Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c35.s3.t5.7

v2.c35.s3.t5.7

The Th. take recourse to the second argument saying that let the ‘present material aggregate’ (paccuppanna-rūpa) be treated as one inseparable object; now, after some time has elapsed, this material aggregate becomes past, i.e., gives up its presentness (paccuppannabhāva) to which the S. agree; then in the same way can it be said that the material aggregate also gives up its materiality (rūpa-bhāva)? The S. deny the latter inference, reasoning thus,—let a piece of white cloth, be regarded as one inseparable object; now, when this cloth is coloured, it gives up its whiteness (like ‘paccuppannabhāva’ in the former case), but does it give up its clothness (like ‘rūpabhāva’ in the former case)? This disarms the opponents. The Th. however follow up this argument of the S. by suddhikanaya (pure logic) saying that if the material aggregate (rūpa) does not give up its materiality (rūpabhāva),² then rūpa becomes permanent, eternally existing like nibbāna—a conclusion not accepted by the S., as according to the latter rūpabhāva is different from nibbānabhāva.