Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c11: Chapter VI: Analysis and Meaning
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c11
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Chapter VI: Analysis and Meaning
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(443) In this Chapter we propose to examine the nature of the analytical outlook, which is one of the features of the thought of the Pāli Canon. It is to this outlook that we have to trace the tendency towards classification, definition and the delimitation of the meaning of terms, which becomes very marked in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka Earlier in the Nikāyas the analytical approach, combined with an empiricism, results in certain important insights and observations with regard to the meaning of propositions.
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(444) The cautious critical and analytical approach towards the study of the nature of things is undoubtedly an inheritance of Buddhism from the mood of the age in which it takes its rise. The Materialists had discarded all that was hitherto taken on faith or trust in the most hallowed of traditions and contrasted baseless belief with the knowledge of what can be directly perceived and proved on the basis of perception. The Sceptics went a step further and denied the possibility of knowledge altogether, in the face of a medly of conflicting theories and probably doubted the evidence of the senses as well (*v. supra*, 154). All this could not but have an impact on the elite of the age, the *viññū purisā*, perhaps typified by a person like Pāyāsi (*v. supra*, 136 ff.), who tried to salvage what he could of the old beliefs with the new methodology and critical outlook though with negative results.
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(445) Since Buddhism tried to appeal to this intelligentsia (*v. supra*, 358), it could not afford to establish itself by dogmatic appeals, but had to rely on rational persuasion based on a critical outlook. The appeal to reason seems to have been quite common at this time, judging by the fact that both the orthodox as well as their opponents resorted to it. The Buddhist and Jain works, as we have seen (*v. supra*, 378 ff.), mention many metaphysical theories belonging to diverse schools of thought, orthodox and heterodox, which were rationally constructed if not rationally defended against each other. The Maitrī Upaniṣad reinforces and confirms what we learn from the heterodox literature (*v. supra*, 77). It stresses the importance of basing our claims to knowledge on valid means of knowledge. At the same time it presents a picture of the atmosphere of confusion and controversy which was a product of the rational temper of the age. It mentions the ‘hindrances to knowledge’ (jñānopasargāḥ, 7 8) present at this time when there were those ‘who love to distract the believers in the Veda by the jugglery of false arguments, comparisons and paralogisms’ (ye ... vṛthā tarka-dṛṣṭānta-kuhakendrajālair vaidikeṣu pariṣṭhātum icchanti, *loc. cit.*). It warns Vedic students not to associate with them (taih saha na saṃvaset, *loc. cit.*) and laments that ‘the world disturbed by false reasoning (*lit.* false comparisons and proofs) does not discern the difference between the wisdom of the Vedas and the rest of knowledge’ (... mithyā-dṛṣṭānta-hetubhiḥ bhrāmyan loko na jānāti veda-vidyāntarantu yat, *loc. cit.*).
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(446) In the face of a critical audience, those who wished to propagate their doctrines, had to be critical themselves. It is not surprising therefore that the leader of the Jains recommends the importance of ‘analysis’ or ‘vibhajyavāda’ (*v. supra*, 233) in the exposition of doctrines and the Buddha himself claims to be ‘an analyst and not (a dogmatist), who makes categorical assertions’ (vibhajjavādo . . aham . . . nāham . . . ekaṃsavādo, M II.197).
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(447) What is meant by this claim is clear from the context. The Buddha is asked for his opinion as to the truth of the two propositions: ‘The householder succeeds in attaining what is right, just and good’ (gahattho ārādhako hoti ñāyam dhammaṃ kusalam, *loc. cit.*), ‘the monk does not succeed in attaining what is right, just and good’ (na pabbajito ārādhako hoti ñāyam dhammaṃ kusalam, *loc. cit.*). The Buddha says that one cannot make a categorical assertion (na . . ekaṃsavādo) as to the truth or falsity of propositions of this sort.¹ In the case of the first of the above propositions, if the subject had the characteristic, micchā-paṭipanna- (of bad conduct), then the proposition is false, but if the subject had the opposite characteristic (i.e sammā-paṭipanna-, ‘of good conduct’), the proposition would be true (*loc. cit.*). It is implied that there are certain propositions of which it is not possible to say whether they are true or false, without clearing up ambiguities and making certain qualifications and the Buddha is an analyst in so far as he analyses such propositions and makes the requisite qualifications without asserting that they are categorically true or false.
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¹ More examples are given in this Sutta
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(448) This is similar to though not identical with the Jain point of view, which advocates the attitude of non-absolutism or anekāntavāda with regard to the truth-value of propositions. Propositions according to Jainism are true or false only in respect of certain standpoints or nayas (*v. supra*, 228) and not in any absolute or categorical sense. This means that certain qualifications have to be made or the naya (standpoint) in respect of which the proposition is asserted has to be specified before we can ascertain its truth or falsity.
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(449) While in the case of Jainism no proposition could in theory be asserted to be categorically true or false, irrespective of the standpoint from which it was made, in Buddhism such categorical assertions were considered possible in the case of some propositions. But the fact that the Buddha did not make a categorical assertion as to the truth-value of some propositions (e.g. the avyākata-s or unanswered questions),¹ the truth of which was being hotly debated at this time (*v. supra*, 378) seemed to have earned him the reputation in certain circles of being one who did not make any categorical assertions at all. The wandering ascetic Poṭṭhapāda says 'we do not know of any categorical doctrine preached by the recluse Gotama' (na kho pana mayam kiñci samaṇassa Gotamassa ekaṃsikaṃ dhammaṃ desitaṃ jānāma, D. I.189) supporting this statement of his, by referring to the fact that the Buddha has not categorically declared that any of the avyākata-theses were either true or false. The Buddha in reply says, 'I have taught and laid down doctrines (of which it is possible to make) categorical (assertions) and I have taught and laid down doctrines (of which it is not possible to make) categorical (assertions)' (ekaṃsikā pi . . . mayā dhammā desitā paññattā, anekaṃsikā pi . . . mayā dhammā desitā paññattā, D. I.191). The former are illustrated by the example of the four noble truths² and the latter by the avyākata-theses.³
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¹ We are using this word to denote the ten unanswered questions considered as propositions in the indicative form (*v supra*, 378)
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² Katame . . ekaṃsikā dhammā desitā . . ? 'Idaṃ dukkhan ti, etc', D. I 191.
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³ Katame . . anekaṃsikā dhammā desitā . . ? 'Sassato loko' ti vā . ., etc., *loc cit*
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Prof. Rhys Davids translates ekamsika- here as ‘certain’ (SBB, Vol II, p. 256) and anekamsika- as ‘uncertain’ (*loc cit*) but this is a strictly incorrect rendering of ekamsika- and anekamsika-. The PTS. Dictionary also supports this translation; it explains ekamsika- as ‘certain’ and anekamsika- as ‘uncertain, indefinite’ in referring to this context (*s.v.* ekamsika-). Indefinite is certainly better than ‘uncertain’ in bringing out the epistemological import of the word, if it could mean a proposition of which ‘one cannot definitely say that it is true or false’ not because of any uncertainty on the part of the knowing subject but on the very nature of the proposition itself (*v. infra*, 477) In the contexts of ekamsa- (M. I.393) and ekamsa-vāda- (M. II 197, A V. 190) the word clearly means a categorical assertion as opposed to a conditional assertion (vibhajja-vāda-) Here a conditional assertion (vibhajja-vāda-) would be an anekamsa- (or anekamsika-) vāda In Jainism the two classes coincided For according to the anekāntavāda, only conditional assertions (note, vibhajjavāyaṁ ca viyāgarejjā, *v. supra*, 233) were possible. The obvious similarity of the etymology and meaning of the two words, anekamsika- and anekānta- may also be noted. Anekamsika = an + ek(a) + aṁs(a) + ika and anekānta- = an + ek(a) + anta and while aṁsa means ‘part, corner or edge’ (*s.v.* aṁsa, PTS. Dictionary) anta means ‘end or edge’.
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(450) But in Buddhism it is necessary to note that while not all propositions were anekamsika, those which were, fell into at least two categories, (1) those which after analysis (vibhajja-) could be known to be true or false (*v. supa*, 447), and (2) those like the avyākata-theses, which could not be thus known. Besides, in the Pāli Canon there was nothing strictly corresponding to the naya-doctrine of the Ājīvakas and the Jains, although the theory of double truth (*v infra*, 615, 618) functions in a way essentially like the naya-theory. In Jainism all statements would be relative (anaikāntika-) because of the relativity of the standpoints. In Buddhism one could not say of all non-categorical statements (anekamsika-) that they were true or false from some standpoint or another. In a sense we may say this of the propositions, which it was considered necessary to analyse further before determining their truth or falsity. Thus we could say that the proposition, ‘gahattho ārādhako hoti ñāyam dhammaṁ kusalam’ (*v. supra*, 447) is true from one point of view, namely if ‘gahattho’ is qualified by ‘sammā-paṭipanno’ but is false from another point of view namely if ‘gahattho’ is qualified by ‘micchā-paṭipanno’. But in the case of the avyākata-theses it was not possible to determine their truth or falsehood even after analysis or from any point of view (however, *v.* infra, 814).
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(451) So while the analytic approach appears to be partly inspired by the Jain example, it takes a different turn in Buddhism, when we consider the epistemology of the two systems.
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(452) The division of statements according to their truth-value into the categorical and the non-categorical and the latter into the analysable and the non-analysable which seems to be implied by the contexts referred to above, is reflected in the analysis of questions which are said to be of four types. It is said that 'a person is not a fit person to debate (or discuss with) if he, when asked a question does not categorically explain a question which ought to be categorically explained, does not analytically explain a question which ought to be explained analytically, does not explain with a counter-question a question which ought to be explained with a counter-question and does not set aside a question which ought to be set aside'.¹ In the same context a person who does the opposite is said to be a 'fit person to debate with' (kaccho hoti, *loc. cit*). More generally it stated elsewhere that 'there are these four kinds of explanations of questions' (cattar'imāni ... pañha-vyākaraṇāni, A. II.46). The four are as follows:
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¹ Sacāyam ... puggalo pañhaṁ puttho samāno ekaṁsa-vyākaraṇīyaṁ pañhaṁ na ekaṁsena vyākaroti, vibhajja-vyākaraṇīyaṁ pañhaṁ na vibhajja vyākaroti, paṭipucchā-vyākaraṇīyaṁ pañhaṁ na paṭipucchā vyākaroti, thapanīyaṁ pañhaṁ na ṭhapeti, evaṁ santāyaṁ ... puggalo akaccho hoti, A. I 197
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(1) pañho *ekamsa-vyākaraṇīyo*, *i.e.* a question which ought to be explained categorically.
(2) pañho *paṭipucchā-vyākaraṇīyo*, i e. a question which ought to be replied with a counter-question.
(3) pañho *ṭhapanīyo*, i e. a question that should be set aside.
(4) pañho *vibhajja-vyākaraṇīyo*, *i.e.* a question which ought to be explained analytically.
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(453) It may be noticed that the order in which these questions are mentioned is different from that of the previous passage, but a verse that follows, which may possibly be earlier than the prose passage, preserves the order at A. I.197:
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*ekamsa-vacanaṁ ekaṁ vibhajja-vacanaṁ paraṁ*
*tatiyaṁ paṭipuccheyya catutthaṁ pana ṭhāpaye,*
@H *loc. cit.*
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(454) It is possible that the earliest division was into (1) ekamsavyākaraṇīya-pañha- and (2) anekamsa-vyākara-nīyapañha- corresponding to the two kinds of statements (ekamsikā dhammā and anekamsikā dhammā) mentioned at D. I 191. Later, the latter class would have been subdivided into the (a) vibhajja-vyākaraṇīya- and the (b) thapanīya-, corresponding to the two classes of statements that were not ekamsika- (*v. supra*, 450). Paṭipucchā-vyākaraṇīya is, in fact, a sub-class of vibhajja-vyākaraṇīya, as will be seen below.
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(455) Although this classification of questions is found in the Nikāyas, nowhere in the Pāli Canon is there an attempt to explain and illustrate what is meant by these four kinds of questions We have to seek these explanations in the Comy. to the Aṅguttara Nikāya (AA. II.308, 309), the Milindapañha (pp. 144, 145), the Abhidharmakośa,¹ the Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā² and Poussin's account of the Abhidharmakośa commentaries ³
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¹ 5 22, Ed R Saṅkṛtyāyana, Benares, 1955, p 137
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² Yaśomitra, Ed U Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932–6, pp 465–7
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³ *v* L'Abhidharmakośa, Poussin, Vol 5, sections 21, 22
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(456) The Mahāvyutpatti (83, p. 29) records the four kinds of explanations (of questions) in the order in which they are stated in the Aṅguttara verse (*v. supra*, 453) and the prose passage at A. I 197 (*v supra*, 452): ekamsa-vyākaraṇam, vibhajya-, paripṛcchā-, sthāpanīyavyākaraṇam. The only innovation it makes is to add vyākaraṇam after sthāpanīya- whereas the Pāli account (A. II 46) merely says thapanīya-, while mentioning vyākaraṇa- along with the other three types. We cannot deduce from this that thapanīya- 'setting aside' was not really considered an explanation of the question since there is the mention of, *cattāri . . . . pañhavyākaraṇāni* (*loc cit*).
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(457) While the Pāli Abhidhamma is strangely silent about these questions, the Abhidharmakośa records a verse mentioning not only the four types of questions but four examples illustrating them as well, viz.
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ekāṁśena vibhāgena pṛcchātaḥ sthāpanīyataḥ
vyākṛtam maraṇotpattivisiṣṭātmānyatādivat,
*loc. cit*
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(458) These examples, as will be observed, are different from those we meet with in the Pāli tradition and we cannot assume that the original division in the Nikāyas was intended to be illustrated by examples of the sort adduced, especially when we find that there was no agreement in this regard within the non-Pāli traditions themselves. This does not mean that we can trust the Pāli tradition as giving a wholly correct account of the four types of questions and it is necessary to examine the illustrations in the light of what we can glean from the Nikāyas themselves as to the meaning of these questions.
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(459) There is little doubt about the kind of question to which a categorical reply is due, although there is no attempt to demarcate its exact logical boundaries. The Milindapañha gives the example of the impermanence of the skandhas (i.e. the constituent factors of one's personality) and puts the question in the form 'rūpam aniccan ti? vedanā ... saññā ... sankhārā ... viññānam aniccan ti?' (i e. Is form impermanent? Feelings ... ideas ... conative dispositions ... cognition impermanent? p. 145). The Ābhidharmikas,¹ explained in the Vyākhyā as the satpādābhidharmapāthin-s,² i.e. most probably the Sarvāstivāda school³ give the same example among other examples.⁴ So do the Mahāsanghikas.⁵ Buddhaghosa gives the example of 'cakkhum aniccam?' (i e. Is the eye impermanent? AA. II.308)—to which we must answer categorically 'āma, aniccam' (i.e. yes, it is impermanent). All the above examples are taken from the Nikāyas themselves.⁶
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¹ Vibhāṣā 15.13; *v.* Poussin, *op cit*, Vol V, p. 45, fn 3.
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² *Ibid.*
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³ Cp. Jñānaprasthānaśāstra of Katyāyanīputra, Tr. and Ed S. B Śāstri, Vol I, Śāntiniketan, 1955, Foreword, 'Of the seven Sarvāstivāda texts, the *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* is the principal work and the other six which are called *pāda* are only supplements to it.'
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⁴ Poussin, *op. cit*, Vol V, p 45
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⁵ Poussin, *op cit*, Vol V, p 47.
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⁶ *v* S II.124 and S. II 244 ff
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(460) The clearest example of a categorical question which the Nikāyas would have envisaged would be one based on the assertion that the ekamsikā dhammā were the four truths (*v. supra*, 449). The question would be of the form, 'Is the world full of suffering?' It is possibly an attempt to base their illustrations on these examples which led the Ābhidharmikas to mention the following questions as categorically answerable, viz. 'Le doleur est-elle bien définie ... le chemin est-il bien défini?' (Poussin, *op. cit.*, p. 45).
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(461) The example given by the Vaibhāṣikas in the Abhidharmakośakārikā is the question of the form, sarve mariṣyantī ti, i.e. does everyone die?⁷ to which one should reply categorically, mariṣyanti, i.e. they die.
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⁷ Poussin, *op cit*, Vol V, p. 44.
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(462) There is no agreement in the different traditions in the examples given to illustrate the nature of a question which ought to be answered after analysis. The Milindapañha gives the example, ‘aniccam pana rūpan ti?’ (i e. impermanent, it seems, is matter?) after giving ‘rūpam aniccan ti?’ as an example of a categorically answerable question. Buddhaghosa, who seems to be following the model of the Milindapañha in framing his examples, has ‘aniccam nāma cakkhun ti?’ (i e. impermanent, it seems, is the eye?) as an example of this type of question (after giving cakkhum aniccan ti? as an example of the first type). Both these examples do not seem to differ in principle from the examples given by them to illustrate the categorical question, since these examples admit of a categorical reply. Thus the answer one would normally expect to the question, ‘aniccam pana rūpan ti?’ would be a straightforward ‘yes’ or ‘āma, aniccam rūpam’ But both the Milindapañha as well as Buddhaghosa seem to find that this question has a certain ambiguity or obliqueness, which has to be cleared up analytically when answering it Thus the suggested answer to aniccam nāma cakkhun ti? is ‘na cakkhum eva sotam pi aniccam, ghānam pi aniccam ...’ *i.e.* ‘it is not the eye alone (that is impermanent), the ear and the organ of smell are impermanent as well’. Thus, this kind of answer is intended to clear up any ambiguities in the questions concerned.
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(463) The Abhidharmakośakārikā illustrates this question with the example, ‘sarve janiṣyantī ti?’¹ for which the suggested reply is ‘sakleśā janiṣyanti na nikleśa’, i e. as Poussin translates, ‘les êtres revêtus de passion naîtront; les êtres exempts de passion ne naîtront pas’ (*loc. cit.*). At first sight it would seem that this question too admits of a categorical reply; one may answer the question by saying, na sarve janiṣyanti, i e. all are not born. This is, in fact, the suggestion of Bhadanta Rāma who ‘disent que la deuxième question appelle, comme la premiére, une réponse catégorique ...’ (Poussin, *op. cit*, p. 45) But if the purpose of an answer is to clear up as far as possible the doubts of the question it is not served by this kind of reply. Na sarve janiṣyanti, may mean that ‘no one is reborn’ or that ‘some are reborn’. If it means the second, one would still not be certain as to which types of persons would be reborn and which not. The suggested answer apparently clears up these doubts in the mind of the questioner by analytically examining the doubts and ambiguities implicit in the question. So we cannot entirely agree with Bhadanta Rāma's dissent.
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¹ *Ibid*, i e ‘Is everyone reborn?’
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(464) The Ābhidharmikas give a much more elaborate example.¹ If a deceitful person desires instruction about the dharmas, he should make distinctions and say in reply that the dharmas are numerous, past, future and present and ask him about which dharmas he wants to know. If he replies that he wants to know about past dharmas, he should distinguish and say that past dharmas are many such as rūpa, samjñā, etc., and ask him about which past dharmas he wishes to know. If he asks about rūpa one should distinguish and say that there are three rūpas, good, bad and undefined. This is a very unsatisfactory example. To say, 'Je désire que le Vénérable me dise les *dharmas*'² is strictly not to ask a question. The question would strictly be, 'What are the dharmas?' to which it would be possible to answer categorically by enumerating all the dharmas and making in the process the necessary distinctions as well. Besides it is necessary to find out the intentions of the questioner before deciding upon the nature of the question and it is therefore not surprising that the Ābhidharmikas should say that 'le même question, posée par un homme perfide, est la question à laquelle il faut répondre par question' (Poussin, *op. cit.*, 46). Even without this complication the suggested answer contains a counter-question (e.g. les dharmas sont nombreux, passes, futures, presents. Lesquels désires-tu que je dise?) and it would therefore be difficult to distinguish it from the third type of question. We cannot therefore consider this as a valid example of a vibhajja-vyākaraṇīya question as understood in the Nikāyas.
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¹ Poussin, *op. cit.*, p 46.
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² *Ibid.*
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(465) An example of such a question is mentioned in the Nikāyas in another context than that which we have already discussed (*v. supra*, 447). It is said that 'the foolish person Samiddhi gave a categorical reply to a question of the wandering ascetic Potaliputta, which ought to have been replied after analysis' (Samiddhinā moghapurisena Potaliputtassa paribbājakassa vibhajja-byākaraṇīyo pañho ekaṃsena byākato, M. III.208). The question referred to is, 'sañcetanikaṃ ... kammam katvā kāyena vācāya manasā, kiṃ so vediyatī ti?' (i.e. having performed a volitional act with one's body, speech or mind, what does he experience?, M. III.207). Samiddhi replies this categorically saying, 'sañcetanikaṃ ... kammam katvā kāyena vācāya manasā dukkhaṃ so vediyatī ti' (having performed a volitional act with one's body, speech or mind one experiences suffering, *loc. cit*). This reply is erroneous probably because the term sañcetanikaṃ kammaṃ (volitional act) is ambiguous and can mean (i) sañcetanikaṃ kusalaṃ kammaṃ (a good volitional act), (ii) sañcetanikaṃ akusalaṃ kammaṃ (an evil volitional act), or (iii) sañcetanikaṃ avyākataṃ kammaṃ (a neutral volitional act) and the reply will differ in each case. The Mahāsaṅghikas seem to have noticed this instance in the Nikāyas and give it as an example of this kind of question (Poussin, *op. cit.*, p 47). The analysis (vibhajya) required in answering this kind of question consists therefore in clearing up the ambiguities implicit or even remotely implied in the terms or the form in which the question is put.
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(466) The third kind of question, the paṭipucchāvyākaraṇīya-, appears in fact to be only a subdivision of the second type, since the necessity for the counter-question is again due to the ambiguities in the original question, which in fact can be cleared up by an analytical answer instead of putting the onus on the questioner by asking him what he means by this or that term The Milindapañha in illustrating this type of question merely gives the example, ‘cakkhunā sabbaṃ vijānāti ti’ (does one know everything with the eye? *loc. cit*) but does not tell us what the counter-question should be The counter-question probably would be a request to clear up the ambiguity of ‘sabbaṃ’ by asking, sabbaṃ rūpaṃ udāhu sabbaṃ saddaṃ .. ? (Is it every form or every sound or ... ?). The question is therefore not logically different from a question of the second kind since it could be analytically answered as follows cakkhunā sabbaṃ rūpaṃ vijānāti, api ca na sabbaṃ saddaṃ vijānāti ..., i e one knows every form with the eye but one does not know any sound ... Buddhaghosa gives the example, ‘yathā cakkhuṃ tathā sotaṃ, yathā sotaṃ tathā cakkhun ti’ (Is the eye the same as the ear and the ear the same as the eye? *loc. cit*) It is said that one should counter-question the questioner and ask him in what sense he is using the word ‘same’. If he answers that it is ‘in the sense of seeing’ (dassanatthena) one's reply should be ‘no’ and if it is ‘in the sense of impermanence’ (aniccatthena) one's reply should be ‘yes’ It is clear that this ambiguity could have been dealt with, without the necessity for the counter-question
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(467) The Abhidharmakośakārikā gives the example, ‘Is man superior or inferior?’ (Poussin, *op. cit.*, p 44). One should reply this with the question, ‘In relation to whom?’ (*loc. cit.*) and if he says, ‘In relation to the gods' (*loc. cit.*), he should reply 'he is inferior' (*loc. cit.*), but if he says, 'In relation to the beings of the lower worlds' (êtres des mauvaises destinées, *loc. cit.*), he should reply, 'he is superior' (*loc. cit.*). Here again the counter-question which is necessitated by the ambiguity of the terms 'viśiṣṭa-' (superior) and 'hīna' (inferior) may be cleared up in the very first answer by specifying the senses in which man is inferior and superior respectively. Bhadanta Rāma thought that this question was of the first type and one could reply it categorically as follows: 'L'homme, en effet, est en même temps supérieur et inférieur d'après le point de comparaison' (Poussin, *op. cit.*, p. 45). But this is a mistake since in specifying, 'd'après le point de comparison' one is making an 'analysis'. The Ābhidharmikas, as we have already remarked, do not strictly distinguish this type of question from the second. It is the same question as the second, which becomes paṭipucchā-vyākaraṇīya and is intended to confuse and confound the questioner when he happens to be a deceitful person (śaṭha) (*v.* Poussin, *op. cit.*, p 46)
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(468) The Mahāsaṅghikas have the merit of picking on an example taken directly from the Nikāyas When the Buddha is asked the question, saññā nu kho ... purisassa attā, udāhu aññā saññā añño attā, i.e. is consciousness a person's soul or is consciousness one thing and the soul another? D. I 185, he replies with the question, kiṃ pana tvaṃ ... attānaṃ paccesi, i.e. what do take to be the soul?, *loc. cit.* The Mahāsaṅghikas give this same example.¹ In this context perhaps the counter-question may be justified for one of the words (attā, soul) used by the questioner admitted of such a variety of usages at this time that no one but the user could have known exactly the sense in which he was employing the term. But even here it may be noted that the reply is based on an analysis of the meaning of the term attā.
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¹ Poussin, *op. cit.*, p 47, Poussin has mistakenly given the reference as Dīgha, i. 195 when it should be D. I 185
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(469) The next kind of question mentioned, the ṭhapanīya-, is interesting in so far as it seems to have a modern parallel in the kind of question which the Positivist dismisses as meaningless and therefore unanswerable. The Milindapañha (p. 145), the Aṅguttara Comy.² (AA. II.309), the Mahāsaṅghikas (Poussin, *op. cit.*, p. 48), and even Ābhidharmikas (Poussin, *op cit*, p. 47) agree in giving the avyākata-theses in question form as examples of this kind of question. The Mahāsaṅghikas mention fourteen theses by extending the theses, antavā loko and sassato loko, into the four logical alternatives (*v. infra*, 571) instead of the two, but curiously enough this extension is not made in the Pāli Canon, which knows of only ten avyākata-theses
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² Here it is said, taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīran ti ādīni puṭṭhena pana, 'avyākataṃ etaṃ Bhagavatā'ti ṭhapetabbo, i e when questioned whether the 'soul is the same as the body', etc, one should set it aside as unexplained by the Exalted One.
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(470) There is no doubt that these theses were regarded in the Nikāyas as those doctrines about which no categorical assertion was made (*v. supra*, 449). At M. I 426 it was said yān'imāni diṭṭhigatāni Bhagavatā abyākatāni thapitāni paṭikkhittāni—sassato loko iti pi asassato loko iti pi ..., *i.e.* those metaphysical theories which have not been explained and *which have been set aside* and rejected by the Exalted One (*v. supra*, 377). This shows that the Nikāyas clearly recognized these questions as those which were to be set aside.
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(471) The problem is why these questions were set aside Buddhaghosa defines a thapanīya pañha as 'a question which ought not to be explained and which ought to be set aside on the ground that it was not explained by the Exalted One' (avyākatam etaṃ Bhagavatā ti thapetabbo, eso pañho na vattabbo, ayam thapanīyo pañho, AA. II 309). This is not very helpful, for he is virtually saying that these questions ought to be set aside because they have been set aside by the Buddha. But the problem really is why the Buddha considered these questions as 'those which ought to be set aside'.
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(472) Did these questions have a certain property which made them unanswerable or were they in principle answerable categorically or analytically though set aside for a special reason. If the latter was the case, the questions do not belong to a logically different type whereas if the former is the case, they would fall into a class of their own. It is also possible that the questions which were classified as thapanīya were a mixed lot, of which some were to be set aside for the former reason and others for the latter.
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(473) We have discussed in a later Chapter what consideration lead us to conclude that these questions were 'to be set aside' (thapanīya) on pragmatic grounds since belief in any of the possible answers was considered irrelevant and otiose for our purpose (*v. infra*, 814) It is possible to argue that these questions were regarded to be in principle answerable categorically though dismissed for pragmatic reasons but it is necessary to note that nowhere is it directly stated that these beliefs were either categorically true or categorically false. They were only pacceka-saccas (individual or partial truths, *v. infra*, 599–601) and a product of wrong reflection.¹ When we consider all the evidence it is clear that at least some of these questions were considered to have such a logical nature that no answer or no categorical answer could be given to them.
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¹ '... Sassato loko ... asassato loko ... antavā loko ... anantavā loko ... ayam ... diṭṭhi... ayonisomanasikārahetu uppannā ..., A V.187.
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(474) Four of the avyākata-questions concern the existence of the Tathāgata (*v. supra*, 378) after death. If a categorical asnwer to the question as to whether the Tathāgata exists or is born (upapajjati, *v. infra*, 477) after death was possible, it should be possible to say according to the laws of logic (*v. infra*, 582, 583) that one of the four alternatives must be true. Now we observe that the Buddha takes the four (logically) possible answers and shows that none of them 'fit the case' (upeti), or adequately describe the situation, viz. upapajjatī ti ... na upeti na upapajjatī ti ... na upeti, upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatī ti ... na upeti, n'eva upapajjati na na upapajjatī ti ... upeti, i.e. (to say) that he is born ... does not fit the case, that he is not born ... does not fit the case, that he is and is not born ... does not fit the case, that he is neither born nor not born ... does not fit the case, M. I.486. This means that no categorical answer to the question, vimutta-citto ... kuhiṁ upapajjatī ti? (i e. where is the one whose mind is emancipated ... born? *loc. cit.*), which is in intent the same as the question, hoti Tathagato param maraṇā? i.e. does the Perfect One exist after death?
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(475) Vaccha, the interlocutor in the above context, is confounded by this reply² of the Buddha apparently because he thought that *one* of the logical alternatives *must* be true and says that he has lost whatever faith he derived from the earlier part of the discourse. The Buddha then reassures Vaccha saying that there is no cause here for lack of discernment or confusion and goes on to illustrate with a simile why none of the possible answers 'fit the case'. Since this simile is important we shall reproduce it here:
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² Cp. Etthāhaṁ bho Gotama aññāṇaṁ āpādiṁ, ettha sammohaṁ āpādiṁ ... , M. I.487.
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Buddha: If this fire in front of you were to go out (*lit.* blow *out*), would you know 'this fire in front of me has gone out (*lit. blown out*)' (sace te ... purato so aggi nibbāyeyya jāneyyāsi tvam: ayam me purato aggi nibbuto ti, M. I.487).
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Vaccha: If the fire in front of me were to go out, I would know, 'this fire in front of me has gone out' (sace me ... purato so aggi nibbāyeyya jāneyyāham· ayam me purato aggi nibbuto ti, *loc. cit*).
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Buddha: Now if someone were to ask you, *'this fire in front of you, which has gone out, in which direction has it gone, eastern, western, northern or southern'*, questioned thus, how would you reply? (sace pana tam ... evam puccheyya· yo te ayam purato aggi nibbuto so aggi ito katamam disam gato puratthimam vā pacchimam vā uttaram vā dakkhinam vā ti, evam puttho tvam ... kin ti byākareyyāsī ti?).
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Vaccha: (I would say) It does not fit the case The fire, which blazed on account of the fuel of grass and sticks, comes to be reckoned as (sankham gacchati) 'gone out', since it had consumed (the fuel) and was not fed with more (fuel) (na upeti .. yam hi so .. aggi tina-katthupādānam paticca ajali, tassa ca pariyādānā aññassa ca anupāhārā nibbuto t'eva sankham gacchatī ti, *loc. cit*)
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(476) This simile clearly illustrates that the question, 'in which direction has the fire gone?' is one to which no categorical reply by means of any of the (logical) alternatives is possible by the very nature (logical) of the question. No categorical reply would aptly describe the situation. The question is grammatically correct in its form and appears to have meaning owing to the logic of 'go out' This verb is used with person words and it makes sense in such usages to ask 'in what direction has he gone out?'. A categorical and meaningful answer specifying the direction is possible to this question Now our symbolism or linguistic usage permits us to extend the use of 'go out' for such processes as fires or lights, but in such situations we would be committing a category mistake¹ if we assume that the going out takes place in a specific direction It therefore makes no sense to ask 'in which direction has the fire gone?'² for we would be making a category mistake and thereby asking a nonsensical question, to which no meaningful answer is possible In fact, Wittgenstein gives the same example to illustrate this kind of question which our symbolism apparently permits, though it is based on a confusion of the logic of concepts,¹ 'Thus it can come about that we aren't able to rid ourselves of the implications of our symbolism, which seems to admit of a question like, "Where does the flame of a candle go to when it's blown out?" "Where does the light go to?" We have become obsessed with out symbolism.—We may say that we are led into puzzlement by an analogy which irresistibly drags us on.'²
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¹ *v.* Gilbert Ryle, 'Categories' in, *Logic and Language*, ed A G N Flew, Second Series, p. 75
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² We can ask, 'in which direction did the fire spread?' but this is different.
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¹ Cp. Ninian Smart, *A Dialogue of Religions*, London, 1960, p 47, makes CB. (i e Ceylon Buddhist) say in reference to this assertion, 'The assertion has no clear meaning a flame neither goes North nor in any other direction ...'.
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² Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*, Oxford, 1958, p. 108
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(477) It is therefore clear that the author of this Sutta considered this question as a meaningless one and as falling into a type of questions which were by their very nature (logical) unanswerable and have therefore to be 'set aside'. This question is given as an example to illustrate the nature of the question, 'vimuttacitto ... kuhim upapajjatī ti?' (*v. supra*, 474) which is also said to be one to which no categorical reply is possible and since this is in effect intended to be in intent the same question as, 'hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā?' we may presume that at least these questions were considered to be thapanīya in the sense that 'they ought to be set aside as unanswerable' as, owing to the very form in which the quesion is put, it is strictly meaningless and no meaningful answer in any of the logical alternatives was therefore possible.
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(478) The Abhidharmakośakārikā alone gives the following example to illustrate this kind of question: 'Les *skandhas* sont-ils la même chose que le *sattva* ou être-vivant, ou en sont-ils différents?' (Poussin, *op. cit.*, p. 44). The explanation given clearly classifies it as a meaningless question, that is a question whose logical character is such, as to make it impossible of being answered by a categorical reply. It is said that the term 'être-vivant' in the question does not refer to any entity and it is therefore like the question, 'Is the son of a barren woman white or black?' (*loc. cit.*). Here the descriptive phrase 'the son of a barren woman' does not refer to anything since it is logically impossible for a barren woman to have a son. Hence the question, which asks for the relationship between an existent thing (the *skandhas*) and a non-entity is literally meaningless and has to be set aside. This example does not occur in the Pāli Canon, although it is stated here that the Tathāgata is not to be identified with the skandhas nor considered separate from them (S. III.111; S. IV.383) and Buddhaghosa identifies Tathāgata- with satta- (= a being) though we think he is mistaken in this (*v. supra*, 380). The Sūtra-kṛtāṅga however refers to the Buddhist view as follows: 'Some fools say that there are five skandhas of momentary existence. They do not admit that (the soul) is different from nor identical with (the elements) ...'¹
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¹ Pañca khandhe vayantege, bālā u khana-joïno aṇṇo aṇanṇo nevāhu, heüyaṃ, ca aheüyaṃ, *op cit*, Vol I, fol 25
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(479) There are a number of questions regarded as 'inappropriate questions' (na kallo pañho, *v. infra*) which are set aside in the Nikāyas on the ground that they are literally meaningless. Thus the question 'What is decay and death and of whom is this decay and death?' is said to be 'a misleading question' (na kallo pañho) to ask The reason is given: 'If one were to say "what is decay and death?" and "of whom is this decay and death?" or if one were to say decay and death is one thing and this decay and death belong to another, both these (questions) are the same (in meaning), only the wording is different.'² The question is supposed to assume and imply that the subject of the attributes is ontologically different from the atttributes themselves and is thus considered to give a misleading picture of the facts. In the context are mentioned the two avyākata-theses, 'taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ, aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ' (*S.* II 61, *v. infra*, 814) Such questions which are suggested by the grammar of the language but which give or imply a false or distorted picture of the nature of reality were considered 'inappropriate' (na kallo) and were presumably set aside. A long list of such inappropriate questions of the same model or logical structure are mentioned (*v. loc. cit.*) Elsewhere, the question, 'Who feeds on the food of consciousness?' (ko nu kho ... viññāṇāhāraṃ āhāreti?, S II.13) is given as an example of an inappropriate question Here too the question implies the existence of an agent of the action apart from the action itself Similar questions mentioned in the context are· ko nu kho phusati ... vediyati ... tasati ... upādiyati?, i.e. who indeed (is the agent who) touches ... experiences .. recoils ... grasps? *loc. cit.*).
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² katamaṃ jarāmaraṇaṃ kassa ca panidaṃ jarāmaraṇan ti ıti vā .. yo vadeyya, aññaṃ jarāmaraṇaṃ aññassa ca panıdaṃ jarāmaraṇan ti vā . . yo vadeyya, ubhayam etaṃ ekattaṃ vyañjanaṃ eva nānaṃ, S II 60, 61
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(480) Another example of a somewhat different character from the above is the question 'Is there anything else after complete detachment from and cessation of the six spheres of experiences?' (channaṃ ... phassāyatanānaṃ asesavirāganirodhā atth'aññaṃ kiñcī ti? A.
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II.161). The question is put in its four logically alternative forms and dismissed with the answer ‘do not (ask) thus’ (mā h’evam, *loc. cit.*). This means that the question is a thapanīya-pañha. The reason given is that, ‘in talking thus one ascribes phenomenal reality¹ to what is not phenomenally real’ (iti vadam appapañcam papañceti, *loc. cit.*). The realm of sensory and mind experience constitutes the realm of the phenomenally real (yāvatā channam phassāyatanānam gati, tāvatā papañcassa gati, yāvatā papañcassa gati, tāvatā channam phassāyatanānam gati, *loc. cit.*) and with the cessation of the former, the latter ceases to be for oneself (channam ... asesāvirāganirodhā papañcavūpasamo, *loc. cit* ) The objection to the question seems to be that the question imputes to transcendent reality the characteristics of ‘existence’, ‘non-existence’, etc., which have a valid application only within the realm of experience ²
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¹ For a discussion and elucidation of this sense of *papañca*, *v.* Sarathchandra, *Buddhist Psychology of Perception*, The Ceylon University Press, Colombo, 1958, pp 4–10
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² Cp. the condemnation of the question as to what the ‘antithesis’ (patibhāga) of Nirvāna was (M I 304).
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(481) There are questions mentioned, where all four of the logical alternatives may be false (*v. infra*, 585) but these questions are not to be treated as thapanīya-pañha since the questions have been categorically answered. The Nikāyas distinguish between the two types by using the formula ‘mā h’evam’ (do not (say) so) for all the four alternatives of a thapanīya-, while in the former case the usual negation, ‘no h’idam’ (it is not so) is used for each of the four alternatives (*v.* A. II.163).
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(482) The term vi+√bhaj- is found in another important sense in the Pāli Canon to denote ‘a detailed classification, exposition or explanation’ of a brief statement or title, e g. ye c’ime bhotā Udenena cattāro puggalā samkhittena vuttā vitthārena avibhattā sādhu me bhavam Udeno ime cattāro puggalā vitthārena vibhajatu anukampam upādāya, M. II.161. The brief statement is called an *uddesa* which has to be analysed and explained in detail: ko nu kho ... Bhagavatā samkhittena uddesassa udditthassa vitthārena attham avibhattassa vitthārena attham vibhajeyya (M. III.193; cp. 198, 223). Such a detailed analysis and explanation is called a *vibhanga* as opposed to its *uddesa*; uddesañ ca vibhangan ca (M. III 187, 192). There are a number of Suttas, which are called *vibhangas* in this sense, e g. Cūlakamma- *vibhaṅga*, *Mahākammavibhaṅga*, *Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga*, *Uddesavibhaṅga*, *Araṇavibhaṅga*, *Dhātuvibhaṅga*, *Saccavibhaṅga*, *Dakkhiṇavibhaṅga* (M. III.202–257). It is also in this sense that the second book of the Abhidhammapiṭaka is called a ‘Vibhaṅga’, as is evident from the contents.
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(483) Vibhaṅga in this sense involves both classification as well as definition. Mrs Rhys Davids speaking of the ‘logical analysis of the skandhas’ in the Vibhaṅga (and the Dhammasaṅgaṇi) says that ‘it resembles our more modern logical procedure known as Determination or the conjunctive and disjunctive combination of terms far more than the older system of classification by way of genus, species and differentia. This latter method would of course, have been repugnant to Buddhists, as involving the philosophical principle of substance and co-inhering qualities. . . . For the Buddhist, things and ideas of things were not analysable into substance and qualities. They were aggregates—the interpretations by mano or viññāṇa of the various forms of impression or ‘contact’—phassa These were analysable into a number of relations and aspects making up the Buddhist view of life and the universe. And to understand any given term or name of an aggregate was to know it in all the relations under all the aspects that were recognized in their philosophy and ethics’ (Vbh. p. xvii) Elsewhere, speaking of definition in the Abhidhamma she says, ‘they consist very largely of enumerations of synonymous or partly synonymous terms of as it were overlapping circles’.¹ She expresses the same view in her article on ‘Logic (Buddhist)’: ‘hence their definitions consist in the laying together of mutually intercrossing, over-lapping or partially coinciding notions’.²
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¹ *Buddhist Psychology*, Second Edition, London, 1924, p 139
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² ERE, Vol. 8, p. 133
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(484) These observations, while not being entirely beside the point, stand in need of qualification in many respects It is probably true that for the Buddhist, things and ideas were not analysable into substance and qualities in the ontological sense. This is clear from the fact that, as we have seen (*v. supra*, 479), certain questions were dismissed as misleading by virtue of the fact that in the form in which they were put they seemed to imply a difference in an ontological sense between a subject and its attributes or appendages But this does not mean that things were regarded in Buddhism as not having attributes but only relations In the later Buddhist theory of definition as Mrs Rhys Davids herself has shown,¹ it was necessary in defining a concept to state its *lakkhaṇa* (essential characteristic), *rasa* (basic function), *paccupaṭṭhāna* (antecedent condition) and *padaṭṭhāna* (resultant condition). We note here that stating the *lakkhaṇa* or 'essential attribute' is of first and foremost importance and although this theory of definition in its developed form is met with for the first time only with the commentators Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta,² its origin can be traced to the Nettippakaraṇa, which mentions not only *lakkhaṇa* and *padaṭṭhāna*, but *paccupaṭṭhāna* as well, although Mrs Rhys Davids incorrectly says that the Nettippakaraṇa 'gives the first and last of Buddhaghosa's four heads'.³ The Nettippakaraṇa undoubtedly places great stress on the concepts of *lakkhaṇa* and *padaṭṭhāna* which it classifies among the 'sixteen guides (to salvation)' (*solasa-hārā*, p. 1), which are its main topics of investigation, but some of the definitions do mention the concept of *paccupaṭṭhāna* as well.
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¹ *Buddhist Psychology*, Second Edition, 1924, p. 189, *ERE*, Vol 8, p 139: *Points of Controversy*, London, 1915, p. li
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² v. *Atthasālinī*, 109, 263 ff; *Abhidhammāvatāra*, 2 ff
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³ v 'Logic (Buddhist)' in ERE, Vol 8, p. 133 under *Literature*.
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(485) In the section on padaṭṭhāna (pp. 27 ff.), a number of words are defined in terms of *lakkhaṇa* and *padaṭṭhāna*. We may then consider the following representative examples:
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(i) 'Greed' has the characteristic of wanting, its resultant condition is stealing (patthanālakkhaṇo lobho, tassa adinnādānaṃ padaṭṭhānaṃ, 27).
(ii) 'Desire' has the characteristic of attachment; its resultant condition is (the interest in) what is attractive and pleasant (ajjhosānalakkhaṇo taṇhā, tassa piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ padaṭṭhānaṃ, *loc. cit.*).
(iii) 'Absence of hatred' has the characteristic of not harming; its resultant condition is absence of killing (abyāpajjhalakkhaṇo adoso, tassa pānātipātā veramaṇī padaṭṭhānaṃ, *loc. cit.*).
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Here *lakkhaṇa* is used to denote the 'basic characteristic' of a concept which distinguishes it from everything else, but in the section on lakkhaṇa, the term is used in the sense of a 'property' common to members of a class, e.g. all the six internal spheres (of sense) have a common property in the sense of being 'executioners' (sabbāni hi cha ajjhattikāni āyatanāni vadhakatthena ekalakkhaṇāni, 30). These two 'senses' are basically the same in that the essential characteristic of a thing is a property common to members of the class to which it belongs. The word padatthāna is not used consistently. It is sometimes the 'antecedent causal condition' which is a predominant factor in bringing about an effect. Thus in the following sequences,
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pāmujjam pītiyā *padaṭṭhānaṃ*, i.e. exultation is the antecedent condition of joy
pīti passaddhiyā *padaṭṭhānaṃ*, i.e. joy is the antecedent condition of composure
passaddhi sukhassa *padaṭṭhānaṃ*, i.e. composure is the antecedent condition of happiness
sukham samādhissa *padaṭṭhānaṃ*, i.e. happiness is the antecedent condition of concentration and insight
samādhi yathābhūtañānadassanassa *padaṭṭhānaṃ*, i.e. concentration is the antecedent condition of true knowledge and insight, p. 29,
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each preceding state is said to be the precedent or 'antecedent condition' (padatthāna-) of what follows. Its definition is given: 'whatever is a condition by way of decisive support and is a causal factor is a *padaṭṭhāna*' (yo ko ci upanissayo yo ko ci paccayo, sabbo so *padaṭṭhānaṃ*, 29). But when 'stealing' (adinnādānam) was said to be the *padatthāna-* of 'greed' (*v. supra*), *padatthāna* is the resultant condition and not the antecedent cause. Its identification with upanissaya-, which is a phenomenon which 'will belong either to the past or the future'¹ according to the *Patthāna* implies this So is pasāda defined in both ways:
(i) ‘Faith’ (pasādo) has the characteristic of placidity (*lit.* non-turbulence) and the antecedent condition of tranquillity (anāvila-lakkhano pasādo sampasīdanapaccupaṭṭhāno, *loc. cit.*)
(ii) ‘Faith’ (pasādo) has the characteristic of placidity and its resultant condition is belief (anāvilalakkhaṇo pasādo tassa saddhā *padaṭṭhānam*, *loc. cit.*).
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(486) The fact that things have a certain basic characteristic or characteristics, which justify our use of certain terms to denote them is taken for granted in the Nikāyas as well. Thus it was assumed in the Upaniṣads that whatever was ātman must have the characteristics of intrinsic control, permanence and happiness, viz. the ātman is the ‘inner controller’ (antaryāmin, Bṛh 3.7.¹) is ‘ageless’ (vijaraḥ, Ch. 8 7.1) and ‘free from sorrow’ (*v. supra*, 33). These are assumed to be the attributes or characteristics of the ātman, where Saccaka argues with the Buddha and claims the truth of the proposition, ‘my body is my ātman’ (rūpam me attā, M. I.232). The Buddha points out that rūpa- has none of the characteristics of an ātman. It does not change according to one’s will (*v.* vattati te tasmim rūpe vaso: evam me rūpam hotu, evam me rūpam mā ahosī ti—no h’idam, *i.e.* do you have control of your body (such that you could determine): ‘thus let my body be and thus let my body not be’—It is not the case, *loc. cit.*); it is ‘impermanent and sorrowful’ (aniccam dukkham, *loc. cit.*). We thus see that both Saccaka and the Buddha assume that whatever is ātman must have these characteristics (lakkhana-).
First 92 of 278 passages. Read on
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- Aggivacchasutta — Pāli
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- Mahākaccānabhaddekarattasutta — Pāli
- Ghoṭamukhasutta — Pāli
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- Pañcattayasutta — Pāli
- Mahākammavibhaṅgasutta — Pāli
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- Sallekhasutta — Pāli
- Khajjanīyasutta — Pāli
- Cūḷakammavibhaṅgasutta — Pāli
- Mahāmālukyasutta — Pāli
- Bhaddekarattasutta — Pāli
- Vepullapabbatasutta — Pāli
- Kathāvatthusutta — Pāli
- Cūḷanikāsutta — Pāli
- Bharaṇḍukālāmasutta — Pāli
- Cakkhusutta — Pāli
- Upavāṇasutta — Pāli
- Paṭhamakodhagarusutta — Pāli
- Rāhulasutta — Pāli
- Samiddhilokapañhāsutta — Pāli
- Sīlavantasutta — Pāli
- Akuppasutta — Pāli
- Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra — Classical Chinese
- Dīghanikāya — Pāli
- Majjhimanikāya — Pāli
- Nirukta — Yāska, Sanskrit
- Sūyagaḍa — Sudharman, Ardhamāgadhī Prakrit
- Nettippakaraṇa — Kaccāyana, Pāli