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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c10: Chapter V: The Attitude to Reason

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c10

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Chapter V: The Attitude to Reason

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(313) In this Chapter we propose to examine the Buddhist attitude to reason, as employed by their opponents. This involves an investigation into the grounds on which the takkī (?) were criticized and this entails the inquiry as to who the takkī (D. I.16, etc.) or takkikā (Ud. 73) were. Were they a class of sophists who employed fallacious reasoning for destructive purposes merely to outwit their opponents in debate, without having any theories of their own? Or were they thinkers, who made a rational defence of their theories or even rational metaphysicians, who founded speculative theories on the basis of reason? Or is the word takkī (or takkikā) used in a wider sense to include and refer to both these classes of people? We shall be concerned primarily with the examination of the conception of takka- and the Buddhist criticism of it.

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(314) In the list from the Aṅguttara Nikāya, claims to knowledge made on ten grounds in all are criticized as unsatisfactory (*v. supra*, 251). Six had reference to claims to knowledge on the basis of some kind of authority and these we dealt with in the previous chapter. The remaining four are claims to knowledge on the basis of some kind of reasoning or reflection. This appears to be in agreement with the Buddha's contention that he does not belong to the class of teachers who are reasoners (takkī) and speculators (vīmamsī), who base their knowledge on reasoning and speculation. The four grounds of knowledge condemned were:

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| (1) takka-hetu | (3) ākāra-parivitakkena |
| (2) naya-hetu | (4) diṭṭhi-nijjhāna-kkhantiyā |

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(315) Just as anussava played a predominant rôle in the list of six, takka- seems to be the keyword here. The commentary explains takka-hetu as 'takka-gāhena' (AA. II.305), which may be translated as either 'by comprehending reasons' or 'by adhering to logic'. But gāhena is not the semantical equivalent of hetu and a more literal translation would be 'on the grounds of takka' since hetu means (1) cause, reason, condition or (2) suitability (*s v.* PTS. Dictionary) in the Pālī Canon and in this context it would probably mean 'reason' or 'ground'. This is in fact the earlier meaning¹ of the term in the Upaniṣads, e g. etasya hetoḥ vyānam evodgītham upāsīta, i e. for this reason one should meditate on the diffused breath as Udgītha (Ch. 1.3.5). But in this context it could mean not just 'ground' but even 'epistemological ground' (pramāṇa), a sense which is found in the Jain Canonical scriptures (*v. supra*, 243) and is retained in the Carakasaṃhitā which defines the word as follows hetur nāmopalabdhikāraṇaṃ tatpratyakṣamanumānamaithyam aupamyaṃ ity ebhir hetubhir yad upalabhyate tattattvam, i e. hetu is the cause of apprehension, viz. perception, inference, tradition and comparison and what is apprehended by these means is true, 3.8.6.25

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¹ The later uses recorded exclusively denote the sense of 'cause' (Śvet. 5.12, 6 5, 16, 17, Mait 6 30)

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(316) As for takka (which we have provisionally rendered as 'reason' or 'logic') it does not make much sense however the word may be translated, unless we know who the takkī and takkikā were and what kind of takka they employed. We can do this by examining the specific theories associated with them with a view to determining the nature of their reasoning. In the Nyāya Sūtra, tarka- is an 'indirect proof' used to demolish the opponents' theory (N S. 1.2 1) and this use has resulted in tarka- being regarded on the whole as 'mere destructive criticism' However, it would be our endeavour to show that it had a positive connotation in the Nikāya usage, where it is used primarily to denote the reasoning that was employed to construct and defend metaphysical theories and perhaps meant the reasoning of sophists and dialecticians only in a secondary sense. Needless to say this goes against the assumptions of almost all scholars (*v. infra*) although it is necessary to add that Schayer had noticed a more positive use of tarka- in the scholastic period: 'In der Epoche der scholastischen Synthese wurde diese Typ des mittelbaren Beweises als *tarka* bezeichnet mit ausdrucklicher Hervorhebung, dass die Aufgabe des *tarka* nicht bloss die negative Kritik (*vitaṇḍā*, *dūṣaṇā*) des Gegners, sondern die positive Begrundung der eigenen These ist'² (317) Scholars have often referred to the takkī as 'sophists' even using the word 'sceptics' interchangeably with it (*v. infra*, 319). It was probably Oldenberg who set the tone for using the word 'sophist' in this loose sense. He speaks of a 'species of Indian sophistic' (eine Art indischer Sophistik¹) and compares it with the Greek sophistic movements, as though the two were exactly parallel developments: 'Certain phenomena which developed themselves in the busy bustle of the ascetic and philosophizing circles, may be described as a species of Indian sophistic, wherever a Socrates appears, sophists cannot fail to follow. The conditions under which this sophistic arose were quite similar to those which gave birth to their Greek counterpart... there followed Gorgiases and Protagorases and a whole host of ingenious, species, somewhat frivolous virtuosi, dealers in dialectic and rhetoric. In exactly the same way there came after the earnest thinkers of the masculine classical period of Brahmanical speculation a younger generation of dialecticians'² When he goes on to enumerate these 'dialecticians' he seems to include almost all those thinkers mentioned in the Pāli Canon, who did not belong to the Vedic tradition, leaving out the Jains. The list is as follows, though we have to infer on the basis of his remarks whom probably Oldenberg had in mind when his references are not quite specific.

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² 'Altindishe Antizipationen der Aussagenlogik, Studien zur indischen Logik II' in *Extrait du Bulletin de l'Academie Polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres*, Cracovie 1933, p 93.

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¹ *Buddha, Sein, Leben, Seine Lehre, Seine Gemeinde*, 13 Auflage, Stuttgart, 1959, p 79

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² *Buddha*, Tr W. Hoey, London, 1882, pp. 68-9.

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(a) '... the professed controversialists with an overweening materialist or sceptical air, who were not deficient in either the readiness or the vitality to show up all sides of the ideas of their great predecessors, to modify them, to turn them into their opposites' (*op. cit.*, p. 69) Is this a reference to the amarāvikkhepikā (Sceptics) who looked at all sides of a question without committing themselves to any point of view, though they were certainly not Materialists?

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(b) Those who discussed about the 'eternity or transitoriness ... infiniteness or finiteness of the world' (*loc. cit.*) This seems to be a reference to the diverse schools of religions which held these mutually opposed views referred to at Ud. 66–70, etc., although the list is far from complete.

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(c) Then spring up the beginnings of a logical scepticism, the two doctrines, of which the fundamental propositions run, 'everything appears to me true' and 'everything appears to me untrue" (*loc. cit.*). This appears to be a reference not to 'the two doctrines', but to the three doctrines attributed to three schools or religious teachers who opposed each other, the third doctrine being 'some views appear to me true and some false' (ekaccam me khamati ekaccam me na khamati, M. I.498), which was opposed to both the above.

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(d) 'Men wrangle over the existence of a world beyond, over the continuance after death'. This is either a reference to Ajita Kesakambalī (D. I.55), the Materialist or to the Materialists in general (D I.34, 35) or to certain mutually opposed theories such as 'taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ' (the soul is the same as the body, D. I 160) and its opposite or 'hoti tathāgato parammaraṇā' (the soul exists after death, D I.188) and the other three possibilities, interpreted on the assumption that 'tathāgato' here means 'soul' (DA. I 118).

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(e) Makkhali Gosāla, who denies 'freewill' (D. I 53)

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(f) Pūraṇa Kassapa, who denies 'moral government' (*loc. cit.*) (*v.* D. I.52).

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(g) Saccaka, who boasts about his dialectical invincibility (M. I.227 ff).

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(318) It is curious that although Oldenberg speaks of the above 'sophists' as 'dialecticians' and probably has the takkī in mind, not one of the above persons or classes of thinkers have expressly been called takkī in any specific context in the Pāli Canon. Besides, it could be seen that the word 'sophists' is used in a very wide and loose sense to include the moral sceptics (amarāvikkhepikā), the logical sceptics (c) dialecticians like Saccaka (g), Materialists (d) and others who held positive theories about the nature of man, morals or the universe (b and d). This loose use of the word 'sophist' is perpetuated by Mrs Rhys Davids, who also uses the word 'sceptic' almost as synonym of 'sophistical'. She says: 'There appears to have been parallel with the Absolutist beliefs, a good deal of scepticism current when Buddhism arose. . . . The most important of the sceptic schools was that of the Ājīvakas'.¹ She then goes on to speak of 'another sophistical school headed by Ajita of the Hair-garment' (*ibid.*, p. 86). In a later work she speaks of 'Sañjaya the sophist' and of Sāriputta as being 'fed up with Sañjaya's sceptical sophisms'.²

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¹ *Buddhism*, undated, Williams and Norgate, p 85.

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² *Śākya or Buddhist Origins*, p 136

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(319) Vidyabhusana was one of the first to suggest not only that the term takkī in the Pāli Canon refers to sophists, but that they may have belonged to the Buddhist, Jain or the Brāhmaṇical communities 'It is not known whether these men were Buddhists, Jainas or Brahmaṇas, perhaps they were recruited from all communities. They were not logicians in the proper sense of the term but they appear to me to have been sophists, who indulged in quibble and casuistry.'¹ He speaks of the takkī as 'sophists' and 'argumentationists' and of the vīmaṃsī as 'casuists'. Keith quotes Vidyabhusana and apparently accepts his interpretation of takkī: 'The old Pāli texts ignore the names Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika: in the Brahmajāla Sutta we hear in lieu of them only of takkī, sophists and vīmaṃsī, casuists, and in the Udāna takkikas appear as in the Epic and Purāṇas.'²

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¹ *History of Indian Logic*, p. 227.

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² *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 13.

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(320) It seems desirable, therefore, that we have a clear idea of the meaning of the term 'sophist' before we apply it in the Indian context to refer to any of the thinkers mentioned in the Pāli Canon. Its meaning derives from its usage in reference to the itinerant teachers of Athens in the fifth century BC. These 'Gorgiases and Protagorases' as Oldenberg calls them were first and foremost sceptics who denied the objectivity of knowledge and therefore the possibility of knowledge. They were also the first to found schools for the study of rhetoric and reasoning. But since they did not believe that reasoning led to valid knowledge, they cultivated and taught for a fee the art of using fallacious reasoning merely for the sake of victory in debate or discussion.³ Thus the Concise Oxford Dictionary defines a 'sophist' as an 'ancient Greek paid teacher of philosophy and rhetoric; captious or fallacious reasoner, quibbler' (*s.v.*) and 'sophism' as a 'false argument intended to deceive' (*s.v.*).

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³ Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, p. 94 ff.

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(321) The Greek sceptics were sophists, but how correct is it to say that the Indian sceptics, if we mean by the latter the amarāvikkhepikā of the Buddhist texts and the aññāṇiā of the Jain texts, were also sophists? It is possible that they arrived at their scepticism by some kind of reasoning (*v. supra*, 151, 154). But what matters for the definition of 'sophist' and the use of the term to apply to them is whether they employed a fallacious reasoning merely for the sake of victory in debate without any scruples for truth.

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(322) Now most of these sceptics shunned debate and we can be quite certain that the third school of sceptics did so (*v. supra*, 169) either because of their scepticism, which induced them to believe no particular thesis could be known to be either true or false or because they adopted scepticism out of intellectual cowardice with the intention of avoiding debate. The key term or phrase in this passage stated that their scepticism was due to 'fear or disgust at anuyoga' (anuyogabhayā anuyogaparijegucchā, D. I.26). Now anuyoga is a technical term in logic but as a technical term it is found in the combined form, niranuyojyānuyogah (censuring the non-censurable), which is one of the occasions for rebuke (nigrahasthāna, N.S 5 2 1) and is defined as consisting of rebuking a person who does not deserve rebuke (anigrahasthāne nigrahasthānābhiyogo, N S. 5 2 23) This gives the possible meaning of 'censure' for anuyoga but the general word for censure would be niggaha (Skr. nigraha-) which is also found in the same stratum (cp. niggahito 'si, D. I.8) in at least a semi-technical sense We should therefore have expected the author of this passage to have said niggaha-bhayā if he had the idea of censure in mind. There is another reason why the meaning of 'censure' would not suit this context. Niggaha- can only occur towards the end of a debate, but these sceptics were afraid of the very idea of joining issue in a debate and Prof Rhys Davids considering the context translates the above phrase as 'fearing and abhorring the joinder of issue' (SBB., II, p 39) This is in fact nearer the original etymology as well, as being formed from anu + √() yuj to join. The PTS Dictionary does not record this unusual semi-technical use of anuyoga- but gives 'invitation, appeal, question' (*s.v.*) as possible meanings of the term Now the verb anuyuñjati is used in the sense of 'asking a question, call to account, take to task' (Vin II.79, *s.v* PTS. Dictionary). This raises the question as to whether anuyoga could mean 'interrogation' by skilled dialecticians as the context demands And this is precisely the sense in which the term is defined as a technical term of logic in the Caraka Saṃhitā, where it was said that 'anuyoga is an inquiry made about the substance or text of some science or other by a person versed in them, for the purpose of testing someone's knowledge, understanding or replies or (the inquiry) 'what is the cause' when one's opponent proposes (the thesis) 'the soul is eternal": anuyogo nāma yattadvidyānām tadvidyair eva sārdham tantre tantraikadeśe vā praśnaikadeśo vā jñānavijñānavacanaprativacanaparīkṣārtham ādiśyate, yathā nityaḥ purusa iti pratijñāte yatparaḥ ko hetur ityāha so'nuyogaḥ 3 8 6.44 This is just what these sceptics feared, namely interrogation on the part of skilled dialecticians (paṇḍitā nipuṇā kataparappavādā vālavedhirūpā, D. I 26). The alternative definition gives a possible reason why they did not wish to make positive assertions, for it is when something is posited or a positive assertion is made (pratijñāte) that the others could then question them whereas if there were no truths that they could uphold, they were quite immune to the attacks of able controversialists owing to their very scepticism.

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(323) Incidentally, we have already noticed two logical terms preserved in the Caraka Saṃhitā in older senses attested by the Jain or the Buddhist texts. One was ‘hetu’ in the sense of ‘pramāṇa’ (*v. supra*, 315) and the other is anuyoga. Keith has expressed the view that the variations in the meanings of logical terms in the Caraka Saṃhitā from that of the Nyāya Sūtra were due to the ignorance of the author of Caraka Saṃhitā of the standard terminology.¹ This is an unwarranted assumption for if this terminology is independently supported by the usages of the Buddhist or Jain texts, it shows not that the author of the Caraka Saṃhitā was ignorant of the meanings of these terms, but that these terms are from an earlier logical tradition not made use of by the author of the Nyāyasūtra, though the latter may have been aware of them and consciously rejected them.

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¹ ‘Nor can any stress be laid on the variations from the Nyāya school, an unscientific exposition of this kind need reflect nothing more than the lack of knowledge of its author and sheds no light on the early history of the school’, *op cit*, p 13.

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(324) If, thus, the third school of sceptics clearly shunned debate altogether, the picture they present would be the very opposite of that of the Greek sceptic, who welcomed debate in order to prove the worth of his scepticism by disproving each and every thesis that came in his way. There is also no reason to think, as we have said, that the first two schools of Sceptics were in principle different from the third in this respect. The fact that the first school was said to be ‘afraid of falsehood’ (musāvādabhayā, D. I 25) showed that they had certain scruples for truth and they would therefore not try to denounce every theory that was put forward in debate merely because they did not believe in it. Besides these first three schools regarded the moral consequences of non-scepticism, for different reasons, to be a source of worry or vexation (vighāta-) and since they may have realized that ‘vexation could result from debate’ (vivāde sati vighāto, M I.499) it is unlikely that they would have debated their scepticism at all. There is, however, one respect in which the outlook of these three schools of Scepticism may be compared with that of Protagoras, though not of the later Greek Sceptics. We have shown that despite their moral scepticism at the intellectual level, they probably subscribed to the traditionally or conventionally accepted moral and religious practices. Now it is said that Protagoras in spite of his disbelief in objective truth 'was led to a defence of law and convention and traditional morality. While as we saw, he did not know whether the gods existed, he was sure they ought to be worshipped'.¹ The significant difference however was that the Indian Sceptic even regarded non-scepticism as a moral danger.

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¹ Russell, *op cit*, p 97

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(325) We have tried to show that if takkī means 'sophist' then at least the three schools of Sceptics we spoke of above were not sophists and much of the confusion in calling them sophists seems to have sprung from the assumption that since the Greek sceptics were sophists, the Indian sceptics were probably the same

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(326) The case is, however, different with the school of Sañjaya who, we suggested, did engage in debate in defence of his scepticism (*v. supra*, 180). Among the propositions which he refused to declare were either true or false, was, hoti Tathāgato parammaraṇā (the Tathāgata exists after death) and its other three alternatives (D. I.27). These are among the very propositions the truth of which was said to have been hotly debated by various religious theorists at this time (*v.* Ud. 67). Could Sañjaya have been criticizing one of these theses at one time and an opposing thesis at another? Did he do so because he felt that the arguments against each of these alternatives were equally strong, though he did not discard the possibility that any one of them could be true? Or did he merely criticize these theories to display his dialectical skill, regardless of the cause of truth because he felt that truth was impossible in these matters? The context seems to favour on the whole the former interpretation. On both interpretations Sañjaya would have been using takka (tarka) merely to disprove his opponent's thesis—the sense in which the word is used in the Nyāya Sūtra (*v. supra*, 316). But if the latter interpretation was true he would come close to being the Indian counterpart of the Greek sceptic-sophist, with the difference that while the Greek scepticism was all embracing in scope Sañjaya's was probably limited to the range of transcendent propositions Apart from the tentative character of this identification there is no reason to think that Sañjaya represented a widespread movement in Indian thought at this time. Even if our identification is correct, he seems to be the exception rather than the rule in the Indian context.

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(327) Let us now examine the theories which Oldenberg thought constituted 'the beginnings of a logical scepticism', to see what their logical and epistemological foundations were. The reference is evidently to the three kinds of theories about 'views' (diṭṭhi) mentioned in the Dīghanakha Sutta and which are as follows:
(1) sabbam me khamati—I agree with every (view)
(2) sabbam me na khamati—I agree with no (view)
(3) ekaccam me khamati, ekaccam me na khamati—I agree with some (views) and disagree with other (views).

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(328) It is said that 'those who firmly hold and dogmatically assert that any one of these theories is alone true and the others false' (imaṃ diṭṭhiṃ thāmasā parāmassa abhinivissa vohareyyaṃ: idameva saccaṃ mogham aññan ti (M. I.498) is likely to engage in contentious debate with their other two opponents (dvīhi assa viggaho, *loc. cit.*) resulting in 'dispute, vexation and worry' (viggahe sati vivādo, vivāde sati vighāto, vighāte sati vihesā, *loc. cit.*). The Buddha speaks well of the second point of view (1.e. 2) as tending towards dispassion (asarāgāya santike, *loc. cit.*) and lack of attachment, excitement, dogmatism and involvement (asaṃyogāya ... anabhinandanāya ... anajjhosānāya ... anupādānāya santike, *loc. cit.*), whereas the first and the third views have the opposite qualities. Dīghanakha, his interlocutor, is exceedingly pleased at this, since it was his own view but the Buddha goes on to explain that holding the second view dogmatically and clinging to it is as bad as holding the other views.¹

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¹ Yā ca kho me ayaṃ diṭṭhi. sabbam me na khamatī ti, imañ ce ahaṃ diṭṭhiṃ ... abhinivissa vohareyyaṃ ... dvīhi me assa viggaho, i.e. if one dogmatically clings to this theory namely 'I do not agree with any view' he would be at loggerheads with two parties, M I.499.

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(329) A distinction appears to be drawn between two ways of holding view (2). The first is to hold dogmatically to this view with the readiness to defend it against its contrary and contradictory. This involves 'not giving it up as a view and the possibility of changing it for another' (tañ ca diṭṭhim nappajahanti aññañ ca diṭṭhiṃ upādiyanti, M. I.398). The other way of holding (2) is to hold it non-dogmatically and disinterestedly 'giving it up as a view and with no possibility of changing it for another' (tañ c'eva diṭṭhiṃ pajahanti aññañ ca diṭṭhiṃ na upādiyanti, *loc. cit.*) as a result of which he does not enter into debate to defend any view (since he is disinterested in all views) and does not suffer the consequences of debate.

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(330) If we call the former way of subscribing to view (2), 2(a) and the latter way 2(b) it would appear from the context that Dīghanakha is holding 2(a) This is evident from the introductory dialogue·

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Dīghanakha: I hold the view that I disagree with every view (aham ... evamdiṭṭhi· sabbam me na khamatī ti, M I 397).
Buddha: Do you agree with the view that you hold, namely that you disagree with every view (Yā ... esā ... diṭṭhi, sabbam me na khamatīti, esā pi te diṭṭhi na khamatī ti, *loc cit.*).
Dīghanakha, Even if I agree with this view, it is all the same (Esā ce me diṭṭhī ... diṭṭhi khameyya, tam p'assa tādisameva, tam p'assa tādisam eva, *loc. cit.*).

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(331) The purpose of Buddha's question, judging from the rest of the context, seems to be to elicit this information, although it gives the appearance of a dialectical trap in a paradox situation. Asserting 'I do not agree with any view' is a paradox situation of the same logical type as saying 'everything I say is false', which appears to be false if true and true if false. For if I agree with the view that 'I do not agree with any view' than I am agreeing with some view and my statement is false, whereas if I do not agree with the view that 'I do not agree with any view', then I am contradicting myself. Dīghanakha's reply, in fact, amounts to saying that even if he agrees with this view it still remains a fact that he does not agree with all other views. Since this is not followed up by an attempt to show that Dīghanakha is thereby making a false statement or is contradicting himself, the Buddha's rejoinder is not meant to be a criticism of Dīghanakha's point of view, but is apparently intended to elicit the information as to whether he is dogmatically holding to this theory, as he appears to be from the subsequent discussion 2(b) on the other hand is the view that the Buddha speaks well of and which he ascribes to 'certain recluses and brahmins' (eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā, M. I.398).

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(332) Who could these 'recluses and brahmins' be who subscribed to the view 'sabbam me na khamati', which among other things is said to be 'anupādānāya santike' (tending to the absence of involvement, M. I.498)? It is very probable that they were no others than those Sceptics (amarāvikkhepikā), who valued mental tranquillity, avoided debate and anything that causes vexation (vighāta, cp D. I.25, 26)

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and among whom at least one school (the second) is said to have regarded non-scepticism as an upādāna (involvement) of which they were afraid and with which they were disgusted (cp. *upādāna-bhayā upādāna-parijegucchā*, D. I.26 and *anupādānāya santike*, M. I 498). That the Buddhist attitude to the amarāvikkhepikā was on the whole a favourable one is also apparent from the place they receive in the Sandaka Sutta (M. I.520, 521), where the religion of these Sceptics was classified as one of the four unsatisfactory but not totally false religions. It also tends to confirm our supposition that the Sceptics, despite their intellectual scepticism had a conception of the moral and religious life.

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(333) We said that 2(a) seems to be the theory that Dīghanakha himself held. Now, according to the commentary not only is Dīghanakha said to be a Materialist (uccheda-vādo = *lit.* annihilationist, but synonymous with ‘Materialist’ at this time) but ‘sabbam me na khamati’ is interpreted differently. ‘Sabbam’ is said to be ‘all rebirths and conceptions, which do not please him’ (sabbā me uppattiyo ... paṭisandhiyo na khamanti, MA. III.204). Miss Horner disagreeing with this comment, says that ‘Gotama, however, takes “all” in its literal sense’ (M.L S II.176, fn 6) but does not clarify what this literal sense was. She translates ‘sabbam me na khamati’ as ‘all is not pleasing to me’ (*loc. cit*) but if we interpret ‘all’ here to mean just ‘everything in the universe’ or even as ‘sense-data and thoughts’ according to the definition of sabba- at S. IV.15, it is difficult to see the reason for conflict and debate between three people who held the views ‘everything pleases me’, ‘nothing pleases me’ and ‘some things please me’. The context makes it evident that diṭṭhi (views) form the content of sabbam for when Dīghanakha says ‘sabbam me na khamati’, the Buddha asks ‘esā pi te diṭṭhi na khamati’ (*loc. cit.*) and it is replied ‘esā me .. diṭṭhi khameyya’ (*loc. cit.*). From this we may presume that sabbam here means ‘all (diṭṭhi-s)’. The fact that the radical form of khamati is closely associated in usage with diṭṭhi (e.g. *diṭṭhi-nijjhāna-kkhanti*, S II.115; IV.139; A. I 189, II.191; M II.170) lends support to our view. We may therefore translate the statement, sabbam me na khamati, as we have done, as ‘I approve of or agree with no (view)’ and it is evident that Oldenberg himself took it in this sense, for otherwise he would not have seen here the ‘beginnings of a logical scepticism’.

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(334) It is a problem as to which school of thought Dīghanakha belonged. As a nihilist who disagreed with and denied every thesis that was put forward by his opponents in debate, Dīghanakha, the paribbājaka,¹ (Dīghanakho paribbājako M. I 497) may have belonged to Sañjaya's school of paribbājakas, the only school of debating sceptics The only historical connection that we can see, is that Dīghanakha was a nephew of Sāriputta (DPPN., *s.v.* Dīghanakha) and Sāriputta is presumed to have been an adherent of Sañjaya before he joined the Buddha. But this does not explain how tradition came to associate him with the Materialists and identify him as a member of that group. This commentarial identification of him as a Materialist is in fact confirmed by the text as well. In the course of the dialogue the Buddha tells Dīghanakha that he should regard 'the body which has form, is composed of the four primary elements and arises from father and mother (kāyo rūpī cātummahābhūtiko mātāpettika-sambhavo, M. I.500) as not a soul (anattato samanupassitabbo, *loc. cit.*)'. The wording is unusual,² occurs rarely and is identical with the phraseology used to describe the first school of the Materialists (*viz.* attā rūpī cātummahābhūtiko mātāpettikasambhavo, D. I.34). It appears as if the Buddha was making a specific criticism of the Materialist theory. There is therefore reason to think that Dīghanakha was in fact a Materialist. As a nihilist Materialist, he may be identified with the school of nihilist Lokāyata, which denied the truth of every thesis (*v. supra*, 113). We do not know what kind of arguments they employed but if they were called takkī (and we have no evidence that they were) they would have employed takka for purely destructive criticism in order to pull down their opponents' theories.

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¹ I e a wandering ascetic

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² The normal formula would have been rūpaṃ attato na samanupassitabbaṃ, vedanā .. saññā, etc.

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(335) The opposite of Dīghanakha's view 'sabbam me khamati' (I agree with every view) is also said to be held by a school of recluses and brahmins (eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā, *loc cit*). This point of view resembles, if it is not identical with the anekāntavāda of the Jains According to this theory every view is true from some standpoint (naya) or other and in general³ no view can be categorically false. The proposition 'S is P' (syādasti) as well as 'S is not P' (syānnāsti) can both be true according to different standpoints (*v. infra*, 589). This logic would entail the truth in some sense of all views. The doctrine of naya is mentioned in some of the early Jain sūtras (*v. supra*, 237) and it is not impossible that it was known, when the Pāli Nikāyas came to be composed. It seems to have also been a doctrine of the Trairāśika Ājīvikas (*v. supra*, 227). While the Sceptics (amarāvikkhepikā) disagree with every view, anekāntavāda represents the opposite point of view of agreeing with every view for some reason or other denying the Law of Contradiction or giving it a new meaning altogether (*v. infra*, 589, 590). Since there is good evidence for the existence of the Sceptics there is little reason to doubt the more or less contemporaneous existence of the opposing theory on the evidence of the Jain scriptures. The commentary is not helpful in identifying this view since it makes no direct comment on it, but it seems indirectly to suggest or assume that ‘Sabbam me khamati’ is the eternalist view being the opposite of Dīghanakha’s Materialist position while ‘ekaccam me khamati . . .’ (I agree with some views) is said to be the semi-eternalist view. But this explanation is far-fetched and therefore inadmissible for had the compiler of this sutta been thinking of the eternalist or semi-eternalist views there is no reason why he should not have employed more direct and less ambiguous language and said ‘sassatam (or sassata-diṭṭhi) me khamati’ instead of ‘sabbam me khamati’ and ‘ekaccasassatam (or ekaccasassata-diṭṭhi) me khamati’ instead of ‘ekaccam me khamati ekaccam me na khamati’.

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³ The Jains did, however, have a conception of falsity (*v infra* 589)

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(336) This relativism of the Jain would have been opposed in debate to the scepticism of Sañjaya, the nihilism of that branch of Lokāyata and the ‘particularism’¹ of the others but their reasoning can hardly be called sophistical. With the possible but doubtful exception of Sañjaya, we do not find in Indian soil the Greek counterpart of the sceptic-sophist. The nihilist Lokāyatika, judging by the example of Jayarāśi, would have been too forthright in his condemnation of all theses to be adjudged a sceptic and in any case we know very little about the reasoning of this early school of nihilist Lokāyata for us to come to any positive conclusions.

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¹ I am using this word to denote those who held that some views were true (i.e. agreed with some views).

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(337) On the other hand there is a constant reference in Indian thought to vitaṇḍā and the vitaṇḍavādin. The vitaṇḍavādin is neither a sceptic nor a sophist though this latter term is often mistakenly employed in translating the term. He has no views of his own but merely indulges in eristic (*s.v.* Runes, *Dictionary of Philosophy*) for the purpose of securing victory in argument. The Nyāyasūtra defines vitaṇḍā as ‘the criticism of the proofs of the opposite side' (svapratipaksasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā, 1.2 3) but the word has a derogatory connotation In the Carakasaṃhitā it is defined as 'merely imputing faults to one's opponents' theory' (parapakṣe doṣavacanamātram eva, 3.8 6 20). It is a form of wrangling which is closely associated with, though strictly distinguished from, jalpa, defined in the NS as 'the defence (*lit.* proof) or attack of a proposition in the aforesaid manner by quibbles (chala), analogues (jāti) and other processes which deserve censure'.¹ The Carakasaṃhitā, on the other hand, defines jalpa as 'proving ones own thesis by one's own reasons and thereby discrediting the opposing thesis'.² The difference in the definitions probably show that there was no standard usage of these terms, but it can be seen that both texts use vitaṇḍā to denote mere attacks on the opposite side for the purpose of gaining victory in debate. Both jalpa and vitaṇḍā, which are unscrupulous and fallacious forms of reasoning, are recommended in the N.S. in dealing with opponents 'for safeguarding the interests of truth, just as fences of thorny boughs are used to protect the growth of seeds'³ but this represents a late view after the Nyāya was accepted by orthodoxy.

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¹ Yathoktopapannaś chalajātinigrahasthānāsādhanopālambho jalpaḥ 1 2 2

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² Svapakṣaṃ svahetubhiḥ sthāpayataḥ tatparapakṣamudbhāvayataḥ eṣa jalpaḥ, 3 8 6 20

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³ Tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitande bījaprarohasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat, 4 2 50

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(338) One of the earliest occurrences of the word vitaṇḍā, is in Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī (4 4.102). The word does not occur in the Pāli Nikāyas, but Buddhaghosa comments on lokāyata (D. I 88), lokāyatika- (S. II 77) and lokakkhāyika- (D. I 8) as *vitaṇḍa-* (*v supra*, 57) But what was 'the art of casuistry' (vitaṇḍasattha, vitaṇḍavādasattha-) for Buddhaghosa, it must be remembered was 'the art of reasoning' (tarkaśāstra-) for Śaṅkara (*v. supra*, 54) and we cannot conclude from this that the brahmins were cultivating the art of casuistry at this time for any special reason. While Buddhaghosa associates this vitaṇḍasattha- with the brahmins, the Saddanīti associates it with the titthiyas (lokāyataṃ nāma ... titthiyasattham)⁴ a word which has a wider connotation and at least includes the Samaṇas (*v.* nānātitthiyā samaṇabrāhmaṇā ... i e various recluses and brahmins who were heretics, Ud. 66). The examples given both by Buddhaghosa and Aggavaṃsa (*v.* SBB., II. p. 167 f.) are similar but it would be noticed that an argument pertaining to the creation of the world is placed on the same footing as an argument that the crow is white or the crane is black. We cannot on this evidence argue that there were vitaṇḍavādins at this time, but if we have reason to believe that the art of reason had been cultivated from the time of the early Upaniṣads, we have no reason to disbelieve that vitaṇḍavādins or casuists may have existed both among the Samaṇas and the brahmins at this time, if there is any independent evidence for their existence.

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⁴ *v* Saddanīti, *La Grammaire Palie D'Aggavaṃsa*, Ed Helmer Smith, London, 1928, p 361

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(339) We may therefore inquire whether there was a class of people, who may be called vitaṇḍavādins or casuists in as much as they were primarily interested in displaying their dialectical skill and defeating their opponents, regardless of the nature of the arguments used. Saccaka (*v.* (g), *supra*, 317) to some extent answers to this description. He is described as 'one who indulged in debate, a learned controversialist, who was held in high esteem by the common people' (bhassappavādako paṇḍitavādo sādhu sammato bahujanassa, M. I.227, 237). There is no reason to doubt that he was one 'who excelled in debate' (bhassappavādako, *s.v.* PTS. Dictionary, where it is explained as 'one who proposes disputation, one who is fond of debate and discussions') for otherwise his opponents would not have given him the credit for this. He is said to have held debates (vādena vādaṁ samārabhitā, M. I.250) with the six famous teachers Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, etc. The list includes Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, although he is described as a follower of Nigaṇṭha (nigaṇṭha-putto, M. I.227, 237). It is implied that he defeated them in debate, Saccaka is made to say that when he joined them in debate, they evaded in one way or another (aññena aññaṁ paṭicari, M. I.250), shifted the topic of discussion (bahiddhā kathaṁ apanesi, *loc. cit.*) and showed signs of irritation, anger and displeasure. These are among the recognized 'occasions for censure' (nigrahasthāna, *v. infra*, 372) and their mention here implies that Saccaka was victorious in these debates. Saccaka boasts (or is represented as boasting) about his dialectical skill in magniloquent language.¹ This exaggerated picture of his dialectical attainments is however not justified by his actual performance, at least as reported by his opponents in the Cūla-Saccaka Sutta (M. I.227 ff.) for he falls a victim to a simple dialectical argument of the Buddha. Even if we call him a casuist because of his eagerness merely to display his dialectical skill, according to the picture drawn of him, it is clear even from the presented version of the debate, that Saccaka had his own private convictions and tried to defend them with his own reasons. He holds the theory that the individual (purisapuggalo) is composed of five selves, the bodily self (rūpattā-Skr. rūpātmā, M. I.230), the hedonic self (vedanattā), the mental self (saññattā), the active self (sankhārattā) and the cognitive self (viññānattā) on the grounds that all activities including the possibility of moral behaviour depend on their substantial existence (*loc. cit.*). This theory bears some resemblance to the theory that the person (puruṣaḥ) is composed of five selves (ātmā) as propounded in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (2.².5). The concepts of the selves and their order is not identical, but the two theories are sufficiently similar to bear comparison as may be seen from the following.

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¹ M. I.227 *v.* Oldenberg, *Buddha*, Tr. Hoey, p. 70.

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| *Saccaka* | *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* |
| rūpattā (has bodily form as the soul) | annarasamaya (-ātma)¹ (the soul consisting of the essence of food) |
| sankhārattā (has dispositions as the soul) | ātmā prāṇamayaḥ² (the soul consisting of organic activities) |
| saññattā (has ideation as the soul) | ātmā manomayaḥ (the soul consisting of the mind) |
| viññāṇattā (has cognition as the soul) | ātmā vijñānamayaḥ (the soul consisting of cognition) |
| vedanattā (has feeling as the soul) | ātmā ānandamayaḥ (the soul consisting of bliss) |

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¹ Note that rūpa (bodily form) is described as 'formed of the four great elements and thriving on gross food' (cātummāhābhūtiko kabaḷīkārāhārabhakkho, D. I 186), i.e annamaya (formed of food)

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² The saṅkhāra-s include 'in and out breathing' (assāsapasāsā ... kāyasaṅkhāro, M. I 301), which is equivalent to prāṇa in the Upaniṣads (*v.* Bṛh 3 9 26, Kaṭha, 2 2 5)

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Even the argument that the first ātman is composed of the essence of food since all life that dwells on the earth (prajāḥ ... yāḥ kāś ca pṛthivīm śritāḥ, 2.3 1) depend on food (annād jāyante ... annena vardhante, *loc. cit.*) is similar to Saccaka's argument that man has his body as ātman (rūpattā) because among other things all organic and sentient life (bījagāmabhūtagāma, M I.230) grows to maturity in dependence on the earth (pathaviṁ nissāya, *loc. cit.*) If this Upaniṣadic teaching was not the source of Saccaka's inspiration and he was in fact a strict adherent of Nigaṇṭha's doctrine (*v.* DPPN., Vol. 2, *s.v.* Saccaka), then the closest teaching to the one that he propounds would be the theory of the five asti-kāyas (jīva, ākāśa, dharma, adharma, pudgala) all of which have a substantial existence, being dravyas,¹ although in that case only two of the astikāyas (i e. jīva and pudgala) would in any way correspond with his five selves (*i.e.* with viññāna and rūpa respectively).² Whatever the origin of Saccaka's theory he seems anxious to defend it and therefore he cannot be called a casuist (vitaṇḍavādī-), who was merely interested in outwitting others in debate in order to display his dialectical skill.

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¹ Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p 161.

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² Cp. Sakkāyadiṭṭhi (Sakkāya=sat kāya?=astikāya? *v.* Franke, *Dīghanikayo*, p 45, Geiger, *Pali Grammar*, para 24; Kern, Toev. II 52; JRAS., 1894, p 324.

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(340) Another set of thinkers who appear *prima facie* to be vitaṇḍavādins are the recluses and brahmins, whom the third school of Sceptics (*v. supra*, 167) feared would engage them in debate. They were described as 'learned (paṇḍitā), subtle (nipuṇā), hairsplitters (vālavedhirūpā), who have mastered the doctrines of others (kataparappavādā)'³ and who go about shattering (vobhindantā) with their intelligence (paññāgatena) the theories put forward (diṭṭhigatāni)' (D. I.26). The fact that they were called 'hairsplitters' who make it their business to study the theories of others in order to controvert them strongly suggests that they were a class of vitaṇḍavādins primarily interested in exhibiting their dialectical skill by defeating their opponents in debate.

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³ Prof Rhys Davids has 'experienced in controversy' (SBB., II.38). The Comy. on M. I 176 gives both meanings, kataparappavāde te viññāta-parappavāde c'eva parehi saddhiṃ katavādaparicaye (MA. II.197).

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(341) There seems to be an eye-witness's account of these 'recluses and brahmins' (samaṇabrāhmaṇā) in action at S.V.73, where Kuṇḍaliya tells the Buddha that he rests in parks (ārāmanisādī) and frequents assemblies (parisāvacaro) and that it is a habit of his to wander in the afternoon from park to park and from pleasaunce to pleasaunce where he sees (passāmi) certain recluses and brahmins (eke samaṇa-brāhmaṇe) holding debates (kathaṃ kathente), merely for the merit of defending their own theories (itivādapamokkhānisaṃsaṃ eva) and of censuring (their opponents' theories) (upārambhānisaṃsaṃ).

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(342) The only other place in the Nikāyas, where the two terms occur together is in the Alagaddūpama Sutta where it is said, te (i.e. ekacce moghapurisā) upārambhānisaṃsā c'eva dhammaṃ pariyāpunanti itivādapamokkhānisaṁsā, which Miss Horner translates ‘they master this dhamma simply for the advantage of reproaching others and for the advantage of gossiping’ (M.L.S. I.171). Itivādapamokkhānisaṁsatthaṁ (A. II.26) has likewise been rendered by Woodward as ‘concerned with a flood of gossip’ (G.S II.28). This sense is favoured by the PTS. Dictionary as well, which explains itivāda- (*s v*) as ‘speaking so and so, talk, gossip’ and itivādappamokkha- (*s.v.* pamokkha-) as ‘pouring out gossip’. But this is a sense which does not at all suit the translation of the term vādapamokkhāya in the sentence, ‘cara vādapamokkhāya’ (D. I.8) where Prof. Rhys Davids following the Comy. and the demands of the context has translated the phrase as ‘set to work to clear your views’ (SBB., II.15) although in a footnote (fn. 3) he has suggested Gogerly’s alternative rendering ‘(depart) that you may be freed from this disputation’ on the grounds that the parallel passage at M. I.133 seems to support such a meaning. Prof Rhys Davids calls this ‘the only parallel passage’ (*loc. cit.*) but in fact the word vādapamokkha- occurs elsewhere (A. II.9, S. V.73) and Gogerly’s rendering certainly would not suit S. V.73, for these ‘recluses and brahmins’ could surely not have been discussing or debating (kathaṁ kathenti) ‘for the advantage of being freed from discussion’.

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(343) We would favour the commentarial explanation which is supported by the etymology of the word, the several contexts as well as by independent evidence. Commenting on itivādappamokkhānisaṁsā (M I.133), it is said that it means ‘for the advantage of (ānisaṁsā) defending (*lit.* freeing) one’s theory (vādapamokkha-) in this manner (evaṁ)’.¹ This is further explained as ‘when one’s opponents (pare) raise objections (*lit.* impute defects, dose āropite) to one’s own theory (sakavāde), then we shall remove those objections (*lit.* free it from that defect, taṁ dosaṁ mocessāma) in such and such a manner’.² Upārambhānisaṁsā is likewise explained as ‘for the advantage of finding fault (*lit.* imputing defects, dosāropanānisaṁsā) with a theory of one’s opponents (paresam vāde)’.³ So what is meant according to this explanation is that some people learn the Dhamma either for the mere sake of defending it against others’ criticisms or for the sake of criticizing with its help the theories of others And this is condemned, for the Dhamma according to this Sutta is to be regarded as a plan of action and not as a theory to be clung to and pitted against other theories in debate either for the purposes of defending it or criticizing with its aid opposing theories. The moral that the Dhamma should not be studied purely out of a dialectical interest in it possibly reflects the intellectual climate of these times, when theories were being defended and attacked largely for the sake of displaying one's dialectical skill. It confirms the picture that we get from the statement of Kundaliya who reported that he saw recluses and brahmins in parks defending and attacking theories merely for the advantage of (ānisamsam eva) of such defence (itivādappamokkha-) and attack (upārambha-).

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¹ Evam vādappamokkhānisaṁsā, MA II 107

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² Parehi sakavāde dose āropite taṁ dosaṁ evaṁ ca evaṁ ca mocessāmā ti iminā ca kāraṇena pariyāpunanti ti attho, MA. II 107

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³ Paresaṁ vāde dosāropanānisaṁsā, MA II 106, 107

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(344) According to the Nyāyasūtra (1.2.1) a debate (vāda) comprises 'defence and attack' (sādhana-upālambha), the defence of one's own theory by means of the genuine criteria of knowledge (pramāna) and the criticism of one's opponent's theory by means of indirect arguments (tarka). But when defence and attack become an end in itself merely for the sake of victory in debate and any means are employed for the purpose it is called jalpa (yathoktopapannaś chalajātinigrahasthāna-sādhanopālambho jalpah, N.S. 1.2.3). The usage of this term in the Caraka Samhitā, as we saw above (*v. supra*, 337), was somewhat different. Here jalpa- and vitandā were not used in a derogatory sense and jalpa- was defined as proving one's own theory on its own grounds and vitandā as 'merely imputing faults to one's opponent's theory' (*parapakse dosavacanamātram eva*). One may compare this definition of vitandā *with* the Pāli commentarial definition of upārambha as *paresam vāde dosāropanam*, i e. imputing defects to the theory of one's opponents. Now upālambha also occurs in the Caraka Samhitā as a technical term and is defined as 'the imputation of defect to the reason adduced' (upālambho nāma hetor dosavacanam, 3.8.6.51) and this in the context of the debate would be very similar to vitandā as understood in both the Caraka Samhitā and the Nyāya Sūtra.

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(345) From the above, we cannot fail to observe the identity in word and meaning between upārambha- as used in the Pāli passages in the context of the debate and upālambha as used in the Nyāyasūtra and as defined in the Caraka Samhitā (Skr. upālambha- > P. upārambha-, *v.* Geiger, Pali Literatur und Sprache, p. 60, section 45). It is also in sense not strictly distinguishable from vitandā as defined both in the Caraka Samhitā and the N.S. One can also observe a certain similarity in meaning between sādhana as employed in the N.S., jalpa as used in the Caraka Saṃhitā and itivāda-ppamokkha- as used in the Pāli Nikāyas and as explained in the Comy. The difference is that while sādhana and jalpa are used in the positive sense of proving one's own thesis, itivādapamokkha- has a negative connotation of defending one's own theory against the defects imputed to it by one's opponents

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(346) Since these ardent dialecticians are said to have been primarily motivated by the advantage of (anisaṃsā) of successful defence or attack, it is not unlikely that at least some of them were vitaṇḍavādins in the later sense of the term but in the absence of any authentic samples of these debates and in our ignorance of the kind of reasoning employed by them we cannot adjudicate on this problem with any degree of certitude.

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(347) The use of jalpa and vitaṇḍā in a non-derogatory sense in the Caraka Saṃhitā is, however, not without significance, since it probably harks back to a time when the dialectical devices of these debaters were not still recognized as casuistry and the distinction between good and bad reasoning was either not drawn or was very thin. Victory and defeat depended largely on the whims of the audience (pariṣad) and the decision would have varied greatly with the nature of the audience for some audiences are said to be learned (jñānavatī pariṣad, C.S. 3.8 6.13) and others foolish (mūḍhapariṣad, CS, *loc cit*). The Caraka Saṃhitā speaks of the expedient of not debating further with a person who is anxious to continue a debate once the audience has shouted him down as having been vanquished.¹ It is obvious that the prejudices and beliefs of the audience played a large part in the decisions they gave. This at least appears to be the view of the Buddha, who recounts the following situations in which the decisions of the audience (parisā) need not be objective when it is acclaimed that someone is learned and victorious:

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