Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c10.76

c10.76

(347) The use of jalpa and vitaṇḍā in a non-derogatory sense in the Caraka Saṃhitā is, however, not without significance, since it probably harks back to a time when the dialectical devices of these debaters were not still recognized as casuistry and the distinction between good and bad reasoning was either not drawn or was very thin. Victory and defeat depended largely on the whims of the audience (pariṣad) and the decision would have varied greatly with the nature of the audience for some audiences are said to be learned (jñānavatī pariṣad, C.S. 3.8 6.13) and others foolish (mūḍhapariṣad, CS, *loc cit*). The Caraka Saṃhitā speaks of the expedient of not debating further with a person who is anxious to continue a debate once the audience has shouted him down as having been vanquished.¹ It is obvious that the prejudices and beliefs of the audience played a large part in the decisions they gave. This at least appears to be the view of the Buddha, who recounts the following situations in which the decisions of the audience (parisā) need not be objective when it is acclaimed that someone is learned and victorious: