Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c35.s3.t5: Doctrines

Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c35.s3.t5

Language: English

Doctrines

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In the history of the secession of schools, it has been shown that the Sarvāstivādins belonged to the orthodox group, hence there are many points of agreement between the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda doctrines.

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I. Sabbam atthi

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The principal point of difference between the two schools is that the Sarvāstivādins maintain the existence of 5 *dharmas* in their subtlest forms at all times, whether in the past, present or future, while the Theravādins deny any such existence. The former accept the fundamental creeds of Buddhism, *viz.*, *anatta* and *anicca* of all worldly things, and their contention is that the things constituted out of the *dharmas* at a particular time are subject to disintegration but not the *dharmas* themselves, which always exist in their subtlest state. *Vedanā*, for instance, may be *kuśala*, *akuśala* or *avyākr̥ta* at a particular time and place but it exists at all times.¹

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¹ See *Points of Controversy*, Appendix pp 375-7

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The *Kathāvatthu* (I. 6) presents the arguments and counter arguments of the Sarvāstivādins and the Theravādins thus: The Sarvāstivādins maintain that all *dharmas* exist but not always and everywhere and in the same form. In reply to the question whether khandhas which are all different by nature exist uncombined (*ayogam*), they answer in the negative. This, however, gives an opportunity to the Theravādins to show the fallacy that if all exist then both micchādiṭṭhi and sammādiṭṭhi exist together. Then again by equating past and future to present, the Theravādins show that if past and future exist then their existence should be predicated in the same way as of the present,¹ which the S. deny, saying that past and future exist but not exactly in the same way as one would speak of the present.

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¹ This is repeated with each of the khandhas

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The Th. take recourse to the second argument saying that let the ‘present material aggregate’ (paccuppanna-rūpa) be treated as one inseparable object; now, after some time has elapsed, this material aggregate becomes past, i.e., gives up its presentness (paccuppannabhāva) to which the S. agree; then in the same way can it be said that the material aggregate also gives up its materiality (rūpa-bhāva)? The S. deny the latter inference, reasoning thus,—let a piece of white cloth, be regarded as one inseparable object; now, when this cloth is coloured, it gives up its whiteness (like ‘paccuppannabhāva’ in the former case), but does it give up its clothness (like ‘rūpabhāva’ in the former case)? This disarms the opponents. The Th. however follow up this argument of the S. by suddhikanaya (pure logic) saying that if the material aggregate (rūpa) does not give up its materiality (rūpabhāva),² then rūpa becomes permanent, eternally existing like nibbāna—a conclusion not accepted by the S., as according to the latter rūpabhāva is different from nibbānabhāva.

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² Cv rūpakkhandhena saṃgahitattā

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The next question put by the Th. is whether past (atīta) gives up its pastness (atītabhāva)? The S. answer in the negative, but take care to note that when they say that atītabhāva exists they mean that anāgatabhāva (futurity) and paccuppannabhāva (presentness) do not exist like the atītabhāva, and similarly when they predicate existence of anāgatabhāva, they mean atīta- *bhāva* and *paccuppannabhāva* do not exist like *anāgatabhāva*. This general statement is then applied to each of the *khandhas*. The Th. round up the discussion by their usual *suddhikanaya* saying that *atīta* or *atītabhāva* then would be the same as *nibbāna* or *nibbānabhāva* a conclusion rejected by the S. The Th. then take to *vacanasodhana* (clearing up of verbal errors) saying that (i) if the existence of past (*atīta*) and non-past (*nātīta*) as also future (*anāgata*) and non-future (*nānāgata*) is denied then the S. should not say that past and future exist; so also (ii) if they do not accept the identity of *atīta*, *paccuppanna* and *anāgata*,¹ they cannot say that *atīta* and *anāgata* exist.

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¹ By taking recourse to the discussion whether *hutvā hoti hutvā hoti* and *na hutvā na hoti, na hutvā na hoti*, the Th. show logically the untenability of the assertion of the S.

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The next argument of the Th. is that if the S. admit that *paccuppannañāṇa* (present cognition) exists and it has the function of knowing things (*paccuppannam ñāṇam atthi, tena ñāṇena ñāṇakaraṇiyam karoti*) and then why not the *atītañāṇa* and *anāgatañāṇa*, the existence of which is affirmed by the S., should not have the function of knowing things in analogy to that of *paccuppannañāṇa*?² This the Th. consider as illogical and reject the contention of the S. that ‘*atītam ñāṇam atthi*’.

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² In the text, this argument is elaborated by the application of this general statement to each of the sense-organs, (paras 23-28) as also to *hattha, pāda, pabba, kāya, āpo, tejo* and *vāyu* (paras 47-49).

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The Th. now take up the cases of the Arhats, Anāgāmis, etc., and show that according to the S. who state *atīta rāga* exists in an Arhat, that *atīta byāpāda* exists in an Anāgāmi and so forth, an Arhat should be *sarāgo*, an Anāgāmi should be *byāpannacitto* and so on, but this inference is not accepted by the S.

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The last argument resorted to by the Th. is that if the existence of *atīta*, *paccuppanna* and *anāgata* khandhas, dhātus, āyatanas be admitted, then the S. should say that there are (3 × 5 or) 15 khandhas, (3 × 18 or) 54 dhātus, (3 × 12 or) 36 āyatanas which the S. reject saying that they may accept the position that *atīta* or *anāgata* exists from one standpoint and does not exist from aother standpoint (*atthi siyā atītam* or *siyā nātītam* or *nanāgatan ti*). The Th. then bring in their *suddhikanaya* by citing the instance of *nibbāna* and establishes the futility of the assertion of the S. that past and future exist. Both the Th. and S. then quote passages from the Sutta Piṭaka in support of their own contentions, one however remaining unconvinced by the other. From the controversies dealt with above the following may be taken as the opinion of the S.:

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1 The past and future, as usually understood, do not exist, though they are perceptible in the present.¹ In the same sense, the non-past and non-future should also be taken as non-existing.

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¹ E.g. *anāgatam hutvā paccuppannam hoti* but *anāgata* is not identical with *paccuppanna* in the ordinary sense, though in *paccuppanna* there is (the dharma of) *anāgata* so in that sense *paccuppanna* is *anāgata*.

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2 It is the *bhāva* of each of the five khandhas and not the khandhas persist in the past, present and future.

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3 An object (*vastu*) may lose its pastness, presentness, or futurity but not its objectness (*vastutva*) but that objectness is not identical with *nibbāna* or *nibbānabhāva*.

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4 An Arhat e.g., for instance, has *atīta rāga* but he is not therefore to be regarded as ‘*sarāgo*’.²

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² Cf. the views of Śaila schools re. *anusaya*, pp. 92-94

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The S. admit impermanency (*anityatā*) of the constituted things but they contend that the “dharmas” (or *bhāvas*) of the past are transmitted into the present and likewise the "dharmas" of the future are latent in the present. This we may illustrate, by citing the example of a sweet mango—the past mango seed transmits into the present "mangoness" if not the "sweetness" and similarly the "future mango" receives its "mangoness" from the present: the mango seed can never produce any other fruit though there may be a change in the quality and shape and colour of the mango. The S. speak of a being in the same way. According to them a being is composed of five dharmas (not five khandhas), viz., (i) citta (mind), (ii) caitasika (mental states), (iii) rūpa (matter), (iv) visamprayuktasamskāra (states independent of the mind),¹ and (v) asamskṛtas (the unconstituted).² The five dharmas (not elements as usually understood) persist in a

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¹ In Vasumitra this appears also as a separate opinion of the S.: The phenomena jāti, jarā, sthiti, anityatā are cittavisamprayuktas but included in samskāraskandha. One of these four items, viz., jarā is discussed in the Kvu, (VII. 8) in the topic "jarāmaraṇam vipāko ti?" an opinion of the Andhakas, the Kvu, supporting the opposite view that "jarāmaraṇam" is not vipāka.

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² These five are sub-divided into seventy-five thus:—

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being, the present being the resultant of the past, and potential of the future. An adept after becoming a sotāpanna remains so

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(b) *Kuśalamahābhūmika* (10)
(i) śraddhā (vi) alobha
(ii) virya (vii) adveśa
(iii) upekṣā (viii) ahiṃsā
(iv) hrī (ix) praśrabdhi
(v) apatrāpya (x) apramāda

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(c) *Kleśa-mahābhūmika* (6) (d) *Akuśala-mahābhūmika* (2)
(i) moha (i) ahrikatā
(ii) pramāda (ii) anapatrāpya
(iii) kauśidya
(iv) aśraddhya
(v) styāna
(vi) auddhatya

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(e) *Upakleśa-bhūmika* (10) (f) *Aniyata-bhūmika* (8)
(i) krodha (i) kaukṛtya
(ii) mrakṣa (ii) middha
(iii) mātsarya (iii) vitarka
(iv) irṣyā (iv) vicāra
(v) pradāśa (v) rāga
(vi) vihiṃsā (vi) pratigha
(vii) upanāha (vii) māna (viii) māyā (viii) vicikitsā
(ix) śāthya
(x) mada

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IV *Citta viprayukta* (14)
(i) prāpti (viii) jāti
(ii) aprāpti (ix) sthiti
(iii) sabhāgatā (x) jarā
(iv) asaṃjñika (xi) anityatā
(v) asaṃjñi-samāpatti (xii) nāmakāya
(vi) nirodha-samāpatti (xiii) padakāya
(vii) jīvita (xiv) vyañjana kāya

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V *Asaṃskṛta* (3). (i) ākāśa
(ii) pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha
(iii) apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha.

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See Rosenberg, *Die probleme der buddhistischen philosophie* p 128-9. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, *Abhidharma-kośa*, Table III in his following existence proving thereby that his past *dharma* continues and the three *saṃyojanas*¹ remain ineffective. It may be argued by the Th. that the three *saṃyojanas* have altogether disappeared; then the Sarvāstivādins may cite the instance of the Sakadāgamin as a better illustration. A Sakadāgamin reduces *rāga*, *dosa* and *moha* to the minimum, and in his following births that state continues, proving thereby the continuity of past "dharmas". Now we may pass on to the case of Arhats. The Arhats, it will be seen, become completely free from *rāga*, *dosa* and *moha*; according to the Th. they are destroyed for ever but according to the S., these *rāga*, *dosa* and *moha* persist though in an ineffective form and these may reappear and cause an Arhat fall from the Arhathood—a topic discussed in the *Kvu.* (I. 2) and attributed by Buddhaghosa to the S., viz., *Parihāyati arahā arahattā ti*?²

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¹ Viz., *sakkāyadiṭṭhi, sīlabbataparāmāsa, vicikicchā*

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² For its exposition, see ante, p. 84 f.

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In Kārikas 25-27 of the fifth Kośasthāna of the *Abhidharmakośa*,³ there is a detailed exposition of the main thesis of the Sarvāstivādins, viz., *Sarvam asti*: The contention of the S. that the dharmas exist in the past, present and future rests on certain statements found in the Āgamas, one of which is as follows:—

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³ See Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception of Buddhism*, Appendix, pp. 76-91; La Vallée Poussin's Fr. transl. of *Kośa*, V 25-27, Rāhula Sānkrityāyana, *Abhidharmakośa*.

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रूपमनित्यमतीतमतनागतम्। कः पुनर्वादः प्रत्युत्पन्नस्य। एवंदर्शी श्रुतवान् आर्यश्रावकोऽतीते रूपेऽनपेक्षो भवति। अनागतं रूपं नाभिनन्दति। प्रत्युत्पन्नस्य रूपस्य निर्विदे विरागाय निरोधाय प्रतिपन्नो भवति।

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The exposition given in the *Kathāvatthu* speaks of "*bhāvanyathātva*" of Dharmatrāta, see p 145.

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[*Rūpa* (material constituents of a being) whether past or future is impermanent, not to speak of the present. A learned *Śrāvaka*, who realises this, remains unconcerned of past *rūpa*, does not rejoice at his future *rūpa* and exerts to rid his mind of the present *rūpa*].¹

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¹ See *M. Vr.*, p 444; cf. Bhaddekaratta-sutta in *Majjhima*, III, p 187:

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On the authority of this statement taken literally (*kaṇṭhataḥ*) the S. contend that if past *rūpa* do not exist, there is no necessity of instructing an adept to remain unconcerned of the same. In the same way it may be said of the future and the present.²

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² *Kośa-vyākhyā* (Jap. ed.), p. 468: अतीतं चेद्भिक्षो रूपं नाभविष्यत् श्रुतावानार्यश्रावकोऽतीते रूपेऽनपेक्षोऽभविष्यत् । यस्मात्तर्ह्यतीतं रूपम् । तस्माच्छ्रुतवानार्यश्रावकोऽतीते रूपेऽनपेक्षो भवति । अनागतं चेद्रूपं नाभविष्यत् श्रुतावानार्यश्रावकोऽनागतं रूपन्नाभिनन्दिष्यत् । यस्मात्तर्ह्यनागतं रूपम् । तस्माच्छ्रुतवानार्यश्रावकोऽनागतं रूपं नाभिनन्दति । प्रत्युत्पन्नं चेद्भिक्षो रूपं नाभविष्यदिति विस्तरः ।

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The same statement when interpreted (*arthataḥ*) yields a further argument, *viz.*, every *vijñāna* (perception, cognition) requires the combination of two things, the sense-organ and its object. Now, one speaks of *mano-vijñāna* (mental perception, cognition) of past acts or things. This also implies the existence of past acts or objects, otherwise how could there be *mano-vijñāna* of the same. The same argument is applicable to future acts or objects.³

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³ *Ibid.* p. 469: न ह्यं प्रतीत्य मनोविज्ञानं स्यात् । यदतीतानागतालम्बनमिति विशेषः । ततो विज्ञानमेव स्यात् चालम्बमात्वादिति ।

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Then again if there be no past, how can one speak of an effect due to past good or bad deeds. At the moment

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Atītaṃ nānvāgameyya, nappaṭikaṅkhe anāgataṃ
Yad atītaṃ pahīnaṃ taṃ, appattañ ca anāgataṃ
Paccuppannaṃ ca yo dhammaṃ tattha tattha vipassati
Asaṃhīraṃ asaṃkuppaṃ taṃ vidvā manubrūhaye.

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when the effect is produced there is the *vipākabetu*, which is past.¹

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¹ *Kośa-vyākhyā*, (Jap. ed.), p. 469: विद्यमान-लक्षणं सुभाशुभमततीतं कर्म । विपाक्काल उत्पद्यमानफलत्वात् । वर्तमान धर्मवदिति ।

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For the reasons stated above, the S. affirm the existence of past and future *dravyas* only and not of *bhāva*, *lakṣaṇa*, or *avasthā*.

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Among the Sarvāstivādins again, there are four different opinions, which are as follows:—

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(i) *bhāvānyathātva*: Bhadanta Dharmatrāta maintains that the past, present and future are differentiated on account of the non-identity of *bhāva* and not of *dravya* e.g. when a vase of gold is broken and transformed into a figure of gold, colour remaining the same or when milk is transformed into whey, changing the taste, strength and digestibility but not its colour. In the same way when future *dharma* is changed to present, the *anāgata-bhāva* only is abandoned and the *vartamāna-bhāva* is acquired, *dravya* remaining identical; in the same way the change of the present into past may be explained, i.e., when the present *bhāva* is abandoned and the past *bhāva* is acquired, the *dravya* remains identical.

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(ii) *lakṣaṇānyathātva*: Bhadanta Ghoṣaka and others maintain that the *dharmas* in their transition from past to present, and present to future, undergo changes in characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*) only. A *dharma*, when it is past, is associated (*yukta*) with the *lakṣaṇas* of the past, but it is not dissociated (*aviyukta*) from the *lakṣaṇas* of the present and future, so also a future *dharma* is associated (*yukta*) with the *lakṣaṇas* of the future but not dissociated from the *lakṣaṇas* of the present and past; in the same way one can speak of the present. By way of illustration, it may be said that when a man is attached (rakta) to a woman, he is not detached (avirakta) from other women.¹

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¹ *Kośa-vyākhyā* (Jap. ed.), p. 470: तद्यथा पुरुष एकस्यां स्त्रियां रक्तः शेषास्वविरक्त इति। एकस्यां स्त्रियां चस्य रागाध्यवसानं वर्तते। शेषामु स्त्रीषु रागप्राप्ति- रेवास्ति। न समुदाचार इति।

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(iii) *avasthānyathātva*: Bhadanta Vasumitra and others maintain that past, present and future of a *dharma* is indicated by its difference in condition (*avasthā*). If in a certain state (*avasthā*) a *dharma* is not active (*kāritraṃ na karoti*), it is future (*anāgata*), if the *dharma* is active it is present (*vartamāna*) and if the *dharma* has ceased after being active (*kṛtvā niruddhaḥ*), it is past. In short, there is change of states (*avasthāntara*) but not change of objects (*dravyāntara*). A *dharma* is described as past, present and future, in accordance with the state attained by it at a particular moment, and not on account of the differences in characteristics.

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Changes in *dharma* occur also on account of changed conditions (*avasthāntara*) due to change in places (*sthānāntara*), but actually there is no change (*nasvabhāvānyathātva*), e.g., when a cipher is put in the place of ten or hundred or thousand, it carries different values, but it actually remains the same, hence there is *avasthāntara* and not *svabhāvāntara*.

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(iv) *anonyathātva*: Bhadanta Buddhadeva and others maintain that the past, present and future are spoken of relatively² i.e., a *dharma* is described as past, present or future with reference to that which precedes and that which follows. Future is established relatively (*apekṣya*) to past and present; the past relatively to present and future and the present relatively to past and future.¹ The same woman, e.g., is called a daughter and mother, when she is referred to in relation to her mother and daughter respectively. Hence there is actually no change in a *dharma* (*na dravyāntaraḥ*); past, present and future of a *dharma* indicate only its relation to other *dharmas*.

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² This, according to Fa-pao, is the opinion of Saṃghabhadra According to P'ou-koung this opinion is also expressed in the *Vibhāṣā*. Cf. *Kośa-vyākhyā*, p. 470: पूर्वमपरं चापेक्ष्यातीतानागतवर्तमाना उच्यन्ते। पूर्वमपीततं वर्त्तमानं चापेक्ष्यानागत इति। पूर्वं वातीतमतपरं वानागतमपेक्ष्य वर्तमान इति। अपरमेव वर्तमानमनागतं चापेक्ष्यातीत इति। पूर्वापरापेक्षोऽन्यथात्वस्य व्यवहारः।

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¹ See *Kośa-vyākhyā* (Jap ed), p. 470-1.

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Vasubandhu regards the first opinion (*bhāvanyathātva*) as similar to that of the Sāṅkhyan thinkers and takes it as upholding the theory of transformation (*pariṇāmavāda*). The second opinion he criticises as marked by confusion of time (*adhva-saṃkara*) because the characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*) of past, present and future are always present. According to the fourth opinion, he says, all the three past, present and future exist at the same time, so it is wrong. He therefore accepts Vasumitra's opinion (*avasthānyathātva*) and rejects the other three.²

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² Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattva-saṅgraha* has criticised the opinions of all the teachers mentioned above, including that of Vasubandhu.

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II. Maitrī (love) and Karuṇā (compassion)

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The S. in consonance with the Th. regard Buddha as a human being but they attribute to him divine, sometimes superdivine, powers. They look upon the Bodhisattvas as *puthujjanas*, who must destroy the worldly ties like an average adept in order to step into the *samyakatvaniyāma* or *sotāpannahood*

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According to the S. "sentient beings are not objects of *maitrī* and *karuṇā* and so forth on the part of the Buddha," and further "if anyone adheres to the view that there are sentient beings he cannot realize emancipation."

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The former opinion is opposed in the *Kvu.* (XVIII. 32: *Natthi Buddhasa Bhagavato karuṇā ti*) on the ground that the Buddha is described in the texts as ‘kāruṇiko’ and that he sometimes enters into mahākaruṇāsāmāpatti and so he has karuṇā for sentient beings. In the Pāli texts, the practice of four brahmavihāras: maitrī, karuṇā, muditā and upekkhā form an essential part of the Theravāda code of spiritual practice. It is by means of brahmavihāras that an adept is able to look upon all beings as one and the same, in other words, develops samatājñāna.

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As regards the second opinion we may state that the doctrine of anattā teaches that there are actually no individual beings, and that it is avijjā which makes one think of the existence of beings. The S. are only stating the axiomatic truth that in Buddha’s eye, no individual beings exist and as such they cannot be the object of his maitrī and karuṇā.

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There are three other views relating to Buddha’s teachings, which are opposed to those of the Mahāsanghikas¹ and are in consonance with the human conception of Buddha. They are,

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¹ All these views have been discussed before, see ante, pp. 74 f

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(i) The Buddhas cannot expound all doctrines with a single utterance.
(ii) The world-honoured One utters words which are not always in conformity with the truth.
(iii) The sūtras delivered by Buddha have nītārtha² and there are even some anītārtha-sūtras.

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² The word nītārtha means expressions which do not convey the real sense directly as the neyyartha would do. Nītārtha corresponds to sammuti or samurti-satya.

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III. Arhats

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According to the Sarvāstivādins, Vasumitra says,—

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(i) A srotāpanna has no chance of retrogression while an arhat has.

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(ii) All arhats do not gain *anutpāda-jñāna*.
(iii) An arhat is governed by the *pratītyasamutpādaṅga* (members of the causal law).
(iv) Certain arhats perform meritorious deeds.
(v) Arhats are not free from the influence of past karma.
(vi) Arhats gain *naivaśaikṣa-nāśaikṣajñāna*.
(vii) Arhats gain the four fundamental dhyānas: they cannot realse the fruits of dhyāna.

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The first opinion that arhats may have retrogression is the same as that of the Mahāsanghikas and others (discussed above, pp. 64, 85). The S. like the M. postulate the existence of two classes of arhats with different degrees of attainments.¹ According to the S., all arhats are not completely perfect—an opinion not accepted by the Theravādins though the latter have no objection to distinguish arhats as *Sa(=sva)-dhammakusala* and *Paradhammakusala*. It is interesting to find this opinion discussed also in the *Milindapañha*,² where it is said that there are arhats who may not be aware of the name and gotra of any and every person, the various roads and so forth, but there may be some conversant with the *vimuttis*.³

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¹ See *Kośa*, vi. 64: The Ubhayatobhāgavimutta arhats realise nirodhasamāpatti and remove both kleśāvaraṇa (obstacle of passions) and vimokṣāvaraṇa (obstacle to the knowledge of akarmanyatā of nāma and rūpa) while the Prajñāvimukta-arhats are those who remove only kleśāvaraṇa by means of prajñā; see also ante, p. 86. For the six kinds of arhats, see *Kośa*, vi. 56ff

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² *Milindapañha*, p. 267: Avisayo mahārāja ekaccasa arahato sabbam jānitum na hi tassa balam atthi sabbam jānitum Cf. Kvu., II, 2 in ante, p. 86.

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³ The five vimuttis are,—(1) tadaṅgavimutti or vippasaṇāñāṇa attained by removing the misconceptions of nicca, nimitta etc.,

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The second opinion reiterates the first in another form. The S. hold that some and not all arhats gain the *anutpādajñāna* (lit. knowledge of the cessation of rebirth) but all may have *kṣayajñāna* (lit. knowledge of the extinction of all impurities in oneself). The M. assert that only Buddhas and not arhats can have both *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādajñāna*.¹

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¹ See above, p. 78-79.

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Regarding the third opinion, Mr. Masuda on the basis of 'Shu-chi says that of the twelve members of the causal law, four, viz., *nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, *phassa* and *vedanā*—(or, according to another interpretation, only *vedanā*) remain active in the case of arhats, the other members, i.e., *avijjā*, *saṃkhārā*, *taṇhā*, *upādāna*, *bhava*, *jāti*, and *jarā-maraṇa* becoming ineffective. The Chinese interpretation can be accepted, only if "vedanā" is limited to "adukkha-asukha-vedanā" for an arhat is *chalupekkho*² (endowed with indifference in respect of the six indriyas)' i.e. the organs of sense come into contact with the respective objects but produce neither good nor bad feeling.

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² See *Dīgha*, iii, p. 245 *Majjhima*, i, p. 219.

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The fourth opinion speaks of the *puññopacaya* of an Arhat. The Th. and Mahīśāsakas reject it; so also do the Mahāsaṅghikas.³ The Arhats are said to have done all that is to be done (*katakaraṇīya*) and are beyond merit and demerit, good or bad; hence to speak of some of them as collecting merits shows that the S. like the Andhakas do not look upon all arhats as completely perfect.

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³ See ante, p. 88

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The fifth opinion that arhats are subject to the influence of past karma is perhaps based upon some instances found in the

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(2, *vikkhambhanavimutti* or *paccavekkhaṇañāṇa*, (3) *samucchedavimutti* or *maggañāṇa*, (4) *paṭipassaddhivimutti* or *phalañāṇa*, and (5) *nissaraṇavimutti* Piṭakan stories that Arhats like Aṅgulimāla and Mahāmoggallāna suffered pain on account of their past karma.¹

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¹ See Milindapañha, p. 134: Na hi mahārāja sabbantam vedayitam kammamūlakam. See also Kvu., VIII. kammahetu arahā arahattā parihāyatīti?

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In the sixth opinion, the word *naivaśaikṣa-nāśaika* as translated by Mr. Masuda appears to be ambiguous,² and preference should be given to the meaning "nirvāṇa" as assigned to it by the *Mahāvyutpatti*. The sense would then be that according to the S., some and not all arhats attain Nirvāṇa (full emancipation).

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² "For arhants there are things which are no longer to be learnt and things which are still to be learnt." *Asia Major*, p. 49.

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The seventh opinion has not been taken up for discussion in the *Kvu*. The *Kośa* (VIII. 6) tells us that there are eight fundamental dhyānas (*maulasamāpattidravyāṇi*), i.e., four dhyānas and four *ārūpyas* (higher dhyānas). The contention of the S. is that all arhats complete the four dhyānas but all do not necessarily attain the fruits of the four dhyānas,³ which are detailed in the *Kośa* (VIII. 27-28), thus: by the first dhyāna, one obtains *dṛṣṭa-dharma-sukhavihāra*,⁴ by the second *jñāna-darśana*, (or *divya-cakṣurabhijñā*);⁵ by the third *prajñā-prabheda*,⁶ and by the fourth *anāsravatā*.⁷

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³ Digha III. 222, Aṅg., II. 4: Atth' āvuso samadhibhavanā bhāvitā bahulikatā diṭṭhadhammasukhavihārāya saṃvattati ñāṇadassana-paṭilābhāya satisampajaññāya āsavānam khayāya saṃvattati

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⁴ lit. enjoyment of happiness in the present body (Pāli: diṭṭhadhammasukhavihāra).

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⁵ lit. insight into the real state of things i.e. free from any vikalpa (=Pāli: ñāṇadassana).

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⁶ lit. special or detailed knowledge of the things of the world--the corresponding Pāli expression is satisampajañña.

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⁷ lit. purity (Pāli: āsavānam khaya).

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IV. *Samyakatvanyāma* (destined to attain nirvāṇa)

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Vasumitra attributes the following opinions to the Sarvāstivādins:—

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(i) A person can acquire the *samyakatvanyāma* through the meditation of *śūnyatā* and *apraṇihitata*; a person in the *samyakatvanyāma* is called *pratipannaka* up to the fifteenth (or the last) moment of the *darśanamārga*. In the sixteenth moment he is called *phalastha* when he is in *bhāvanāmārga*.

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(ii) A person can acquire the *samyakatvanyāma* and can also gain arhatship independently of the four dhyānas.

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(iii) A being (in Rūpa or Arūpa-dhātu) can gain arhatship but not *samyakatvanyāma*. It is only when he is in Kāmadhātu that he can have *samyakatvanyāma* as also arhathood.

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Allied to the above three, there are two other views attributed to the S., viz.,

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(iv) There are also certain devas who lead a holy life.

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(v) There is no one who is free from passion in the Uttarakuru. No saint is born there or in the *Asaññisattvaloka*.

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The first three views raise the question of *samyakatvanyāma*, i.e., of persons who are destined to attain Nirvāṇa, and have no chance of being diverted from the Aryan path and going to lower states or joining heretical sects. An adept in *samyakatvanyāma* is the same as *sotāpattimaggapaṭipanna*, i.e., one after destroying the three *saṃyojanas* (impurities), viz., *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* (belief in a self), *sīlabbataparāmāsa* (belief in the efficacy of rituals) and *vicikicchā* (lack of faith in the Triratna) is on the way to sotāpattiphala. According to the scheme of the S., an adept remains sotāpattiphala-pratipannaka for the first fifteen moments, i.e., up to the development of mārge anvayajñāna-kṣānti,¹ when he completes the darśanamārga; from the 16th moment he is in bhāvanāmārga and is a srotaāpattiphalastha or srotaāpanna.

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¹ For references see *Kośa*, vi. p. 181 f.n.

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¹ See infra, p. 151.

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The first opinion raises the question whether one can become a srotaāpattiphalapratipannaka by the meditation of śūnyatā (i.e. anattatā) and apraṇihitā i.e. duḥkhatā and anityatā² and not of animittā;³ the answer given by the S. is in the affirmative.

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² Cf. Asia Major, II, p. 40, n. 9.

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³ Mr. Masuda on the basis of Fa-jen states that Dharmagupta held that one cannot attain samyakatvanyāma without animittasamādhi, Asia Major, p. 40, n. 9.

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The second deals with the problem whether samyakatvanyāma followed by arhathood can be attained without the practice of the four dhyānas, the S. asserting that it is possible to attain arhathood by means of certain practices other than the usual four dhyānas, e.g. by means of satipaṭṭhāna or brahmavihāra and so forth.

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The third is concerned with the problem whether gods in the Rūpa or Arūpadhātu can gain samyakatvanyāma as also arhathood. The S. hold that they can attain the latter but not the former which can only be attained by a being while in the Kāmadhātu. This problem is discussed in the Kvu. (I. 3): N'atthi devesu brahmacariyāvāso ti?—an opinion held by the Sammitīyas. The opinion of the S. is upheld by the Th. In the Kvu. it is contended that "brahmacariyāvāso" does not mean merely "pabbajjā" (ordination), "muṇḍiyam" (shavenheadedness) and so forth as held by the Sammitīyas, but includes “maggabhāvanā.” The Th. and the S. hold that the Anāgāmis do not come to the Kāmadhātu but they remain in Rūpa or Arūpadhātu and by maggabhāvanā there, they become Arhats, without becoming a samyakatvanyāma.

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The fourth opinion of the S. is that the gods except the Asaññisattas can have maggabhāvanā, though not pabbajjā, muṇḍiyam, etc.

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The fifth opinion is based on a passage of the Aṅg. Nik. (iv. 396) and cited in the Kvu. (I. 3, p. 99) in which it is said that the inhabitants of Jambudīpa surpass those of Uttarakuru and Tāvatiṃsa heaven in courage, mindfulness and in religious life (brahmacariyāvāsa);¹ from this it has been inferred that there cannot be any saint in Uttarakuru.² It has been mentioned above that the S. as well as the Th. exclude the Asaññisattas from the gods who follow a religious life, and so, among the Asaññisattas also there cannot be any saint.³

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¹ Points of Controversy, p. 73

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² The S. are making an anomaly in drawing the inferences. If Uttarakuru cannot have any saint how the Tāvatiṃsa can have any?

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³ Mr. Masuda points out (in the fn. Asia Major, p. 46) that Uttarakuru is regarded as a land of pure happiness and the Asaññisattas as the highest devaloka with long life and happiness; hence the beings of these two abodes need not take to religious life.

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V. Anupubbābhisamaya (gradual realisation of the truth)

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Vasumitra attributes the following views to the Sarvāstivādins:—

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(i) The four truths are to be meditated upon gradually.
(ii) The catur-śrāmaṇyaphala are not necessarily attained gradually.

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(iii) If one is in *samyakatvanyāma*, he can attain (at once) the fruits of *sakṛdāgāmi* and *anāgāmi* on account of (the completion of) the *laukikamārga*.

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An adept, according to the S., develop insight into the four truths in a gradual order¹ in 15 moments thus:—

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¹ Cf. *Kośa*. VI. 2: सत्य-युक्तानि चलारि दुः खसद्यस्तथा । निरोधो मार्गेः एतेषां यथाभिसमयं क्रमः ॥

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*Darśana-mārga*:—

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(i) Duḥkhe (or five skandhas, i.e. nāma-rūpe) *dharmajñāna-kṣānti*² } confined to Kāmadhātu.

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² Kṣānti means "faith (kṣamate = rocate. *Kośa* VI 18). An adept at the first moment thinks that he has realised (though actually he has not realised) the fact that the things of the Kāmadhātu i.e. the skandhas are undesirable. It is in the second moment that he realises that the skandhas are undesirable. He acquires now *dharmajñāna*.

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(ii) Duḥkhe *dharmajñāna*

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(iii) duḥkhe *anvayajñāna-kṣānti*³ } extended to Rūpa and Arūpadhātus.

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³ After the realisation of the actual state of skandhas of the Kāmadhātu, the adept extends his inner vision to the skandhas of Rūpa and Arūpa-dhātus to realise in the next two moments that skandhas of the higher worlds are also undesirable and hence existence in any of the worlds is to be avoided. In the same way, the other three truths are to be understood.

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(iv) Duḥkhe *anvayajñāna*

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*Srotaāpatti-pratipannaka-darśanamārga*:—

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(v) Samudaye (sāsravadharmānām hetu i.e., karmakleśe) *dharmajñāna-kṣānti* } confined to Kāmadhātu.

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(vi) Samudaye *dharmajñāna*

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(vii) ,, *anvayajñāna-kṣānti* } extended to Rūpa and Arūpadhātus.

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(viii) ,, *anvayajñāna*

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(ix) Nirodhe (pratisamkhyā-nirodha or karmakleśa-kṣaye) *dharmajñāna-kṣānti*. } confined to Kāmadhātu

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(x) Nirodhe *dharmajñāna* (xi) Nirodhe anvayajñānakṣānti
(xii) ,, anvayajñāna (xiii) Mārge (śaikṣā aśaikṣā dharmā or samatha-vipaśyanāyām) dharmajñānakṣānti
(xiv) Mārge dharmajñāna
(xv) Mārge anvayajñānakṣānti Srotaāpatti-pratipannaka-darśanamārga:—
(xvi) Mārge anvayajñāna¹

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¹ Cf. Vibhanga pp. 235, 315, 329

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} extended to Rupa and Arūpadhātus.

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} confined to Kāmadhātu

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} extended to Rūpa and Arūpadhātus.

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From the above table it is evident how the S. mark the gradual stages of the development of insight into the four truths. In the Kvu. the controversies: Anupubbābhisamayo ti? (II. 9) and Odhisodhiso kilese jahātīti? (I. 4) and also Vimuttam vimuccamānan ti? (III. 4), support the view of the S. about the gradual realisation of the truths. The problem discussed is whether an adept realises the four sāmaññaphalas including vimutti gradually or not? The Th. contend that there is no bar to the realisation of all the phalas at one and the same time. The S. subscribe to this view as will be apparent from the second opinion of the S. quoted above, except that they do not include the fourth phala, viz., arbathood or vimutti.² Buddhaghosa should have pointed out this discrepancy as far as the S. are concerned. According to him, the opinion that the realisation of the phalas happens gradually is held by the Sammitīyas.

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² There may be ascetics who obtain the four fruits gradually (anupūrvena catuhphalaprāpti). Kośa, vi. 45.

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In the third point, it is stated that according to the S., those adepts only who have completed the laukikamārga³ attain the second and third phalas at one and the same time. The Th. hold that *bhāvanāmārga* which commences from the *srotaāpattiphala* stage is *lokottara* and cannot be *laukika*; the S., however, contend that it may be either *laukika* or *lokottara*. A topic allied to this is discussed in the *Kvu.* (I. 5), which will be dealt with hereafter.

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³ Kośa, vi. 45: The bhāvanā-mārga is of two kinds: laukika or sāsrava and lokottara or anāsrava.

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VI. *Puthujjana, Laukikamārga or Laukikāgradharma* The S., as pointed out by Vasumitra, hold—

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(i) An average man is able to destroy *rāga* and *pratigha* in the *Kāmadhātu*.

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(ii) A *puthujjana* can die in a good state of mind.

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(iii) There is *laukikasamyagdṛṣṭi* and *laukikīśraddhendriya*.

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(iv) The *laukikāgradharma* is a stage lasting but one moment (*eka-kṣaṇikacitta*).

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In the Buddhist texts a *puthujjana* (an average man), whether a householder or a recluse, who has not yet destroyed the three *saṃyojanas* viz. *sakkāyadiṭṭhi, vicikicchā* and *sīlabbata-parāmāsa*¹ in order to become a *sotāpanna*, can hardly be expected to destroy *rāga, dosa, moha* which impurities are normally removed when an adept reaches the *anāgāmī* stage. The S. hold that a *puthujjana* is able to remove from his mind *rāga* and *pratigha* which is the same as *dosa* or *vyāpāda*. The Th. discuss this view in the *Kvu.* in these words: *Jahati puthujjano kāmarāgabyāpādan ti*? (I. 5) concluding that a *puthujjana* cannot completely eradicate from his mind *rāga* (attachment) and *byāpāda* (hatred), gross and subtle. In course of this discussion, the Th. raise the other question: *Puthujjano kāmesu vītarāgo saha dhammābhisamayā anāgāmiphale saṇṭhātī ti*? (*Kvu.* I. 5, p. 112), i.e. whether an average man who is free from *kāma* attains with the realization of the truth the anāgāmi stage or not? The S., as we have seen above, answer the question in the affirmative, but they do not think that such a puthujjana can attain arhathood, but he can attain all the other three phalas at one and the same time. In other words, the contention of the S. is that a puthujjana’s attainments through laukikamārga may be of so high an order that the moment the truth flashes in his mind he becomes an anāgāmi, when he completes all the necessary conditions for anāgāmihood, including those of the lower two phalas.¹

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¹ See above, p. 152

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¹ See Kvu. pp. 113-4.

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The second opinion that an average man dies with a kusala-citta is based on many instances of upāsakas dying with a good mental state. The Th. also subscribe to this view, and hence there is no discussion in the Kvu.

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The third opinion is the same as that of the Th. and is opposed to that of the Śaila Schools (see ante, p. 97).

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The fourth opinion is not touched in the Kvu. but has been dealt with fully in the Kośa (VI. 19) thus:—

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कामासदुः खविषयाऽधिमाता एकक्षणा तु सा । तथाप्राः etc.

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If the conviction (kṣānti) concerning duḥkha (= skandhas) of the Kāmadhātu be the strongest, it lasts only for a moment; so also are the agradharmas, i.e., laukikāgradharmas,² which though sāsrava (impure) are the highest of the worldly dharmas and lead one to the darśana-mārga (way to the realisation of truths).

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² Cf Sūtrālaṅkāra, xiv 23. laukikāgradharmāvasthā = ānantarya-samādhi. Kośa, vi. p. 166, n agradharma = dharma-smṛtyupasthāna

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The point is that a puthujjana, according to the S., may attain spiritual progress up to the anāgāmi stage by taking to satipaṭṭhāna and such other practices which are laukika so long as they are practised by one who is not yet in one of the maggas and phalas.

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VII. Anuśaya and Paryavasthāna

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The S. are of opinion that:—

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(i) All the *anuśayas* are *caitasika*; they are *cittasampra-yukta* and are also objects of thought (*ālambana*).

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(ii) All the *anuśayas* can be included in the *paryavas-thānas* but all *paryavasthānas* are not *anuśayas*.

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The above two opinions are diametrically opposed to those of the Mahāsaṅghikas, and in full agreement with those of the Th. The topics are dealt with in the *Kvu.* fully (see ante, p. 94f.), in which it is shown that *anuśayas* are not without *ārammaṇa*; they are not *avyākata* (neither good nor bad); they are the same as the *paryavasthānas* (= *pariyuṭṭhānas*) which again are not *cittavippa-yutta*. The S. distinguish the *anuśayas* from *paryavasthānas*, saying all *paryavasthānas* are not *anuśayas* while the *vice versa* is true.

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VIII. Meditation

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The Sarvāstivādins hold that

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(i) In the state of *samāhita* one can utter words.

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(ii) No man ever dies in the state of *samāhita*.

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(iii) It may be said that four *smṛtyupasthānas* can include all the *dharmas*.

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(iv) All the *dhyānas* are included in the *smṛtyupasthānas*.

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(v) There are four *lokottara-dhyānas*.

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(vi) The *bodhyaṅgas* are acquired in seven *samāpattis* and not in others.

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The first opinion is in agreement with that of Śaila schools, and as such has been refuted by the Th. in the *Kvu.* (see ante, pp. 97-98).

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The second is opposed by the Rājagirikas and the Th. and as such is discussed in the *Kvu.* (XV. 9): *Saññāvedayita-* nirodham samāpanno kālam kareyyā ti? The Th. contend that a meditator while in the saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti cannot have any death-like (maraṇantiko) contact, feeling, perception, etc. or is not affected by poison, weapon-stroke or fire; hence to speak of him as dying while in meditation is wrong. The opponents contend that there is no such law (niyāma) that a meditator while in saññāvedayitanirodha will not die.

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The third topic is discussed in the Kvu. (I. 9): sabbe dhammā satipaṭṭhānan ti?—an opinion attributed by Buddhaghosa to the Andhakas The interpretation of Buddhaghosa is that the opponents meant by satipaṭṭhāna the objects which form the basis of sati (satiyā paṭṭhāna, satigocara, satiyā patiṭṭhāna).¹ In this sense the second opinion may be explained as that the satipaṭṭhānas include all forms of meditation, i.e., an adept practising satipaṭṭhāna needs not have recourse to other meditational practices. The S. may well point to the well-known statement found in many places of the Nikāyas (vide Majjhima, I, pp. 55-6), that there is only one way to the attainment of purity and that is the practice of satipaṭṭhāna (ekāyano ayaṃ maggo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā . . . . . yadidam cattāro satipaṭṭhānā).²

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¹ Kośa, vi. 14: Le smṛtyupasthāna est triple. smṛtyupasthāna en soi (svabhāva), par connexion (saṃsarga), en qualité d'object (ālambanasmṛtyupasthāna).

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² Cf Kośa vi p. 158. n. 1: एकायनोऽयं भिक्षवो मार्गो यदत स्मृत्युपस्था-नानि । केवलोऽयं कुशलराशिः यदत चत्वारि स्मृत्युपस्थानानि ।

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The fourth opinion needs hardly any comment. It refers to the first four dhyānas when they are practised by adepts who are in one of the maggas and phalas. The dhyāna of a maggaṭṭha or phalaṭṭha is regarded as lokottara (supramundane).

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The fifth opinion evidently refers to the contention discussed in the Kośa (VIII. 6) that of the eight dhyānas or samāpattis, the first seven are capable of elevating the mind of the adept to the purest state but not the eighth in which *saṃjñā* is in the feeblest form and as such the meditation of *naivasamjñā-nāsamjñāyatana* is ineffective. Consequently the attainment of the *bodhyaṅgas* takes place while the adept rises from one *dhyāna* to the next up till the seventh leaving nothing for the eighth.

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IX. Vijñāna

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The S. assert, as stated by Vasumitra, that
(i) The five sense-perceptions (*pañcavijñānakāyas*) conduce to attachment (*sarāga*) and not to detachment (*virāga*), because these only perceive the characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*) of objects and have no independent thinking faculty of their own.

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If the reason adduced by the S. that the *vijñānakāyas* by themselves cannot produce *virāga*, how can they induce *sarāga*? Hence, the reasoning of the Sarvāstivādins is not quite clear, and it would be better to accept what the *Kvu.* says on the point (see ante, p. 99-100).

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X. Avyākṛta, Asamskṛta, and Antarābhava

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The following opinions are attributed to the Sarvāstivādins:—
(i) There are indeterminable problems (*avyākṛtadharmas*).
(ii) The law of causality (*pratītyasamutpādāṅikatva*) is undoubtedly constituted (*samskṛta*).
(iii) The *samskṛtavastus* are of three kinds; the *asamskṛtavastus* are also of three kinds.
(iv) Only in Kāma- and Rūpa-dhātus there is an intermediate state of existence (*antarābhava*).

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The first two opinions are opposed to those of the Mahāsāṅghikas and agree with those of the Th. (discussed above, pp. 101-2).

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The third also is not accepted by the Mahāsanghikas and agreed to by the Th. (see ante, pp. 101-2). The difference between the Th. and the S. lies in the fact that the latter makes the modification in accordance with their doctrine "sabbam atthi" discussed before (pp. 137 f.), according to which, the constituted things (saṃskṛtavastu) should be classified as three, viz., those of the past, those of the present and those of the future (see Masuda, p. 40, n. 2).

Linked texts (13)

Devadūtasutta — Pāli
Kathāvatthu — Moggaliputta Tissa, Pāli
Vibhaṅga — Pāli
Milindapañha — Pāli
Tattvasaṃgraha — Śāntarakṣita, Sanskrit
ཆོས་མངོན་པའི་མཛོད་ཀྱི་བཤད་པ — Classical Tibetan
Abhidharmakośa — Vasubandhu, Sanskrit
Mahāvyutpatti — Sanskrit
Bhaddekarattasutta — Pāli
Dīghanikāya — Pāli
Majjhimanikāya — Pāli
Aṅguttaranikāya — Pāli
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra — Maitreyanātha & Asaṅga, Sanskrit