digha*. I, p. 28-29.

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¹ See Infra, ch. V.

(ii) Makkhali Gosāla

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This teacher of the Ājīvikas, it is said, was originally a follower of Pārśvanātha, the first Jaina Tīrthaṅkara, but later on he gave up his old faith on account of his conviction that living beings have only reanimation and not death.

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Makkhali Gosāla upheld the doctrine of fatalism (niyati-saṅgati-bhāva) viz. a being’s sufferings or happiness does not depend upon any cause or condition. A being is helpless, he can neither help himself nor others, and he cannot attain perfection (vimutti) by exertion. He must transmigrate from one existence to another, and it is only after repeated existences that he will attain emancipation (suddhi). The consecutive existences of a being including the periods and types of existences are unalterably fixed (niyata). The several existences of a being may be compared to a ball of yarn unwinding itself, the ultimate end of the yarn being the suddhi or vimutti i.e., end of existence of a being. In every existence a being is endowed with certain characteristics (saṅgati-bhāva), peculiar to the particular form of existence without any reference to his past deeds just as “fire is hot, ice cold.”² In the Majjhima Nikāya this doctrine is described as ahetuka and akiriyadiṭṭhi,³ while in the Aṅguttara (I, p. 287) it is said to be a doctrine which denies kamma (deed), kiriya (action) and viriya (energy).

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² Barua, op. cit, p. 312.

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³ Majjhima, I, p. 409; cf. II, p. 121.

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Dr. Barua says that according to Gosāla, there are infinite gradations of existence, and each type of existence is eternal.¹ The Pāli expression for the different types of existence is *chalābhijātiyo*, which means six types of human beings, the types being distinguished according to the qualities (*guṇas*).²

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¹ Barua, *op cit.* p 306.

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² (i) Kaṇhābhijāti — Bird-catchers, hunters, fishermen, etc.
(ii) Nīlābhijāti — Recluses who take to rigorous ascetic practices including the Sākyaputtiya Samaṇas.
(iii) Lohitābhijāti: — Nigaṇthas who wear one piece of cloth.
(iv) Haliddābhijāti: — Lay-devotees of Acelakas including Ājīvikasāvakas.
(v) Sukkābhijāti. — Ājīvika ascetics like Nanda, Vaccha, Sankicca. In the *Majjhima* (I, p. 238) these ascetics are said to be engaged in *kāyabhāvanā* and not *cittabhāvanā*.
(vi) Paramasukkābhijāti: Ājīvika saints. See *Sumangalavilāsinī*, I, p. 162; *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 121.

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These fatalists, in the opinion of the Buddhists, have no hope of deliverance. Like the followers of other teachers,³ they are liable to evil deeds. They belong to *abrahmacariyāvāsas* (those who lead impure lives) and are fond of eulogising themselves and disparaging others.⁴

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³ *Majjhima*, I, p. 401-2; see also I, p. 483.

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⁴ *Ibid*, I, p. 524.

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(iii) Ajita Kesakambali

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Ajita was an out and out materialist. He held that a being is composed of the four *mahābhūtas* (elements), viz., earth, water, air and fire, and *ākāśa* (space), and that after death the physical body disintegrates and merges in the four elements, while the *indriyas* (organs of sense) pass into space (*ākāśa*).⁵

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⁵ *Ibid.*, I, p. 515.

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There is no rebirth or transmigration, and hence performance of sacrifices and practice of austerities are of no avail, and there are no such acts as good or bad. Dr. Barua points out that Ajita’s doctrine is similar to that of Pāyāsi¹ who held that the soul is not an entity distinct from the body.²

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¹ *Digha*, II, no. 23: Pāyāsisuttanta.

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² Barua, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

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In the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, p. 402), Ajita’s teaching is criticised as leading to improper acts, speech and thoughts, and to indulgences in worldly pleasures. Dr. Barua disagrees with the opinion expressed above and in its stead says that Ajita’s teaching has a moral leaning inasmuch as it believed in life rather than in death, and it advocated proper service towards men when they are alive rather than honouring them after death.³ Dr. Barua, in fact, is trying here to justify the materialistic point of view.

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³ *Ibid.*

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Ajita’s materialistic teaching was not unknown in India. It had been coming down as the Lokāyata or Bārhaspatya School of philosophy,⁴ which later on became popular as the doctrine of Cārvāka. In the *Nikāyas* it is classified as *Uccheda-vāda* or the doctrine of annihilation after death or *Tam jīva tam sarīravāda* or the doctrine of identity of the soul and body.⁵

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⁴ Cf. *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*, p. 5-6.

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⁵ *See Infra*, pp. 46, 47.

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लोकायतिकपच्चे तु तत्त्व भूतचतुष्टयम् ।
पृथिव्यापस्तथा तेजो वायुरित्येव नापरम् ॥
... ... ...
...देह एवात्मा न ततोऽन्यो विलक्षणः ॥
इहलोकात् परो नान्यः स्वर्गोऽस्ति नरको न च ।
... ... ...
तपोभिरुपवासाद्यैर्मूढ एव प्रशुध्यति ॥

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(iv) Pakudha Kaccāyana

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This teacher held that a being is composed of seven elements, viz., earth, water, air, fire, pleasure (sukha), pain (dukkha) and soul (jīva), and that these elements even when they compose a being do not interact upon one another. These seven elements eternally exist and they are uncreated, and unalterably fixed, and hence any action, good or bad, is ineffective, e.g., cutting of a man in two pieces means nothing more than passing a sword through some elements. This teaching is classified in the Buddhist texts as Akiriyavāda as also Sassatavāda.¹ It is akiriya² inasmuch as it teaches that any act, good or bad, is not capable of bearing any fruit, and it is sassata as the elements remain in their original state unaffected by any composition whatsoever. From the Buddhist stand-point, this teaching is as undesirable as the Ucchedavāda, for it also teaches moral irresponsibility leading men to evil deeds.

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¹ See Infra, ch. V, pp. 49 ff

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² Barua, op. cit., p. 286.

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(v) Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta

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Sañjaya was an ajñānavādin, i.e., an agnostic or sceptic.³ He refuses to give a definite answer to questions dealing with ultimate problems, e.g., "Is there an after-life or not?" "Is there any fruit of good or evil deeds?" "Does the Tathāgata exist or not after death?" It is rather strange that Sañjaya’s attitude towards the ultimate problems is criticised by the Buddhists, for the Buddhists themselves admit these problems as indeterminable (avyākata).⁴ It may be that Sañjaya unlike the Buddhist thinkers carried his logic too far inasmuch as he refused to give a definite answer to questions relating even to moral responsibility. In any case, he is criticised as an *Amarāvikkhepikā*¹ but not as an *Akiriyavādin*. The story that Sāriputta was the quondam disciple of Sañjaya is not unworthy of belief, for Sañjaya's teaching is only a stepping stone to that of Buddha, who dissuaded men from wasting their time on the solution of ultimate problems before they had developed their intellectual faculties and convinced themselves of the process of origin and destruction of worldly things.

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³ Ibid., pp. 319, 328.

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⁴ See Infra, ch. V, pp. 44 ff.

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¹ See Infra, p. 47 & ch. VI.

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(vi) Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta

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In the Pali texts, only the ethical aspect of Nigaṇṭha's teaching has been dealt with. There is not a word about his *Syādvāda*,² or the *Navatattva*,³ etc., the only distinctive feature pointed out in the Buddhist texts is that it is like Buddhism a Kiriyavāda as opposed to Akiriyavāda of the other teachers.

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² The Syādvāda of the Jainas is allied to the Vibhajjavāda (as opposed to Ekamsavāda) of the Buddhists and the Vikkhepa attitude of Sañjaya. By this doctrine the Jainas assert that the answer to a problem may be correct from one standpoint but not from another; in other words, it cannot be absolutely correct. Buddha also advocated this view as he pointed out that answers ought to be given by taking into consideration the motive of the inquirer and the answer should be directed to a particular aspect of the problem.

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³ The nine substances are *jiva*, *ajiva*, *puṇya*, *pāpa*, *āsrava*, *saṃvara*, *bandha*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa*. *Jiva* indicates the soul—that which is conscious while *ajiva* the non-soul—that which is unconscious. *Jiva* acts with the help of *ajiva* just as soul or mind functions with the help of body. The results of such actions (*karman*) through mind, speech and body may be either good (*puṇya*) or bad (*pāpa*), which are also substances. These substances, which are karmaic effects, normally flow (*āsrava*) into *Jiva*, but again mind, speech and body may function in such a way that the flow of karmaic effect into *Jiva* may be arrested (*saṃvara*). In the case of *āsrava*, the *jiva* is invested (*bandha*) with *karman* and suffers on account of

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³ *Gradual Sayings*, I, p. 186.

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The principal teaching of Mahāvīra, as embodied in the Nikāyas, is that perfection can be attained only by neutralising the effects of past karma and avoiding the accumulation of either merit or demerit. It advocates rigorous asceticism (*tapasya*) for counteracting the past karma. By easy means, it teaches, the highest bliss cannot be attained; it is only by means of rigorous ascetic practices that it can be obtained.¹ In the Sāmaññaphala-sutta, the doctrine is described as Cātuyāmasaṃvara or the four restraints, *viz.*, (i) to be free from passion and desire; (ii) to keep aloof from all kinds of traffic; (iii) to get rid of all *parigrahas* (ideas of possession); and (iv) to remain absorbed in knowledge and meditation of self.² The Nigaṇṭhas laid the utmost emphasis on the doctrine of *ahiṃsā* (non-injuring of living beings). In the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, 56), it is shown that the Nigaṇṭhas laid more emphasis on physical deeds (*kāyadaṇḍa*) than on mental (*manodaṇḍa*), a point of view which is just the opposite of the Buddhists. Though the Buddhists and the Nigaṇṭhas differed widely in their philosophic viewpoints, there are several agreements between the two systems in moral outlook and disciplinary rules.

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¹ *Majjhima*, I, p. 93. Na sukhena sukham adhigantabbam, dukkhena kho sukham adhigantabbam. Sukhena ca sukham adhigantabbam abhavissa rāja Māgadho Seṇiyo Bimbisāro sukham adhigaccheyya.

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² B. C. Law, *Mahāvīra*, p. 14.

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repeated existence (*saṃsāra*). A Jaina monk is enjoined to destroy (*nirjarā*) the effects of karman by means of *saṃvara* and when the effects are completely destroyed he attains liberation (*mokṣa*) from *saṃsāra* (repeated existences). See Shah, *Jainism in North India*, p. 39 f.

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