Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c11.76
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c11.76
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c11.76
II.161). The question is put in its four logically alternative forms and dismissed with the answer ‘do not (ask) thus’ (mā h’evam, *loc. cit.*). This means that the question is a thapanīya-pañha. The reason given is that, ‘in talking thus one ascribes phenomenal reality¹ to what is not phenomenally real’ (iti vadam appapañcam papañceti, *loc. cit.*). The realm of sensory and mind experience constitutes the realm of the phenomenally real (yāvatā channam phassāyatanānam gati, tāvatā papañcassa gati, yāvatā papañcassa gati, tāvatā channam phassāyatanānam gati, *loc. cit.*) and with the cessation of the former, the latter ceases to be for oneself (channam ... asesāvirāganirodhā papañcavūpasamo, *loc. cit* ) The objection to the question seems to be that the question imputes to transcendent reality the characteristics of ‘existence’, ‘non-existence’, etc., which have a valid application only within the realm of experience ²
Cites (1)
- Mahākoṭṭhikasutta — Pāli