Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c9.7

v1.c9.7

From the available expositions of these problems, it is apparent that the underlying reason for negating all the four propositions is that the inquirers, who seek a solution of the problems, labour under the misconception that the Tathāgata is an individual, a composite of skandhas, and that the only difference between a man of the world and the Tathāgata is that the former is composed of impure (sāsrava) skandhas and the latter of pure (anāsrava). In other words the inquirers want to ascertain whether Buddhism has anything to say about the existence of the soul (ātman) and its state when an individual attains mukti. The four problems hinge on the question whether the Tathāgata is a person, and whether his personality, which becomes pure by constant spiritual culture through ages, continues to exist after death (which in this case is Nirvāṇa). As Buddhism denies the existence of personality, the only course open to it is therefore to answer all questions relating to soul in the negative, as such questions do not arise. It is like putting the question whether the flower in the sky is red or blue. Any answer, positive or negative, would be misleading; hence the four propositions stated above are treated in the Buddhist texts as avyākata. The real issue therefore is not the existence of Tathāgata after death, but whether there is attā, and if so, does the attā of Arhats or Buddhas remain eternally in Nirvāṇa in any form, or become extinct.