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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c13: Chapter VIII: Authority and Reason within Buddhism

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c13

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Chapter VIII: Authority and Reason within Buddhism

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(622) In Chapters IV and V we discussed the attitude of Buddhism to authority and reason respectively. The general conclusion was that neither could be trusted as giving us certain truth. The general context of the discussion, however, seemed to show that by 'authority' here was meant mainly, if not solely, the authority of other religious traditions (and persons) than that of Buddhism. In this chapter, we propose to examine to what extent, if at all, this attitude to authority and reason is maintained within Buddhism.

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(623) In this inquiry, we shall strictly confine ourselves to the Buddhism of the Pāli Canon, for we feel that much of what has been said on this subject¹ is vitiated by the fact that almost the entire field of Buddhism (the different schools, ancient and medieval) has been treated together, with little regard for historical perspective.

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¹ *v.* Poussin, 'Faith and Reason in Buddhism' in *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, Vol. II, 1908, pp. 32–43; Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, Ch. II.

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(624) We have to ask ourselves three questions in trying to elucidate the place of authority within Buddhism. First, does Buddhism or the Buddha uncritically accept any doctrines on authority from the prevalent traditions? Secondly, is the attitude recommended towards the authority of external traditions and persons the same as that expected towards the doctrines of Buddhism itself? Thirdly, irrespective of the answer to this second question, do the disciples of the Buddha accept any doctrines on the authority of the Buddha?

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(625) The answer to the first question on the part of scholars has on the whole been in the affirmative. According to Oldenberg, 'it is certain that Buddhism has acquired as an inheritance from Brahmanism, not merely a series of its most important dogmas, but, what is not less significant to the historian, the bent of its religious thought and feeling, which is more easily comprehended than expressed in words'.¹ Prof. Rhys Davids says that 'Gautama was born and brought up and lived and died a Hindu ... There was not much in the metaphysics and principles of Gautama which cannot be found in one or other of the orthodox systems'² and again that 'Buddhism grew and flourished within the field of orthodox belief'.³ Radhakrishnan is of the same opinion: 'Early Buddhism is not an absolutely original doctrine It is no freak in the evolution of Indian thought '⁴

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¹ *Buddha*, Tr Hoey, London, 1882, p 53

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² *Buddhism*, pp 83-4

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³ *Op cit*, p 85.

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⁴ *Indian Philosophy*, Vol I, p 360

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(626) There is, however, a difference between a critical and uncritical acceptance of ideas, prevalent at the time, and the above statements do not make it very clear which was the case with Buddhism. But Thomas is much more specific, when speaking of Buddhism he says 'it started from special Indian beliefs, *which it took for granted*. The chief of these were the belief in transmigration and the doctrine of the retribution of action ... *they were already taken for granted* as a commonly accepted view of life by most Indian religions'⁵ (italics mine).

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⁵ v E J. Thomas, 'Buddhism in Modern Times' in UCR, Vol 9, p 216

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(627) On the other hand, Keith going on the suggestions of (the earlier) Mrs Rhys Davids⁶ that the Buddha could not disregard the ordinary terminology of his time⁷ has suggested the purely hypothetical possibility, which he himself does not accept, that the Buddha did not accept the dogma of transmigration, since it contradicted his anattā doctrine, viz. 'Or more frankly, we may accept the view that the Buddha himself was a true rationalist and absolutely declined to accept the dogma of transmigration'.⁸ This view is in fact seriously put forward by Jennings, who holds that the Buddha did not believe or even teach rebirth or karma⁹ (in the sense of personal responsibility for our actions).

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⁶ I e Mrs Rhys Davids, before she changed her views radically about the nature of the doctrines of Early Buddhism

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⁷ v *Buddhist Psychology*, p 21, *Compendium of Philosophy*, p 278 cp Prof Rhys Davids' view that there is much subtle irony in the discourses of the Buddha, SBB, Vol II, pp. 33, 160, 163, cp Poussin, JA, 1902, Vol II, p 250.

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⁸ *Buddhist Philosophy*, p 14

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⁹ J G. Jennings, *The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha*, Oxford University Press, London, 1947, pp xxi-xxvii, xxxvi-lv.

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(628) This latter view is clearly in contradiction with the texts and we have to accept these statements in the texts, which speak of rebirth and karma, as genuine on methodological grounds, unless there are very strong considerations against such acceptance. That the concept of personal responsibility appears at first sight to be incompatible with the doctrine of anattā (soullessness) is no good ground for rejecting these doctrines since these texts themselves are conscious of this problem and do not think that there is a discrepancy. It is said that 'a certain monk entertained the thought that since body, feelings, ideas, dispositions, and consciousness is without self, what self, can deeds not done by a self, affect' (aññatarassa bhikkhuno evam cetaso parivitakko udapādi: Iti kira, bho, rūpam ... vedanā ... saññā ... saṅkhārā ... viññānam anattā anattakatāni kammāni kam attānam phusissantī ti, M. III.19). This is the same as saying that if there is no self, there can be no personal identity and no personal responsibility but this is dismissed as an unwarranted corollary of or as going beyond the teaching of the Buddha (cp. satthu-sāsanam atidhāvitabbam maññeyya, *loc cit*). The paen of joy said to have been uttered by the Buddha on attaining enlightenment stresses the fact of freedom from 'repeated birth' (jātipunappunam, Dh. 154). The conception of *salvation from*¹ is intimately connected in Buddhism with the belief in rebirth. It is therefore an integral part of Early Buddhist belief and much of Buddhism would be unintelligible without it.

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¹ *v.* N Smart, *A Dialogue of Religions*, pp 31 ff.

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(629) But this need not commit us to the view that rebirth (and karma) are uncritically or dogmatically accepted from the earlier or prevalent religious tradition. The only evidence adduced by those who put forward or suggest this view, is that rebirth is almost universally accepted in the Indian religious tradition. Since Buddhism too subscribes to this view, it is argued that Buddhism dogmatically accepted this theory from the prevalent tradition. From this it follows that the Buddha himself was violating the very injunction he was making, when he asked people not to accept a doctrine merely because it was found in a tradition, etc. (*v. supra*, 260).

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(630) With all deference to scholarship, we wish to submit that this conclusion arises from both an unhistorical as well as an uncritical survey of the material. In fact, that a belief is found in a stratum *A* and in a chronologically successive stratum *B*, provides no conclusive evidence that the thinkers of stratum *B* uncritically and dogmatically accept it from the thinkers of stratum *A*. If we say so, it would follow that even a good scientist uncritically or dogmatically accepts the theories of his predecessors with whom he happens to agree, merely on the grounds of this agreement!

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(631) Let us examine the credentials of the above widely accepted theory. In the first place it is false to say that rebirth was universally accepted by the Indian religious tradition prior to the advent of Buddhism There is no trace of a belief in rebirth in the Ṛgveda,¹ where we find only sporadic references to a belief in a life after death. The Atharvaveda, too, makes no reference to the doctrine. The Brāhmaṇas show a greater interest in the after-life and we meet with a variety of views on this subject but no conclusive reference to rebirth is found. The conception of a 'second death' (punar mṛtyu) is pregnant with the possibility of developing the idea of rebirth and all that can be said is that 'the Brāhmaṇas contain all the suggestions necessary for the development of the doctrine of rebirth'.²

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¹ *v.* Radhakrishnan, *op cit*, pp 113-116, *cp* Oldenberg, *op cit*, pp 47 ff, Mrs Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, Ch II, 'The Basic Doctrine of Rebirth', pp 245 ff

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² Radhakrishnan, *op cit*, p 135.

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(632) In the Early Upaniṣads, there is intense speculation on the subject of the after-life and rebirth is only one of the many theories that are mooted. At this time the very possibility of survival appears to have been questioned (*v. supra*, 86). In one place, rebirth is clearly ruled out as impossible It is said '... there are three worlds, the world of men, the world of the fathers and the world of the gods. The world of men is obtained through a son only, not by any other means...' (... trayo vāva lokāḥ manuṣyalokaḥ pitṛlokaḥ devaloka iti So'yam manuṣyalokaḥ putreṇaiva jayyaḥ nānyena karmaṇā ..., Bṛh. 1.5.16). This means, in other words, that there is no possibility of a future life on earth for the person who dies.

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(633) Speculation seems to have resulted in a number of one-life-after-death theories of survival at this time, some of them coming down from the Brāhmaṇic tradition. The belief in the possibility of a 'second death' (punar-mṛtyu) and in devices intended to avert this, is still strong in the earliest stage of the Upaniṣads (*v.* Bṛh 1 2 7, 1.5 2, 3 3 2). But despite this conception, we do meet with a number of theories, which contemplate the possibility of a single after-life We have already referred to the theories of Yājñavalkya (*v. supra*, 44), Prajāpati (*v. supra*, 40) and Uddālaka (*v. supra*, 40), which, as we have shown, were probably known to the Buddhist texts. We may add to this list. We meet with the early pantheistic theory that ‘the karma of he who reveres the soul as the world does not perish and out of this soul he creates whatever he likes (after death)’ (*sa ya ātmānam eva lokam upāste na hāsya karma kṣīyate asmādd hy eva ātmano yad yat kāmayate tat tat sṛjate*, Brh. 1.4.15). Since his karma does not get exhausted, he would presumably live in this state for ever. This same theory of personal immortality is mentioned in the Nikāyas as the theory which states that ‘the soul is my world, after death I shall be permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change and I shall remain in that condition eternally’ (*so loko so attā, so pecca bhavissāmi nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo sassatisamam tath’eva thassāmī ti ...*, M. I.135, 136). Another such theory holds that the person who is made of mind (manomayo’yam puruṣaḥ, Brh. 5.6.1) after departing from this world goes to the wind, the sun, the moon and to the world that is without heat, without cold and lives there eternally—a theory which we have identified with one of the rational eternalist theories referred to in Buddhism (*v. supra*, 431). As we said, the Brāhmanic theories persist in a slightly different dress. Thus, the belief that we attain the company of the sun is found at Ch. 3 17.6, 7 and this is the theory which appears in the Kauśītaki Brāhmaṇa and is noted in the Nikāyas (*v. infra*, 820). In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad there is a theory that the person after death changes his states from one to another: ‘... asmāl lokāt pretya etam annamayam ātmānam upasaṅkrāmati ... prāṇamayam ... manomayam ... vijñānamayam ... ānandamayam’ (i.e. after departing from this world proceeds to the (state of the) self consisting of food ... consisting of the life-principle ... consisting of mind ... consisting of understanding ... consisting of bliss, 3.10.5). Now these ‘selves’, as we have shown, partly correspond to the ‘selves’ mentioned in the Poṭṭhapāda Sutta (*v. supra*, 529) and here the first is said to be *rūpī*, i e. ‘has form’¹ and the last *arūpī*,² i.e. ‘has no form’. It is likely that it was this theory of survival that was thought of when it was held in the Brahmajāla Sutta that ‘the soul has form and does not have form (after death)’ (attā rūpī ca arūpī ca ..., D. I.31).

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¹ *Rūpī cātummahābhūtiko . ayam oḷāriko attapaṭilābho*, D. I 195

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(634) The first clear reference to the theory of rebirth or the return to earth to become man or animal is found at Brh. 6 2 15–16, Ch. 5.10.1–8 and Kauś. 1.². It is only in the Katha Upaniṣad that for the first time the theory is generally accepted (1.2 6, 2.2 7) and thereafter we find its acceptance in the Muṇḍaka (1.2.10), Śvetāśvatara (5.12), Praśna (5.3-5) and Maitrī (3.¹)

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² *Arūpī saññāmayo*, ayam arūpo attapaṭilābho, *loc cit.*

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(635) If the rise of Buddhism is to be placed sometime after the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and before the Maitrī (*v. supra*, 80, 81), there is little ground for holding in the light of the above evidence, either that the acceptance of this belief was widespread or that the belief was of great antiquity.

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(636) Besides these alternative theories of survival, which were current at that time, it should not be forgotten that there was an influential body of thinkers, according to the evidence of both the Buddhist and the Jain texts, who doubted the possibility of knowing the ultimate truth about survival (*v. supra*, Ch III). There is little doubt that Buddhism was influenced by this sceptical movement (*v. infra*, 739).

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(637) Lastly, we have to reckon with very influential Materialist schools of thought at this time (*v supra*, Ch II). The reference to seven Materialist schools of thought was possibly exaggerated (*v. supra*, 141) but the number probably reflects the impact of Materialist thinking at this time on the thought of Buddhism. This impact must have been very strong for when the Buddha comes to classify the thinkers of his day, he gives equal prominence to the Materialists as against the Eternalists He says 'There are these two theories—the theory of personal immortality and the annihilationist (Materialist) theory. Those recluses and brahmins who hold to, seek refuge in and cling to the theory of personal immortality are utterly opposed to the annihilationist theory and those recluses and brahmins who hold to, seek refuge in, and cling to the annihilationist theory are utterly opposed to the theory of personal immortality'.¹ Similarly juxtaposed with equal weight are the Eternalist theory (sassatavāda, sassatadiṭṭhi) and the Materialist theory (ucchedavāda, ucchedadiṭṭhi, *v* S. II 20, S. III 98, 99). The doctrine of *anattā* in denying or discarding the concept of the soul, which was one of the central theses of the Eternalists seems to make the Buddha veer more towards the Materialists than the Eternalists. In fact, in his own time according to the evidence of the Nikāyas, we find his own contemporaries accusing him of being a Materialist and not an Eternalist. It is said that ‘the recluse Gotama declares the cutting off, the destruction and the annihilation of a real being’ (samaṇo Gotamo sato sattassa ucchedam vināsam vibhavam paññāpeti, M. I.140), it is the same language that is used to describe the main thesis of Materialism, viz. itth’eke sato sattassa ucchedam vināsam vibhavam paññāpenti (D. I.34, 35). Elsewhere it is stated much more specifically as a current belief that ‘the recluse Gotama is a Materialist, who teaches a doctrine of Materialism and trains his disciples in it’ (ucchedavādo samaṇo Gotamo ucchedāya dhammam deseti tena ca sāvake vineti, A. IV.182 ff.). We have also shown that Buddhism appears to have been impressed by the epistemology of the Materialists and tried to adopt it in its own way (*v. infra*, 737). In the light of this it is very unlikely that the Buddha who would have been well-acquainted with the Materialist critique of the doctrine of survival, would have uncritically accepted the doctrines of rebirth and karma, unless he had at least believed he had good grounds for it.

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¹ Dve'mā ... diṭṭhiyo bhavadiṭṭhi ca vibhavadiṭṭhi ca Ye hi keci ... samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā bhavadiṭṭhiṁ allīnā bhavadiṭṭhiṁ upagatā bhavadiṭṭhiṁ ajjhosītā, vibhavadiṭṭhiyā te paṭiviruddhā Ye hi keci ... samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā vibhavadiṭṭhiṁ allīnā vibhavadiṭṭhiṁ upagatā vibhavadiṭṭhiṁ ajjhosītā, bhavadiṭṭhiyā te paṭiviruddhā, M. I.65.

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(638) Besides the Materialists and the Sceptics there was the wider class of the *viññū* or the élite whom, as we have shown (*v. supra*, 358) the Buddha was particularly keen on addressing and converting. A man like Pāyāsi would probably fall into this class and he, as we have seen (*v. supra*, 136–139), showed a healthy interest in the problem of survival, going so far as to perform experiments in order to discover the truth about it Even if we dismiss him as a Materialist, who was more interested in exposing the falsity of the belief, we find that the sermons addressed to the *viññū* do not, unlike many other sermons, assume the truth of rebirth or even of survival. Thus, in the Apaṇṇaka Sutta, where the Buddha appeals to the reflections of the ‘rational person’ or the viññū puriso (*v.* tatra ... viññū puriso iti paṭisañcikkhati, M. I 404, 406, 408, 409, 410, 411) he does not assume the truth of the belief in survival or moral responsibility but uses a ‘wager argument’ (*v. infra*, 686) to show that it would be better in the long run to entertain such a belief and act accordingly, irrespective of the consequences. In the Sandaka Sutta, where again we find a similar appeal to the reflections of a ‘viññū puriso’ (M. I 515, 516, 517, 518), there is no assumption of the belief in survival and the appeal is purely to rationalist considerations.

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(639) When we thus look at the problem historically, we find that there are no grounds for holding that the belief in rebirth was universal or even widespread prior to the advent of Buddhism. There were Materialists, Sceptics and those who believed in survival without subscribing to the doctrine of rebirth. These theories were known and criticized in the Buddhist texts and there is no reason to believe that the criticisms of the theory of rebirth by the Materialists, Sceptics and others was not known to the Buddhists. The élite seem to have had an open-minded attitude on the subject and when the Buddhists did accept the theories of rebirth and karma, they seem to have done so on the ground that their truth was verifiable (*v. infra*, 754, 755) though we may doubt whether this kind of verification was sufficient or adequate to claim the veracity of these theories But one thing is certain and that is that we have no grounds for saying that Buddhism took for granted dogmatically or uncritically accepted these doctrines from the prevalent tradition That these doctrines were almost universally accepted in the post-Buddhistic Indian tradition is due largely to the fact that the Jains and the Buddhists, the most influential critics of the orthodox Vedic tradition, accepted them and the Materialists who came under fire from all these schools of thought, gradually faded out of the Indian philosophical scene. But the picture that we get at the time of the rise of Buddhism is somewhat different and it would be quite unhistorical to presume that it was the same as what it was in later times.

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(640) Let us turn to the second question. Is the attitude recommended towards the authority of external traditions and persons the same as that expected towards the doctrines of Buddhism itself? The question is related to the alleged omniscience of the Buddha. Did the Buddha claim omniscience and expect his statements to be treated as the pronouncements of an omniscient being? If not, how authoritative were these statements?

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(641) Scholars have made statements to the effect that the Buddha was omniscient without distinguishing the question as to whether this was a claim of his or of his disciples, immediate or of a later time. On this ground, they have argued that Early Buddhism was an authoritarian creed, meaning thereby that the Buddha's statements were in fact taken or intended to be taken on the authority of the omniscient Buddha. Both Poussin and Keith quote with approval the words of Kern, who said that 'Buddhism is professedly no rationalistic system, it being a superhuman (uttarimanussa) Law, founded upon the decrees of an omniscient and infallible Master'.¹ Keith goes on to say that 'he (i.e. the Buddha) is omniscient and he himself claims to be completely free from fault, one in whom no blemish can be found' (*op. cit.*, p. 35). Keith refers in support of this statement of his to AN. IV.82 (*v.* fn. 6) but A. IV.82 does not support him. It is merely said here that 'the Tathāgata has four things he need not guard against ... perfect conduct of body ... perfect conduct of speech ... perfect conduct of mind ... and a perfect livelihood, whereby he need not be on his guard that someone would find him out'.² This text, as will be seen, merely claims the moral perfection of the Tathāgata and makes no mention of his omniscience or lack of it.

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¹ *Manual of Buddhism*, p 50, quoted Poussin, *Bouddhisme, Third Edition*, 1925, p 132, fn 3; also Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p 33.

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² Cattāri Tathāgatassa arakkheyyāni ... parisuddhakāyasamācāro ... parisuddhavacīsamācāro ... parisuddhamanosamācāro ... parisuddhājīvo yam ... rakkheyya 'mā me idam paro aññāsī'ti, *loc. cit.*

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(642) Poussin starts by saying that 'la vielle doctrine bouddhique prétend et à juste titre, être un foi, mais elle admet le principe du libre examen'.³ In stressing its claim to be a faith, he says: 'Que le Bouddhisme soit essentiellement une foi, l'adhésion à la parole de l'Omniscient ...'.⁴ But the only text he quotes from the Pāli tradition for the omniscience of the Buddha is 'Milinda, p. 214' (*op cit.*, p. 132, fn. 2.) where 'omniscient' is said to be an epithet of the Tathāgata.⁵ This is better than Keith's citation but the Milinda is far removed in time from the Canon but, perhaps, Poussin is not talking here about 'la vielle doctrine bouddhique', though he does not make himself clear.

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³ *Bouddhisme, Third Edition*, p. 130.

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⁴ *Op cit*, p 132, cp by the same author, JRAS., 1902, pp. 363 ff. and JA, Vol II, pp. 252 ff.

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⁵ Sabbaññu-vacanam Tathāgatassa ... vacanam.

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(643) Much earlier Poussin had expressed the same views, addressing the third international congress of religions. He is anxious to show in this paper that 'Buddhism is contradiction itself'⁶ and that 'it has been no happier in making out a comprehensive theory of the relations between faith, reason and intuition' (*loc. cit.*). He says that 'Buddhism was at the same time a faith in revealed truths and a philosophical institution' (*op. cit.*, p. 33) and makes the following observations: 'documents and theories point to conflicting statements: the old Buddhism pretends and rightly to be a creed. But it admits the principle of 'libre examen'; still more it considers critical inquiry as the one key to the comprehension of truth ...' (*loc. cit.*). 'Buddhism is a faith and a creed, a respectful and close adhesion to the word of the one Omniscient' (*op. cit.*, p. 34). He adds, 'innumerable are the documents which establish this point' (*loc. cit.*) but not a single reference is given to the Pāli Canon where it is said or implied that the Buddha was omniscient. He does not make it clear whether on his view the Buddha both claimed omniscience and/or was acclaimed omniscient by his disciples, though he holds that the latter is true: 'according to his disciples the Buddha alone knows everything . . .' (*loc. cit.*).

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⁶ 'Faith and Reason in Buddhism' in *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, Vol. II, p. 42.

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(644) Some Canonical texts are referred to in the sequel apparently intended to show that the Buddha claimed omniscience and/or was acclaimed omniscient. There is a reference to the Kevaddha Sutta, where the Buddha claimed to know the answer to a question, which even Brahmā was ignorant of (D. I 223). The parable of the elephant and the blind men (*v. supra*, 599) is mentioned with the remark, 'human wisdom always falls short in some point. To be saved one must refer to the Omniscient' (*loc. cit.*) Lastly, there is a reference to a passage in the Anguttara Nikāya (presumably A. IV.163 ff.), where the Buddha is compared to a granary, whence men bring every good word, followed by the remark that 'they show beyond doubt that Buddhism is a faith and creed' (*loc. cit.*). Keith quotes these same passages to make the same point.¹

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¹ *Op cit*, p. 33

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(645) Now an examination of these passages will show that they do not establish the fact that the Buddha claimed omniscience or was believed to be omniscient by his disciples. The point of the Kevaddha Sutta is to show that Brahmā did not know the answer to the question, 'where do these four great elements ... cease to be?' (kattha nu kho bhante ime cattāro mahābhūtā aparisesā nirujjhanti, D. I.223). The Buddha alters the question so as to preserve the naïve realistic theory of the external world, viz 'where does water, earth, fire and air not penetrate ...?' (kattha āpo ca pathavī tejo vāyo na gādhati ... *loc. cit.*) and answers it. The fact that he answers it is not intended to imply that the Buddha was omniscient but only that Brahmā was ignorant as he is elsewhere said to be (cp. avijjāgato ... Brahmā, M I 326) of matters pertaining to the transcendent reality or Nirvāna The Buddha, where he disclaims omniscience, claims to have three kinds of knowledge, viz. (1) knowledge of his diverse past births, (2) clairvoyance, and (3) the knowledge of the destruction of the 'intoxicants', i.e. the knowledge of the means to and the fact of Nirvāṇa (*v. infra*, 801). Brahmā, not having attained Nirvāṇa, lacks the third (i.e. 3). With regard to (1), Brahmā's knowledge is said to be limited;¹ the same is the case with (2), for the Buddha claims to know the existence of three groups of gods of whom Brahmā is ignorant.² So the Kevaddha Sutta merely reinforces Buddha's claim to possess a 'three-fold knowledge'.

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¹ It is said that 'his memory is defective' (tassa . . sā sati muṭṭhā, M. I.329) owing to his prolonged existence in that state.

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² *v.* Atthi . . . aññā tayo kāyā tattha tvaṃ na jānāsi na passasi, tyāhaṃ jānāmi, passāmi, i e. there are three other groups of which you have no direct knowledge, which I know and see, *loc cit*.

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(646) The parable of the blind men and the elephant likewise does not seem to imply the omniscience of the Buddha. It merely tries to illustrate the fact that the other religious teachers had at best only a partial vision of reality³ (*v. supra*, 599). By implication the Buddha had a total vision of reality, but this is not the same as a claim to omniscience, for in such a case we would have to say that every metaphysician who makes such a claim is claiming omniscience!

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³ *v* Aññatitthiyā . . . paribbājakā andhā acakkhukā, Ud 70.

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(647) We can again hardly draw the inference that omniscience is claimed for the Buddha when it is said in the Aṅguttara Nikāya that 'whatever is well-spoken is the word of the Exalted One' (*yam kiñci subhāsitaṃ, sabbam tam tassa bhagavato vacanam . . .*, A. IV.164), if we take this statement in the context in which it is made. This is not a saying attributed to the Buddha, but to a little known monk Uttara who says this in a mythological context, addressing Sakra, the king of the gods. In its context, there is a simile accompanying the utterance: 'If there is a granary in the vicinity of a village or hamlet and people were to carry grain in pingoes, baskets, in their robes and hands . . . then if one were to ask the question 'from where are you carrying this grain', the proper reply would be to say that it was from this large granary. Even so, whatever is well-spoken is the word of the Exalted One'.⁴ What it means in its context, is that those 'well-spoken' utterances made by the disciples of the Buddha at a time and place when the Buddha had appeared are the utterances of the Buddha. This appears to be the contextual significance of this remark, which is used to illustrate that an utterance of Uttara's was not really his, since he was merely echoing the words of his master (*v.* kim pan'idam bhante āyasmato Uttarassa sakam paṭibhānam udāhu tassa Bhagavato vacanam ...? *i.e.* is this a product of your own insight or is it an utterance of the Exalted One...? A. IV.163) It is strange that this statement should be torn out of its context, to make it say some-thing that it does not even remotely suggest in its context.¹

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⁴ Seyyathā pi gāmassa vā nigamassa vā avidūre mahādhaññarāsi, tato mahājanakāyo dhaññaṃ āhareyya kācehi pi piṭakehi pi ucchaṅgalehi pi añjalīhi pi . . . yo nu evaṃ puccheyya· kuto imaṃ dhaññaṃ āharathā ti . . . amumhā mahādhaññarāsimhā āharāmā ti kho sammā vyākaramāno vyākareyya. Evam eva . . . yaṃ kiñci subhāsitaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ tassa Bhagavato vacanaṃ . . , A IV.164.

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¹ Keith even confuses this statement with its illegitimate converse, 'whatever has been said by the Buddha is well-said,' occurring in the Bhabru Edict, *v* *op* *cit*, p 33.

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(648) Apart from the negative conclusions following from an examina-tion of the above passages, we have the positive claim on the part of the Buddha that he should be regarded not as one who is omniscient all the time but as one who has 'a three-fold knowledge' (*v. infra*, 801), which even others can develop (*v. infra*, 752). This attitude of not claiming omniscience for the Buddha seems to have been maintained right up to the time when the Vibhaṅga was composed for this book gives the most elaborate account of the ten cognitive powers of the Buddha (*v. infra*, 805) with no mention of his alleged omniscience. In the Nikāyas, we find a list of ten verses, containing no less than a hundred epithets of the Buddha,² where the epithets sabbaññū (omni-scient) or sabba-dassāvī (all-seeing) or any of its synonyms are con-spicuous by their absence (*v.* M. I.386).

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² If we count 'Bhagavato' which is repeated ten times, there would be 101 epithets in all

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(649) But the Buddha appears to have been acclaimed omniscient in the Theravāda school sometime before the Pāli Canon was finally completed for we find such a claim made in the Paṭisambhidāmagga and the Kathāvatthu. The Paṭisambhidāmagga in its section called 'the discourse on knowledge' (ñāṇakathā) specifies 'what is meant by the omniscience of the Tathāgata' (katamam Tathāgatassa *sab-baññutañāṇ*, 131). It begins by saying that his omniscience consists in 'knowing everything conditioned and unconditioned without re-mainder' (sabbam saṅkhatam asaṅkhatam anavasesam jānātī ti, *loc. cit.*) and in 'knowing everything in the past, present and future' (atītam... anāgatam... paccuppannam sabbam jānātī ti, *loc. cit.*). It then goes on to list a number of components of his omniscience, the last of which is that ‘he knows everything that has been seen, heard, sensed, thought, attained, sought and searched by the minds of those who inhabit the entire world of gods and men’.¹ This is followed by the inquiry as to the sense in which the Buddha is ‘all-seeing’ (kenatthena samantacakkhu, *op. cit.*, p. 133). This word (samanta-cakkhu) is used with a slightly different connotation from that of sabbaññū and curiously enough the ‘omniscience of the Buddha’ comes to be classified as one of the fourteen kinds of knowledge, which constitute the knowledge of the Buddha (*cp.* cuddasa Buddhañāṇāni ... sabbaññūutanñāṇam Buddhañānam, *loc. cit.*). Whatever this may mean, it is clear from this section that omniscience is claimed for the Buddha by disciples far removed in time from the Buddha himself. Similarly, the Kathāvatthu urges as a matter of common belief that the Buddha is omniscient (sabbaññū) and all-seeing (sabba-dassāvī). These two epithets occur in a list of eight epithets (Tathāgato², Jino³, Satthā⁴, Sammā-sambuddho⁵ *Sabbaññū Sabbadassāvī Dhammassāmī*⁶ Dhammapatisarano, *Kvu.* 228) five of which (see footnotes) are found in the Sutta Piṭaka as regular epithets of the Buddha. It may be concluded from the above that neither did the Buddha claim omniscience nor was omniscience claimed of the Buddha until the very latest stratum in the Pāli Canon and that is even after most of the books of the Abhidhamma had been completed.

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¹ Yāvatā sadevak

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(650) We cannot therefore hold that the Buddha claimed authority for his statements on the grounds that he was omniscient. Nor can we say that he received his knowledge from an omniscient divine source as seems to be implied in Poussin's statement that ‘Buddhism... was a faith in *revealed* truths’ (*op. cit.*, p. 33). The injunction on the part of Brahmā to the Buddha to preach his religion (*v.* desassu bhagavā dhammam, M I.169) does not imply that the Buddha gained his knowledge from Brahmā, especially when we see it said that Brahmā was ignorant of the deeper spiritual truths of Buddhism (*v. supra*, 645). Przyluski has also expressed the view that the Early Buddhist scriptures constitute a revelation. He says: ‘In Buddhist thought the notion of *śruti* is far more important than generally believed. It explains the frequently used term of *bahuśruta*,—rendered literally in Chinese by to-wen ‘who has heard much’. The initial formula of the sutra, *evam* *mayā śrutam* not only alludes to the sacred texts by Ānanda, when the First Council was held, but also indicates that these texts were revealed and that the whole of them constitute the *śruti*. And just as *śruta*- is opposed to drsta- or śruti- to pratyaksa- the former term applied as compared to the latter, a knowledge of superior quality. It seems easier now to understand why Pāli ditthi- 'view, opinion' is so frequently used deprecatingly with the meaning of 'ill-founded or false opinion'.¹ In a footnote commenting on *śruti* (*op. cit.*, p. 246, fn. 2) he says that 'it is true that for Buddhaghosa followed in this respect by European scholars (Kern, Manual of Buddhism, p. 2, quoted by Poussin, Opinions, p. 35) *evam mayā śrutam* means, sammukhā patiggahītam (DA. I.31)'. But this interpretation he says is 'a later one' (*loc. cit.*). This view is surprising It goes against everything that we know from and about the Pāli Canon. In the first place there is no reason to doubt the traditional explanation that 'evam me sutam' means 'thus have I heard', even if we doubt the rest of the tradition that they were the words of Ānanda This phrase introduces a Sutta, which has been reported by someone who had learnt it in an oral tradition. It preserves the same non-dogmatic attitude recommended in the Cankī Sutta that when someone has heard something from a tradition (anussavo) he preserves the truth, if instead of dogmatically claiming that it was the case he says, 'this is what I have heard from the tradition' (*evam me anussavo*, M. I.171, *v. supra*, 278). If the Buddha himself introduced his statements with the words, 'evam me sutam', we would have reason to believe that he was giving expression to something that he received from a human or divine source Not only does he not say anything of this sort but claims on the contrary the following: 'I do not say this having heard it from another recluse or brahmin, but what I myself have seen and experienced, that I speak' (tam kho pana aham ... nāññassa samanassa va brāhmanassa va sutvā vadāmi, api ca yad eva me sāmam ñātam sāmam dittham sāmam viditam—tam evāham vadāmī ti, It 59, 60, 74, M III.186). We see here the very opposite of what Przyluski was suggesting, namely the superior valuation of *dittham* (what is seen) over *sutam* (what is heard) (cp. *supra* 69). Przyluski has also apparently confused dittham with ditthi (*v. infra*, 742)

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¹ J Przyluski, 'Dārstāntika, Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivādin' in IHQ, Vol 16, p 246

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(651) What attitude, then, was expected towards the statements of the Buddha? Is it the same as the attitude recommended towards all teachings in the Kālāma Sutta or is it different? There seems to be a considerable divergence of opinion among scholars on this subject. It relates to the problem of the rôle of saddhā (belief, faith) in Early Buddhism and scholars are divided in their opinions. As we have already said, Poussin sees in Buddhism ‘a faith and creed’ (*v. supra*, 644) and in its pretence to be a creed in which critical inquiry is held out as the one key to the comprehension of knowledge (*v. supra*, 543), he holds that the attitude of Buddhism is conflicting, if not self-contradictory. Faith says Poussin is ‘the root of the correct view’ (*loc. cit.*) in Buddhism. He quotes the statement ‘the Law saves the believer and destroys the unbeliever’ (*op. cit.*, p. 35) and even says ‘Buddha’s word is to be believed without inquiry’ (*loc. cit.*). Keith is more or less of the same view. He says that faith in Buddhism is an ‘indispensable preliminary’ (*op. cit.*, p. 34) and it ‘is the root of correct knowledge’ (*loc. cit*) and ‘the means by which a man may ... cross to the safety of Nirvāṇa’ (*op. cit.*, p. 35) and adds that ‘the teaching of the Buddha saves him who has faith but destroys the faithless’ (*loc. cit.*). He says, however, that ‘there is some place for the operations of reason’ (*loc. cit.*) and unlike Poussin (who thought that the critical outlook contradicted the emphasis on faith) believes that ‘happily enough (there) is a bridge built between the final authority of the Buddha and the demand of the individual for respect to his intellectual independence’ (*loc. cit*), since ‘Buddha’s teaching ... appears as the occasion but not the cause of the knowledge’ (*loc. cit.*) and the individual ‘has another mode of testing the value of the Buddha’s teaching’ (*loc. cit*) namely by personal verification. Both Poussin and Keith had based their observations on the contents of both the Pāli tradition and the BHS. works, but Mrs Rhys Davids too, whose observations are based almost solely on a study of the Pāli Canon stresses the importance of faith in Buddhism: ‘Years of study in Buddhism has shown me that for it faith is no less important than it is for all religions worthy of the name.’¹

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¹ ^1 *Wayfarers’ Words*, Vol III, p 1124

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(652) On the other hand, Dr Gyomroi-Ludowyk on the basis of a study of the Pāli Nikāyas has observed that ‘wherever the word *saddhā* is met with in the early Pāli texts a noteworthy difference between its importance and that of faith in Christianity will be observed’.² According to her, ‘ “Faith” in the sense of trust, confidence This page appears to be blank (except for a stray ink mark or speck near the bottom right) and contains no text to transcribe.

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² ^2 ‘The Valuation of Saddhā in the Early Buddhist Texts’ in UCR, Vol 5, p. 37.

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stratum it is not, although attempts are made to bring it in harmony with its outlook.

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(654) Poussin's and Keith's treatment of the subject suffer from treating many different strata together. It is also necessary to point out a mistranslation on the part of both when the former says that 'the Law saves the believer and destroys the unbeliever' (*v. supra*, 651) and the latter that 'the teaching of the Buddha saves him who has faith but destroys the faithless' (*v. supra*, 651). The original reads as follows: '... sabbadevamanussānam imasmim dhamme assaddhiyam vināseti, saddhāsampadam uppādeti. Ten'etam vuccati:

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vināsayati assaddham saddham vaddheti sāsane
evam me sutam icc'evam vadam Gotamasāvako'

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Both Poussin and Keith take 'saddham' in this stanza to denote the person, viz. 'the believer', 'him who has faith' and 'assaddham' to mean 'the unbeliever, the faithless' but the prose introduction and the context as a whole shows that this is incorrect. Assaddhiyam always stands for 'disbelief' (*s.v.* PTS. Dictionary) and never for the 'disbeliever' (e.g. *assaddiyam kho pana Tathāgatappavedite dhammavinaye parihānam etam*, i e. *lack of faith is a sign of decline in the religion preached by the Buddha*, A. V.158). Similarly it is obvious that 'saddhā-sampadam' (the accusative of saddhā-sampadā) cannot mean 'the person who has the wealth of faith' but just 'the wealth of faith'. We may translate the prose and in its light the stanza as follows: 'It destroys the lack of faith of all gods and men in this doctrine and it generates the wealth of faith. Therefore has it been said: "It destroys lack of faith and promotes faith in the religion—in this vein have I heard a disciple of Gotama speaking"'. This verse, therefore, does not offer a threat of destruction to those who would not believe, as is suggested by the inaccurate renderings of both Poussin and Keith.

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(655) The usage of saddhā (faith, belief) in the Pāli Canon is such that the meanings of bhatti- (devotion = Skr. bhakti), pema- (filial affection) and pasāda- (mental appreciation) overlap with it, e.g. idha ... ekacco puggalo ittarasaddho hoti, ittarabhatti ittarapemo ittarapasādo, i.e. here a person has very little faith, very little devotion, very little affection and very little appreciation, A. III.165. The Comy. to the Puggalapaññatti defines these uses as follows. 'Faith is devotion in the sense of continuous adoration. Affection is classifiable as the affection of faith and filial affection. But appreciation and faith are identical' (punappunam bhajanavasena saddhā va bhatti. Pemam saddhā-pemam gehasitapemam ti vattati. Pasādo saddhā pasādo vā, 248). According to this appraisal saddhā is closest in meaning to pasāda—with which it is identified and we find this exemplified in the usages in the Nikāyas The Jñānaprasthāna (1 19) defines śraddhā as 'cetasah praśādaḥ'¹ (appreciation of mind) and we find 'cetaso pasāda-' in the Nikāyas where we can expect saddhā· yato yato imassa dhammapariyāyassa paññāya attham upaparikkhcyya labheth' eva attamanatam labhetha *cetaso pasādam*, i.e inasmuch as he examines with his intellect the meaning of this doctrinal passage he obtains satisfaction and a mental appreciation (of it), M. I 114 We note here that cetaso pasāda- is 'mental appreciation' or the 'intellectual joy' resulting from intelligent study and a clarification of one's thoughts ² Lack of pasāda- is likewise correlated with lack of understanding, e g. saddhammam avijānato pariplavapasādassa paññā na paripūrati, i e. the wisdom of a person who does not understand the good doctrine and whose pasāda- is fickle does not increase, Dh 38 Similarly, *aveccap-pasāda-* in the Buddha, his Doctrine and his Order (Buddhe . dhamme ... sanghe aveccappasādena samannāgato hoti, M I.37) seems to mean 'faith based on understanding' since avecca- seems to mean 'having understood', e g. yo ariyasaccāni avecca passati, i e he who having understood sees the noble truths, Sn. 229 Here the Comy. has paññāya ajjhogāhetva, 'having comprehended with one's intelligence'. The Comy., however, has 'acala-' (unshaken) for the same word at D. I.217, but this is probably a secondary meaning since 'faith born of understanding' (aveccappasāda-) is similar to 'rational faith' (ākāravatī saddhā, M I 320) which is said to be 'rooted, established, fixed and irremovable' (mūlajātā patiṭṭhitā ... daḷhā asamhāriyā, *loc. cit.*). We have to presume that avecca- (*s v* PTS Dictionary) is formed from ava + present participle from √i, 'to go', meaning 'understand' (cp avagata- from ava + √gam, 'to go' = understood, *s v.* PTS. Dictionary) It is said that failure to investigate and understand results in lack of pasāda-, e.g. ananuvicca apariyoḡ̄-hetvā pasādanīye thāne appasādam upadamseti, i.e. one shows lack of faith in a situation in which one ought to have faith as a result of not investigating and understanding.¹ Dr Gyomroi-Ludowyk in a 'Note on the Interpretation of Pasīdati'² has shown that pasāda- is different from 'faith' as understood in Western religions, where it means 'to believe in something which cannot be explained' culminating in the attitude of *credo quia absurdum*. She concludes that 'we can render pasīdati most appropriately as a mental attitude which unites deep feeling, intellectual appreciation and satisfaction, clarification of thought and attraction towards the teacher' (*op. cit.*, p. 82).

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¹ v Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, II, p. 106, fn 3, Poussin translates 'cetaso praśādaḥ' as 'la clarification de la pensee' (*op cit*, II, p 156).

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² Poussin translates 'cetaso praśādah' as 'la clarification de la pensee' (*op cit*, II, p. 156).

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¹ A. III 139, cp. purimena kathasallāpena ahu pasādamattā sā pi me etarahi antarahitā, i e the little faith that resulted from the previous conversation has now disappeared, M I 487

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² UCR, Vol. 1, pp. 74-82.

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(656) It is necessary to observe that there could be many aspects to the study of the concept of faith in Buddhism. Faith has an affective, conative and a cognitive aspect. When Dutt says that saddhā 'carries two distinct meanings (1) one is faith (pasāda) producing pīti- (serene pleasure), and (2) the other is self-confidence producing vīriya (energy)',³ he is speaking of the affective and the conative aspects of saddhā respectively and not of two different uses of the word altogether. But when he says that (1) is an antidote to vicikicchā (doubt) and moha (delusion) he is confusing the affective with the cognitive aspect of faith as 'belief'. We shall be mainly concerned with this last aspect since it is the only aspect which has an epistemological significance.

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³ N. Dutt, 'Place of Faith in Buddhism' in IHQ, Vol 16, p. 639.

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(657) But the post-Canonical literature from the Milindapañha onwards speaks mainly about the first two aspects of faith and Dutt seems to have been led largely by the accounts they give. Thus, both in the Milindapañha (34) and the Atthasālinī (section 304), saddhā is said to have the characteristics of appreciation (sampasādana-lakkhaṇa) and endeavour (sampakkhandana-lakkhaṇa). The first (sampasādana-lakkhaṇa-) represents the affective characteristic of faith. It corresponds to what was denoted by pasāda- in the Nikāyas. Now pema- (filial affection) and bhatti- (devotion) are also used synonymously with saddhā (in its affective aspect) in the Nikāyas, but while the affective trait of pasāda- was highly valued (*v. supra*, 655), pema- is less so and bhatti- hardly occurs In its only use which approximates to the sense of saddhā (apart from the instance quoted, *v. supra*, 655), bhatti- denotes the 'allegiance' or 'devotion' which an evil person has towards another evil person (asappuriso asappurisabhattī hoti, M. III.21) or a good person may have towards another good person (M. III.23).

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There is no usage even remotely suggesting the impact of a bhakti cult.¹ Pema- is used synonymously with saddhā (M. I.142, 444, 479) and even pasāda- (*nivitthasaddho nivitthapemo ... abhippasanno*, A III.326) and is considered to have limited value. Those 'who have mere faith and mere affection for the Buddha are destined to heaven' (yesaṃ mayi saddhāmattam pemamattam, sabbe te saggaparāyanā, M. I.142). But it is a condition that can lapse (cp ... yaṃ pi'ssa taṃ saddhāmattakaṃ pemamattakaṃ tamhā pi parihāyi, i.e. he would decline from that state of mere faith or affection, M. I.444) and it is a sentiment that can generate undesirable emotions Hatred can arise out of affection for a person (pemā doso jāyate, A II 213), if a person whom one likes and holds dear is addressed in undesirable and foul language by another it arouses hatred towards him (yo kho myāyaṃ puggalo ittho kanto manāpo, taṃ pare anitthena akantena amanāpena samudācarantī ti so tesu dosaṃ janeti, *loc. cit*) Attachment to a person is said to have five drawbacks (pañc'ime ... ādīnavā puggalappasāde, A. III.270). As such, it is a hindrance to salvation in this life and even attachment to the Buddha is no exception in this respect (*v. supra*, 652).

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¹ On the concept of *bhakti* in Indian thought, *v* J McKenzie, *Hindu Ethics*, Oxford University Press, 1922, Ch V and pp 124, 130 f, 136, 159 f, cp E W. Hopkins, *Ethics of India*, New Haven, 1924, Ch VII and pp 200, 204, 214

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(658) The Nettippakaraṇa draws attention to the cognitive aspect of saddhā, when it says *inter alia* that 'faith has the characteristic of trust and the proximate state of belief (inclination)' (okappana-lakkhaṇā saddhā adhimutti-paccupaṭṭhānā, 28). This was the sense which Dr Gyomroi-Ludowyk proposed for saddhā (*v. supra*, 652) and we find that this sense is supported by even the pre-Buddhistic use of the term. By a comparative study of the use of śraddhā and bhakti in the Vedic literature, Miss Das Gupta has shown that 'śraddhā in the Vedic texts, at least in the Vedic Saṃhitās must have conveyed a sense which was never akin to the mood of *bhakti* as a form of loving devotion to a personal deity but simply implied confidence, trust or *belief based on a knowledge of truth* (italics mine) ... and even in later literature śraddhā is not always used synonymously with *bhakti* .. The term *bhakti* in the technical religious sense is nowhere employed in the Vedic Saṃhitās'.² This sense of 'confidence, trust and belief' is quite prominent in certain contexts of the use of the term in the Canon. It is said of a person who comes to learn the art of mounting an elephant and using the elephant-driver's hook that if he lacks *saddhā* he would not be able to acquire that which can be acquired by *saddhā*;¹ here saddhā denotes the 'confidence, trust and belief' in the instructions of the teacher.

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² Miss M. Das Gupta, 'Śraddhā and Bhakti in the Vedic Literature', in *IHQ.*, Vol. 6, p 322.

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¹ M II 94

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(659) The object of saddhā in the Nikāyas is most frequently the Buddha. The favourite phrase is 'having heard his doctrine he acquired faith in the Tathāgata' (tam dhammam sutvā Tathāgate saddham patilabhati, M. I.179, 267, 344; M III.33). If saddhā means 'belief', 'acquiring faith in the Buddha' is equivalent to saying 'believing in the Buddha' and what is meant by believing in the Buddha is that one believes that what the Buddha says is true. As Woozley points out, 'certainly we do talk of believing in a person but there we mean that we believe that what he says is true'.² The verb, pasīdati, 'to have faith in, appreciate' also has the person of the Buddha as the object (e g. Satthari pasīdim, M. I.320) but pasāda- in the compound avec-cappasāda- (*v. supra*, 655) frequently has the Buddha, his teaching (Dhamma) and his Order (Sangha) as the objects.³ Here 'faith' or belief in the Dhamma means the statements that constitute the Dhamma or the teachings of the Buddha Likewise, believing in the Saṅgha implies believing in the truth of the utterances of the Sangha, since these were more or less derived from the Buddha,⁴ it again ultimately implies a belief in the statements of the Buddha.

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