Early Monastic Buddhism v2.c36.81

v2.c36.81

Their next discussions related to *purusakāra*. The Th. do not admit any doer, so they asked the Sam. whether the latter would subscribe to the same opinion. On their denial, the Th. ask whether the Sam. would admit the existence of the doer, and a creator of the doer, which is negated by the Sam. on account of the heretical doctrine of *issaranimmāṇa* (god the creator of the world) but on second thought affirmed it in view of the fact that the parents, teachers etc. are also in a sense the makers (*kattā-kāretā*) of a person. The Th., without going into the implied sense of the replies, say that such a state of things, i.e., a doer having a doer and a deed implies not just a deed but also a doer, would lead to the conclusion that so long there is deed (*kamma*), there is its doer (*kārako puggalo*) and hence there can be no end to *puggalaparamparā* and that would falsify the fact that by the stoppage of the wheel of actions, *dukkha* can be brought to an end. Then again *nibbāna*, *mahāpathavi*, etc. must also have a doer. All the inferences drawn by the Th. are rejected by the Sam. In conclusion the Sam. deny that the deed and the doer can be distinct, just to avoid admitting that the *puggala* has mental properties.