Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c36.54

v2.c36.54

The first question put by the Theravādins to the Vātsīputrīyas, known in the Pāli texts as Sammitīyas, is as follows: Can the *puggala* be known in the same way as *that which is real and ultimate*, e.g. *Nibbāna* (or *Rūpa*) is known? (para 1).¹ In other words, the Theravādins want to ascertain whether the Sammitīyas (henceforth abbreviated as Sam.) admit the existence of the *puggala* either as the unchangeable, ever-existing reality like *Nibbāna*, or as a constituted (*sappaccaya-saṃkhata*) object like *rūpa*, or regard it as false as a mirage (*māyāmarīci viya*), or look upon it simply as a hearsay. The Sam. deny practically all the four possibilities though they assert that the *puggala* is known as a real and ultimate fact (*saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena*).