Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c14.20

c14.20

(722) Now Keith seems to have noticed the essential affinity between the way of knowing of the Middle and Late Upanisads and that of Early Buddhism; he makes the following observation: 'The view of intuition as the source of true knowledge, and at the same time a decisive cause of emancipation from rebirth is characteristic of Buddhism as of the Upanisads, and explains why in neither do we find any serious contribution to epistemology. The Buddha, like the sage of the Upanisad, sees things as they truly are (*yathābhūtam*) by a mystic potency, which is quite other than reasoning of the discursive type. The truth of his insight is assured by it alone, for it is obviously incapable of verification in any empirical manner.'¹ He qualifies this statement when he adds that 'the Canon does not treat intuition (paññā) as being wholly distinct from, and unconnected with discursive knowledge . . . it is allied to deliberate and searching mental appreciation (yoniso manasikāro)' (*op. cit.*, p. 90).