Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c9: Chapter VI: The Tathāgata

Early Monastic Buddhism v1.c9

Language
English

Contents

Chapter VI: The Tathāgata

v1.c9.1

In the previous chapter the six indeterminables have been discussed. The remaining four relate to the question, what is Tathāgata in other words, Nibbāna? Throughout the Buddhist literature, whether Hinayānic or Mahāyānic, the problems are thus presented:

v1.c9.2

(i) Hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā ti? (Does Tathāgata (henceforth abbreviated as T.) exist after death?)

v1.c9.3

(ii) Na hoti T. param maraṇā ti? (Does not T. exist after death?)

v1.c9.4

(iii) Hoti ca na ca hoti T. param maraṇā ti? (Does not T. exist and not exist after death?)

v1.c9.5

(iv) Neva hoti na na hoti T. param maraṇā ti? (Does T. neither exist nor not exist after death?).

v1.c9.6

Though in the Buddhist texts, the problems have been treated as avyākata (inexplainable) and not conducive to the spiritual welfare of the inquiries, we find that in the Saṃyutta Nikāya (iv. pp. 382ff.), the Mādhyamikavṛtti and a few other Mahāyāna texts, there are attempts to offer an explanation of the problems. These have been, in fact, utilized in the Mahāyānic texts to establish their contention of Śūnyatā or Vijñānamātratā.

v1.c9.7

From the available expositions of these problems, it is apparent that the underlying reason for negating all the four propositions is that the inquirers, who seek a solution of the problems, labour under the misconception that the Tathāgata is an individual, a composite of skandhas, and that the only difference between a man of the world and the Tathāgata is that the former is composed of impure (sāsrava) skandhas and the latter of pure (anāsrava). In other words the inquirers want to ascertain whether Buddhism has anything to say about the existence of the soul (ātman) and its state when an individual attains mukti. The four problems hinge on the question whether the Tathāgata is a person, and whether his personality, which becomes pure by constant spiritual culture through ages, continues to exist after death (which in this case is Nirvāṇa). As Buddhism denies the existence of personality, the only course open to it is therefore to answer all questions relating to soul in the negative, as such questions do not arise. It is like putting the question whether the flower in the sky is red or blue. Any answer, positive or negative, would be misleading; hence the four propositions stated above are treated in the Buddhist texts as avyākata. The real issue therefore is not the existence of Tathāgata after death, but whether there is attā, and if so, does the attā of Arhats or Buddhas remain eternally in Nirvāṇa in any form, or become extinct.

v1.c9.8

In the Saṃyutta Nikāya (iv. pp. 383-384), just after the discourse that attā should not be identified with one or more or all of the skandhas, it is shown that the Tathāgata likewise should not be identified with one of the skandhas thus:

v1.c9.9

(a) whether rūpa or vedanā or saññā or saṅkhārā or viññāṇa is Tathāgata?

v1.c9.10

(b) whether T. is in rūpa, vedanā etc.

v1.c9.11

(c) whether T. is something different from rūpa or vedanā etc.

v1.c9.12

(d) whether rūpa, vedanā etc. all taken together are T.

v1.c9.13

(e) whether T. is devoid of rūpa, vedanā etc. (arūpī, avedano, asaññī, asaṅkhāro, aviññāṇo).

v1.c9.14

The answer to each of these questions evidently could be nothing but no b'etam.

v1.c9.15

What the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* has laid down by a few simple statements has been elaborated into a whole chapter¹ in the *Mādhyamikavṛtti*. Nāgārjuna (henceforth abbreviated as N.) commences (the chapter) with the statement that, if the existence of transmigrating beings (*bhavasaṃtati*) in reality be proved then only the reality of the Tathāgata, the perfect Buddha, the saviour of the world, can be established, but as the former, is not proved, the existence of the Tathāgata cannot be established. It must be shown that the

v1.c9.16

¹ Ch. XXII: *Tathāgataparīkṣā*.

v1.c9.17

(a) Tathāgata is the same as the skandhas; or
(b) T. is different from the skandhas; or
(c) T. is in the skandhas; or
(d) the skandhas are in T.; or
(e) T. is possessed of skandhas (*skandhavān*), but as none of these are true, and so there is no T. in reality.

Is T. the same as the skandhas?

v1.c9.s1.1

N. first takes up the proposition that the T. is something pure and indescribable and is identical with the skandhas. There are two sets of skandhas, one being the usual five viz., *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra* and *vijñāna* and the other, the five dharmas which make one a Buddha viz., *śīla*, *samādhi*, *prajñā*, *vimukti* and *vimuktijñānadarśana*. As the latter set of skandhas is not found in all beings (*avyāpaka*), he takes up the question of identity of the first set of skandhas, *rūpa*, *vedanā* etc. with the T., and points out the absurdities, to which this identity would lead. He argues thus:

v1.c9.s1.2

(i) If fire be taken as identical with firewood, or Buddha with upādāna (= skandhas, i.e., elements which make an individual) then the doer, and the thing done, become one.

v1.c9.s1.3

(ii) If Buddha (i.e., the Ātman of pure being) be identical with skandhas, then Buddha (or pure Ātman) would be subject to origination and destruction¹

v1.c9.s1.4

¹ See M. Vṛ., p. 434 and infra, pp. 85, 89 f.

v1.c9.s1.5

*Is. T. different from the skandhas?*

v1.c9.s1.6

N. then assumes that T. is different from the skandhas, and points out the absurdities, to which this assumption would lead. He says:

v1.c9.s1.7

(i) If fire be different from firewood, fire could exist without the firewood. Again not being dependent on any other material, it does not require to be ignited. It would be self-existent, proving thereby the futility of exertion (*ārambha-vaiyartham*). Analogously it may be said that Buddha and upādāna being different, Buddha is devoid of upādāna, so he is causeless and is self-existent from this it follows that no exertion is needed to become a Buddha.

v1.c9.s1.8

(ii) If Buddha be different from the skandhas, he would be devoid of the characteristics of the skandhas.²

v1.c9.s1.9

² Ibid., p. 434; for detailed treatment, see infra, pp. 89 f.

v1.c9.s1.10

It follows then that skandhas cannot be different (*vyatirikta*) from the T. Now, when skandhas and T. are not different entities, the other propositions, viz., skandhas are in T., T. is in skandhas or T. is possessed of skandhas, fall to the ground, for these relations can exist only between two distinct entities.

v1.c9.s1.11

Thus, Nāgārjuna by the line of reasoning *reductio ad absurdum*, establishes that the Tathāgata can neither be proved to be identical with the skandhas nor different from them, and hence there is no Tathāgata—the Tathāgata which is popularly supposed to be the ultimate perfect state of beings. At the same time Nāgārjuna adds, there is no transmigrating being (bhava-saṃtati), who is supposed to become the Tathāgata ultimately.

Does T. exist relatively?

v1.c9.s2.1

N. then says that it may be contended by some that though it has not been possible to establish the existence of T. directly, it may be done, at least, indirectly (parabhāvataḥ) by proving the existence of the upādānas, and T. as their image. But this also is shown untenable by N. by the application of reductio ad absurdum thus:

v1.c9.s2.2

Against the argument that the existence of T. can be proved at least as a reflection of pure skandhas similar to the image of an object on a mirror, Nāgārjuna advances the following arguments:

v1.c9.s2.3

(a) That which appears by depending on something else, e.g. the reflection on a mirror is anātma (substanceless) and whatever is anātma is unreal (niḥsvabhāva). Hence, there is no ground for holding that the so-called T. exists in reality.

v1.c9.s2.4

(b) Again, if T. had been really existent, then only it would have been possible to establish the separate existence (parabhāva) of skandhas by showing their apartness (paratvam) from T. As it has been already proved T. is non-existent by its own nature (svabhāvataḥ), the question of separate existence (para-bhāva) of skandhas cannot arise, so it is futile to argue that the existence of T. can be proved at least indirectly (parabhāvataḥ) with reference to the skandhas, with which paratva (apartness) and hence parabhāvatva (separate existence) of T. is out of the question.

v1.c9.s2.5

An object must have either an existence of its own (*svabhāva*) or at least, its existence can be established with reference to some other thing (*parabhāva*) but T. has neither; hence, how can T. be said to be real.

v1.c9.s2.6

Does T. become apparent by means of *skandhas*?

v1.c9.s2.7

Now, it may be contended that T. is not to be spoken of as identical with, or different from, the *skandhas*; he is known only on account (*upādāya*) of the *skandhas*.¹ Nāgārjuna replies that the position also is not tenable, the reason being that it implies the existence of T. as prior to, and distinct from, *skandhas*; and that T. had the *skandhas* later on, just as we say, Devadatta exists and he later on acquires wealth. From all considerations, the conclusion that is arrived at is that T. cannot have an existence before he has taken up the *skandhas*, i.e., he cannot exist uncaused (*anupādāya*), for that would again give rise to the fallacy that things can originate without cause. That which does not exist at all,² how can it take up something else,³ in this case, the *skandhas* (*upādānas*).

v1.c9.s2.8

¹ The object of the opponents of Nāgārjuna is to say that T. exists for ever, but only when he takes up the aggregates (*skandhas*), he becomes apparent to us.

v1.c9.s2.9

² e.g. flower in the sky, son of a barren woman.

v1.c9.s2.10

³ Just as it is meaningless to say that the flower in the sky has red petals.

v1.c9.s2.11

From the above it follows that a thing, which is not taken up by something else, cannot be regarded as *upādāna*. N. says: now that it has been established that T. was non-existent before the acquisition of *skandhas*, and that T., in fact, did not take up the *skandhas*, then, is it proper to regard a thing as a cause of some other thing even if the latter does not receive the former (in some shape or other). Hence, the skandhas should not be regarded as the cause of T. A thing when not taken up by something else cannot be called *upādāna* (cause) of the latter; in the absence of such cause (*upādāna*), there can be nothing as producer (*upādātṛ*) out of that cause. As there is nothing without substantial cause (*nirupādāna*), there can be no Tathāgata.¹

v1.c9.s2.12

¹ This may be cleared by the following simile: Earth is normally the material cause of a jar. But unless a quantity of earth is taken up and converted into a jar, it cannot be called the cause of the jar. When earth remains unutilised, it is not the material cause of the jar; and the existence of the jar cannot be asserted. From this N.'s conclusion is that there is neither the material cause nor the jar.

v1.c9.s2.13

The T., when examined in the five-fold way (i.e. identity, difference etc.), has been shown as neither existing by itself (*svabhāvataḥ*), nor with reference to the skandhas (= *upādānas*), (i.e. *parabhāvataḥ*). Moreover the skandhas themselves are non-existent, because they are dependently originated (*pratītya-samutpannatvāt*).² Their existence also cannot be established indirectly (*parabhāvataḥ*), that is, by their relation to something else, e.g. the *upādātṛ*. The existence of *upādāna* is not possible without an agent (*upādātṛ*). Even if the existence of the agent (*upādātṛ*) be assumed, how can the reality of a thing be established by showing its relation to the agent (or originator) when the thing itself is non-existent which N. has shown in the chapter on *skandhaparīkṣā*. Nāgārjuna thus concludes that there is neither *upādāna* nor *upādātṛ*.³

v1.c9.s2.14

² For detailed arguments see *M. Vr.*, ch. IV.

v1.c9.s2.15

³ *M. Vr.* pp. 440-1:

v1.c9.s2.16

We need not follow Nāgārjuna any further, for he passes next to the abstruse conception of Śūnyatā, which is beyond our scope here. He is not satisfied with establishing his point that there is no Tathāgata the person—a fact accepted by the Hīnayānists, he goes further and shows that there are no *skandhas*, the existence of which is admitted by the Hīnayānists.

v1.c9.s2.17

Both the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists agree in holding that there is no persisting entity (*pudgala*) in a being apart from the *skandhas*, and any question about the existence of the Tathāgata after his passing away really raises the issue whether there is any persisting entity in a being, and whether that entity continues to exist after the being is thoroughly cleansed of his impurities and passes away for ever. To put it in another way, does the entity (*pudgala*) exist in Nirvāṇa eternally, or not? As both the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists deny the existence of that entity—the personality of beings, both refuse to give any answer to the question whether there is Tathāgata (the person) after he has passed away, for a question like that cannot arise and hence any answer, if given, would be misleading,¹ and so it is safer and better to leave it as *avyākata* or *anirvacanīya*.

v1.c9.s2.18

¹ It should be remembered that Nāgārjuna denies the existence of Tathāgata the person but not of Tathatā or Śūnyatā, for an exposition of which see my *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 214-5. To the Hīnayānists, Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins, Nirvāṇa exists but is devoid of any individuality. It is like the sea of one taste, one colour etc. and in which all rivers of different names, colours, tastes lose their individual characters.

Linked texts (3)