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Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c36: Chapter X: The Vātsīputrīya-Sāṃmitīyas, Dharmottarīyas and other Schools

Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c36

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Chapter X: The Vātsīputrīya-Sāṃmitīyas, Dharmottarīyas and other Schools

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This group of schools comprised mainly the Vajjiputtakas or Vātsīputrīyas, Dhammuttarīyas, Bhadrayānikas, Channagarikas and Sammatīyas. Of these the Vātsīputrīyas, later on known as Vātsīputrīya-Sāṃmitīyas,¹ became the most prominent school of this group. The monks adhering to these schools were probably those Vajjiputtakas who submitted to the decisions of the Second Council and gave up their heresies as distinguished from those who preferred to remain apart and form a distinct Saṅgha of their own.² We do not hear much about this school in the early history of Buddhism excepting a few criticisms of its radical doctrine of the temporary existence of a self (prajñapti-sat-pudgala) apart from the five skandhas. This school became popular and most widespread during the reign of Harṣavardhana (606-647 A.D.) and it is said that the king's sister Rājyaśrī joined the school as a bhikṣuṇī. The Chinese travellers also testify to its wide popularity in India. The earliest evidence to the existence of this school is furnished by a Gupta inscription discovered at Sārnāth,³ which states that this school ousted the Sarvāstivādins about 300 A.D., who had established themselves there after supplanting the Theravādins. This inscription is interesting from more than one point of view. It shows that Sarnāth was a centre of the Theravāda group, the earliest popular school,¹ which gradually yielded its place to the next popular school, Sarvāstivāda. Though Sarvāstivāda retained its popularity and influence all over Northern India it had, at least at Sarnāth, given place to the Sāmmitīyas.

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¹ ERE., XI, p. 168; Kośa-vyākhyā, IX, 3 (Jap. ed.), p. 699: Vātsīputrīya Āryasammatiyah.

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² See Infra.

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³ EI., VIII, p. 172; Sahni, Catalogue of the Museum at Sarnath, p. 30.

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¹ See Infra

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The Sāmmitīyas ascribed the origin of their school to Mahākaccāyana, the famous monk of Avanti. This established their close connection not only with the Pāli school but also with Avanti, for which their alternative name is given in some sources as Avantaka.² Their robes had 21 to 25 fringes and their badge was Sorcika flower like those of the Theravādins.³

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² According to Vinitadeva, the Sāmmitīyas were sub-divided into three sects, Kuru-Kullakas, Avantakas and Vātsiputriyas See Buston, II, p. 99.

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³ Buston, II, p. 100.

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Yuan Chwang writes that he carried to China 15 treatises of this school⁴ while I-tsing speaks of its separate Vinaya text.⁵ The latter tells us further that this Vinaya had rules regulating the use of undergarment, girdle, medicines, and beds for the members of the sect in a way peculiar to itself. The only treatise that is expressly mentioned as belonging to this school in Nanjio's Catalogue and extant in Chinese translation is the Sāmmitīya-śāstra or Sāmmitīyanikāyaśāstra containing the tenets of this sect. Most of the passages cited in the Kathāvatthu as giving the views of the Sāmmitīya school are traced in the Pāli Piṭaka. It is very likely that the Sutta-piṭaka of the Sāmmitīyas was substantially the same as that in Pāli.

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⁴ Watters' Yuan Chwang, I, pp. 20, 21

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⁵ Takakusu, I-tsing, pp. 7, 66, 140.

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Kapila and Uluka believe in the existence of a permanent soul, which according to them, is different from the constituents of a being and is not a term indicating the flux of elements¹ (*skandha-santāna*). The soul, the Buddhists assert, can neither be established by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) nor by inference (*anumāna*).

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¹ *Vyākhyā* (Jap ed.), p. 697 quotes this *stotra*:

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Vasubandhu (henceforth abbreviated as V.) first defines the contention of the Vātsīputrīyas (henceforth abbreviated as Vā) thus: Is the pudgala of the Vā. real (*dravya*) or nominal (*prajñapti*)? By real (*dravya*) existence he means existence like that of *rūpa* and such other elements and by nominal (*prajñapti*) he means existence like that of milk, house or army, which has no separate existence of its own apart from its constituents.

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If the soul of the Vā. be of the former category (*dravya*), it would be different from the *skandhas* as *vedanā* is from *rūpa*, and is not also all the *skandhas* taken together. Now, in that case it should be either *saṃskṛta* (constituted), or *asaṃskṛta* (unconstituted). It cannot be the latter, for it would make the Vā. hold the *Śāśvata* view, which is heretical.

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If the soul of the Vā. be of the latter category (*prajñapti*), its existence is dependent on the *skandhas* and so cannot have any independent existence of its own, i.e. it does not exist (*pudgala iti prajñaptir asat-pudgalaḥ prāpnoti*).

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The Vā. contend that their Soul is real (*dravya*) but it is neither identical with, nor different from, the *skandhas* as fire is to fuel. Fire exists as long as the fuel lasts, so also soul

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मादृशारे मनसि न क्षमं याति जन्मबन्धो
मादृशस्यति हृदयदाहहरो च सत्यम् ।
अन्यः आत्मा जगति च यतो नास्ति नैरात्म्यवादी
नान्यस्मादप्रमविभेस्वन्तादस्ति मार्गः ॥

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(pudgala) exists as long as there are skandhas otherwise pudgala would be either asaṃskṛta (unconstituted), śāśvata (eternal) or saṃskṛta (constituted), aśāśvata (=uccheda—annihilating).¹ Fire is different from fuel inasmuch as it has the power of burning an object to ashes or producing light, which the fuel does not possess.

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¹ Cf. the quotation in the Kvu p 34 — Khandhesu bhijjamānesu so ce bhijjati puggalo Ucchedā bhavatī diṭṭhi yā Buddhena vivajjitā Khandhesu bhijjamānesu no ce bhijjati puggalo Puggalo sassato hoti nibbānena samasamo.

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Vasubandhu argues that fuel and fire appear at different times (bhinnakāla) like seed and sprout. Hence fire is impermanent, and the difference between fuel and fire is one of time and characteristics (lakṣaṇa), and again one is the cause of the other.

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He then states that according to the Vā., fuel is constituted of three mahābhūtas while fire is of the fourth (tejas) only, then it follows that fire is different from fuel.

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The Vā. reply that fire and fuel are co-existent and the latter is a support of the former (upādāya; āśritya), and that one is not wholly different from the other, for fuel is not totally devoid of the fiery element; in the same way pudgala should be distinguished from skandhas. Vasubandhu challenges the Vā. by citing the instance of a burning log of wood and saying that it represents both fuel and fire and hence they are identical (ananya).

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According to the Vā., pudgala is neither to be described as anitya, which is sub-divided into past, present and future nor nitya, eternal. It is avaktavya, indeterminable, inexplicable. It is not included in the list of constituents of a being but is perceived when only all the constituents are present.²

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² Ibid., p. 700: स्वमतः सहमत्वं प्रतिज्ञायते वात्सीपुत्रीयैः ॥

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Cf. the quotation in the Kvu p 34 —
Khandhesu bhijjamānesu so ce bhijjati puggalo
Ucchedā bhavatī diṭṭhi yā Buddhena vivajjitā
Khandhesu bhijjamānesu no ce bhijjati puggalo
Puggalo sassato hoti nibbānena samasamo.

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The question next raised is, can the pudgala of the Vā. be cognized by any sense-organ (indriya), if so, by which? The Vā. reply that it is perceived by all the six sense-organs. They contend that eyes do not care to see rūpa (object) or recognise it unless mind (mana indriya) is there. Eyes act as the dominating factor when the visual action takes place, hence it is not correct to say that eyes alone see rūpa, or for the matter of that, each of the five sense-organs cannot function in their respective spheres independent of the mind.¹ For cognition of pudgala, the Vā. state that all the sense-organs point out to the mind indirectly that there is a pudgala; eyes, e.g., discern the rūpa (colour-figure) of a body and thereby induces the mind to cognize the presence of an individual (pudgala), but that pudgala is neither identical with, nor different from, rūpa.² V. argues that if rūpa be the cause of cognition of pudgala (रूपाणां कारणत्वमधिक्रियते) one should not say that rūpa and pudgala are different (anyam),³ again, if cognition of rūpa leads at once to the cognition of pudgala (रूपायुपादाय पुद्लोपलब्धिरिति) one should also say that rūpa and pudgala are identical (ananyas)⁴ in other words, one is only a modification of the other ( रूपान्तरवत ). The Vā., however, would neither identify rūpa (colour-figure) with pudgala nor treat them as different; in the same way they would neither regard the perception of *rūpa* (colour-figure) as identical with the perception of *pudgala* nor look upon them as different.

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¹ See above, p. 101; also Masuda, p. 23 n.

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² चक्षुर्विज्ञयानि रूपाणि प्रतौत्य पुद्गलं प्रतिविभावयतीत्युपलभ्यति तदुपादानत्वात् । नो तु वक्षव्यो रूपाणि वा नो वेत्येतच्चक्षुत्वादवक्तव्यः । See Kośa (Fr. transl.) ix, p. 238 fn.

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³ Just as light, eyes and mind which cause a visualisation of an object are not different from the object यदि तावद्रूपाणि पुद्लोपलब्धेः कारणं भवन्ति न च तैभ्योऽन्यो वक्तव्यः एवं तर्हि रूपम्यालोकचक्षुरमनसिकारिभ्योऽन्यं न वक्तव्यम् Ibid., p. 238 n. See Vyākhyā, p. 701.

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⁴ अथ रूपाप्युपलभमानः पुद्गलमुपलभते किं तयैवोपलभ्योपलभते आहोस्वितदन्यया । यदि तयैव रूपाद्भिन्नस्वभावः पुद्गलः प्राप्नोति रूप एव वा तत्प्रसङ्गः । इदं रूपमयं पुद्गलः कथमिवं परिच्छिद्यते । Ibid., p. 239 n. See Vyākhyā, pp. 701-2.

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V. asserts that if *pudgala* be an entity, it should be either material (*rūpa*) or non-material (*nāma*), but Buddha says *rūpa* or *vedanā* or *saṃjñā* or *saṃsārā* or *vijñāna* is not self—all *dharmas* are without self—there is no *pudgala*. He further states that *sattva*, *jīva*, or *pudgala* is a *prajñapti* (designation) applied to the false notion of a self cherished by the unenlightened.

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The Vā. in reply state that they were not prepared to accept the statements attributed to Buddha as authentic¹ as these were not to be found in their Piṭaka. They referred to statements, in which Buddha spoke of a person's past existence or recognised *pubbenivāsañāṇa*² as one of the higher acquisitions of an adept, and asked, who is it that remembers? Is it *pudgala* or the *skandhas*? They further argue that if Buddha be regarded as omniscient, i.e. he knows everything past or present, of every place, of every being etc. it also implies a continuity of something, in other words, it implies the existence of a *pudgala*. The Vā. further state that unless there were some form of *pudgala* why the disciples should be instructed to avoid thinking of *rūpavān ahaṃ babhūvātīte 'dhvani* (in the past I possessed a body) and so forth.³

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¹ Cf. Vyākhyā, मूलसंगतिसंशात् ।

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² Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 22: so evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgane...pubbenivāsānussaratiñāṇāya cittaṃ abhininnāmeti.

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³ Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 8: ahosin nu kho ahaṃ atītaṃ addhānaṃ, ......kiṃ hutvā kiṃ ahosiṃ nu kho atītaṃ addhānaṃ, etc. etc.

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V. refutes this contention by saying that *pudgala* here refers only to *skandha-santāna* (continuity of skandhas) and not to anything else. The Vā. then cite the *Bhārahārasūtra*, and assert that by *bhāra* is meant the constituents (*skandhas*) of a being and by *bhārahāra* the individual (*pudgala*) who is known by a name, gotra etc.¹ If *bhāra* (=*skandhas*) included *bhāra hāra* (=*pudgala*), there was no need of distinguishing the two and so *pudgala* exists apart from *skandhas*, it is neither identical with nor different from *skandhas*.

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¹ Cf. *Vyākhyā* (Jap. ed.), p. 706, *bhāraḥ katamaḥ pañcopādānaskandhāḥ. ......bhārahāraḥ katamaḥ. pudgala iti syād vacanīyam yo 'śav āyuṣman evamnāmā evamjātīya evamgotra* etc.

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The Vā. admit the existence of *aupapāduka* beings and *antarābhava*,² and prove thereby the existence of *pudgala*. They also cite the passage "*ekapuggalo bhikkhave loke uppajjamāno uppajjati bahujanahitāya*" (*Aṅguttara*, i. 22) and lay stress on the word "puggala", saying this "puggala" is born (*uppajjati*) and hence there is besides the *skandhas* something, which may be designated as "puggala". V. refutes all these by appropriate quotations and arguments.

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² Cf. *Kośa*, iii. 10, 12, 18-19, quoting *सप्तस्य रूपगतिमत*।

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The Vā. further state that if the *pudgala* is only a word meant to designate the five *skandhas*, then why Bhagavā did not identify *jīva* with *śarīra*. V. cites the discussion on the topic from the *Milindapañha*. The Vā. further argue that why *pudgala* has been declared by Buddha as indeterminable (*avyākṛta*), well, if it does not exist, then why Bhagavā did not declare that *jīva* does not exist absolutely. V. in reply comments on the *Vatsagotra sūtra* and other *sūtras* dealing with the indeterminable problems.

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The Vā. point out that the statement *ātmā* does not exist in reality (*satyataḥ sthititaḥ*)³ is a wrong view, it indirectly implies the admission of the existence of *pudgala*.

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³ Cf. *Majjhima*, i. p. 8: *Atthi me attā ti vā 'ssa saccato thetato*

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The Vā. next raise the question, if pudgala does not exist, who it is that transmigrates from one existence to another. If the elements only exist, how do you explain when Buddha says "I was at that time the master Sunetro and in that statement why 'I' of the past is identified with 'I' of the present; does it indicate that the elements of the past are the elements of the present?" V. refuted it by saying that just as fire passes from one wood to another, the fire never remaining the same, so the elements pass from one existence to another, nothing remaining identical. If, according to the Vā., Buddhas admit the existence of pudgala they would be subject to the wrong belief of *satkāyadṛṣṭi*.

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The Vā. now ask, how can memory be explained without the conception of 'pudgala'. Who is it that remembers; V. answers that it is *saṃjñā* that remembers—*saṃjñā* with attention directed to the object, an idea etc. similar to, or connected with it, provided there is no corporeal pain to impair its capacity.³

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³ *Ibid*., p. 710: तदाभोगसहस्र-सम्बन्धि-संज्ञादिमाश्रितविशेषः। "आदि" ग्रहणेन प्रविधानिबन्ध्यासादिग्रहम्। आश्रयविशेष्य श्रोकतश्च व्याधिपतसादिरेशमिति आश्रयविशेष्य श्रोकत्वाच्चादीनि। तैरनुपहतप्रभावश्चित्तविशेषः।

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The Vā. are of opinion that there must be an agent, a doer, a proprietor of the memory. There must be a cognizing agent, an action must have a doer. 'Devadatta walks' implies the exis-

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diṭṭhi uppajjati, natthi me attā ti vā 'ssa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati, etc.

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¹ *Sunetro nāma śāste ti*. Saptasūryodayasūtre yam eva Bhagavān ṛṣiḥ Sunetra nāma babhūveti. See *Kośa* (transl.), V, p. 271; *Kośavyākhyā*, p. 710.

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² *Kośavyākhyā*, p. 710: यथा तु चषिकोऽगिरिति विस्तरः। स च देशान्तरो- स्वतिसंतत्या संचरतीत्युच्यते। तथा सत्त्वाख्यस्कन्धसमुदायस्योपादानः।

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tence of an individuality. V. replies that it is not so. He states that just as when a fire traverses from one forest to another, no question of individuality arises, similarly Devadatta is a *prajñapti* (like fire) applied to a conglomeration of elements passing from one existence to another and has no individuality.

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Now, we shall pass on to the arguments of the Vā. and the counter-arguments of the Theravādins as presented in the *Kathāvatthu*, which being of a much earlier date than that of the *Kośa*, follows a form of controversy, quite different from that of the medieval and modern dialecticians.

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The first question put by the Theravādins to the Vātsīputrīyas, known in the Pāli texts as Sammitīyas, is as follows: Can the *puggala* be known in the same way as *that which is real and ultimate*, e.g. *Nibbāna* (or *Rūpa*) is known? (para 1).¹ In other words, the Theravādins want to ascertain whether the Sammitīyas (henceforth abbreviated as Sam.) admit the existence of the *puggala* either as the unchangeable, ever-existing reality like *Nibbāna*, or as a constituted (*sappaccaya-saṃkhata*) object like *rūpa*, or regard it as false as a mirage (*māyāmarīci viya*), or look upon it simply as a hearsay. The Sam. deny practically all the four possibilities though they assert that the *puggala* is known as a real and ultimate fact (*saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena*).

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¹ “Para” refers to the paragraphs marked in the P.T.S edition of the *Kathāvatthu*.

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The Sam. now assail the Th. with the counter-question whether the latter would admit that the *puggala* is *not* known in the same way as *that which is real and ultimate*. The Th. answered in the affirmative as according to them *puggala* is not even an object like *rūpa*; it is a mere *paññatti* (conventional term), a *sammutisacca* (so-called truth).

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But when the same question is repeated by the Sam. (as in paras 2 and 6),¹ the Th. reply in the negative by saying "na h' evam",² because the answer is to be given to a question which included both *sammutisacca* (conventional truth) and *paramatthasacca* (the highest truth). The questions and answers which follow next have mixture of both *sammuti* and *paramattha* truths, and so they appear contradictory to a superficial reader.

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¹ The remaining paras 3-5 and 7-10 are mere logical rounding up of the questions and answers put in paras 1 & 2.

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² The question is,—Yo saccikattho paramattho tato so puggalo n'upalabbhati saccikattha-parametthanāti ti?

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Now the Th. give up the logical tricks and put the question straight (para 11) thus: whether *puggala* is a *paramattha-sacca*,³ or not, *i.e.* whether or not the *puggala* is known in the same way as the real and ultimate everywhere (*sabbattha*) in and outside *rūpa* (material parts of the body), always (*sabbadā*) in this and the following existences, and in everything (*sabbesu*) *i.e.*, in all *khandhas*, *āyatanas*, *dhātus* etc. The answer of the Sam. is also definitely in the negative, *i.e.*, they do not consider "puggala" as real in the highest sense, and as existing everywhere, always and in everything as pointed out by the Th.

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³ Perhaps like the *jīvātman* of the Vedānta School of Philosophy.

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The next attempt of the Th. is to find out whether the Sam. regard *puggala* as something existing like any of the 57 elements, *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, etc. The Sam. deny it saying they do not admit *puggala* as an element apart from the 57 elements,⁴ and in support of their contention they quote from the Nikāyas (*Dīgha*, iii, 232; *Majjhima*, i. 341; *Aṅguttara*, ii. 95) the passage "atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno", which indicates that *puggala* exists but not apart from the elements. The Th. also do not clearly state that *puggala* (as a *paññatti*) is different from the elements, the reason assigned by Buddhaghosa¹ being that the questions of the opponents have a mixture of *sammuti* and *paramattha* truths and as such the Th. have no other alternative but to leave them unanswered (*thapaniya*).²

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⁴ Samayasuttavirodham disvā paṭikkhepo paravādissa, *Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 16.

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¹ See his *Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 16. 2 Paras 130-137 dilate on the above question, comparing it with each of the 57 elements. 3 *Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 18.

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The next attempt of the Th. is to show that the Sam. should advocate either *Uccedavāda* or *Sassatavāda*. With this end in view the Th. put the questions whether *puggala* is identical with *rūpa*, or different from *rūpa*, or *puggala* is in *rūpa* (like the container and the contained) or *rūpa* is in *puggala*. The Sam. reject all the four propositions as otherwise they would become either an *Uccedavādin* or a *Sassatavādin*. Though, according to the Sam., *puggala* is of the same nature (*ekadhammo*) as *rūpa* and other elements,³ they would not treat it as an element separate from, and independent of, the 57 elements.

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The Th. now assail their opponents by questioning on *lakkhaṇas* of the *puggala*, and ask whether the *puggala* is *sappaccaya* (caused) and *saṃkhata* (constituted) like *rūpa*, or is *appaccaya* (uncaused) and *asaṃkhata* (unconstituted) like *Nibbāna*. The Sam. deny both and ask how the Th. would explain the ‘*puggala*’ in the statement of Buddha: ‘*Atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno ti.*’ Is the *puggala* referred to in this passage *sappaccaya*, *saṃkhata* or *appaccaya*, *asaṃkhata*? The Th. deny both, as in their opinion the term *puggala* is only a *sammutisacca*, and as such it is non-existing.

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The next argument put forward by the Th. is whether the statement "puggala perceives" is the same as the statement, "that which perceives is puggala"¹ i.e. whether the two statements are identical as citta is with mano or different as rūpa is from vedanā. Buddhaghosa interprets the position of the opponents thus: the Sam. hold that puggala perceives but not everything that perceives is puggala, e.g., rūpa, vedanā, etc. are not puggala but that puggala perceives and that which perceives referred only to the percipient (puggala), and not to rūpādi.² The opponents, however, rely on the statement "atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno ti" which, again is counteracted by the Th. by saying that the Sam. should equally rely on the statement "suññato lokam avekkhassu, etc." and admit that there is no puggala.

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¹ Puggalo upalabbhati (yo yo) upalabbhati (so so) puggalo ti? Kvu. p. 24.

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² Aṭṭhakathā. p. 20: The opponents say. Mama puggalo atthi puggalo 'ti satthuvacanato upalabbhati. Yo pana upalabbhati, na so sabbo puggalo. Atha kho ke hi ci puggalo ke hi ci na puggalo 'ti. Tattha kokāratthe kekāro hikāro co nipātamatto. Koci puggalo koci na puggalo 'ti ayam pan' ettha attho. Idam vuttam hoti: puggalo pi hi rūpādisu pi yo koci dhammo upalabbhati yeva Tattha puggala 'va puggalo rūpādisu pana koci pi na puggalo 'ti

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The Th. now proceed to examine the paññatti (description) of puggala. In answer to the question whether the puggala of the Rūpadhātu is rūpī and likewise of the Kāmadhātu is kāmī and of the Arūpadhātu, arūpī, the Sam. affirm the first and the third but not the second. The Sam. argue that puggala = satta = jīva and kāya = sarīra. Though they do not admit either the identity of, or difference between, jīva and sarīra, they hold, though not logically tenable, that kāya must be different from puggala as there are such statements as ‘so kāye kāyānupassī viharati and so forth’, in which so cannot but refer to puggala.

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The next discussion relating to upādāpaññatti (rebirth) of puggala raises the question of transmigration. The Sam. affirm that puggala passes from this world to the next but it is neither the self-same puggala nor a different puggala—a statement similar to what the Th. would say about the passing of the khaṇḍhas—avoiding the two heretical opinions of sassatavāda and ucchedavāda as also the ekaccasassatikavāda and amarāvikkhepaditthi.¹ In support of their contention the Sam. quoted the passages in which a “puggala” is said to pass from one world to another (sandhāvāti saṃsarati).

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¹ See my *Early Monastic Buddhism*, I. pp. 51 ff.

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Accepting the opinion of the opponents that the self-same or a different, puggala does not pass from one existence to another, the Th. point out that they admit that some form of puggala referred to in the above-mentioned passages does pass from one existence to another. This puggala can then have no death, it once becomes a man and then a god and so forth, which is absurd.¹¹ In reply the Sam. point out that a sotāpanna-manussa is known to take rebirth as a sotāpanna-deva and question how can this sotāpanna-hood pass from one existence to another unless there exists some form of puggala to carry the qualities. In order to show the unsoundness of the statement, the Th. ask whether the passing puggala remains identical in every respect² and does not lose any of its qualities.³ The opponents first negative it on the ground that a man does not continue to be a man in the devaloka. But on second thought they affirm it in view of the fact that the carrier of certain qualities from one existence to another is a *puggala*, an *antarābhavapuggala*.¹ The Sam. take care to keep clear of the two extreme views: *tam jīvam tam sarīram* and *aññam jīvam aññam sarīram*. They affirm that the transformed *khandhas* and *puggala* and not the identical *khandhas* and *puggala* pass from one existence to another. The *khandhas* are, however, impermanent and constituted while the *puggala* is not so but it is not also permanent and unconstituted. Without *khandha*, *āyatana*, *dhātu*, *indriya* and *citta*, *puggala* cannot remain alone but for that reason, the colour and other qualities of the *khandha*, *āyatana*, etc. do not affect the *puggala*. Again the *puggala* is not a shadow (*chāyā*) of the *khandhas*.

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¹¹ [Note: The text has a superscript '11' here, though it appears to be a typo for '1' or a footnote reference. I will transcribe as printed.]

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² Anañño = sabbākārena ekasadiso

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³ Avigato = ekena pi ākārena avigato.

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¹ The self which exists between death and rebirth. See above p 103-4.

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In reply to the question whether *puggala* is perceivable in every momentary thought, the Sam. answer in the affirmative but they would not accept the inference drawn by the Th. that the *puggala* in that case would have momentary existence (*khaṇikabhāvam*) i.e. would die and be reborn every moment like *citta* (thoughts).

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The Sam. now ask the Th. whether they would admit that one (*yo*) who sees something (*yam*) by means of an organ of sense (*yena*) is the *puggala* or not. The Th. after assenting to it as a conventional truth (*sammutisacca*), put the same question in the negative form thus: One (*yo*) who² does not see anything (*yam*) by means of an organ of sense (*yena*) is not a *puggala*. The Sam., however, without arguing further quote a few passages in which Buddha said: I (i.e. the *puggala*) see by means of my divine eyes (*dibbena cakkhunā*) beings appearing and disappearing and so forth, and infer therefrom that the seer is the *puggala*.

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² E.g., a blind man, an *asaññasatta*.

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Their next discussions related to *purusakāra*. The Th. do not admit any doer, so they asked the Sam. whether the latter would subscribe to the same opinion. On their denial, the Th. ask whether the Sam. would admit the existence of the doer, and a creator of the doer, which is negated by the Sam. on account of the heretical doctrine of *issaranimmāṇa* (god the creator of the world) but on second thought affirmed it in view of the fact that the parents, teachers etc. are also in a sense the makers (*kattā-kāretā*) of a person. The Th., without going into the implied sense of the replies, say that such a state of things, i.e., a doer having a doer and a deed implies not just a deed but also a doer, would lead to the conclusion that so long there is deed (*kamma*), there is its doer (*kārako puggalo*) and hence there can be no end to *puggalaparamparā* and that would falsify the fact that by the stoppage of the wheel of actions, *dukkha* can be brought to an end. Then again *nibbāna*, *mahāpathavi*, etc. must also have a doer. All the inferences drawn by the Th. are rejected by the Sam. In conclusion the Sam. deny that the deed and the doer can be distinct, just to avoid admitting that the *puggala* has mental properties.

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In the above, the doer of a deed is enquired into, while in the following discussion identity of the doer of a deed with the enjoyer of its fruit is enquired into.

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The Th. deny the existence of a feeler or enjoyer apart from *vipākapavatti*, (that which is realised, the fructification of an effect). The Sam. hold that *paṭisaṃveditabba* is *vipāka* (result) but the *puggala* is not *vipāka*.¹ They further state that Nibbāna or Mahāpathavi, etc. is not *vipāka* like divine happiness (*dibbasukha) or human happiness (manussasukha) so none of them is an object of enjoyment of the *puggala* but again the Sam. do not admit that *sukha* is distinct from the *sukha*-enjoyer. The Th. logically wanted to make their opponents admit that there must be not only an enjoyer of a fruit but also an enjoyer of the enjoyer of the fruit and so on an endless chain, in other words, according to them, as shown above *dukkha* can have no end.

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¹ But it may happen that *puggala* who is in the enjoyment of his fruits, say, merits. may be again an object of enjoyment of another *puggala*, e.g. a son enjoying the fruits of his actions may be the object

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The Th. now put the crucial question thus: whether the doer of a deed is identical with, or different from, the enjoyer of its fruit. The opponents first deny both to avoid contradiction of Buddha’s saying: *sayaṃ kataṃ paraṃ kataṃ sukhadukkhaṃ*, etc. but on second thought in view of their theory that there is a common element keeping the link between the present and the future life, they admit it. In short, the Sam. affirm that there is a *kāraka* (doer) and *vedaka* (feeler or enjoyer) of a deed, but the two are neither identical nor different, neither both identical and different, nor not both identical and different.

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The Sam. next apply the test of *abhiññā* (supernormal powers), *ñāti* (relatives) and *phala* (attainments) and put the propositions thus:

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(i) How can a person perform certain miracles keeping his organs of sense etc. inert and inactive, unless there is something else as *puggala*.

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(ii) How can one recognise the existence of parents, castes, etc. without positing that there is a *puggala*, and

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(iii) How can a *phalastha* continue to be the same in his more than one birth, unless the existence of a *puggala* is admitted.

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of affection of his mother and so forth. This explanation of Buddhaghosa should be compared with the above like the *kāretā* of *kattā*.

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The Th. avoid the issuues by putting the counter-arguments that one who cannot perform miracles is not a *puggala*, and in this way they refute the other two propositions.

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The next question of the Th. is whether *puggala* is constituted (*saṃkhata*) or unconstituted or neither constituted nor unconstituted (*n'eva saṃkhato nāsaṃkhato*). The Sam. affirm the last alternative but would not treat *puggala* as something apart (*añño*) from the *saṃkhata-khandhas*. They state that the *puggala* has certain aspects of *saṃkhata*, e.g., it is subject to *sukha*, *dukkha*, and so forth; again it has certain aspects of *asaṃkhata*, e.g., it is not subject to birth, old age and death (*jāti, jarā*, and *maraṇa*).

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In reply to the Th.'s question whether a *parinibbuto puggalo* exists in Nibbāna or not, the Sam. negative both as the affirmation of either would make them either a Sassatavādin or an Uccedavādin.

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Now the Sam. put the counter question: does not a person say that he is feeling happy or unhappy and so forth, how can a person say so unless he is a *puggala* and not a mere conglomeration of separate *khandhas*. In refuting this contention, the Th. put the same question in a negative form thus: well, if a person does not feel happiness or unhappiness, then there is no *puggala*. The Th. further ask whether Sam. would treat *sukha* and *puggala* as something separate and distinct. The Sam. evade a direct answer and ask, well, when a *puggala* (*koci* or *so*) is said to be *kāye kāyānupassī viharati*, does it not affirm the existence of a *puggala*?

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The controversy is then closed by citations of passages from the Nikāyas, the Th. quoting only those which clearly express *anattā* of all things while the Sam. quote those in which the word *puggalo* or *atthahita* or *so* appeared.

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Through these controversies it is apparent that the Sam. are seeking to establish that the five khandhas which are distinct from one another cannot give rise to the consciousness of I-ness, a unity. The facts that a person acts or thinks as one and not as five separate things, and that in many passages Buddha does actually use the words *so*, *attā* and *puggala*, and that a person’s attainments like *sotāpannahood* continue to be the same in different births, that one speaks of his past births and so forth, do lead to the conclusion that besides the five khandhas there exists some mental property which forms the basis of I-ness, and maintains the continuity of karma from one existence to another. That mental property, however, is changing with the changing khandhas but in view of the fact that one can think of his past, even of the events of his past births, the changing khandhas alone cannot be made responsible for the memory. The Sam. therefore affirm the existence of a sixth mental property and call it *puggala* which can remain only along with khandhas and so must disappear when the khandhas disappear in Nibbāna. As this mental property or *puggala* is not *kṣaṇika* like the khandhas, it has not all the properties of a *saṃkhata* (constituted object) and again it is not also unchanging and ever existing like Nibbāna so it is not *asaṃkhata*. Therefore the *puggala* must be said as neither *saṃkhata* nor *asaṃkhata*.¹

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¹ Cf. Obermiller’s *Analysis of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, III, p. 380, referring to *Tarkajvāla* and Schayer, *Kamalaśīla’s Kritik des Pudgalavāda*. Obermiller writes ‘the Vātsīputrīyas, Bhadrayānikas, Sāmmitiyas, Dharmaguptas and Samkrāntivādins are those that admit the reality of the ‘individual.’ They say that the ‘individual’ is something inexpressible, being neither identical with the five groups of elements nor differing from them. It is to be cognised by the six forms of *vijñānas* and is subject to *saṃsāra* (phenomenal existence).

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Vasumitra summarises the doctrine of the Sammitīyas or the Vātsīputrīyas thus:

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1. The *pudgala* is neither the same as the *skandhas* nor different from the *skandhas*. The name *pudgala* is provisionally given to an aggregate of *skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus*.

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2. Dharmas cannot transmigrate from one world to another apart from the *pudgala*. These can be said to transmigrate along with the *pudgala*.

Other doctrines

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Vasumitra attributes to the Vātsīputrīyas a few other views which have already been discussed. These are,—

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(i) The five *vijñānas* conduct neither to *sarāga* (desire) nor to *virāga* (removal of desires);¹

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¹ See *ante*, pp. 99-101.

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(ii) To become free from desire (*virāga*) one must relinquish the *saṃyojanas* which can be destroyed by an adept when he reaches *bhāvanāmārga* and not while he remains in *darśanamārga*;

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(iii) When one has entered the *samyaktvanyāma* he is called *pratipannaka* in the first twelve moments of the *darśanamārga* and when he is in the thirteenth he is called *phalastha*.²

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² Cf. Masuda's notes in the *Asia Major*, II. p. 56. In short, the Sammitīyas count in all fourteen moments instead of Sarvāstivādin's sixteen; so the 13th moment of the Sammitīyas corresponds to the 15th of the Sarvāstivādins; see p. 155-6.

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(iv) There is *antarābhava*.³ The Sammitīyas like the Sarvāstivādins hold that every being be he destined for Kāmaloka or Rūpaloka by his *karma*, remains for some time in an intermediate state of existence. At that time the body takes no material form not even the *skandhas*. It is not an independent state of existence but just a waiting stage preliminary to his existence in one of the two lokas. The Sammitīyas add that those beings who are destined for hells, or Asaññī sphere or Arūpaloka have no antarābhava.

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³ See *ante*, pp. 103-4. 162.

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(v) *Parihāyati arahā arahattā ti* (Kvu. I. 2).¹
(vi) *N'atthi devesu brahmacaryavāso ti* (Kvu. I. 3).²
(vii) *Odhisodhiso kilese jahatīti* (Kvu. I. 4).⁴ (viii) *Jahati puthujjano kāmārāga-byāpādan ti?* (Kvu. I. 5).³

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¹ See ante, pp. 85 f., 149 f.

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² See ante, p. 152.

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³ See ante, p. 156.

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⁴ See ante, p. 157.

Dhammuttarīya, Bhadrayāniya and Chan-nagarika

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Vasumitra skips over the special doctrines of these three schools,⁵ mentioning in verse only that they differed regarding the attainments of an arhat, and the consequent chances of fall from arhathood. It seems that in other matters, these three schools agreed with the views of the Sammitīyas.

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⁵ See ante, pp. 48-9.

Vibhajyavāda

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This is one of the schools enlisted by Bhavya and Vinītadeva, but not by Vasumitra. It does not also appear in the list of schools of the Ceylonese chronicles. Bhavya and Vinītadeva treat it as an offshoot of the Sarvāstivāda school. Prof. La Vallée Poussin has traced in the Chinese commentary of the Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi a passage in which Vibhajyavādins are identified with the Prajñaptivādins.⁶ This apparently refers to the Bahuśrutīyavibhajyavādins,⁷ by which name the Prajñaptivādins distinguished themselves from the Bahuśrutīyas. Prof. Poussin has shown that the position of the Vibhajyavādins cannot be clearly made out as their doctrines have much in common with the doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsaṅghikas, Sammitīyas and others. To add to this confusion, we have the Ceylonese traditions, in which the Pāli School, i.e. the Theravādins preferred to call themselves, Vibhajyavādins.¹ This anomalous position of the Vibhajyavādins, it seems, may be explained by regarding them not as an independent school, but as a term to denote those who did not accept the doctrines of a particular school in toto.² To wit, it may be shown that those Sarvāstivādins who did not accept the *sarvam asti* thesis in toto and held instead the opinion that the past which has not yet produced its fruits and the future does not exist were known as Vibhajyavādins, i.e. Sarvāstivāda-vibhajyavādin just as we have Bahuśrutīya-vibhajyavādin. On this analogy we may explain that among the Theravādins perhaps, there were some dissenting groups who were distinguished as Theravāda-vibhajyavādins. The Ceylonese monks of Mahāvihāra probably preferred to call themselves Vibhajjavādin as we find it clearly expressed in the versified table of contents of chapter III of the Cullavagga³ and in the colophon of the commentary on the *Tika-paṭṭhāna*,⁴ as also in the *Dīpavaṃsa*, (xviii. 41, 44). In the account of the Third Council, as given in the Ceylonese chronicles¹ as also in Buddhaghosa’s commentaries,² the Vibhajjavādins were declared as orthodox monks.³

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⁶ Kośa, Intro., p. lv

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⁷ See above, p. 108.

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¹ *Mahāvaṃsa*, p. 54.

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² See *Kośa*, Index, p. lvi; V, p. 23-24 fn. quoting *Arthapradīpa*, p. 48. "Les Vibhajyavādins ou bien sont des maîtres divergents du Grand Véhicule, ou bien toutes les écoles du Petit Véhicule sont nommées Vibhajyavādins: ceux-ci ne sont pas une école déterminée. Par conséquent, dans le *Mahāyānasamgraha* (Nanjio 1183), les Vibhajyavādins sont expliqués comme Mahīśāsakas; dans la *Vibhāṣā*, comme Sāmmutiyas."

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³ See *Vinaya*, CV, pp. 72, 312: ācariyānaṃ Vibhajjavādānaṃ Tambapaṇṇidīpapasādakānaṃ Mahāvihāravāsīnaṃ vācanā saddhammatthitiyā ti.

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⁴ *Tika-paṭṭhāna* (Cy), p. 366: ācariyānaṃ vādam avihāya

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¹ *Mahāvamsa*, V, 271

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² *Kathāvatthu-aṭṭhakathā*, p. 6

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³ Before Vibhajjavāda came to refer to a sect, it simply meant one who dealt with the metaphysical problems analytically, from a particular standpoint as opposed to one who solved the problems straight-away (*ekamsavādin*) by a direct answer See *Majjhima*, II, pp 99, 107. cf. EMB., I, p. 124: *Vibhajjavyākaraṇīva* and *Ekamsavyākaraṇīva*. In the *Majjhima*, I, p. 163; *Papañcasūdani*, II, p 171, Buddha declared that he knew *theravāda*, which, according to Buddhaghosa, meant *thirabhāvavāda* (mental steadiness). Though these two terms *Vibhajjavāda* and *Theravāda* were used in the Nikāyas, they did not denote any sect, but we may take them as the source, from which the sectarian name issued later on.

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As Vasumitra does not count the Vibhajjavādins as one of the sects, he has not mentioned any special doctrines of theirs. It is only in the *Abhidharmakośa* that we come across certain doctrines attributed to this sect. Evidently Vasubandhu had in his mind the Sarvāstivāda-vibhajjavādins. The doctrines as summarised by Prof. La Vallée Poussin are in short as follows:—

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i Sound is an effect (saddo vipāko, *Kun.* xii. 3; *Kośa*, i. 37)

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ii The faculties of faith, memory etc. (*Śraddhendriya*, *Smṛtindriya* etc.) are pure (*anāsrava*). (*Kośa*, ii. 9).

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iii There is no intermediate state of existence (*antarābhava*) (*Kośa*, iii. 10).

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iv The pratītyasamutpāda is unconstituted (*asaṃskṛta*) (*Kośa*, ii. 28).

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v Abhidhyā, vyāpāda, mithyādṛṣṭi are physical acts (*kāyika*).

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Vibhajjavādisissānam etc: p 367 theravamsappadīpanam therānam Mahāvihāravāsinam vamsālaṅkārabhūtena vipula-visuddhabuddhinā Buddhaghoso ti therena katā.

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vi Bhagavān is always in meditation (*Kośa*. Fr. transl. iv. p. 40 n) and has no *middha* (*Ibid*). vii *Bhavatṛṣṇā* is abandoned by *bhāvanā* (*Kośa*, iv. 10-11). viii Arhats have no fall (*Kośa*. vi. 58). ix There are 41 Bodhipakṣika-dharmas (*Kośa*. vi. p. 281n: the four additional dharmas are the four ārya-vaṃsas . See *Mahāvyutpatti*). x There is *rūpa* (matter) in the Ārūpya-dhātu (*Kośa*. viii. 3. See Fr. transl. p. 135 n.).

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Some schools like the Andhakas, Mahāsaṅghīkas, Mahīśāsakas point out that *rūpa* exists in arūpyadhātu but in a very subtle state. The contention of the Vibhajyavādins is possibly the same as that of the Tāmraparṇīyas¹ (*Kośa*. i. 39) who state that *mano-dhātu* is a material organ, which they call *hadaya-vatthu* (see *Visuddhimagga*, p. 447). This basis of the *mano-dhātu*, which is material, exists in the Arūpyadhātu.

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¹ *Vyākhyā*, p. 39: ताम्रपर्णीयापि हृदयवस्तु मनोविज्ञानधातोराश्रयं कल्पयन्ति । तस्माद्रूपधात्वपि विद्यत इति वर्णयन्ति । आरूप्यधात्वपि हि तेषां रूपमभिप्रेतम् ।

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xi The Ārya of the 4th Ārūpya (i.e. nevasamjñānāsamjñāyatana) obtains arhathood without the aid of the *magga*, This is a doctrine of the Mahīśāsakas. xii There are twelve viparyāsas, (see *Vyākhyā*, p. 454) of which eight are removed by *darśanamārga* and four by *bhāvanāmārga* (*Kośa*. v. p. 23 n.). xiii *Jñāna* is the same as dharmas which are good by nature (*svabhāvataḥ*), while *vijñāna* means those dharmas which are good by association (*samprayogataḥ*), i.e., associated with *jñāna* (*Kośa*. iv. p. 33 n. ix, p. 248 n). xiv Realisation of the four truths takes place all at once and not gradually² (*Kośa*, vi, pp. 185, 123).

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² See above, pp. 154-6.

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